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Abstract
This thesis examines the operation and evolution of the new system of governance
for science, technology and innovation (STI) in Scotland following devolution. One
of the founding aspirations of the Scottish Parliament was to develop a policy¬
making process that fostered a move away from a narrow conception of top-down
government towards a more inclusive notion of associative governance. At the same
time, the Parliament inherited a suite of existing UK policies for STI as well as a
distinctive Scottish trajectory in regional innovation and economic development. In
order for a small country to benefit fully from its investments in STI, it might seek to
adopt an integrated research and innovation strategy. However, the Scottish situation
is particularly complicated: with certain aspects devolved and others reserved,
science and to a significant extent innovation, are "concurrent powers". This thesis
investigates how the science base and technology-based firms engage with the
Scottish system of governance and, more specifically, how devolution has affected
their role in the policy-making process. This empirical study adopts the "multi-level
governance" model to investigate the complex assemblage of actors operating within
and between the multiple levels of governance for STI and uses a policy network
approach as a tool to analyse the nature of these relationships through interviews
with policy targets (universities, research institutes and SMEs) and policy-makers in
the Scottish life sciences sector. By focusing on policy learning, the research
examines the extent to which actors within a regional system of innovation can
actually shape the policy domain. Despite apparently having all of the necessary
precursors to facilitate a network-based regional polity for STI, Scotland is still
failing adequately to co-ordinate its policies or foster more cohesive policy networks:
while inter-personal networking occurs, this has not so far led to inter-organisational
policy networks. The predominance of the public sector and the gate-keeping roles
therein present significant barriers and militate against an integrated, participative
policy environment. This Scottish case study thus provides evidence of broader
relevance to policy debates on the regionalisation of research and innovation policy
within Europe and, through its synthesis of conceptual frameworks from innovation
studies, regional science and political science, demonstrates why an interdisciplinary
approach is often necessary in order to engage effectively in policy-related research.
i
I am indebted to Professor Robin Williams and Professor Joyce Tait for guiding me
through the PhD process and for their helpful comments on evolving drafts. I would
also like to extend my thanks to colleagues past and present within the Research
Centre for Social Sciences, the ESRC Innogen Centre and more widely across the
University of Edinburgh for their support and assistance. Friends and family have
provided encouragement and managed to maintain an interest in this abstruse
endeavour over many years and I am forever in Richard Jackaman's debt for his
unfailing support in this as in so many aspects of our life together.
This research would not have been possible without the generous contributions from
informants and I would like to thank them and their colleagues who helped to make
the interviews possible. The Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland
provided valuable assistance in the form of a research grant which supported the
fieldwork for this project. I would like to thank Moyra Guilar for her supremely
efficient transcribing and Nic McCormack for making sure that the hyphens were in
the right place.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the late Professor Keith Pavitt's contribution to
my research. Keith supervised my Master's thesis at the University of Sussex in
1993 and helped to set me on this current research path. I am sorry he is no longer
with us to critique this study as I know that he would not have let me off lightly.
Abbreviations
ABPI Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
ACF Advocacy coalition framework
BIA Biolndustry Association
BIGT Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team
BLC Bioscience Leadership Council
BMFT Bundesminister fur Forschung und Technologie (German Federal
Ministry for Research and Technology)
BRC BioRegio competition
CAQDAS Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CEO Chief executive officer
CIA Chemical Industries Association
COSHEP Committee of Scottish Higher Education Principals
COSLA Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
CSA Chief Scientific Adviser
CSAC Chief Scientific Adviser's Committee
DA Devolved administration
DECHEMA Gesellschaft fur Chemische Technik und Biotechnologie (German
Society for Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology)
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DFES Department for Education and Skills
DOH Department ofHealth
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
EEDA East ofEngland Development Agency
ELLD Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department
EMEA European Medicines Agency
ERA European Research Area
ERBI Eastern Region Biotechnology Initiative




FEDS Framework for Economic Development in Scotland
GM(O) Genetically modified (organism)
GO-EAST Government Office for the East ofEngland
HE Higher education
HEI Higher education institute
HIE Highlands and Islands Enterprise
HMT Her Majesty's Treasury
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IPU Innovation Policy Unit
ITI Intermediary Technology Institute
LEC Local enterprise company
MISG Ministerial Industry Strategy Group
MLG Multi-level governance
MNC Multinational company
MSP Member of the Scottish Parliament
NDPB Non-departmental public body
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NICE National Institute for Clinical Excellence
NSF National Science Foundation
NSI National system of innovation
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OST Office of Science and Technology
PICTF Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force
PSRE Publics sector research establishment
RDA Regional development agency
RSA Regional Selective Assistance
RSE Royal Society of Edinburgh
RSI Regional system of innovation
RTD Research and technological development
RTP Regional Technology Plan
iv
SABRI Scottish Agricultural and Biological Research Institute
SASA Scottish Agricultural Science Agency
SCDI Scottish Council Development and Industry
SCVO Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations
SE Scottish Enterprise
SEBCC Science and Engineering Base Co-ordinating Committee
SEERAD Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department
SEN Scottish Enterprise Network
SET Science, engineering and technology
SHEFC Scottish Fligher Education Funding Council
SMART Small Firms Merit Award for Research and Technology
SME Small-medium sized enterprise
SPUR Support for Products under Research
SQA Scottish Qualifications Authority
SSAC Scottish Science Advisory Committee
SSI Scottish system of innovation
SST Science Strategy Team
STI Science, technology and innovation
STUC Scottish Trades Union Congress
SUPRA Scottish Universities Policy Research and Advice
SURF Sustainable Urban and Regional Futures






Chapter 1 Research Focus and Methodology
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Conceptual framework 2
1.3 Policy context 5
1.4 Research design 9
1.4.1 Research themes 9
1.4.2 Research questions 11
1.4.3 Advancing knowledge and expanding disciplinary domains 13
1.5 Research methodology 14
1.6 Chapter overview 24
Chapter 2 Changing boundaries: systems, governance and networks
2.1 Introduction 27
2.2 Systems of innovation: changing the boundaries from nations to regions 31
2.2.1 The NSI model 31
2.2.2 The RSI model 34
2.2.3 The associative governance model 38
2.2.4 Implicationsfor small countries 40
2.3 Governance: changing the boundaries between the state and society 41
2.4 Policy networks: breaking down institutionally imposed boundaries 45
2.5 Policy learning 52
2.6 New modes of governance 56
2.7 Reprise 59
vi
Chapter 3 The Scottish System of Innovation
3.1 Introduction 61
3.2 The devolution process 61
3.3 Devolved and reserved powers 63
3.4 Key policy actors and instruments 65
3.4.1 ST1policy instruments 65
3.4.2 Scottish policy actors 67
3.5 Mapping the Scottish System of Innovation 75
3.5.1 Providing generalpolicyframework 78
3.5.2 Formulating and implementing STIpolicy 18
3.5.3 Regulating STIpolicy 78
3.5.4 Financing STI 78
3.5.5 Producing knowledge 79
3.5.6 Educating and training workforce 80
3.5.7 Producing goods and services 80
3.5.8 Supporting knowledge production/distribution/commercialisation 81
3.5.9 Linkages within the SSI 81
3.6 Government intervention in the Scottish System of Innovation - The need
for an integrated approach 86
3.6.1 Vertical integration 89
3.6.2 Horizontal integration 89
3.6.3 Integrating research and innovation policy 91
3.7 Participation in the policy-making process 93
3.8 Reprise 99
Chapter 4 Scottish Policy Networks: Extant, Extinct or Emergent?
4.1 Introduction 101
4.2 Policy participants and mechanisms 103
4.2.1 Ad hoc consultation 103
4.2.2 Bilateral relationships 105
4.2.3 Active engagement? 106
4.3 The impact of devolution 112
vii
4.3.1 Increased consensus? 115
4.3.2 The role ofMinisters 117
4.3.3 The challenges ofmulti-levelpolicy-making 119
4.4 Engagement in policy networks 125
4.4.1 Networks, fora and steering groups 129
4.5 Policy learning 133
4.5.1 Lobbying or dialogue? 136
4.5.2 The "star" system 140
4.5.3 Failure to learn 142
4.6 Reprise 144
Chapter 5 Scotland's Science Strategy
5.1 Introduction 149
5.2 Consultation 150
5.2.1 A multi-stage process 150
5.2.2 User engagement 153
5.3 Recurring themes 158
5.4 Launch 161
5.5 Outcomes 164
5.5.1 Creation of the SSAC 164
5.5.2 Establishment ofcross-cutting science group 165
5.5.3 Making the right connections 167
5.6 Perpetuating the linear model 171
5.7 A missed opportunity 175
5.8 Reprise 179
5.9 Annex to Chapter 5 182
5.9.1 Report of the Science Strategy Review Group: Summary ofKey
Questions 182
5.9.2 Membership ofScience Strategy Review Group 185
5.9.3 Membership of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee 185
viii
Chapter 6 Contrasting Policy Networks at Different Levels of Governance
6.1 Introduction 187
6.2 UK national level: Government-industry taskforces 189
6.2.1 Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force 189
6.2.2 Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team 194
6.2.3 Are taskforces a proxyfor policy networks? 196
6.3 UK regional level: The Cambridge biotechnology cluster 198
6.4 Cross-national comparison: The multi-level governance ofGerman STI
policy 206
6.5 Reprise 214
Chapter 7 Barriers to the Effective Operation of Scottish Policy Networks
7.1 Introduction 218
7.2 Predominance of the public sector 220
7.2.1 Dependency culture 220
7.2.2 Leadership vs. self-organisation 222
7.3 Lack of "joined-up" government 226
7.3.1 Within the Scottish level ofgovernance 228
7.3.2 Between governance levels in the UK 238
7.4 Gate-keeping role of key government agencies 242
7.5 Reprise 247
Chapter 8 Concurrent Power: Closing the Governance Gap
8.1 Introduction 249
8.2 Research questions revisited 250
8.3 Recent developments 254
8.4 Implications for policy and theory 257




3.1 Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee activity during the First
Session 68
4.1 Analytical framework 103
5.1 Timeline for Scotland's Science Strategy 150
5.2 Analysis of Science Strategy consultation process 155
5.3 Companies and business organisations involved in consultation 157
5.4 Analysis of audience at Science Strategy launch 163
5.5 Textual analysis ofA Science Strategyfor Scotland 179
A1 Breakdown of category and location of interviewees 289
List of Figures
2.1 Simplified model ofRSI 55
3.1 Key policy actors in the Scottish System of Innovation 65
3.2 The Scottish system of innovation 76
5.1 Analysis of invitations to comment 156
5.2 Analysis ofwritten responses 156
5.3 Analysis ofmeetings 156
5.4 Analysis of audience at Science Strategy launch 163
5.5 The SSAC's recommendations to the Scottish Executive 169
6.1 Cabinet Office definition of participation in policy-making 188
6.2 PICTF's terms of reference 191
7.1 Government-industry policy interaction at the UK level of governance 246
7.2 Government-industry policy interaction at the Scottish level of
governance 246
A1 The data analysis process 293
A2 Initial N6 coding framework (to interrogate text) 294
A3 Interim N6 coding framework (to identify analytical issues) 295
A4 Final N6 coding framework (to develop structure) 296
A5 Analytical questions 297
A6 Base codes 297
A7 N6 search strategies 297
x
A8 Sample cognitive map 298
Appendix Research Notes
A1 Topic guide 287
A2 Interviews 289
A3 Data analysis 291
A4 Events attended 299
A5 Publications 302
xi
Chapter 1 Research Focus and Methodology
Shall the practitioner stay on the high, hard ground where he can practice
rigorously...but where he is constrained to deal with problems of relatively little social
importance? Or shall he descend to the swamp where he can engage the most
important and challenging problems ifhe is willing to forsake technical rigor? (Schon
1983, pp.42)1
1.1 Introduction
When the Scottish Parliament was formed in the summer of 1999 one of the
founding aspirations was to develop a new policy-making process in Scotland that
engendered a shift from a narrow conception of government to a more inclusive
notion of associative governance (Brown 2001). At the same time, in the field of
science, technology and innovation (STI) policy, the Scottish Parliament inherited
both a suite of existing UK policies and also a distinctive Scottish trajectory in
regional innovation policy and economic development, supported by a number of
significant pre-existing institutions. This research examines how the science base
and technology-based companies are engaging in the Scottish system of governance
and, more specifically, how devolution has affected their role in the policy-making
process.
The devolution settlement gives Scotland some scope to develop its own distinctive
policies for STI but also presents some limitations as many of the factors that
influence this policy field are reserved to the UK Parliament at Westminster (for
example, research funding, defence policy, European policy). While it is clear from
the devolution settlement that the Scottish Parliament has limited fiscal and monetary
autonomy, the situation surrounding STI policy is more complex. With certain
aspects devolved and others reserved, science policy, and to a significant extent
1
Quoted in Tait, 1987.
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innovation policy, are "concurrent powers" shared between Westminster and
Holyrood.
For the purposes of this thesis, Scottish devolution is therefore used as a laboratory in
which to examine how policy processes have changed and to discover whether
devolution has facilitated more participative governance or whether, conversely, it
has resulted in a more complex policy system where the Scottish government is not
the authority on many key policy arenas, forcing Scottish firms and universities to
maintain a dialogue at multiple levels of governance in order to influence policy.
A key related issue concerns the development of STI policy within the context of
multi-level governance (at regional, national and supra-national levels) and the extent
to which steps are being taken to ensure policy co-ordination and integration both
within Scotland and between Scotland and the rest of the UK and Europe. This leads
to further questions about how Scotland contributes to the national STI debate and
how it creates institutional structures that permit more effective knowledge flows
between the relevant agents.
This thesis will argue that, while the Scottish system of innovation should provide all
of the necessary ingredients to encourage associative governance and support a
participative policy-making process, a number of constraints have so far prevented it
from performing optimally.
1.2 Conceptual framework
This thesis follows authors such as Edler et al. (2003) in attempting to synthesise two
analytical systems concepts - "the political system" and the "innovation system" -
by drawing on two theoretical frameworks derived from political studies and
innovation studies. Theories of innovation have traditionally focused on the firm as
the main repository of knowledge but it is increasingly argued that this focus is too
narrow and that, if we are to develop a better understanding of innovation, we need
to focus not on the individual firm but on the ensemble of relations in which firms,
states and systems interact (Cooke and Morgan 2000). As we shall see in Chapter 2,
the concept of national systems of innovation (NSI) (Edquist and McKelvey 2000;
Nelson 1993a; Walker 1993) and, in particular, the role of the public sector within
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NSI, will be used as a starting point to develop an understanding of the multi-level
governance of STI in Scotland and the range of external influences, reflecting on
how this approach has led to the development of a regional system of innovation
approach (Braczyk et al. 1998); regional governance; and an emphasis on networks
across the disciplines of innovation studies, regional studies and political studies
(Rhodes 1997; Marsh 1998a; Morgan et al. 1999; Morgan 1997).
Regional policy is no longer simply concerned with re-distribution but increasingly
about affecting capabilities to absorb change. The focus of regional policy has
widened from investing regional support funds in infrastructure and attracting
foreign companies, to investing in the capacities of indigenous industries and the
competences of local people (Cooke et al. 2000). Over the last two decades, new
paradigms of regional development have emerged, based on the importance of
knowledge and innovation, and this shift has been used by policy actors at the
regional level to argue for an increased role in the governance of science, technology
and innovation (Regional Studies Association 2003).
If governments wish to influence technological and innovation capacity at the
regional level they must develop policies that support learning processes, that
develop policy networks to improve communication and co-ordination within the
region and that foster policy learning by ensuring that regional bodies understand
their own strengths and weaknesses, compare their situation with other regions and
learn from their experiences (Cooke et al. 1997; Cooke 1998a). But, there are limits
to what a "region-state" such as Scotland can achieve when it seeks to use STI policy
to foster regional economic growth. Masked and Tornquist (1999 p.50) describe
regional development policy as mainly a process of "making do" with the historical
legacy of institutions and routines, maintaining that economic processes are so
strongly path dependent that we can never build anything entirely new. Politics can
both enhance and constrain the governance of science and innovation at the regional
level. Although regional states are limited in their legislative and policy aspirations,
major political developments, such as the re-establishment of the Scottish
Parliament, can create expectations and motivate individuals in ways that can
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circumvent long-standing constraints and create unexpected outcomes (Latouche
1998).
As discussed further in Chapter 2, "governance" is, itself, a term that takes different
meanings in the hands of different authors. Some take a "state centric" view of
governance (Pierre and Peters 2000, p.25) in contrast to Rhodes' approach (Rhodes
1997), which downplays the role of central government. Others focus on the
complexity, dynamics and diversity of interactive social-political governance where
the state still has a role in steering society (Kooiman 1993). In this scenario, there
has been a shift from formal powers to political capabilities so that there is now less
reliance on coercive policy instruments and a greater reliance on more subtle
techniques. This has led to a restructuring of state institutions, creating agencies,
quangos and other institutional forms that operate at considerable distance from
control by the political elite (Pierre and Peters 2000, p. 195). Nevertheless, these
authors contend that states as centres of governance still play a defining role in the
economy, in international relations, and in many areas of domestic politics and
policy. What we are witnessing is the gradual transformation of the power of the
state from "power over" towards "power to" (Pierre and Peters 2000, p. 196) and this
perspective highlights concerted public-private efforts and co-operative rather than
adversarial policy strategies. Pursuing this collective interest through different forms
of governance on and between different institutional levels requires closer, more
continuous and more informal contacts between political institutions and their
environment (Pierre and Peters 2000, p. 196-199). The result is a complex network
of policy-making institutions that constitute a new form of governance of regional
development where regional institutions gain power not only from above but from
the creation of new regional structures with new capacities and greater autonomy
(Cameron et al. 2000).
Policy networks are central to the concept of governance and currently dominate the
literature on policy-making. However, as we shall see in Section 2.4, there is
considerable variation in perceptions of what constitutes a policy network. The
policy network approach takes account of the influence of various governmental and
non-governmental actors at different stages in the policy process and emphasises the
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linkages between actors at all stages of the process, including implementation, to
explain policy-making (Bache 1998). Indeed as we shall see later, others take the
concept further and argue the case for self-organising policy networks (Rhodes
1997).
The term "multi-level governance" (MLG) was first developed as a conceptual
framework to recognise the roles played by various actors on the European policy
stage (Marks et al. 1996; Sloat 2002a; Bache and Flinders 2004, pp.2-4). The MLG
approach challenged the state-centric view that national governments were the
central players in European policy-making (Sloat 2002a, p.35) and is now considered
to have relevance to policy relationships between actors organised at different
territorial levels as well as cross-sectoral interaction through horizontal policy
networks, particularly in the context of devolution (Bache 2003).
In discussing multi-level governance, the "actor-centred" approach, which specifies
the role of particular individuals and institutions in the decision-making process, is
often adopted (Danson et al. 2000). The policy network approach recognises the
importance of a multitude of actors exchanging information, expertise and other
resources at the sub-national, national and supra-national levels and breaks down the
boundaries of a more traditional institutional approach to the policy process
(Atkinson and Coleman 1992).
1.3 Policy context
There appears to be general agreement that an active civil society is necessary for a
healthy democracy (Sloat 2002b). Amin (1999) describes how many of the
prosperous regions of Europe are also regions of participatory politics, active
citizenship and civic pride - societies "brought back into the art of governance".
But, despite frequent references to the need for more integrated approaches to policy
development, new governance initiatives in the UK are largely socially-oriented and
ignore STI-related issues (Lyall and Tait 2004). Although others do argue that recent
social backlashes against certain technologies have opened up a new era in the
governance of science and innovation at the EU level (Borras 2003, pp.5-6), the EC
recognises that innovation policy will only work if there is an efficient dialogue
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among innovation stakeholders, including "policy-makers, regions, research, civil
society and enterprises" (Anon 2004).
From an academic standpoint, the governance perspective might just be "a
simplifying lens to a complex reality" (Stoker 1998) but policy-makers believe that
improved participation in the policy-making process will create more confidence in
the resulting policies and in the institutions that deliver them:
The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on
ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain — from
conception to implementation (Commission of the European
Communities 2001, p. 10)
The development of new governance structures, for example in the UK under the
Modernising Government agenda (HM Government 1999), focuses on modernising
the processes of government, including a framework for excellence in policy-making
and a strong emphasis on learning lessons from policy experience in other countries.
The over-arching ethos is "what matters is what works" with, at least in theory, a
much free-er flow of ideas between government departments and from one level of
governance to another, focusing on ideas that can contribute to an effective system of
governance, rather than on the ideology that generated the ideas (Lyall and Tait
2004).
Devolution was described as a crucial part of the government's modernisation
programme, intended to provide a "stimulus to fresh thinking about the business of
government" (HM Government 1999, p. 11) and adopting an inclusive approach to
policy-making by:
[IJnvolving others in policy making...[and]developing new relationships
between Whitehall, the devolved administrations, local government and
the voluntary and private sectors; consulting outside experts, those who
implement policy and those affected by it early in the policy making
process so we can develop policies that are deliverable from the start
(HM Government 1999, p. 16)
This implicitly acknowledges the growing importance of policy networks and
suggests a commitment to developing more extended networks incorporating new
categories of actor (Newman 2002, p.66). This quote also epitomises why
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participatory policy-making is desirable "so we can develop policies that are
deliverable from the start": buy-in at the outset by those affected by the policy is
more likely to guarantee successful policy implementation. However, Parsons'
(2001) critique of the Modernising Government agenda suggests that the prevailing
model is still predicated on "a centralised and top-down view of what policy-making
is about" and is thus more to do with controlling the message than communicating
with, and listening to, stakeholders: it therefore tends to forget that policy-making is
about dialogue (Parsons 2001).
The White Paper (ibid.) also highlights the current government's preoccupation with
evidence-based policy which has been gaining currency over the past decade
(Solesbury 2001):
This Government expects more ofpolicy makers. More new ideas, more
willingness to question inherited ways of doing things, better use of
evidence and research in policy making and better focus on policies that
will deliver long-term goals (HM Government 1999, p. 16)
More recently, the British Prime Minister launched the "Big Conversation" (Blair
2003); an attempt to engage the British public in discussion across major policy areas
in order to foster a "progressive, imaginative, vibrant public debate". Although Blair
did not actually use the term "governance" in his speech, he talked about abandoning
the top-down approach to policy and developing a more consensual style of policy¬
making with public consultation and public debate, acknowledging that "the old top
down approach won't work any more". Inevitably, critics of the idea have dismissed
this as a New Labour "gimmick" (BBC News 2003).
Many aspects of the new governance-based policy-making systems are relevant to
STI policy, such as initiatives on policy integration, evidence-based policy, the use of
standards and guidelines linked to policy evaluation, encouragement of openness,
stakeholder involvement and consultation, and avoidance of unnecessary regulatory
burdens. The cri de coeur of the current Labour Government for "joined up" policy
is reflected in the goal of the Modernising Government initiative to develop a more
integrated approach to policy-making, and a series of Cabinet Office publications
(e.g. Cabinet Office Performance Innovation Unit, 2000; Cabinet Office Strategic
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Policy Making Team, 1999) aims to improve policy formulation and implementation
in areas that cut across the policy boundaries of traditional government departments.
However, this integrated, participatory approach has not yet been extended to cover
STI policy per se where stakeholder involvement still tends to focus on public
understanding of science and fostering the public acceptance of scientific advances.
Co-ordination between policy domains (research, innovation, industrial policy,
education, training, employment) in the UK, as in other European countries, is
probably still the "exception rather than the rule" (Cooke, et al. 2000, p. 123) and
there has been a confusing plethora of initiatives in recent years aimed at improving
UK competitiveness (Anon 2001a). In Scotland there have been complaints about
congestion and duplication in the provision of economic development services
(Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee 2000), which has led to restructuring
within Scotland's regional development agency, Scottish Enterprise. Others
complain that most of the schemes that the Scottish Executive has put in place are
aimed at the wrong target: increased commercialisation of research in universities,
rather than the need to increase the involvement of SMEs, in particular, and Scottish
industry in general in the exploitation of Scottish science and technology (Rennie
2002). With 50% of the Scottish Parliament's legislative agenda predicted to be
initiated by Brussels, many argue that businesses in Scotland are still affected more
heavily by UK legislation on financial and economic matters than by devolved areas
(Sloat 2000a) and that, while the Scottish Parliament may influence business
decision-making, the Parliament's powers may be largely confined to the public
services (Kerley 1999). Any sub-national government's ability to enhance its
region's competitiveness and capabilities is constrained by the overarching structure
of policies and regulations instituted by national or supra-national (e.g. EU)
governments and the degree to which a regional government can hope to change the
relative attractiveness of its economy in the short run except by project-specific
inducements is limited (Gray and Dunning 2000, p.418).
Across Europe, and elsewhere where regional governance systems already exist or
are newly emerging, science and innovation policy is becoming an area of shared
competence between national and regional governments, to a greater or lesser degree.
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In the UK, where STI policy has, up until now, been largely a national activity, this
leads to a range of novel debates on the multi-level governance of STI policy
including:
• the location of science funders and major science infrastructures
• the potential for regional interests to be involved in shaping STI policy priorities
• the regional development implications of STI exploitation (Charles et al. 2004,
pp.3-5)
As we shall now demonstrate, the current research has been designed to explore the
impact that the policy initiatives described in this section have had on the policy¬
making process for STI policy in Scotland.
1.4 Research design
1.4.1 Research themes
This thesis explores the theme of "Concurrent Power" in the context of science,
technology and innovation (STI) policy in Scotland. As we shall see in Chapter 3,
this is the technical term used to describe policy matters that are partly devolved to
j #
the Scottish Parliament and partly reserved to the UK Parliament . In this sense, the
term "concurrent power" indicates shared policy competences between governance
levels and exemplifies the concept ofmulti-level governance.
However, Scottish devolution was intended not only to transfer powers downwards
territorially but to foster a new type of politics with more participation that would
lead to more consensus politics, stronger Parliamentary committees, and power
2
Although the Scotland Act 1998 (Chapter 46, Section 56) uses the term "shared powers" to describe
the functions that are to be exercisable jointly by Scottish and UK ministers (see
www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl 998/80046~e.htm#56, last accessed 08/02/05), the term "concurrent
power" seems to have been adopted into general parlance by the Scottish Parliament to describe these




sharing between the Executive, Parliament and the civil service, so this research
extends the concept of concurrent power to include power sharing - or at least power
relations - between key Scottish policy actors whose roles will be introduced in
Chapter 3. In this context, the research considers how policy responsibilities for STI
are negotiated and co-ordinated between these policy-making bodies and investigates
whether Scottish devolution has resulted in a more integrated policy approach in this
area.
Finally, a key focus is on the impact that devolution has had on the actual processes
of policy-making and policy learning for STI. As described in more detail in Section
1.5, the research adopts an ethnographic approach to examine the interactions
between policy-makers3 and representatives from the academic and commercial life
sciences sector ("policy targets") to explore whether the policy-making process has
become more interactive and participative. So this is the third sense in which this
thesis uses the term "concurrent power": to reveal power sharing between policy¬
makers and policy targets.
We are currently seeing a new set of regional and sub-national policy institutions
emerging in the UK with links to regional economic development and regional
competitiveness policy. The Scottish Executive has made a play for science, even
though it is largely a reserved power, and was the first of the UK devolved territories
to have a science strategy. Nevertheless, it appears to be following its pre-devolution
policy trajectory with regard to regional innovation and its focus on the
commercialisation of the science base. As discussed further in Chapter 2, the overall
context for the current research is evident in the Europe-wide shift towards
regionalisation, albeit using very different models of devolution which makes
generalisations from a single case more problematic. The Scottish case study
described in this thesis does, however, provide evidence of broader relevance to
discussions of the regionalisation of research and innovation policy within Europe
and explores policy-relevant themes related to the shaping of science, technology and
innovation policies and the evolution of policy-making in multi-actor spaces: does
3
Specifically, unelected officials, i.e. civil servants, rather than elected policy-makers.
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this new regional context for science and innovation policy, for example,
automatically lead to new forms of engagement in the policy-making process? The
concept of policy networks thus forms a significant component of governance theory
and is a topical issue in the current devolutionary climate. Meanwhile, the concept
of governance, itself, is moving on from the domain of political studies and being
adopted by innovation studies specialists in the context of national and regional
systems of innovation.
In a study of regional science and technology policy in Ontario, Salter (1998) pointed
to the limits of associative governance and suggested that future research should
consider where and when associative participation is useful and necessary. Closer to
home, Mackinnon (1998) found, in a study of local government and economic
development, that local governance in the Scottish Highlands continues to be
underpinned by government while, in an early study of the Scottish Parliament, Sloat
(2000b) demonstrated the lack of public debate about the external process of policy¬
making (in the context of European policy). She recommended that future
researchers should examine how various consultative and participative mechanisms
enable new forms of governance and she highlighted the challenge of enabling civic
organisations and business interests to voice their opinions in the legislative process
while preventing the dominance of the "usual suspects".
1.4.2 Research questions
This research design therefore adopts the governance model as the overall framework
for looking at reality. As outlined above and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2,
the concept of policy networks derives from this model and is used to explore the
phenomenon of participative policy-making. The study draws on the theory ofmulti¬
level governance to test the hypothesis that the nature of the devolution settlement in
Scotland, which has resulted in shared competences for many policy areas related to
STI, is actually preventing Scotland from achieving good associative governance and
is hampering the development of policy networks and preventing policy learning.
While recognising that policy research does have to be grounded in theory
(Bechhofer and Paterson 2000, p. 128), the focus on this research lies at the nexus
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between theory, policy and practice and errs more towards drawing inferences for
policy (Finch 1986) than in expanding theory. The opening quote (Schon 1983)
reflects on some of the tensions experienced by researchers working at the interface
between research and policy. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical
constructs of governance, systems of innovation and policy networks are all
contested within the literature which raises issues about the utility of the research
design when there is a lack of consistency about definitions, making it difficult for
others to adopt this approach as a research tool. This research is, however, firmly
located within a substantial body of UK research efforts currently considering the
impacts of constitutional change and the rise of regional governance (see, for
example, the ESRC Programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change4) although
few scholars focus on the topic of science and innovation which marks one of the
key distinctions of the current study3. We therefore contend that these constructs
provide a useful framework or series of stepping stones to move this research
forwards towards its overall goals of exploring the impacts of devolution on the
Scottish system of governance for science and innovation and, more specifically,
examining how devolution has affected the role of stakeholders in the policy-making
process.
This thesis therefore asks whether, rather than leading to more cohesive policy
networks and greater integration of policies for science and innovation, the nature of
the Scottish devolution settlement has resulted in greater complexity and a
disintegrated policy environment where policy targets (universities, research
institutes, technology-based firms and their representatives) are subject to a range of
external drivers for science, technology and innovation and must now engage with
policy-makers at multiple levels of governance if they are to influence the policy
agenda?
These concepts are operationalised in the following research questions and the
methods used to address these questions are discussed in Section 1.5:
4
http://www.devolution.ac.uk (last accessed 28/10/04).
5
Notable work in this regard is also being carried out by one or two projects in the ESRC Science in
Society Programme (see http://sbs-xnet.sbs.ox.ac.uk/scisoc/) (last accessed 28/10/04).
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• Who participates in policy-making at the regional level in Scotland and through
what mechanisms are policy targets engaging in the policy process in Scotland?
• Has participation in the policy-making process been facilitated by the
establishment of the Scottish Parliament?
• Is there evidence that this engagement is leading to the formation of a distinct
Scottish policy network for STI?
• Is there any evidence of changes in practice or outcomes ("policy learning") as a
result of this dialogue between policy-makers and policy targets?
These research questions were inspired by substantive policy concerns relating to
theories about the nature of the policy process within a system of innovation.
However, as we shall see in Chapter 2, the systems of innovation approach tends to
say little about the processes or policy regimes that underpin that system. So, as the
following section explains, a significant methodological question that also motivates
this research explores why it is often necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary
approach, synthesising theories from more than one disciplinary domain, in order to
engage effectively in policy-related research.
1.4.3 Advancing knowledge and expanding disciplinary domains
This thesis aims to advance academic knowledge and contribute to the wider policy
debate in a number ofways. First, it will apply the MLG approach to a novel area of
policy by exploring STI policy-making in a devolved context within the UK. As
noted above, others have applied this approach in other countries and in other policy
domains and have highlighted a number of features that remain to be addressed.
Secondly, by shifting the focus onto policy learning, rather than learning between
firms, this approach aims to expand our understanding of the dynamics of policy
interactions between policy-makers and other actors within systems of innovation.
This point is explored further in Section 2.5. A key problem with policy learning is
that governments typically introduce new systems (or new elements to an existing
system) and do not learn sufficiently from previous experiences, so that, for example,
policy learning does not become embedded following policy evaluation (Lyall et al.
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2004). Finally, this research seeks to extend the boundaries of academic knowledge
domains by contributing to a new interdisciplinary field as we shall now discuss.
In order to reach these overall research objectives, this thesis will examine who
participates in policy-making at the regional level in Scotland and whether this has
been facilitated by the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. The changing nature
of regional policy, and its particular application to STI, crosses traditional
disciplinary boundaries; and research on arrangements for new patterns of
institutional change, governance and regional development and their effects is in the
relatively early stages of development (Cameron et al. 2000, p.274). No one, single
discipline or approach has been adopted to explain these developments.
Increasingly, there are calls for more interdisciplinary approaches to solve complex
social problems, along with encouragement for greater collaboration and networking
to develop interdisciplinary research where one discipline on its own cannot provide
an answer (Bruce et al. 2004). Real life, and hence policy, can rarely be
compartmentalised into neat, discipline-based boxes. Within the context of the
multi-level governance of science and innovation this research takes the relatively
novel approach of integrating insights from innovation studies, regional science and
political science following the example of a few pioneers in this area6. This research
design is therefore firmly located within the Mode 2 "new production of knowledge"
genre of research (Gibbons et al. 1994) that cuts across disciplinary boundaries in
order to resolve complex societal problems, and will use empirical research to try to
capture the variety of degrees of influence and decision-making authority operating
within the new Scottish system of innovation to explore whether policy learning is
taking place at the regional policy level. As discussed in Section 8.5, such an
interdisciplinary approach can present certain challenges, not least the imperatives of
maintaining a research focus and exercising critical judgement.
1.5 Research methodology
This thesis describes an empirical piece of research that set out to test whether
Scottish devolution has in fact promoted participative policy-making through the role
6
For example, Cooke et al. (2000), Cooke et al. (2004) and Smits and Kuhlmann (2004).
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of policy networks or whether, conversely, the nature of the devolution settlement is
preventing good associative governance. The research is therefore a contemporary
study of the early impacts of Scottish devolution with respect to STI policy and is
embedded in the current policy and academic debates, alluded to in the previous
sections, that are prevalent in the UK and EU on the inter-related topics of
devolution, new modes of governance, policy integration ("joined up" policy) and
wider participation in the policy-making process. This research is timely as the
Scottish Parliament has recently completed its first session and the new institutional
structures have now had five years to establish themselves. It takes as its timeframe
broadly the period of the first term of the Scottish Parliament (1999-2003) but does
also draw on experience prior to devolution. The research was carried out between
autumn 2000 and autumn 2004.
This research was spurred by the premise of "starting where you are" (Lofland and
Lofland 1995); taking a topic with which the researcher was familiar, having worked
in policy-related roles for a number of years, and relating it to an academic context.
However, the process of "deciding to decide" (Hogwood and Gunn 1992, pp.4-8) in
terms of issue search and setting the actual research agenda proved something of a
challenge. While the concurrent nature of STI policy provided the starting point for
the study, the initial theoretical framework - that of systems of innovation - proved
inadequate. Like many economic models, the focus of NSI is upon the revealed
collective performance of the innovation system (an approach that is much less
appropriate when the system itself is new and evolving) and little attention is paid to
the factors that set the rules of the game, i.e. as discussed in the following chapter,
the policy regime in which the system operates remains something of a black box. A
serendipitous encounter opened the door to a different body of literature on the
policy-making process, introduced the term "governance" to the researcher's
vocabulary, and provided the tools to start exploring the Scottish system of
innovation in a different way.
The thesis adopts a qualitative research design to assess the role of policy networks
for science and innovation in Scotland. The research design uses an exploratory case
study approach in an attempt to illuminate the process whereby policy targets are
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involved in the governance of STI policy in Scotland post-devolution. As described
by Yin (1994), a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context, which relies on multiple sources of
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and benefits from
the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and
analysis. The core methodology therefore involved a series of semi-structured,
qualitative interviews complemented by case studies of Scotland's post-devolution
flagship science strategy and comparative policy networks drawn from different
levels of governance in the UK and Germany.
The unit of analysis for this study is the Scottish system of innovation and, more
specifically, the Scottish biotechnology industry. The biotechnology/life sciences
sector has been a priority area for Scottish and UK policy-makers in terms of
competitiveness both pre- and post-devolution in an attempt to develop a world-class
biotechnology cluster in Scotland. The Scottish biotechnology sector includes a
range of new and maturing companies along with a number of support and
representative organisations that formed the core of the survey sample for this
research. The interview sample included policy-makers (in government departments
and agencies in Scotland, London, Cambridge and Brussels) and what have been
termed "policy targets", i.e. those whose actions STI policy seeks to influence
(primarily universities, research institutes, technology-based firms and their
representatives). A small sub-set of interviews was carried out with a parallel
community in Cambridge to try to identify those aspects specific to the Scottish
policy arena rather than UK wide.
Interviews were conducted between June 2002 and October 2003. While recognising
that interviewing over an extended period is less than ideal given the possible
impacts of changes taking place during that time on the system being studied, this
was unavoidable due to the part-time nature of the study. A total of 48 respondents
representing 28 organisations were interviewed (see Appendix for further details).
All respondents were guaranteed anonymity so no interviewee is identified but,
broadly, interviews were conducted with the following categories of respondent:
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Policy-makers: officials in the Scottish Executive Enterprise and Lifelong Learning
Department (ELLD), Health Department and Policy Unit; officials in the Scottish
Higher Education Funding Council (SHEFC), Scottish Enterprise (SE), Scotland
Europa and Scotland Office. At the UK level, interviews were conducted with
officials in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Office of Science and
Technology (OST) and the Government Office for the East of England (GO-EAST).
Policy targets: CEOs of biotechnology firms (start-up companies and well-
established firms) in the Edinburgh and Cambridge areas; representatives from
business support organisations and trade associations in Edinburgh, London and
Cambridge; directors of Scottish public sector research establishments; and academic
staff and university managers from the University ofEdinburgh and the University of
Cambridge.
The sample selected for interview attempted to embrace a "heterogeneity of
experiences" (Devine 1995, p.142) by seeking a diversity of views from both policy-
• 7makers and policy targets at a variety of levels of governance . The sampling
process was essentially purposive in order to select relevant respondents from each
of the key institutions engaged in STI policy and drew initially on the previous
professional experience of the researcher. Some "snowballing" took place during the
interview process as respondents alluded to other possible interviewees and a degree
of participant observation was undertaken through attendance at various STI events
and fora linked to the researcher's professional role which further helped to identify
suitable interviewees who were active in the science and innovation policy
community in Scotland (see Appendix for details of events attended).
An initial sample of firms was identified from various biotechnology directories and
then discussed with industry commentators to select a number of companies that
7
Interviewees from SMEs were at the level of CEO/Vice-President while the remainder of
interviewees from business and policy organisations were generally Directors or Heads of Teams.
The academics interviewed were all of a professorial or director level, as were the PSRE
representatives.
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seemed both fairly typical of the sector (including larger and well-established
companies as well as smaller, start-up firms) and also moderately engaged in the
policy process. The industry sample included only biopharmaceutical companies in
the Edinburgh and Cambridge areas (EH and CB postcodes) in an attempt to screen
out any possible variations between different types of biotechnology company and
also variation due to geographical location.
The experience of interviewing these policy-makers and policy targets lay
somewhere between elite interviewing (Dexter 1970) and interviewing one's peers
(Piatt 1981c) given the researcher's previous professional experience. Whichever the
case, informants were interviewed as holders of roles (Hakim 1987), where
interviewees were of interest because of information and opinions they were able to
provide by virtue of their professional position and experience. Interviews took the
form of structured conversations steered by a topic guide (see Appendix), which
aimed to explore, through a series of relatively open-ended questions, whose voices
are heard by policy-makers, whether a coherent policy network exists and what
processes are used to influence the policy agenda within the multi-level governance
context. The topic guide was developed following a series of pilot interviews in
spring 2002.
The interviews generally lasted one hour. A statement about the project, its aims and
conduct was circulated to informants prior to interview to ensure informed consent.
Each interview was tape recorded, transcribed in full and the transcripts augmented
with field notes. Transcripts were then analysed using computer-assisted qualitative
• o
data analysis software (CAQDAS), QSR N6 . This had the advantage of providing a
relatively rapid data management tool, enabling the researcher to explore a range of
analytical questions, and introducing an element of rigour, transparency and
traceability into the analytical process (Searle 2000).
8 See www.qsrinternational.com/products/productoverview/N6%20brochure.pdf for details (last
accessed 28/10/04). Training in the use of this data analysis method was provided by the ESRC's
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) networking project at the University of
Surrey.
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N6 is a document management and data analysis software package that enables code-
based interrogation and searching of qualitative data. As described graphically
through a series of evolving coding schema included in the Appendix (Figures A.l-
A.7), the data analysis began with a fairly straightforward code-and-retrieve
approach using the topic guide to develop the initial coding framework (or "node
structure") to identify key themes and responses to the research questions (see Figure
A.2). One of the primary advantages of a data analysis programme such as N6 is the
flexibility it confers, allowing codes and coding structures ("tree nodes") to be
readily modified and the whole data set to be rapidly searched. These facilities
enabled the data to be explored further using a more grounded theory technique
(Glaser and Strauss 1967) to begin to develop theories about the Scottish polity for
science and innovation and the performance of policy networks.
As well as coding for content, each transcript was also ascribed base data codes (i.e.
demographic codes) such as geographical location and type of respondent (see Figure
A.6 for a complete listing of base data codes). This enabled the application of
various search algorithms within N6 to try to detect inter alia trends in views
expressed by different categories of respondent. This process generated 20 node
searches (see Figure A.7) that compared the views of different categories of
respondent in five areas: impact of devolution; impact of MLG; views on evolving
policy networks; evidence of impact on policy; evidence of policy learning.
Although a summary of some form of aggregated view is attempted in Section 4.6,
the analysis explicitly resists the temptation to treat this qualitative data in a
quantitative fashion by eschewing statements such as "x% of respondents from the
policy-making community said y".
The result of this iterative process of assembling and reassembling the data in
different configurations was a substantial set of extracts from the interviews,
structured under a series of headings corresponding to the research questions (see
Figure A.4). The memo facility in N6 was then used to begin to construct an
analytical narrative around this data. (Figure A.l in the Appendix draws an analogy
between this data analysis technique and a common purification method where the
substrate (in this case the interview data) is gradually passed through a series of
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successively finer filters in order to condense and refine the information, resulting
finally in a distilled, analytical narrative and a few key quotes which are reported in
Chapters 4-7.)
This methodology therefore uses the voices of the interviewees, through direct
quotation where appropriate, to illustrate or emphasise a particular point being made
in the narrative which is, itself, grounded in the summation of views on that topic,
termed the generation of "meaning through comparison" by Mackinnon (1998, p.24).
Selected quotations are not necessarily representative of opinions held by the
interview sample as a whole, or indeed by any one particular category of respondent,
and care has been taken to avoid selectively picking statements that are unduly
negative or positive with respect to the overall tone of the interview data. This "key
quotes in context approach" (Mackinnon 1998, p.26) therefore selects illustrative
quotes for their significance in addressing key research questions and the desire to
present a range of perspectives on these issues.
Yin (1994) argues that a case study database, as represented by the QSR N6 database
constructed for this project, increases the reliability of the case study whereby other
investigators, in theory, (subject to the constraints of data confidentiality) could
review the data and data analysis protocols directly. However, the CAQDAS
approach is not without its critics. Qualitative data, of the type reported here, can
always be criticised for being partial and selective, and other analysts might offer
different, but equally valid, interpretations of the data. Significantly, the process of
"coding" does not equate to "analysis" but it does facilitate the process by making it
easier for the analyst to develop and examine linkages within the data. The benefit
of a software package such as N6 therefore lies in its ability to manage and
manipulate interview data more readily and efficiently than traditional manual
methods. One disadvantage of the CAQDAS approach, however, is the rapid
fragmentation of the data into disjointed sections of text. Other researchers have
described the process of "decontextualisation before recontextualisation" whereby
sections of text are lifted from the original interview transcript and placed with
related (or in some cases contrasting) segments from other interviews and the
analysis then proceeds "by examining and contrasting the juxtaposed segments"
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(Mackinnon 1998, p.23). However, a clear advantage ofN6 over the traditional, pre-
computerised "cut and paste" method, where text units were physically separated
from the original transcript, is that in a keystroke it is possible to expand the text
segment and revert back to its original context, thereby enabling particular comments
or phrases to be located within the discourse from which they originated.
In order to further counter the risk of fragmentation and to explore the broader
context of some of the interviews, a number of transcripts were also analysed using a
mind-mapping tool, Banxia Decision Explorer9, which provided a visual map of the
main points and logical threads for a sample of the interviews to aid theory
development (a sample map is included in the Appendix, Figure A.8).
Qualitative research designs are most appropriate when research is seeking to explore
people's subjective experience and are also useful for studying processes (Devine
1995): in this case the experience of the devolution process and its perceived
impacts. Policy impacts take a long time to accrete10 and Scotland is probably still
working through the impacts of pre-devolution policy. Given this situation, and the
focus of the research on actors' personal experience of the devolution process,
quantitative indicators were deemed to be inappropriate. However, there is a danger
of interview-based research just confirming views of participants and recording how
they reached decisions (John 1998, p.11). Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p.22) describe
such an ethnographic approach as a "soft science that guesses at meanings, assesses
the guesses and draws explanatory conclusions from the better guesses" but they also
suggest that "(history and) ethnography are the best tools for constructing our story
of other people's constructions of what they are doing: that is, thick descriptions of
individual beliefs and preferences" (Bevir and Rhodes 2004). However, it would
appear from the debate in the literature that this methodological approach is
relatively novel in political science (Bevir and Rhodes 2004).
9 See www.banxia.com/dexplore/pdf/DEbrochure.pdf for details (last accessed 28/10/04).
10
If, indeed, it is ever truly possible to make direct correlations between a single policy initiative and
outcome: "policy" is rarely about one specific event and only seldom has a discrete beginning and
end.
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Qualitative methods can be criticised on the grounds of reliability, validity and
objectivity (Devine 1995) and qualitative analysis can be considered by some to be
incomplete or partial: it is only one possible interpretation amongst many. Hill
(1997, pp.1 and 25) suggests that studies of the policy-making process are, of
necessity, often qualitative and interpretive, making them particularly vulnerable to
this charge. Such interviews can also be subject to bias (both response bias on the
part of the informant and interviewer bias due to poorly constructed questions) and
poor recall (Yin 1994). There is also the danger of the interviewee giving the
interviewer what they think they want to hear although this is arguably less of an
issue where the respondent is an "elite" interviewee. Indeed, there might be quite
separate issues when studying a system that is in a state of transition and might be
subject to controversy where respondents may try to send messages to policy-makers
through the research or attempt to portray their position or actions in a particular
manner.
An additional weakness in the current design may have been the danger of the
researcher subconsciously interviewing as an "insider", one who had previously
worked as a civil servant and NGO policy officer, and who may, therefore, make
assumptions about the policy-making process. At the same time, Hakim (1987,
pp.73-74) describes the interviewing of public role-holders as quite different in
nature from standard research interviewing where such interviews often require the
interviewer to demonstrate prior knowledge of the subject, to treat the interviewee as
an informant as well as a respondent, and to display sensitivity to the fact that views
offered by role-holders may not coincide with the interviewee's personal opinions.
In an attempt to counter these possible limitations, the research design did not rely
solely on interview data but also encompassed a case study of the Scottish
Executive's policy document A Science Strategy for Scotland (Scottish Executive
2001a) and the subsequent Scottish Science Advisory Committee (SSAC) in order to
analyse the extent to which policy targets' views influenced the development of this
strategy. This case study includes a documentary analysis of submissions made
during the consultation process, participation in the consultation process itself,
attendance at related events, interviews with key informants, an analysis of the final
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policy document and a review of SSAC outputs. However, documentary analysis of
government policy documents is also not without problems. Piatt (1981a; 1981b)
portrays documentary research as not being a clear cut and well-recognised category
like survey research and asks "does it tell the truth?", a particularly apposite
challenge when analysing documents that have been written for a political agenda.
The research design also encompasses a further comparative element, considering
related policy activities taking place at different levels of governance throughout the
UK and beyond. The research analyses the conduct of two examples of industry
participation in national (UK level) STI policy in the form of the Pharmaceutical
Industry Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF) and the Bioscience Innovation and
Growth Team (BIGT). It then explores the role of policy networks in a successful
regional biotechnology system in Cambridge (UK) and concludes with an
international comparator in the shape of the German STI system and the BioRegio
scheme.
These four short cases are based on documentary analysis of primary and secondary
data sources together with a limited number of interviews with key informants. As
such, they offer a comparative perspective rather than provide a highly developed
comparative case study11. As discussed in Section 8.5, there can be difficult trade¬
offs with any such comparative approach. As a small, semi-autonomous territorial
region located within a nation state, it is difficult to identify an exact homologue for
Scotland: countries such as Denmark or Finland have similar population sizes (and
possibly a more consensual style of government) but are sovereign nations; regions
within, say, Spain or Germany have some similar, although not identical, political
features but are generally more populous and tend to have different economic
profiles. The four cases were therefore selected for illustrative purposes and,
although not without its limitations, this comparative element was considered
worthwhile in order to draw some lessons for Scotland on the role ofpolicy networks
in the multi-level governance of science and innovation. Hence, for example, the
11 Grand plans for extensive inter-country case studies were tempered by the reality of resource
constraints (not just money but, perhaps more significantly given the part-time nature of this research,
time) but also by the realisation that the Scottish case on its own offered a very rich source of data.
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contrasts afforded by studying German biotechnology policy networks are instructive
when considering the Scottish situation, first, because there is a closer interaction
between interest groups and less of a clear-cut divide between public and private
sectors in the German administrative structure than in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of
policy-making (Diederen et al. 1999, p.4) and secondly, because Germany has both a
long tradition of regional governance and a strong biotechnology sector.
Triangulation of research methods is one of the central tenets of the qualitative
research process (Blaikie 2000, pp.262-270) in order to strengthen the validity of
empirical research and counter researcher bias. The methodology adopted in this
research design collects data from a variety of sources, including at different levels
of governance (regional, national and to a lesser extent supra-national), from
different categories of respondent (policy-makers and policy targets) and in different
formats (interview data, documentary analysis and comparative case studies) in the
pursuit of methodological rigour although, as acknowledged in Section 8.5, other
research approaches may also have had merit.
Finally, a few words on what this research design has not attempted to do. While the
focus of the research is on Scotland in the context of multiple levels of governance,
this does not extend to local government. Nor does the study of participation in the
policy-making process extend to civic participation or the general public's
engagement with STI. Many authors have studied the process of innovation and the
role of innovation networks from a sociological standpoint (e.g. Callon et al. 1986).
While the current research is located within the systems of innovation approach, its
focus is on policy processes and the convergence of innovation studies and political
studies perspectives. It does not attempt a study of the sociology of networks and
rejects the social networks analysis approach on the grounds that this can be highly
descriptive without actually examining how networks operate in practice (Atkinson
and Coleman 1992).
1.6 Chapter overview
This chapter has introduced some of the complexities surrounding the Scottish
devolution settlement as they pertain to STI policy and has broached the concept of
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policy networks within the context of multi-level governance. It has described the
research design and offered a short critique of the methodology employed in this
study. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework for this research (outlined in
Section 1.2 above) which lies at the nexus between the systems of innovation
literature and the political studies literature on governance and the role of policy
networks in the policy-making process. We shall see that these academic domains
are undergoing an elision into the emerging, interdisciplinary field of the regional
governance of science and innovation.
Chapter 3 argues the case for the existence of a Scottish system of innovation. This
chapter discusses the constraints on the system in terms of the external drivers that
influence STI policy and explores the multi-level nature of policy-making in
Scotland and the need for greater policy integration at the regional level. It
introduces the key institutional actors and discusses their role in the policy-making
process.
Chapter 4 presents the findings from the survey of policy-makers and policy targets.
It analyses the policy-making context for STI in Scotland and the degree to which
users are involved in this process in an attempt to gauge whether the impact of
Scottish devolution on the government to governance shift is borne out in reality or is
merely political rhetoric.
Chapter 5 takes the Scottish Executive's key science policy document, A Science
Strategy for Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001a) as an exemplar of regional STI
policy and examines the consultation process and the work of the ensuing Scottish
Science Advisory Committee to assess further the engagement of users in the
development and implementation of Scotland's science policy. In so doing, this
chapter will argue that, rather than using the opportunity of greater policy autonomy
to achieve greater policy integration, the Scottish Executive is perpetuating the out¬
moded linear model of science and innovation in its current policy pursuits.
In order to avoid an overly parochial view of Scotland's STI policy, Chapter 6
attempts to make some comparisons with related policy activities taking place at
different levels of governance. It analyses the activities of two national (UK level)
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STI policy fora in the form of the Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task
Force and the Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team, considers whether there is a
role for policy networks within the biotechnology sector in the Cambridge region and
includes an international comparator in the shape of the German BioRegio scheme.
Chapter 7 explores the theme of "joined up" government, examines the gate-keeping
function of certain key government agencies in Scotland and demonstrates why,
despite having all of the necessary precursors to facilitate a network-based regional
polity for STI, Scotland is currently failing adequately to co-ordinate its policies for
science and innovation or foster more cohesive policy networks.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by summarising what has been learnt about the
practice of governance in Scotland as it pertains to the policy-making process for STI
in a multi-level context. It relates key findings to policy issues and indicates both the
potential contribution to the academic study of the regional governance of STI and
some lessons for policy-makers. This chapter reflects on the limits of the research
design and offers some suggestions for future research directions.
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Chapter 2 Changing boundaries: systems, governance and networks
2.1 Introduction
The research literature on the policy-making process for science, technology and
innovation (STI) spans a number of knowledge domains. It is, as others have noted
(de la Mothe 2001b), a demanding area of study because it is, by definition, multi-
disciplinary, encompassing inter alia economics, sociology, politics and the
machinery of government. The innovation studies literature, and the systems of
innovation literature in particular, have tended to focus on the structure of firms and
on inter-firm networking and learning rather than on the interactions between firms
and other agents that might help to inform the policy regime. The political studies
literature on governance and the role of networks in the policy-making process
meanwhile demonstrates that these relationships span the boundaries between the
public and private sector, and between administrative units within government, as
well as between different territorial units of the state. However, because of their
specific focus, each of these literatures tends to identify only certain aspects of the
networked polity: the systems of innovation model tends to down play the policy¬
making process, while the policy networks model usually focuses on aspects of
social policy rather than embracing STI as a distinct policy domain worthy of study.
STI policy has evolved from supply-oriented "science policy" (concerned with
creating the circumstances and facilities that enable the advancement of scientific
knowledge) and mission-oriented "technology policy" (such as the development of
Concorde) to diffusion and demand-oriented "innovation policy" which seeks to
achieve successful exploitation of new ideas but recognises that innovation involves
more than just technical issues and includes many organisational and managerial
aspects. As we shall see in this chapter, a further, more recent, evolution
acknowledges the regional dimension of STI policy.
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In the UK, the Labour Government's new regional policy (see for example, DTI
2001; Regional Studies Association 2001) emphasises innovation and enterprise and
promotes a bottom-up approach to regional renewal with local inputs and tailoring to
local needs, in contrast to the previous imposition of policy derived from the centre.
The systems of innovation literature argues that policies of national governments can
make a difference. The question to be addressed now is whether recent changes in
the governance of STI policy in Scotland have led to transformations in the way
these policies are developed.
In discussing the theoretical framework for the research, this chapter makes the case
for a new governance of STI by synthesising the innovation studies and political
studies perspectives in order to shed light on the impact of devolution on the policy¬
making process for STI and the implications this has had for policy learning in
Scotland.
Research into innovation emphasises its multi-actor nature and one of the chief aims
of innovation policy must be to facilitate flows of technology and information
between these actors (including firms of all sizes, public and private research
institutes) with the aim of improving the capacity of firms, networks, industries and
entire economies (Dodgson and Bessant 1996, p.4). Early attempts to model the
process of innovation and to use such models for policy-making were based on linear
and simplistic views of how innovation occurs in firms. While effective innovation
does rely on the exchange of knowledge between the science base of R&D
undertaking bodies and firms, it is much more than the linear one-way process
traditionally implied by technology transfer.
Innovation research has demonstrated the inadequacy of this linear model and instead
promotes an interactive coupling of the various inputs recognising that effective
innovation requires both push and pull as well as extensive interaction and feedback
loops. However, although discredited in the academic community, versions of this
linear approach still dominate public policy for technology transfer and innovation
(Tait and Williams 1999) as evidenced by the Scottish Science Strategy (see Chapter
5).
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As our understanding of the innovation process has evolved, a more systemic
approach to innovation has emerged and with it a change in policy emphasis:
encouraging the learning process within firms and creating and increasing the
effectiveness of intermediaries between users and suppliers have become legitimate
policy goals. The 1993 White Paper (OST 1993), on which much of contemporary
UK STI policy is based, identified the lack of UK technological progress not as a
lack of innovative capacity but rather the inability to exploit science through
innovation processes. UK policy recognises that technological change is the key to
competitiveness but that the strong science base in UK universities is not reflected in
industrial competitiveness. Hence the proposed remedy was not increased
investment but improved co-ordination to strengthen links between science (i.e.
universities) and industry (Diederen et al. 1999, p.46).
Nowadays, it is unlikely that innovation would be thought of in purely technological
terms and STI policy has become less focused on the individual firm and more
focused on networks and multiple actors. Networks can diffuse and modulate policy
so the task of government becomes one of facilitating networks and designing robust
and flexible policy that can effectively be adapted and used through networks. The
network model of innovation also highlights the important role of intermediaries and
innovation agents such as technology brokers, university industry liaison
departments, and regional technology centres so that, in parallel with the
decentralisation of innovation policy, there has been a corresponding growth of
intermediary services.
This chapter begins by discussing the national systems of innovation (NSI) approach
which emerged in the late 1980s/early 1990s when authors such as Freeman,
Lundvall and Nelson started to view innovation from a perspective that emphasised
country specialisations and recognised that there were significant differences
between countries of seemingly similar industrial structures in the level and trends in
R&D and related activities (Pavitt and Sharp 1993). This review then explains why,
partly as a result of the influence of European Union policy, which promoted
innovation by networking and developed a focus on regional economic development,
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the emphasis began to shift from the national level to the regional level in systems
thinking about innovation, leading to a "new regionalism" approach (see, for
example, Cooke et al. 2000). Hence we see a boundary change from the national to
the regional level.
Turning to the literature on political and policy studies more generally, the discussion
then focuses on the transition from top-down legislative styles that attempt to
regulate the behaviour of people and institutions in quite detailed ways (characterised
as "government"), to an approach that attempts to set the parameters of the system
within which people and institutions behave so that self-regulation achieves the
desired outcomes (termed "governance").
Rhodes (1999) uses the phrase "hollowing out the state" to describe the changes that
he suggests are taking place in British government in relation to this shift from
government to governance:
• privatisation and limiting the scope and forms of public intervention
• the loss of functions by central and local government departments to alternative
delivery systems
• the loss of functions by British government to EU institutions
and to this we would also now add:
• the devolution of policy-making powers to self-governing, devolved territories.
This "hollowing out" shorthand therefore implies boundary changes with a loss of
function upwards to the EU and other international bodies, and downwards and
outwards to agencies and devolved regions.
A corollary of this should be the emergence of more collaborative and consensual
forms of working, breaking down the boundaries between policy-makers and
stakeholders, and leading to the development of networks of multiple actors involved
in the policy-making process with consequential improvements in the development,
implementation and integration of policy initiatives. While this is becoming evident
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in social policy arenas less has been written about whether this shift from
government to governance has facilitated networked interactions within a regional
system of innovation between policy-makers and policy targets or whether this
interaction, if it occurs, has resulted in policy learning.
Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that the boundaries between these academic
domains are becoming blurred and undergoing an elision into the emerging
interdisciplinary field of the regional governance of science and innovation.
2.2 Systems of innovation: changing the boundaries from nations to
regions
2.2.1 The NSI model
The rationale for beginning this discussion with the NSI model is twofold. First, it
introduces the concept of a system of innovation which is discussed further in
Chapter 3 in terms of the particular characteristics of the Scottish system of
innovation and, secondly, it provides, in a sense, a stepping stone to thinking about
STI policy in a regional rather than a national context. NSI is considered to be a
useful concept because it helps to explain differences between the ways different
countries promote and manage innovation as well as helping us to identify
institutions that promote or discourage innovation (Patel and Pavitt 1994). The NSI
approach stresses that firms do not innovate in isolation but in interaction with other
organisational actors such as other firms, universities, financial institutions and
standard-setting agencies.
This NSI approach developed in parallel with work dealing with related concepts
such as networks or clusters in contemporary social science thinking about
innovation (Edquist and McKelvey 2000). Although authors take different slants on
the NSI concept, their approaches share a number of common characteristics. In
general, these approaches place innovation and learning at the centre, they take a
historical perspective, emphasise interdependence, and consider the role of
institutions (Edquist 2000).
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In simple terms, a NSI is:
[t]he network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new
technologies (Freeman 1987, p.l)
but, according to Freeman (1988, p.2), the "NSI is not just a set of laboratories but a
cumulative process of learning by producing, learning by using and learning by the
interaction of producers and users". Nelson's (1993a) approach is empirically based
and focuses on the institutions whose interactions determine the innovative
performance of national firms but does not assume that the system was consciously
designed or that its constituent parts work smoothly together (Nelson and Rosenberg
1993). Given that Nelson takes a broad view ofwhat constitutes innovation there are
no hard and fast rules about what should be included in the innovation system, and
what can be left out; the "system" in Nelson's approach is a "set of institutional
actors that, together, play the major role in influencing innovative performance"
(Nelson 1992). Edquist (2000) argues that this does not make the systems of
innovation approach incompatible with the notion that processes of innovation are
largely characterised by interactive learning.
To some extent at least, a nation's innovation system is shaped by factors such as its
size (see Section 2.2.4) and natural resource base but a nation's innovation system
tends to result from conscious decisions to develop and sustain economic strength in
certain areas (Nelson 1993b). However, the system is much more than simply the
actors doing R&D (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993). Key themes in any NSI are the
distribution of R&D activity; funding sources for R&D; characteristics of firms and
important industries; the roles of universities; and, significantly for this study,
government policies aimed at encouraging innovation (Nelson 1992).
Writing in the early 1990s, Walker (1993) characterised the UK NSI as one where
the heavy reliance on Stock Market finance, the loss of a strong technological
culture, the diminishing status of manufacturing industry, the shortcomings of
education and training and the heavy commitment to defence spending had led to
weaknesses in the UK innovation system. Government policies in the previous
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decade had given priority to squeezing more out of less and "value for money" had
been a guiding principle when defining policies for science, R&D, education and
training. Significantly, Walker signals a weakness in co-ordination within the UK
NSI noting that Britain is poorly endowed with bridging institutions. He attributes
this to the British management style (which is traditionally hierarchical rather than
participatory), a lack of a close co-ordinating relationship between banks and
industry and a lack of "collective integration" in the British economy.
Surely now, a decade on from the seminal works on NSI, the attempts of national
governments to define and support a national industry will be frustrated by
internationalisation and questions have to be asked about what level of analysis is
appropriate - national, regional, sectoral, supra-national at the European level or
global. Jacobs (1998) asks what scope remains for national policy-making in
innovation policy given the increasing trends towards globalisation. Now that
business and technology are trans-national, are national policies (especially in
smaller countries) doomed to fail?
Nelson's case studies (Nelson 1993a) show that there are differences between
various national systems in terms of institutional set up, R&D, and performance, and
Edquist (2000) believes that it is still sensible to talk about a national system because
most public policies influencing the innovation system as a whole are still designed
and implemented at the national level. Technological systems are at least partly
consciously built by the state but Nelson implies national systems are not designed or
developed by policy-makers. Edquist (2000) takes the middle ground by saying that
some elements ofNSI are consciously designed by actors such as policy-makers but
other important elements evolve spontaneously over time, agreeing that a national
system as a whole cannot be designed.
In his survey of the systems of innovation literature, Carlsson (forthcoming 2005)
finds that one quarter of the publications surveyed deal with policy issues, focusing
on policies to improve technology infrastructure, but he allows that there is
"considerable confusion about what institutions are and what role they play" and
"little analysis or discussion of the specific mechanisms through which institutions
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work". As discussed further in Section 2.5, systems of innovation models can be
criticised for generally offering a rather apolitical account that assumes a relationship
between the policy regime and the innovation system but does not pay explicit
attention to interactions with policy actors and the impact that such interactions
might have onpolicy learning as opposed to technological learning.
Nelson (1992) acknowledges that the term NSI "suggests much more uniformity and
connectedness within a nation than is the case" but maintains that nationhood matters
because "a distinctive national character pervades the firms, the educational system,
the law, the politics, and the government, all of which have been shaped by a shared
historical experience and culture". Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) argue that it does
make sense to think of a national system of innovation "if one is careful to recognize
the shadiness and to some extent the arbitrariness of both the institutional and
national borders" although Rip (2002) points out that these systems are "leaky" and
that it is more realistic to consider them as a "mosaic of sectoral systems and
networks with a national boundary imposed upon them". Kaufmann and Todtling
(2001) offer a further criticism of the NSI model for being too inclusive. They note
the "tendency to broaden the system to include any possible source of influence
without dealing with the question where an innovation system starts and ends" and
cite Padmore et al. (1998) who argue that "a system approach accepts that in
principle 'everything interacts with everything' but recognizes that in practice, some
interactions matter more than others". Kaufmann and Todtling (ibid.) further
criticise the system model for failing to take proper account of boundaries and
conclude that there is not one single system of innovation but several social systems
participating in the process of innovation. We shall return to the issue of boundaries
and external influences in Chapter 3 when discussing the Scottish system of
innovation.
2.2.2 The RSI model
In parallel with the debate about whether it is still meaningful to talk about a national
(rather than global) system of innovation there is, almost paradoxically, a move
towards a greater regional dimension to innovation. Over the past two decades,
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innovation has assumed an increasingly important role in the theories of regional
economic development. It seems that globalisation and regionalisation, far from
being mutually exclusive, are in fact concomitant, partly because foreign direct
investment is often attracted to, and has a reinforcing effect on, "innovation clusters"
within a specific region. As multinational companies (MNCs) increase R&D
investments abroad these facilities represent "listening posts" to access foreign
sources of learning and innovation (Morgan 1997); hence globalisation and
regionalisation are seen as complementary parts of the process.
A number of factors are driving this "new regionalism" and different academic
disciplines have approached it from various standpoints. Since the early 1980s,
social scientists have increasingly focused on the significance of the region to the
organisation of economic life while economic analysts see the regional level as the
key to international competitiveness. European policy to promote cohesion has
highlighted the role of the regions within Europe as part of a broader EU programme
to improve the competitiveness of EU regions through the promotion of innovation,
while in the UK the devolution of powers to its territories, not just in the form of the
Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, but also to Regional Development
Agencies in England has raised the profile of regional governance.
European Union support for innovation in the form of the early Framework
Programmes was directed towards centres of excellence generally located in
prosperous regions while less favoured regions (areas of low income, high
unemployment and underdeveloped infrastructure) had little research and
technological development (RTD) activity (Morgan 1997). Such schemes were
regarded as increasing the technology gap between the most advanced countries in
the EU and the less developed regions. It was recognised that measures to promote
innovation within European regional policy were vital if the EU was to implement
effectively the principle of social and economic cohesion. Closing the inter-regional
technology gap became a precondition for closing the cohesion gap (Landabaso
1997).
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A Regional Technology Plan (RTP) to align regional development and RTD
activities was launched in 1994 with the objective of encouraging less favoured
regions to develop a regional innovation process involving stakeholders in the
development of a bottom-up strategy attuned to the needs of their region. The EU
came to the conclusion that successful regions were those that set a high premium on
consensus, collective success and long-term objectives (Morgan 1997). RTP
signalled a decisive break from the traditional infrastructure-led approach of EU
regional policy because it addressed the processes of stimulating innovating by
networking and of building a collective learning capacity (Morgan 1997). RTP was
superseded in the late 1990s by the Regional Innovation Strategies which took on the
role of shaping emerging regional economic policies as part of a broader EU
programme to improve the competitiveness of EU regions through the promotion of
innovation.
In academia there has also been a convergence in recent years between the
disciplines of regional studies/economic geography and innovation studies with the
former becoming interested in innovative capacity as a way of explaining uneven
regional development with respect to learning, innovation and the role of institutions
in regional development (Morgan 1997). This "new regional science" approach
encompasses a shared interest in systemic interaction within political economies and
the role of institutions and their evolution over time (Cooke 2002a). Elowever, as
Thomas (2000) describes, there is a body of literature that is sceptical of the regional
approach (see, for example, Lovering (1999)). Critics question the ability of even
successful regions to respond to globalisation pressures and doubt the long-term
viability of success models and their transferability to peripheral regions that are
unlikely to achieve regional competitiveness without strong macroeconomic
recovery programmes1.
Cooke et al. (1997) query the appropriateness of the national level as a starting point
for the analysis of innovation processes and investigate whether or not systemic
1 Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 6, government policy does not always seem to be a prerequisite
for a successful cluster such as the Cambridge biotechnology cluster.
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innovation should also be sought at the regional (and even sub-regional) level. The
concept of a regional system of innovation (RSI) in contrast to a national system
started to crystallise by the mid 1990s. The RSI concept lies in two main bodies of
theory and research - systems of innovation research and regional science with its
interest in explaining local distribution and policy impact of regional high technology
industry - and is characterised by the key notions of trust, co-operation and
networking (Cooke 1998a). As with NSI, the RSI approach looks for constituent
elements and their specific characteristics, the relationship between these elements,
the boundaries of this system and the interaction with its environment.
Cooke et al. (1997) describe the following necessary elements for identifying a
regional system of innovation:
• firms with access to other firms acting as customers, suppliers or partners via
formal or informal networks
• knowledge centres, i.e. universities, research institutes, contract research
organisations and technology transfer agencies
• a governance structure of private business associations and public economic
development training and promotion agencies and government departments
They conclude that, if there is regular, two-way interchange on matters of importance
to innovation and the competitiveness of firms, then a regional learning system
exists. Where the financial infrastructure also exists to enable firms to access
venture funding in order to innovate, this may then be termed a regional system of
innovation. We return to these criteria in Section 3.5.9 when discussing the evidence
for a RSI in Scotland.
A RSI approach stresses the importance of diffusion of knowledge and interactive
learning within and beyond the region as a system. As with NSI, a central concern of
RSI is to identify the particular institutional arrangements in the areas of training,
research and finance and the forms of inter-firm networking that serve to increase
technological capability and hence competitive advantage within that region (Lawson
and Lorenz 1999).
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Over the past decade there has been growing support for the view that innovation is
an interactive process - between firms and the science base, between users and
producers - and that this process constitutes a process of interactive learning. The
literature on "the learning region" stresses that what counts in the long run is firms'
capacity for continuous learning and, specifically, product innovation (Lawson and
Lorenz 1999). Authors differ on the extent to which proximity is a key ingredient.
Nauwelaers and Wintjes (2000) find that, while the role of geographic proximity
might be important to nurture learning relationships, it is not a necessary ingredient
everywhere, while Cooke et al. (1997) support the view that learning has important
specific and local characteristics and can be improved through certain institutional
changes and active policies.
2.2.3 The associative governance model
In parallel with the systems of innovation approach, the focus on interactive learning
has given rise to the "network" or "associational paradigm" of regional development
(Cooke and Morgan 1993). Associative governance involves a shift from state
regulation of economic affairs to a degree of self-regulation by responsible societal
groups. Cooke (1998a) sees institutional learning as a crucial part of this associative
approach, which promotes the principle of innovating by networking and the
9 • •
potential of social capital" at the regional level (Morgan 1997): where social capital
is well developed it can facilitate collaboration between firms and the science base or
between finance and industry.
Intangible factors such as know-how and tacit knowledge are recognised as playing a
key role in economic development. This has led to the acceptance of the notion of
"untraded interdependences" as a major feature of the learning aspects of economic
development which extend beyond traditional customer/supplier and servicing
relationships to embrace formal and informal collaborative and information
2 Social capital is a term used to describe certain features of social organisation such as networks,
norms and trust that facilitate co-operation for mutual benefit (Morgan 1997).
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networks, interactions through local labour markets and shared conventions and rules
for developing communications and interpreting knowledge (Storper 1995).
In the UK, the promotion of industry clusters and networks has been part of a recent
drive to dynamise business and promote a knowledge-based, high technology
economic future (Thomas 2000). Innovation agencies in the UK have moved from
supporting "hard" infrastructure (land reclamation, advance factory building and
inward investment) to the "soft" infrastructure of business support services,
technology transfer, skills development (Morgan 1997). Despite Porter's (1990,
p.655) caution about institutional intervention ("Governments can reinforce, not
create clusters"), governments have promoted economic development based on
industry clusters as the key to regional competitiveness (Thomas 2000) and a
powerful consensus in favour of network-based new regionalism built up over the
1990s.
However, in an analysis of 40 policy tools in 11 European regions Nauwelaers and
Wintjes (2002) found that too many policy tools still take the form of traditional
subsidies and not enough are innovative instruments that enhance the learning
process: the content and modes of delivery of regional innovation policies were in
most cases not interactive and followed a hierarchical rather than a systems
approach. Although a move towards interactive support was visible, the authors
again commented that linear policy tools predominated and did not form a system: a
lack of co-ordination between tools was the norm, the majority of tools were
developed in a top-down fashion and policy learning was still rare and
underdeveloped.
As discussed later in Section 7.2.1, Cooke (2002a) describes associative governance
as a system where key regional administrative bodies are interactive and inclusive
with respect to other regional actors. If governments wish to influence technological
and innovation capacity at the regional level they must develop policies that support
learning processes, that develop policy networks to improve communication and co¬
ordination within the region and that foster policy learning by ensuring that regional
bodies understand their own strengths and weaknesses, compare their situation with
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other regions and learn from their experiences (Cooke et al. 1997; Cooke 1998b;
Cooke et al. 2000).
2.2.4 Implications for small countries
A country's size has implications for the way its national innovation system
functions (Diederen et al. 1999, p.ll). Small countries face certain obstacles to
successful technological innovation, international competitiveness and economic
growth (Walsh 1988) and may struggle to initiate more than a very small part of the
new developments in world science and technology and will have particular
problems in staying at the forefront of world-class science and technology. They
have less money to spend on R&D and fewer trained personnel but are still faced
with the same breadth of possible research areas as large countries. Small countries
face hard choices - they must either spread their resources more thinly or specialise -
and this issue must lie at the heart of their policies for science and technology.
Johnson (1988) argues that international competitiveness is a question of institutions
and institutional change and that competitiveness requires flexibility. Small,
developed countries have to be able to adapt to changes in international competition
primarily by producing for markets with high and rising demand. This means a
constant reallocation of resources and a high rate of product and process innovation.
Changes in technology require institutional adaptation and institutions that facilitate
change are important. There may be some specific institutional characteristics of
small countries that encourage competitiveness as a result of the relatively small
number of important decision-makers operating in an environment of relatively high
cultural homogeneity and with many possibilities of face-to-face contacts. Jacobs
(1998) comments that "in such smaller countries, there is no illusion of being able to
manipulate the international system, which keeps governments and enterprises
focused". There should also be greater opportunities for people to overcome
professional boundaries than in larger countries which should lead to informal
networks of relationships between scientists, entrepreneurs, bankers, government
officials and industrialists (Walsh 1988) so that small countries should be better able
to bring about governance changes and systemic approaches (Edler et al. 2002, p.21).
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However, the dominance of certain key individuals (which is discussed in more
detail in Section 4.5.2 in the context of the "star" system) within a small country can
potentially exclude legitimate participants from the policy process. A key challenge
may therefore be to retain the interpersonal links engendered by a small country
while keeping entry to the system or network open to others (Sloat 2002b). The
account of the Scottish system of innovation, which follows in Chapter 3 and the
results of the fieldwork reported in Chapter 4, will explore the extent to which these
observations hold true for Scotland.
2.3 Governance: changing the boundaries between the state and
society
As noted above, the expanding role of supra-national institutions such as the EU,
coupled with the trend towards globalisation on the one hand and enhanced
devolution to sub-national levels of government on the other, is contributing to the
"hollowing out of the state" (Wolfe 1997; Rhodes 1999) which is delegating its
authority either downwards or upwards to other levels of governance. Cooke
(2002b) explains how these multi-level governance hierarchies have evolved
whereby national governments are mainly responsible for delivering science policy
and basic research funding, while regional governance systems (involving public and
private actors) deliver innovation programmes. Cooke (ibid.) describes this
"discovery of the regional" by policy-makers worldwide as the most striking change
in policy theory in the past decade, while Danson et al. (2000) note that these
apparently contradictory developments are creating the need for an evolving research
agenda and a better understanding of the underpinnings of successful regional
governance structures.
This "rise of the region" discussed in the systems of innovation and regional science
literature above is mirrored by the governance debate in policy studies more
generally with its antecedents in various disciplines including: institutional
economics, international relations, organisational studies, development studies,
political science and public administration (Stoker 1998). As Sloat (2002b) points
out, the term "governance" is currently applied to "everything from corporations to
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rural society" and the academic literature on the subject of governance has been
described as "eclectic and relatively disjointed" (Stoker 1998). The meaning of the
term "governance" is contested and often lacks definitional clarity (Bache 2003)
although most commentators accept that "governance" is no longer a synonym for
"government". However, Stoker (1998) argues that, as governance is ultimately
concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action, its
outputs are no different from those of government. What is significant is the
difference in processes.
Most would accept that governance refers essentially to the increased role of non¬
government actors in policy-making (Bache 2003). Some use the term to refer to "a
pattern of rule characterised by networks that connect civil society and the state"
(Bevir et al. 2003a) and it is generally regarded as implying an increasingly complex
set of state-society relationships in which networks, rather than hierarchies, dominate
policy-making (Bache 2003). The current work adopts the view that "governance"
refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and
within public and private sectors have become blurred, where governing mechanisms
do not necessarily rely on the authority of government (Stoker 1998). Thus,
governance is used as shorthand to describe the changing nature and role of the state
in advanced societies and the changing boundary between state and civil society
(Bevir et al. 2003b).
In this approach, the role of the state changes from being the main provider of policy
to one of facilitating interaction among various interests (Sloat 2002b) so that
government's role is increasingly one of co-ordination and steering (Bache 2003).
Most would agree that, in a governance relationship, no one organisation can easily
command although one organisation may dominate a particular process of exchange
(Stoker 1998). Some take this further and downplay the role of the state entirely,
focusing instead on the role of self-organising, inter-organisational networks (Rhodes
1997, p. 15), whereby networks involve not just influencing government policy but
taking over the business of government (Stoker 1998).
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From a governance perspective the process of governing is an interactive one
because no single actor has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems
unilaterally (Kooiman 1993) and the powers of government tiers are no longer
clearly distributed, as co-operation replaces hierarchy and legislative competences
are shared among several levels (Sloat 2002b). In summary, this perspective focuses
on the co-ordination ofmultiple actors and institutions to debate, define and achieve
policy goals such that the state no longer dominates the policy-making process and
decisions are made by "problem solving rather than bargaining" (Sloat 2002b).
From an academic standpoint, the governance perspective might just be "a
simplifying lens to a complex reality" (Stoker 1998) but policy-makers believe that
improved participation in the policy-making process will create more confidence in
the resulting policies and in the institutions that deliver them:
The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on
ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain - from
conception to implementation (Commission of the European
Communities 2001, p. 10)
There appears to be general agreement that an active civil society is necessary for a
healthy democracy (Sloat 2002b) and Amin (1999) describes how many of the
prosperous regions of Europe are also regions of participatory politics, active
citizenship, civic pride, and intense institutionalisation of collective interests -
societies "brought back into the art of governance". He sees the challenge for the
regions as finding ways of developing a pluralist and interactive public sphere that
draws in both the state and a considerably enlarged sphere of non-state institutions so
that regional government does not draw solely on a small elite from the regional
government offices, local authorities, development agencies, business leadership, etc.
His concern is that governance has always been in the hands of elite coalitions, and
the resulting "institutional sclerosis" has been a source of economic failure by acting
as a block on innovation and the wider distribution of resources and opportunity. To
overcome this, regional actors ask whether their decision-making processes
constitute an obstacle to institutional renewal, away from a culture of hierarchy and
rule-following, towards one that focuses on "informational transparency, consultative
43
and inclusive decision-making, and strategy-building on the basis of reflexive
monitoring of goals" (Amin 1999).
For Cameron and Danson (2000) the advantages of such a partnership approach
include:
• increasingly innovative policies and better operational decisions arising from
dialogue and interaction among organisations with different responsibilities and
perspectives on problems
• increased continuity and consistency in policy as a result of the building of trust
and understanding with others
• co-ordination and integration of disparate actions and aggregations of separate
budgets to enhance policy impacts
• high level strategic planning and decision-making through shared agreement
reached on essential needs and priorities
However, there may also be limitations and this approach to policy-making could
lead to generalised, "lowest common denominator" policies and an inefficient and
time-consuming process as a result of the extensive communication necessary
(Cameron and Danson 2000).
The value of the governance perspective rests in its capacity to provide a framework
for understanding changing processes of governing (Stoker 1998). Stoker suggests
that governance as an organising perspective makes a theoretical contribution by
providing a set of assumptions and research questions and a language with which to
identify key features of a complex system (Stoker 1998). This systemic co¬
ordination goes a step further by establishing a level of mutual understanding and
embeddedness whereby organisations develop a shared vision and joint working
capacity that leads to the establishment of self-governing networks as discussed in
the next section (Stoker 1998).
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2.4 Policy networks: breaking down institutionally imposed
boundaries
Policy networks are central to the concept of governance and this theoretical
approach currently dominates much of the literature on policy-making. Newman
(2002, p.66) suggests that states may have an interest in promoting policy networks
because they "make policy-making predictable and reduce policy conflicts".
Nevertheless, there is considerable variation in perceptions of what actually
constitutes a policy network. Borzel (1998) offers a working definition of a policy
network as a relatively stable set of relationships that are non-hierarchical and
interdependent in nature, linking a variety of actors who share common interests with
regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests and in
so doing acknowledge that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.
The policy network approach takes account of the influence of various governmental
and non-governmental actors at different stages in the policy process and emphasises
the analysis of links between actors at all stages of the process to explain policy¬
making (Bache 1998, pp.25-28). It recognises the importance of a multitude of
actors exchanging information, expertise and other resources at the sub-national,
national and supra-national levels and breaks down the boundaries of a more
traditional institutional approach to the policy process (Atkinson and Coleman 1992).
According to the Rhodes Model (Rhodes 1997) a policy network is a set of resource
dependent organisations and such networks will have different structures depending
on the mix of interests, membership, vertical and horizontal interdependence and the
distribution of resources.
The network approach is said to have developed in response to the failure of pluralist
• ^ • • • •
and corporatist explanations in accounting for variations in government-interest
group relations in different policy sectors (Bache 1998, p.25) although Ansell (2000)
3 Pluralism recognises the dispersal of power in society and acknowledges that people operate not
only as individuals but also within groups with specific interests so pressure groups can exert
influence on government policies. Corporatism is regarded as a version of pluralism and recognises
that the organised interests most often involved in corporatist relationships are groups of employers
(Brown et al. 1998).
45
contends that the networks approach draws from both of these bodies of political
thought: like corporatism, a policy network implies a co-operative mode of
governance based on long-term exchange that differs from the more competitive
mode of pressure group tactics implied by pluralism yet, like pluralism, policy
networks imply a multiplicity of organisations with overlapping jurisdictions (Ansell
2000).
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that a partnership approach is analytically
distinct from a policy network as a mode of governance and the creation of a
partnership does not imply that relations between actors are conducted on the basis of
mutual benefit, trust and reciprocity which characterise the network mode of
governance. This distinction is significant in the light of the current approach to user
engagement adopted by the Scottish Executive as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
The notion of a policy network is not, however, an uncontested concept (see, for
example, Thatcher 1998) and there is disagreement both on how to define policy
networks (Hay and Richards 2000; Blom-Hansen 1997), and on the utility of the
concept as an explanatory device (Atkinson and Coleman 1992; Blom-Hansen 1997).
Theorists argue about whether policy networks constitute a "mere" metaphor, a
useful analytical tool or a "proper" theory (Borzel 1998) and some conclude (Hay
and Richards 2000) that the policy network approach is:
less a theory or perspective (far less an explanation) so much as a
theoretically neutral attempt to introduce a (once) new and (still)
significant analytical concept to the study of the policy-making process
(Hay and Richards 2000)
Dowding (2001) criticises the "pointless theorising about policy networks" and
argues (Dowding 1995) that, while the identification of different types of network is
a useful heuristic device, the policy networks metaphor is limited in its utility and
may only become a theory by developing along the lines of sociological network
analysis, although this too can be a highly descriptive approach without actually
examining how networks operate in practice (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). Despite
this high degree of conceptual confusion there is general agreement in the literature
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that the strength of the policy networks concept lies in its descriptive value (Blom-
Hansen 1997).
Rhodes (1999) argues that policy networks matter because:
• they limit participation in the policy process
• they define the roles of actors
• they decide which issues will be included and excluded from the policy agenda
• they shape the behaviour of actors
• they privilege certain interests according them access and favouring their
preferred outcomes
while for Parsons (1995, p. 185) policy networks draw attention to the way in which
policy is the product of a complex interplay of people and organisations and provides
a more informal picture of how "real" politics takes place. The policy network
metaphor thus focuses on the pattern of formal and informal relationships which
shape policy agendas and decision-making in contrast to the traditional, institutional
approach to policy-making.
There are many definitional disputes about what constitutes a "policy network".
Rhodes (1997) identifies a continuum from policy communities, which are stable,
highly interdependent, and with a restricted membership, to issue networks at the
other end of the continuum, which have large numbers of participants and a limited
degree of interdependence. He uses the term "policy network" to refer to
dependency relationships and "policy community" to a shared framework with a
more tight-knit set of relationships between actors who share core values and
attitudes (Parsons 1995, p. 189) and reach decisions unanimously and co-operatively:
even where actors may not always agree, they are willing to accept unfavourable
decisions to preserve the network (Blom-Hansen 1997).
"Issue networks" represent a much looser set of interests and are less stable, non¬
exclusive (Parsons 1995, p. 189) and populated by a wide and unpredictable number
of participants (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). They are characterised by a lack of
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consensus on policy principles, and fluctuating interaction between interest groups,
administrative agencies, legislators, environmentalists, consumers, journalists,
researchers and experts (Greer 2003). Daugbjerg (1998) sees members of issue
networks as less privileged than members of policy communities in terms of power
in the policy-making process. While actors in policy communities must be
recognised by each other, participation in issue networks is open to anyone with an
interest who will try to force their viewpoint into a decision-making process where
dominant actors make decisions unilaterally (Blom-Hansen 1997). Significantly, in
the light of the forthcoming discussion in Chapter 4 on the current modes of policy
engagement in Scotland, the issue network involves primarily policy consultation
rather than shared decision-making because there is no shared understanding either
among interests or between the interests and the bureaucracy (Rhodes and Marsh
1992). As we shall see, it is this "issue network" model that still prevails in
Scotland.
Opinions also vary on the role of the state in policy networks. For Rhodes (1997, p.
15), governance refers to:
self-organising, interorganisational networks characterised by inter¬
dependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant
autonomy from the state (emphasis added)
Even so, although the state does not occupy a privileged sovereign position, it can
"indirectly and imperfectly steer" networks to varying degrees depending on the
sector, the issue and the point in time (Rhodes 1999). However, the state's
relationships with other units of government and with policy networks are
"asymmetric" since, for example, the state commands more legal resources than any
other actor (Rhodes, 1997, p. 15). As Bache (2000) found in his study of
regeneration networks, the more peripheral issues are to the government's
programme and electoral success and the more limited the range of interests affected,
the greater the independence of a network to run its own affairs free from state
intervention (Rhodes and Marsh 1992).
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Others see the state as occupying a pivotal position in networks where government is
simultaneously a participant in the policy network (usually an administrative
department) and a key part of the context within which the network operates (Greer
2003). Greer's study of the organic agriculture policy sector demonstrates the
centrality of governments which have the capacity to reconfigure or create networks
and he echoes Peters' (1997) view that the state still plays a central role rather than
being a passive recipient of demands made by self-organising networks.
Ansell (2000) takes a middle line between these two positions noting the importance
of central leadership in facilitating co-operation between multiple actors. However,
he suggests that this leadership does not necessarily need to come from the state,
although a common view implies that the lead state organisation is at the nexus of a
web of networks and will adopt a critical brokerage role in bringing actors together.
Where this brokerage role requires mobilisation across departmental boundaries or
across the public-private divide, it may be facilitated by the creation of semi-
autonomous agencies (Ansell 2000) and we shall return to this point in Section 7.4
where the gate-keeping roles of such government agencies are examined in more
detail.
Policy networks can both enhance and reduce the efficiency and legitimacy of
policy-making (Borzel 1998). While networks are usually favoured for their positive
attributes such as flexibility and responsiveness, they tend to be dominated by
producer groups, professional groups and government (Rhodes and Marsh 1992) and
can be viewed as a "clique" by those excluded from the network (Hay and Richards
2000). The policy process varies across policy domains and many remain the
preserve of conventional trade associations while others can also contain single-issue
groups, professional lobbyists and think tanks. Effective network participation can
depend on possessing technical capacity and detailed information and the exchange
of information between state and private actors can create privileged relationships
from which the uninitiated are excluded (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). Policy
networks can also be a source of continuity and hence policy inertia rather than a
source of policy innovation: networks dominated by economic or professional
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interests can be particularly resistant to change (Rhodes and Marsh 1992). Tensions
also exist between the more traditional depiction of networks in the literature on
(central) government as institutionally dense, cumbersome and slow moving and the
new governance literature on networks as flexible and dynamic, strategic alliances
(Hay and Richards 2000).
In their review of the new network model of funding and governance for science and
innovation, Geuna et al. (2003) offer a more critical view of the networked polity.
While acknowledging that systems of innovation, the sociology of science and
regional clusters of technological development all identify the effectiveness of
networks for the exchange and distribution of knowledge as a way of fostering
innovation, they believe that:
[it] was demand that created the new networks, rather than the networks
that created demand. In the case of Europe, policy has often created
networks that are in search ofdemand (Geuna et al. 2003, p.399)
Although the new model of funding and governance involves new patterns of social
interaction and new co-ordination mechanisms that blur traditional distinctions
between public and private; science and society; and science and technology (Geuna
et al. 2003, p.395), these authors judge that "the continued promotion of networks as
a panacea serves little purpose" and the key policy question must be how to manage
networks to produce effective outcomes {ibid., p.397), namely the use of policy to
harness, support and expand private activities and to shape public choices. They do
not see this call for flexibility in policy as a retreat from the role of the state: instead
governments will need to become more effective policy managers, selecting and
managing a wide range of different and sometimes competing policy instruments.
Morgan et al. (1999, p. 182) describe networking as deceptively simple in principle
but profoundly demanding in practice because, to be effective, it involves trust,
goodwill and a capacity to forgo opportunistic behaviour. Their studies of local
economic development networks in Wales and the West of England found that the
growth of networks was partial, often limited to achieving short-term goals, and
subject to external influences:
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while local economic development networks can indeed make a
difference, especially when they have invested in social capital, their
scope remains heavily circumscribed by non-local factors, so much so
that the 'governing without government' thesis is a fatal conceit (Morgan
et al. 1999, p. 196)
Cameron and Danson (2000, p. 18) describe how the character of local networks,
their leadership and elites, are fundamentally determined by the economic structure
and layout of their economies, which in turn depends on the relation of the local
economy to the national and global economic system. In many cases, European or
national levels of government have created strong incentives for regional actors to
enter into various forms of partnership. The motives and interests for each partner's
involvement will be dependent on the status of organisations (whether public or
private) and the tiers of government that affect them (Cameron et al. 2000, p.268).
Danson and Gilmore (2000, p.228) suggest that Scotland has a long track record for
introducing and encouraging partnerships, particularly as models of economic
development strategies that predate devolution and represent a capacity in
institutions and individuals to an extent not yet achieved in the rest of Britain.
Hay and Richards (2000) acknowledge that the Labour Government brought a
general change in the consultative process for Ministers and civil servants and that,
furthermore:
the establishment of numerous task forces covering a wide panoply of
policy areas has the potential to present a considerable challenge to the
authority of some of the more traditional and well-established policy
networks
a point to which we shall return in Chapter 6 when examining the activities of the
Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Taskforce and the Bioscience Innovation
and Growth Team.
No one theory or model is adequate to explain the complexity of policy activity in
the modern state (Parsons 1995, p.73) and Parsons urges policy analysts to accept the
pluralistic nature of their inquiry, both in terms of the interdisciplinary nature of the
research and the need for a "hermeneutic tolerance of diversity", given that policy
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analysis is made up of "multiple constructions of the policy process". The strength
of the network approach is that it provides a metaphor for this complexity which fits
with the technological and sociological changes of modern society (Parsons 1995,
p. 185) and it recognises that "government" is not an undifferentiated whole: it is a
department or a section of a department that is involved in a policy network, not the
entire government (Rhodes and Marsh 1992). Against these strengths is the
weakness that the metaphor is highly diverse in its use and interpretation (Parsons
1995, p.185).
Nevertheless, Atkinson and Coleman (1992) urge that these ambiguities should not
be allowed to overshadow the fact that the concept of a policy network has assisted
public policy studies by shifting attention from policy-making in national institutions
to policy-making in sub-systems and sectors and in the process "institutionally
imposed boundaries...have been broken down and replaced by a more fluid and less
restricted view of the policy process".
2.5 Policy learning
Network studies have provided useful snapshots of the policy process at a particular
point in time but they typically devote less attention to changes in policy processes
and outcomes. Policy analysis has traditionally been dominated by the linear,
"stages model" whereby policy-making is seen as a sequential process involving
some or all of the following steps: identification of a policy problem, policy initiation
and formulation, legislation, implementation, evaluation, and iteration (John 1998,
pp.22-37). This approach adopts a legalistic, top-down focus that may be
inapplicable when policy stems from a multitude of overlapping directives and actors
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994) and fails to recognise that policy evolution
usually involves multiple, interacting cycles initiated by actors at different levels of
government (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994).
In considering the impact of environmental changes on policy networks, Atkinson
and Coleman (1992) argue that "networks may delay and even channel the direction
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of policy change" and that the concept of policy networks needs to be reviewed if
they are to be used to study policy innovation and change:
Greater attention must be paid to the cognitive frameworks of all
members of the policy community, to the relative strength ofcoalitions of
community members supporting alternative sets of ideas, and to the
potential for policy learning (emphasis added) (Atkinson and Coleman
1992)
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993;
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) deals with
situations where there is policy change, often over long time periods of a decade or
more, and considers the role of policy-oriented learning during the period. It
describes the concept of a policy-making process operating across various
institutions of government and a range of actors and seeks to understand the process
of policy change and the role of learning by incorporating actors across all levels of
government, not just the national level. An advocacy coalition therefore consists of
actors from a variety of governmental and private organisations at different levels of
government who share a set of policy beliefs and seek to realise them by influencing
the behaviour of multiple government institutions over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993, p.212).
A further refinement of the research design could therefore have been to explore the
extent to which an advocacy coalition existed in Scotland. However, this presents
some methodological problems. From an ACF perspective, policy change takes
place over time (10 years or more) and the current research is essentially studying a
four-year time frame over the life of the first session of the Scottish Parliament. The
approach, itself, may be less applicable to a UK context where there is less openness
and contact between actors and a less pluralistic decision-making process than in the
American political system (Parsons 1995, p.200). Finally, the ACF concept has most
frequently been applied to environmental or social policy fields where, as Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith (1993, p.213) note, "advocacy coalitions...take time to develop
and may well do so only in the presence of sustained policy conflict". It is doubtful,
therefore, whether the ACF would be particularly applicable to the arena of STI
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policy in Scotland which has not been subject to this type of conflict over core belief
systems.
However, there is no question that the issue of policy learning lies at the crux of this
research. The evidence-based policy approach adopted by the current UK
government with its philosophy of "what matters is what works" (Solesbury 2001),
its emphasis on the need for collaboration (to identify what matters), and the role of
"evidence" (to discover what works) (Nutley and Webb 2000) is meaningless unless
policy-makers learn from the process and improve its outputs. Indeed, the
government's own policy-making guidelines note that, to be effective, policy-making
must be a learning process (Cabinet Office Strategic Policy Making Team 1999, para
10.1). In particular, policy-makers need to move away from a "use and dispose"
attitude to policy learning where knowledge is brought in to serve a specific purpose
and then disregarded rather than becoming systematised and embedded4: this mode
of copying and emulation does not lead to learning (Common 2004). Furthermore,
Common (2004) warns that the public sector's capacity to learn has been damaged
by increasing organisational fragmentation and is ultimately compromised by
political agendas.
Mytelka and Smith (2002) stress the changing nature of policy structures which,
although they can exhibit inertia, can also be dynamic. They argue that this
dynamism often results from learning which can arise from improved understanding
of, and interactions with, the actors that are the objects of policy. They consider the
drivers and mechanisms for such learning and conclude that innovative learning and
policy learning cannot be fully separated from one another, such that:
a central component of understanding the dynamics of innovation as a
whole should therefore include the nature and effects of learning within
policy systems (Mytelka and Smith 2002)
4 Contribution to PRIME Doctoral Conference, University of Sussex, 19-20 May 2004 by Kasper
Munk, Copenhagen Business School.
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While much of the traditional systems of innovation literature discussed in Section
2.2.1 focuses on the interactions that lead to learning between firms, it often neglects
the interactions between the system actors (firms/science base/intermediaries) and
the policy regime. Thus, these models can sometimes be rather divorced from
politics, viewing the policy routines in which the system of innovation is embedded
as a benign black box. This can be especially problematic when the system itself is
being re-worked, as is the case in Scotland following devolution, where the rather
permeable state-region boundaries that exist between Scotland and the rest of the UK
are being re-negotiated and both existing and new actors are trying to work out
where they fit into this new system. This current study therefore shifts the emphasis
from the process of learning between firms (depicted by the thin arrows in Figure 2.1
in a simplified model of a regional innovation system after Cooke et al. (2000)) on to
Figure 2.1 Simplified model of RSI depicting policy-learning interactions
between actors from firms, the science base and the wider
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the interactions between government and other actors within the Scottish level of
governance (depicted by the broad arrows in Figure 2.1) and, to a lesser extent, the
interactions across governance levels (depicted by the dashed arrows) that might help
to inform the policy learning process.
2.6 New modes ofgovernance
Recent work on both innovation networks and policy networks across a range of
knowledge domains shows a convergence in approach and a recognition that closer
integration of the insights from innovation studies with those from organisation and
policy studies might bear fruit (Steward 2001; de la Mothe 2001b). This elision
lends support for a form of associative governance that has grown partly as a result
of its perceived benefits to regional systems of innovation and partly as a result of the
failure of top-down forms of policy-making and implementation (Wolfe 1997).
The appeal of the associative model of governance derives from the insights it can
provide into the policy-making process where the exclusive role of public policy¬
makers is supplanted by a mix of public and private inputs and where the role of
learning is paramount (Wolfe 1997).
Although the associative model as a way of thinking about state-society relations is
relatively pervasive in the European literature, British authors tend to regard the
policy network paradigm as a form of "interest group intermediation" (a generic term
for all types of relationships between interest groups and the state) whereas German
and Dutch scholars view policy networks as a new form of governance, as a
mechanism for mobilising political resources in situations where these resources are
widely dispersed between public and private actors, and as a specific form of public-
private interaction based on non-hierarchical interaction (Marsh 1998b; Borzel
1998).
Edler et al. (2002) adopt this latter stance. They draw attention to the discrepancies
between the increasing perception of innovation as a systemic, horizontal
phenomenon caused by and influencing a broad spectrum of factors while the related
policy institutions continue to work in a departmentalised and fragmented manner,
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maintaining a narrow, vertical, thematic focus. Building on work done by Smits and
Kuhlmann (2002), Edler et al. (2002) report that the governance of innovation in
most OECD countries is characterised by failing attempts at restructuring
responsibilities in government, the dominance of the linear model of innovation and
innovation policy run in very specific, narrow fields. They find that this situation is
exacerbated by the emerging multi-level governance of innovation in a European
context which makes the development of a systemic policy approach even more
difficult. The workshop on which these authors report (Edler et al. 2002) discussed
the need for a new policy design where the state acts as a moderator and enabler
within a network-oriented approach rather than a hierarchical interventionist
approach. This requires a "new mode of governance" with, on the one hand, more
elaborate forms of institutionalised co-ordination between the European level and
national and regional levels, and on the other hand, a continuous reflection on
appropriate principles of governance with respect to both strong leadership and
participatory approaches. These authors conclude that this will require a re¬
organisation of administrations in a way that enables flexible, horizontal co¬
ordination and exchange.
An interactive innovation policy is therefore "one where the boundaries between
science and technology development, SME support, education and training, and
industrial policy have faded away" (Cooke et al. 2000, p. 142) although as these
authors note, public policy in general (not just at the regional level) is not used to
tackling problems in such an integrated manner:
[on]the contrary, these policy domains are usually compartmentalised in
different departments and agencies competing for power rather than co¬
operating to tackle the policy issues (Cooke et al. 2000, p. 142)
Such transparency and horizontal co-ordination within the regional innovation
system requires decision-making powers to be devolved as well as some level of
consensus about the region's goals for economic development and STI policies. This
"is likely to fail if it is pursued as a top-down policy by a dominant policy actor"
(Cooke et al. 2000, p. 142) and instead requires a true commitment to user
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involvement that goes beyond just offering the opportunity to "participate in
participation" (de la Mothe 2001a, p.8).
Shapira et al. (2001) call for policy and institutional modernisation to reorient
innovation systems to match current and emerging socio-economic and political
developments, noting that, in most industrialised countries, innovation policy-makers
are indeed trying to reform traditional policy approaches. They point to a shift in the
institutional locus of innovation policy and the pursuit of new models for innovation
that are "typically iterative, catalytic and networked and which accelerate the growth
and pace of innovation among multiple participants". However, they warn that such
policy changes need to be accompanied by "considered assessment, reflection and
learning" in order to ensure success (Shapira et al. 2001).
Cooke et al.'s (2000, p. 134) study of European RSIs demonstrated that innovation
policy is generally fragmented and haphazard and does not fit the needs of its users
(see also Nauwelaers and Wintjes (2002), Section 2.2.3 above). They find that the
discrepancies that exist between innovation support provision and its uptake by
SMEs, indicate that innovation policies are not attuned to the real problems of firms
and that top-down innovation policies, developed without consulting its users and
stakeholders, lead to inefficient innovation support strategies that either do not match
the needs of regional industry or only reflect the wishes of those firms that are the
best at articulating their needs (Cooke et al. 2000, p. 142) (see also Section 4.5.2 on
the "star" system). Improvements will only come when regional governments
develop policies "that have the consensus of regional stakeholders and address the
needs of regional firms" (Cooke et al. 2000, p. 134).
Likewise, Mytelka and Smith (2002) caution that policy-makers have found it
difficult to deal with the complex reality represented by the systems of innovation
approach and, although national governments would be expected to tailor new policy
instruments to the needs of actors whose behaviour the policy is designed to
influence:
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[0]nly where stakeholders at the regional level have been able to shape
policies directly through participatory processes are there small signs of
movement in this direction (Mytelka and Smith 2002)
2.7 Reprise
This review has demonstrated how early thinking on innovation policy has responded
to the influences of "new regionalism" by developing the concept of a regional
system of innovation which in turn reflects the political shift from government to
governance and the concomitant ascendancy of the policy network paradigm. This
advance towards more associative forms of governance for STI policy exemplifies a
convergence between the academic domains inhabited by the interdisciplinary field
of science and innovation studies and those of public policy and political studies.
While scholars argue over points of detail, most authors acknowledge this shift
towards networks as a new form of governance and agree that policy networks do
affect policy outcomes while recognising that they may only be part of the
explanation and accepting that hierarchy, in terms of the role of government or
public authorities within networks, is still important (Marsh 1998b).
Marsh (1998a) describes policy networks as a meso-level approach where the macro
level deals with the broader political context and processes of government within
which any policy network operates and the micro level deals with individual actions
and decisions of actors within the network. The meso level therefore concentrates on
questions concerning the structure of networks and patterns of interaction within
them.
In adopting this meso-level approach, this thesis will investigate the impact of
environmental change (in the form of devolution) on policy networks in Scotland and
try to assess how these networks are influencing STI policy development. In
particular, this study will consider how sectoral networks affect the pattern of policy
outcomes for science and innovation in the life sciences in Scotland and how the sub-
national, national and supra-national political institutions condition these policy
networks.
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The literature suggests that, in order to reap the economic benefits of their STI-based
resources, regions such as Scotland should be promoting the formation of regional
policy networks. In so doing, they should learn from past experiences, improve
policy integration (both within the region as a whole and more specifically within
and between government departments and agencies), and attempt to develop a policy
consensus on future STI strategies across a broad range of stakeholders. This should
be done, not by reinventing the policy wheel, nor by adopting policy solutions
developed in other countries in a wholesale fashion, but through iteration and policy
learning to ensure that STI policies respond to changing policy conditions and
evolving policy goals.
This research therefore uses the policy network approach as a tool to investigate the
complex relationships that exist in areas related to STI policy in Scotland post
devolution; it tries to understand policy outcomes by exploring who participates and
who wields power in these networks; and it considers whether these networks fit the
popular typologies of policy communities or issue networks. Authors such as Cooke
et al. (2000 p. 120) discuss how the direct and indirect impacts of public policy shape
a regional system of innovation. By focusing on policy learning, the current research
examines the converse: the extent to which actors within the RSI actually shape the
policy domain (see Figure 2.1).
The term "multi-level governance" was originally developed to give due recognition
to the roles played by various actors at supra-national, national, and sub-national
levels in a European policy context (Sloat 2002a, p.35). The current research adopts
this model of governance to examine the interactions amongst a complex assemblage
of actors operating within the broad purview of STI policy within and between the
multiple levels of governance now in place in the UK. Rather than the popular
metaphor of the "conceptual lens", a more appropriate optical analogy for this
espousal of the governance model might therefore be that of a prism, refracting light
into a spectrum of multi-tiered, societal actors and dispersed policy resources in
order to illuminate the process of policy-making for STI in Scotland.
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Chapter 3 The Scottish System of Innovation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter makes the case for the existence of a Scottish system of innovation
(SSI). It discusses the constraints on the system in terms of the external drivers that
influence STI policy and explores the multi-level nature of policy-making in
Scotland and the need for greater policy integration at the regional level. This
chapter continues the policy network metaphor, introduced in the previous chapter, to
draw further attention to the way in which policy is the product of a complex
interplay of people and organisations, thereby providing a picture of how "real"
politics takes place in contrast to the traditional, institutional approach to policy¬
making (Parsons 1995, p. 185). The character of such policy networks is determined
by many factors, including local economic structures (Cameron and Danson 2000,
p. 18), so in order to begin to understand their role in the Scottish system of
innovation, this chapter starts by introducing the key policy actors, discussing their
role in the policy-making process and reviewing some of the recent policy and
strategy documents relevant to STI in Scotland. Next it attempts to map the SSI,
discussing the general policy framework and its linkages both within the system and
with external actors in order to explore some of the constraints that might impact on
the regional governance of STI in Scotland. This leads on to a discussion of the need
for a more integrated approach to government intervention within the SSI and
between the different levels of governance. This chapter concludes by reflecting on
some of the changes that devolution has wrought as regards participation in the
policy system, a theme that is then explored in detail in Chapter 4.
3.2 The devolution process
Following the election of the Labour Government in the UK in May 1997, a White
Paper on devolution was published setting out key proposals for the re-establishment
of a Parliament in Scotland. A referendum took place in Scotland in September 1997
and the Scotland Bill, paving the way for Scottish devolution, received Royal Assent
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in November 1998. A Consultative Steering Group was established which reported
in December 1998 (Consultative Steering Group 1998), setting out detailed
recommendations for the day-to-day running of the Scottish Parliament. The first
elections for the Scottish Parliament were held on 6 May 1999. The first day of
business in the Parliament was 12 May 1999, with the official opening taking place
on 1 July 1999. The election for the second session of the Parliament took place in
May 2003. Both of these elections returned Labour as the largest single party, but
with no overall majority.
The Scottish Parliament consists of 129 elected representatives known as Members
of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and the Scottish Executive comprising: the First
Minister, the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General (also known as the Law
Officers) and 18 other Ministers and Deputy Ministers appointed by the First
Minister. Until May 2003 there was also a Secretary of State for Scotland who was a
member of the UK Cabinet. As anticipated (Brown et al. 1998, p. 121), on 12 June
2003 the Prime Minister announced a number of changes to the government which
led to the Scotland Office becoming part of the Department for Constitutional Affairs
with the position of Secretary of State for Scotland now held by the Secretary of
State for Transport who is responsible for Scottish affairs, advised by the Scotland
Office. The role of the Secretary of State and the Scotland Office is to promote the
devolution settlement, to represent Scottish interests within the UK government and
to advise the UK government as regards Scots law, although it appears that this can
often be a case of trying to promote co-operation and compromise (Eames 2001). A
Memorandum of Understanding (Cabinet Office 1999a) sets out the principles that
will underlie relations between the UK government and the devolved administrations
while a series of Devolution Guidance Notes (Cabinet Office 1999b) give
departments advice on the routine practicalities of working with the devolved
administrations. However, as these notes make clear (ODPM nd), effective relations
between the devolved administrations cannot be sustained by memoranda and
concordats alone and ultimately rely on effective communication between civil
servants at the various levels of government. As we shall see, this must be the case
within levels of governance just as much as it is between the different tiers.
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3.3 Devolved and reserved powers
The freedom of action of the Scottish Parliament, as of any regional government
anywhere in the world, is limited and the integration of the Scottish economy into the
British, European and world economies means that distant economic events over
which no Scottish actor has any control may have much greater effects on the
Scottish economy than any actions of Scottish Parliament (Newlands 1999a, p.21).
The Parliament does have the power to pass legislation but does not have powers
over monetary policy and only very limited powers over fiscal policy1 so that
Scottish businesses are still more heavily affected by UK legislation on financial and
economic matters than by devolved powers (Sloat 2000a). However, while the
Scotland Act 1998 makes it clear that overall macroeconomic policy is reserved to
the UK Parliament, the Scottish Parliament does have the authority to develop a
distinctive "micro-economic" agenda (Burnside and Wakefield 2003) using policy
tools related to education and training, support for businesses, promoting Scottish
exports, developing tourism, and providing roads, local transport and other
infrastructure.
Key areas of devolved responsibility include:
• Health • Education
• Transport • Housing
• Local government • Training
• Economic development • Agriculture
• Environment
1 The Scottish Parliament also has the power to raise or lower the basic rate of income tax by up to 3
pence in the pound but has not so far acted upon this.
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Those policy areas still covered by the UK Government in Westminster (known as
reserved powers) are:
• Constitutional matters
• Foreign and defence policy
• Most economic policy
• Social security
• Medical ethics
• Relations with the EU
Many aspects of technology and innovation policy are covered by Scottish economic
development policy; and some aspects of science policy, related to education, public
understanding of science, universities and other higher education institutes may be
covered by education policy. Science itself is a "concurrent power", meaning that
responsibility is shared between the Scottish and UK Parliaments.
The split between devolved and reserved powers illustrates the highly complex
situation of STI policy, with many of the key policy-makers remaining at the UK
level (see Figure 3.1). Policy links between the UK and EU levels are well defined
and have been smoothed by long familiarity and regular use. Links between the UK
and Scottish levels are still in their formative stages. It would seem that government
should have a particularly important co-ordination role in the Scottish system of
innovation given this multi-level nature of governance with policy emanating from
local, national and supra-national levels where many of the key drivers for science
and innovation are external to the Scottish system. This multi-level dimension of the
Scottish system of innovation presents a considerable co-ordination and
communication challenge. Devolution may thus be unintentionally reinforcing
traditional tendencies to develop policy in separate compartments or "policy silos",
rather than a more integrated approach. This leads to important questions about
where Scottish policy actors have influence and control, given that many of the
drivers for UK science are powers reserved either to the UK Parliament in
Westminster or to the European Commission.
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Figure 3.1 Key policy actors in the Scottish System of Innovation
(OST = Office of Science & Technology; HMT = Treasury; FCSD = Finance & Central Services Department)
3.4 Key policy actors and instruments
3.4.1 STI policy instruments
In terms of published strategies that might elucidate the Scottish government's
thinking on STI, the Framework for Economic Development in Scotland (Scottish
Executive 2000a) and A Smart, Successful Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001b),
discussed below, have provided the basis for action on the economy, and hence
enterprise and innovation to date. The key science policy document, A Science
Strategy for Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001a), set out a framework for the
development of the Scottish Executive's policy in terms of maintaining a strong
65
science base; increasing the exploitation of scientific research; ensuring the supply of
scientific talent; promoting awareness and understanding of science in society; and
ensuring the effective use of scientific evidence in policy formulation and resource
allocation by government. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 in terms of the
role of users in the policy development process and the impact the strategy has had
on the co-ordination of STI policy in Scotland.
Published in June 2000, the Framework for Economic Development in Scotland
(FEDS) provides an over-arching policy statement on economic development. It
headlines two aspects germane to this study of the policy-making process, namely
"partnership" where it states that economic development is ultimately driven by the
private sector, therefore FEDS seeks to enable and encourage that development, and
"evidence-based policy" whereby "policy-making needs to be underpinned by
evidence and rigorous analysis, not by anecdotal and ad hoc assessment" (Scottish
Executive 2000a, p.xi), noting that "the evidence that underpins the thinking on
economic development remains patchy in several areas" (Scottish Executive 2000a,
p. xiv) and requires enhanced knowledge and understanding of the key elements that
drive progress. Innovation is described as a key feature of entrepreneurial dynamism
and an important driver of the increased productivity which in turn drives the overall
competitiveness of the Scottish economy (Scottish Executive 2000a, p.60). The
FEDS document underlines the research strengths of Scotland's universities and
focuses on the need to achieve a step change in the quantity and quality of
commercialisation activity in Scotland's science and research base. Although FEDS
raises the questions of how to encourage industry "pull" to match the academic
"push" and how to bring about more effective interaction between government,
academia and industry, it is grounded in the "treasure trove model" (SUPRA 2000)
where universities are exclusively seen as the source of innovation. We shall return
to this issue in Section 3.6 and again in Chapter 5.
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3.4.2 Scottish policy actors
Scottish Parliament
The Scottish Parliament controls 60% of the public funding for research and
development in Scotland (Miller 2000). UK Research Councils and UK charities
provide the remaining 40%. Significantly, science funding via the UK Research
. 9 . • ....
Councils remains a reserved power, something that the Scottish universities and
their representative bodies campaigned hard to retain in order to avoid the
fragmentation of the science base, arguing that there is a minimum efficient scale of
scientific community and of resourcing below which it is difficult to sustain an
internationally competitive research capability (Royal Society of Edinburgh and
Royal Society of London 1999; Boulton 1999).
Much of the work of the Scottish Parliament takes place in committee and it is
through these committees that the Scottish Executive is held to account and where
proposed legislation is examined. The Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee
(now the Enterprise and Culture Committee ) noted in its legacy paper at the end of
the first session (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee 2003) that, unlike
some other committees, it had not had a high volume of legislation or petitions
referred to it and its focus had therefore been on self-generated inquiry work. The
committee indicated that its main objective was, by the end of the first parliamentary
session, "to have had an impact on the governance of Scotland" although when
reviewing the outputs from this committee during Session 1 (Table 3.1) it is evident
2 Scotland benefits disproportionately from Research Council funding. Figures from 1998-99 quoted
by Miller (2000) show that - with a population of only 9% of the UK population - NERC spends 13%
of its budget in Scotland, ESRC 6%, EPSRC 13% and MRC 12%.
3 At the start of the second session of the Scottish Parliament the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning
Committee was replaced by the Enterprise and Culture Committee. The remit of this committee is to
consider and report on matters relating to the Scottish economy, business and industry, energy,
training, further and higher education, lifelong learning and such other matters as fall within the
responsibility of the Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning. It also covers matters relating to
tourism, culture and sport, and all other matters covered by the Minister for Tourism, Culture and
Sport.
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Table 3.1 Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee activity during the
first session
Inquiries
• local economic development services
• the governance of the SQA
• the impact of the new economy
• fuel prices in remoter rural areas




• Education and Training (Scotland) bill
• Education (Graduate Endowment and Student Support) (Scotland) bill
• University of St. Andrews (Postgraduate Medical Degrees) bill
• Secondary committee on the following legislation
• Transport (Scotland) bill
• Tobacco Advertising and Promotion (Scotland) bill
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that issues relating to the governance of STI may have been overshadowed by more
populist policy areas.
Economic theory predicts that the powers of regional governments largely concern
service provision and economic development policy (Newlands 1999a) although it
could be argued that decentralisation of economic development powers to Scotland
existed for many years prior to the advent of an elected Scottish Parliament as
virtually all of the key policy actors in Scotland (with the obvious exception of the
Parliament itself) pre-date devolution. The Scottish Office, pre-cursor to the Scottish
Executive, was founded in the 19th century with the Scottish Development
Department and Scottish Industry Department established in the 1960s. Scottish
Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise4 were established in 1991 following
a merger with the Scottish arm of the Training Agency, which gave the Scottish
Office greater responsibility for training policy in Scotland. Around the same time
oversight of higher education policy in Scotland passed to the Scottish Office with
the creation of the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council (SHEFC). While
there may not have been legislative devolution to Scotland, there was therefore very
considerable administrative devolution in policy areas related to STI (McCarthy and
Newlands 1999) although commentators note that the capacity to be creative was
greater in some areas of Scottish policy than in others. For example, during the last
three decades there has generally been more Scottish innovation in education, child
law, housing and social work, than in training, industry, and health (Brown et al.
1998, p. 102). Even now, some critics doubt that the Scottish Parliament can
significantly enhance economic activity. While the Scottish Parliament may
influence business decision-making, the Parliament's powers may be largely
confined to the public services since many of the key aspects of government action
that impact on business and the economy are reserved powers (Kerley 1999).
4 Preceded by the Scottish Development Agency (founded 1975) and Highlands and Islands
Development Board (founded 1965) respectively.
Scottish Executive
Within the Scottish Executive, STI policy is primarily the responsibility of the
Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department5 and the remit of the
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Minister includes:
economy, business and industry, including Scottish Enterprise,
Highlands and Islands Enterprise, European Structural Funds, trade and
inward investment, energy (including renewable energy), further and
higher education, lifelong learning, training and science (Scottish
Executive 2003)
Within the Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department there are two
divisions responsible for STI policy: the Enterprise and Industrial Affairs Group and
the Lifelong Learning Group. The latter has lead policy responsibility for issues
affecting higher education in Scotland. Within this division the Science and Higher
Education Branch (formerly the Science Policy Unit) has policy responsibility for
cross-cutting science issues within the Executive, for the implementation of the
Science Strategy and for policy relating to the funding and management of research
in Higher Education.
Within the Enterprise and Industrial Affairs Group, the Innovation Policy Unit (IPU)
has policy responsibility for innovation "in its broadest sense from an economic
development perspective"6. IPU's remit includes promotion of the knowledge-based
economy; higher education institution (HEI) /industry links; commercialisation of the
science-base; technology transfer; and sponsorship of specific hi-tech sectors
including supporting the implementation of the Biotechnology Framework for
Action. Other departments such as Health and Environment and Rural Affairs also
have policy responsibilities within the broad remit of STI.
5 Until the 2003 election known as the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department and generally
referred to as such in this thesis.
6




The Scottish Enterprise Network is the key delivery mechanism for the Executive's
economic development policy including many aspects related to science and
innovation. Scottish Enterprise covers the southern part of the country (covering 93%
of the Scottish population). Its headquarters are in Glasgow and there are 12 local
t n
offices, known as local enterprise companies (LECs) .
Scottish Enterprise has had a strategy in place since 1996 to increase the contribution
that Scotland's science and technology base makes to the economic wealth of
Scotland through commercialisation (Scottish Enterprise and Royal Society of
Edinburgh 1996) and in January 2000 the second phase of this strategy was launched
as Technology Ventures Scotland which aimed to encourage investment in
technology research and development in Scotland and to accelerate the
commercialisation of Scotland's science and technology. In the specific area of
biotechnology, Scottish Enterprise launched a four-year Framework for Action in
1999, a £40 million strategy to grow the biotechnology cluster in Scotland. This
Framework, which has been updated annually, sets out a number of targets to grow
the sector again with a focus on new firm formation and the commercialisation of the
science base (Scottish Enterprise 2002). Scottish Enterprise is widely regarded as a
leading exponent of the clusters approach in Europe (Sainsbury 1999). However,
clusters policy is an inherently political issue. Some would say that Scottish
Enterprise adopted the clusters approach in the 1990s as a way of differentiating
itself from English economic development policy. Scottish Enterprise is now
recognising that clusters policy is just one element of effective innovation support
and should not be promoted in isolation but as part of a larger policy picture and the
clusters initiative now seems to have been largely overshadowed by Scottish
7 The Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990 set out the legal basis for the establishment of
Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise. Both bodies are charged with enhancing
skills and environmental improvements, but Scottish Enterprise's functions also included safeguarding
employment, industrial efficiency and competitiveness while Highlands and Islands Enterprise's
(HIE) remit included broad measures for the social and economic development of their area (Burnside
and Wakefield 2003). The role ofHIE is of less relevance to this study and is not discussed further.
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Enterprise's new flagship initiative, the £450 million Intermediary Technology
Institutes (ITIs), which aim to encourage and support pre-competitive research in the
areas of Energy, Life Sciences and Techmedia (Communications Technology and
Digital Media).
By the mid 1990s, some years prior to devolution, Scottish Enterprise had
established itself as an effective regional body and used the latitude in its relationship
with the Scottish Office to begin to pursue a number of quite distinct agendas
promoting both clusters and regional entrepreneurship several years before they were
to appear on the English agenda (Gillespie and Benneworth 2002). However,
although Scottish Enterprise and its predecessors have existed for much longer than
their English counterparts, their initial aim had been to attract inward investment and
they have had less experience of stimulating home-grown enterprise (Gillespie and
Benneworth 2002). In line with other development agencies in the UK, Scottish
Enterprise has now moved away from this historical focus on foreign direct
investment towards a greater emphasis on the "soft" infrastructure of business
support services, technology transfer, and skills development (Morgan 1997) and,
more recently, there has been a further shift from a focus on increasing Scotland's
business birth rate (particularly in the biotechnology sector) towards the
sustainability and growth of existing firms.
The creation of LECs was seen by some as taking decentralisation too far, with the
loss of a central strategic overview of the problems of the Scottish economy and a
multiplication of the problems of co-ordination both within the Enterprise Networks
and between the Networks and other economic development actors (Newlands
1999a, p.22). A review of the Enterprise Networks was launched in December 1999
by Henry McLeish, the then Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning. A
Review Issues Paper was published in February 2000 and circulated to a range of
interest groups and organisations, seeking input from Scottish business, academics,
local authorities and the Enterprise Networks themselves. One of the main outcomes
of the review was the publication ofA Smart, Successful Scotland: Ambitions for the
Enterprise Networks (Scottish Executive 2001b), a strategy for enterprise that
detailed the Executive's expectations for the Enterprise Networks and aimed to
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clarify relationships between the two institutions. Smart, Successful Scotland set out
three priority themes: Growing Businesses, Global Connections, and Skills and
Learning. It signalled a shift in priorities, suggesting that the Enterprise Networks
should withdraw from areas where market failure was no longer evident, less focus
on the direct provision of traditional business development services and a greater
focus on issues related to skills and learning, digital connectivity and positioning
Scotland on the world stage. The document is written in the language of
facilitation/co-ordination/joint venture and sets out a vision of "new relationships
between the Networks, their customers, stakeholders and the Executive". It hinted at
poor past performance ("The Enterprise Networks must be better at responding to
their customers") and a less than amicable past relationship when it spoke of the
Executive building "relationships of trust that give the specialist expertise and insight
of the Networks Boards and staff better leverage to enhance the prosperity of
Scotland" (Scottish Executive 2001b, p.7). While future enterprise strategy was to
be set jointly by the boards of Scottish Enterprise, HIE and the Scottish Executive,
direction was to be essentially the responsibility of the Scottish Executive while
delivery was the responsibility of the Enterprise Networks (Scottish Enterprise, HIE
and the LECs) (SPICE 2001).
Further steps were also taken to improve co-ordination within and between the
networks in an attempt to bring about a more cohesive, streamlined and customer-
driven Network including a change in the status of LECs to make them wholly
owned subsidiaries of either Scottish Enterprise or HIE. However, despite these
changes, critics "struck by document fatigue" were still calling for fewer promises
and more action (Murden 2001) and noting that Scottish Enterprise's performance
indicators still set too much store by numerical targets rather then assessing the value
of activities.
SHEFC
The other key government agency in Scotland with policy links to STI is the Scottish
Higher Education Funding Council (SHEFC). Established in June 1992 as a non-
departmental public body responsible to the Scottish Executive, SHEFC provides
financial support for teaching, research and associated activities in Scottish higher
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education institutions. Although this study is not about higher education policy per
se, SHEFC is a relevant policy actor as it has increasingly, in recent years,
participated in the economic development agenda by playing its part in knowledge
transfer. SHEFC was a key partner in the Technology Ventures initiative and more
recently established a Task Group on Knowledge Transfer jointly with Scottish
Enterprise (SHEFC/Scottish Enterprise 2002) to develop a blueprint for collaboration
between industry, academic and the public sector to capture the economic benefits of
Scotland's research base.
Linkages with UK level of governance
At the UK level, the Office of Science and Technology (OST) retains responsibility
for the science budget and the task of co-ordinating STI policy across government,
while the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is responsible both for UK science
policy (through OST), and for promoting the development and use of technology by
industry. Although OST oversees R&D spending, it does not have executive
authority over other departments that also have STI policy roles such as the
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs or, indeed, the Scottish
Executive.
Formal and informal links exist between policy-makers and stakeholders but few
consensus-making bodies. The Council for Science and Technology is the
government's top-level advisory body on major science and technology issues of
strategic importance to the UK and advises Ministers on the balance and direction of
UK STI. The House of Commons and House of Lords Select Committees on
Science and Technology both have remits to review science and technology policies
but have no direct equivalent in the Scottish Parliament. Although committees of the
Scottish Parliament may examine any matters that fall within their remit, conduct
inquiries and consider and report on the policy and the administration of the Scottish
government as well as initiate legislation, their full timetables have not so far
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allowed them to undertake the detailed scrutiny of STI policy issues carried out by
• R
the UK Parliamentary Committees .
Of the various actors involved in economic development policy, Newlands (1999b)
suggests that the Scottish experience implies that regional development agencies are
the crucial component. Furthermore, the construction of devolved economic
development policies is both a long-term and a two-way process. Building up
effective economic development policies adds to the credibility and legitimacy of
devolved institutions and provides an argument for the further devolution of powers
(Newlands 1999b). Scotland clearly, therefore, had a long track record in certain
aspects of the governance of STI prior to devolution. Having identified the key
policy actors and introduced some of the complexities brought about by the nature of
the Scottish devolution settlement, the following section attempts to map the Scottish
system of innovation and explore some of the constraints that might impact on the
regional governance of STI in Scotland.
3.5 Mapping the Scottish System of Innovation
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the national systems of innovation approach
(NSI) provides a useful conceptual framework, first to define and describe the nature
and determinants of the (sometimes intangible) investments made by countries in
activities to promote and manage technical change and secondly, to analyse the
differences between countries in the levels and patterns of these investments
(McKelvey 1991).
The key interdependent elements of any NSI are the R&D system, the role of the
public sector, relationships between firms, the financial system, and education and
training (Senker el al. 1999). Figure 3.2 attempts to identify the key factors that
constitute the system of innovation in Scotland, taking a fairly broad definition of the
NSI approach by encompassing all institutions and cultural factors that affect
innovation in a national economy rather than the narrower definition which
8 A notable exception to this is the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee's inquiry into local
economic development services, published May 2000.
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concentrates on institutional actors producing and diffusing knowledge (Senker et al.
1999). The role of government policy in NSI is not just about those policies directly
targeted at technological advance but includes policies for educating the workforce
and those aimed at shaping the macro-economic climate, regulation (e.g.
environmental, patent protection), and public procurement.
The role of government is particularly important in the Scottish system of innovation
(SSI) as policy emanates from multiple levels of governance: regional, national and
supra-national. The right hand side of Figure 3.2 identifies eight functional/policy
levels within the SSI. The top half of the diagram (darker shading) includes those
policy areas that are the key drivers for science, technology and innovation, e.g.
finance, regulation and the overall policy framework (i.e. the system drivers). The
bottom half of the diagram (no shading) describes the operation and outcomes of the
STI system, e.g. knowledge, a trained workforce, goods and services. Thus, the
"system" is intended to represent Scotland as a discrete regional and political entity,
but the boundaries of this system are somewhat permeable. Indeed, Cooke et al.
(2003) describe a RSI as an open system "in constant interaction with its national,
other regional and innovation nodes and networks". The left hand side of Figure 3.2
therefore identifies institutions that are external to Scotland but nevertheless have an
impact on these policy levels. It is also worth reflecting momentarily on the attitudes
of system "insiders" and "outsiders", a point to which we shall return in Chapters 4
and 8. Those external to the SSI often regard Scotland as a well-functioning, joined
up, policy community (e.g. Interview with European policy-maker, P2409029) and
are envious at how cohesive the system is (Interview with service provider,
1160702), whereas those who view the system from the inside perhaps inevitably
tend to focus on its imperfections (Interviews with policy targets, passim).
The intention in this section is to use the SSI described in Figure 3.2 as a starting
point to identify the constituent elements, to analyse the relationships between these
9
Respondents were offered anonymity and are therefore classified by their role (academic, policy¬
maker, industrialist, etc.) and identified by a code number based on the date of interview. See
Appendix for further details.
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elements (particularly those that are mediated by public policy), to identify the
source of those policies (Scotland, UK or Europe), and to consider the opportunities
for policy targets to influence those policies.
3.5.1 Providing general policy framework
At the top of the diagram is the general policy framework. This would include
policies for the macro-economy, fiscal policy, trade and anti-trust laws, infrastructure
development, regional development and public procurement. Although the Scottish
Parliament does have the authority to vary the tax rate and is responsible for the
infrastructure in Scotland, the macro-economy, defence (a significant driver for
public procurement) and international trade law are all reserved powers. Regional
development would fall within the Scottish Parliament's remit but is regulated (and
financed) by the European Commission to a significant degree.
3.5.2 Formulating and implementing STI policy
The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive do have more scope for
formulating and implementing STI policy although again this has to be done within
the frameworks set out by the UK government and the EC. For example, Foresight is
a national initiative and the clusters approach to innovation, although possibly given
a different emphasis in Scotland, is a central tenet of UK innovation and
competitiveness policy.
3.5.3 Regulating STI policy
Scotland's distinctive legal system pre-dates devolution but the regulation of STI in
the form of, for example, environmental standards, patent protection, and product
licensing is still controlled by the UK, the EC and international law giving the
Scottish Parliament little scope for high level policy interventions and leaving it
essentially with an implementation and monitoring role and responsibility for local
environmental issues such as planning.
3.5.4 Financing STI
Although, as noted above, the Scottish Parliament controls 60% of the public funding
for research and development in Scotland (Miller 2000), the remainder comes from
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UK-wide bodies in the form of the UK Research Councils and UK charities.
Funding for research (both in the public and private sector) also comes in the form of
European Framework funds and much of the private sector funding from banks,
venture capital firms and multinational companies is also external to the Scottish
system. However, with only 9% of the UK population, Scotland does well out ofUK
public sector funding winning 12% of total UK funding council resources for
research; 13% of the research councils' resources for research; 13% of government
research departments' resources for research and 12% ofEU research resources spent
in the UK. The per capita income from research grants and contracts in Scotland is
£39 compared with £28 for England (data from Technology Ventures Scotland
2003). However, as noted below (Section 3.5.5), Scottish industry's contribution to
financing STI is minimal.
Scotland has developed some distinctive policies in this area such as the highly
regarded Proof of Concept fund which aims to bridge the gap between early research
and the first stage of commercial funding, the RSE Enterprise Fellowships to support
young entrepreneurs, and Scottish Enterprise's £20 million venture capital fund to
plug the equity gap for companies looking for up to £500,000 to grow their business.
However, little direct financial assistance is given to companies beyond small-scale
competitive SPUR and SMART awards which can often be seen as more of a
bureaucratic hindrance than a real benefit to a company (Interview with
biotechnology CEO, 1090603).
3.5.5 Producing knowledge
Scotland has 14 universities and Scotland's academics produce 1% of all research
publications in the world-ranking Scotland third in the world for the number of
research publications published per head of population10. In the public sector there
are several research establishments including the six Scottish Agricultural and
Biological Research Institutes (SABRIs), all of which could be said to contribute to
the production of knowledge, a range of non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs)
10 Universities Scotland website, www.universities-scotland.ac.uk (last accessed 28/10/04).
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including Scottish Natural Heritage, the Scottish Agricultural College, and the Royal
Botanic Garden, and a number of executive agencies such as the Scottish
Agricultural Science Agency, which has an advisory and regulatory role. However,
Scottish industry's contribution to knowledge production is meager, investing a
dismal 0.5 per cent ofnational GDP on R&D, half the level of the UK as a whole and
a third of the OECD average (data from Technology Ventures Scotland 2003)
3.5.6 Educating and training workforce
Countries that are sustaining competitive and innovative firms are characterised by
good education and training systems, not just supporting universities but ensuring
that universities and other education and training institutions provide graduates that
meet industry's needs. In addition to its universities, Scotland also has two art
schools, one conservatoire, one college of higher education, one university college, a
teacher training college and 47 further education colleges. Forty-seven per cent of
Scots now go into higher education in comparison with the UK average of 35%10 and
around 400,000 students per year enrol in further education courses11. Authors such
as Masked (1998) argue that localised learning can give small countries a
competitive advantage and Andersen and Lundvall (1998) suggest that one of the
main reasons for the relative success of small European countries might be the fact
that most of them developed mass education systems at an early stage.
3.5.7 Producing goods and services
Within the SSI the tier that actually produces goods and services is much broader
than just the manufacturing sector. Scottish Enterprise includes over 360
organisations in Scotland's life sciences community many of whom provide services
to the dedicated biotechnology firms in the Scottish cluster which comprise 20% of
• • 19 ... . •
the UK's life sciences companies . This tier includes intermediate and final
markets, supply chains and the infrastructure and utilities needed to produce goods.
Significant external actors include the alliances and collaborations that Scottish firms
11 Scottish Further Education Unit website, www.sfeu.org.uk (last accessed 28/10/04).
Scottish Enterprise website www.scottish-enterprise.com/sedotcom_home/sig/sig-
biotechnology/biotechnology-key-facts-and-figures.htm?siblingtoggle=l (last accessed 28/10/04)
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have with UK and international companies. Crucially, strengthening the
competitiveness of a small country such as Scotland through policies that only
support the first steps in the chain of innovation might prove to be counterproductive
as the end users are an important part of the innovation system and may currently be
external to the system.
3.5.8 Supporting knowledge production/distribution/commercialisation
As noted in Section 3.5.4 above, UK government support for innovation relies less
on direct financing and more on providing support mechanisms for technology
transfer, developing organisational learning, and promoting networking. In Scotland
there is a plethora of business support organisations from the public sector Scottish
Enterprise Network to private sector law firms. Although the industry trade
associations still tend to be UK-, and often London-based, many such as the
Biolndustry Association (BIA) and the Association of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry (ABPI) are developing a greater Scottish presence post devolution in
addition to local biotechnology support organisations such as Edinburgh Bio-
Alliance and more general technology business development networks such as
Connect Scotland.
3.5.9 Linkages within the SSI
Although theoretical work on NSI tends to stress economic aspects, technological
innovation includes many complex factors, such as key industrial sectors, the
national environment, cultural interactions, and producer-user interactions. In the
context of regional development, success is determined not only by technological
and political considerations but also by institutional path dependencies (Braczyk and
Heidenreich 1998).
A national system of innovation represents more than just the sum of its individual
components and it is the interdependent relationships between these components that
give it its unique character. Within the system there will be flows of knowledge and
information, flows of money and flows of authority. There will be formalised
contractual relationships at both the domestic and international levels (for example
domestic and international consortia and firm alliances, domestic university/industry
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collaborations and international university collaborations) as well as informal
arrangements such as networks, clubs, and business fora.
The concept of NSI encompasses an idea of systematic interactions that cannot be
reduced simply to the actions of specific firms, or to the existing R&D system or to
competition among firms or institutions (McKelvey 1991). The component
institutions regulate the manner in which the technological knowledge available
within a nation or region is generated, developed and harnessed economically.
Success depends on the synergy between these institutions. Within any system of
innovation, co-ordinated co-operation between governmental, scientific and political
actors is needed to achieve international competitiveness. The multi-level dimension
of the Scottish system of innovation provides even greater challenges of co¬
ordination.
As previously noted, the freedom of action of the Scottish Parliament as of any
regional government is limited. The lower half of Figure 3.2 (no shading) illustrates
areas of relative autonomy within the SSI where there are fewer strong policy links
with external institutions. However, the key drivers for STI - finance, policy
environment, regulation - are in the top half of the diagram (dark shading) where
there are many external policy influences residing at different levels of governance.
Current Scottish STI policy seems to be concentrating on the linkages between
elements depicted in the bottom half of Figure 3.2, which are of course important in
the light of all the literature discussed in Chapter 2 on developing learning networks
to encourage innovation, etc., but this raises concerns about what is happening in the
"top half' of the system to ensure both the adequate co-ordination with external
policy actors and the engagement of policy targets in the policy-making process.
Scotland, therefore, faces a constrained policy environment for STI with many key
actors external to the SSI. Critics note that, while the Scottish Parliament has the
authority to effect significant impact on industrial and economic development (by
introducing and customising policies in areas such as training, provision of venture
capital, and new firm formation), this also requires greater attention to be paid to the
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linkages within the system in order to maximise the value added to the Scottish
economy (Danson 1999, p.96).
Others offer a more positive view of the SSI. Cooke and co-authors (e.g. Cooke et
al. 1997; Cooke et al. 2000; Cooke 2001a) have discussed the criteria for identifying
a RSI including autonomy to spend from a block grant; taxation authority (present
but not so far implemented in Scotland); and freedom to develop infrastructure (both
"hard" e.g. transport and "soft" e.g. knowledge). Scotland would probably come into
the category of a "region with a high capacity for developing regional innovation
systems", being a region with high infrastructure and policy organisation capacity
with a developed organisational infrastructure of mediating organisations for
technology and vocational training and a presence of public research and educational
organisations (Cooke et al. 2000, pp.98-119). Cooke et al. (ibid.) conclude, among
other things, that:
• in an MLG system, the ability to interact at all appropriate levels, upwards and
downwards, is a distinct advantage
• support from EU policies for regional innovation systems is needed, in
preference to existing piecemeal policies
• regional innovation requires a package of measures covering finance,
management, training, marketing and competitiveness advice, as well as more
conventional technology transfer
• different regions have different innovation and MLG models and this may take
time to change
• each regional innovation system must have at its core a strong university-industry
innovation and networking system (Cooke et al. 2000, pp.98-119)
Taking this one step further, Cooke (2001a) proposes various measures to assess the
degree of "embeddedness" of a region with respect to the organisation of
governance, suggesting that an embedded region (one with higher RSI potential) will
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display "inclusivity, monitoring, consultation, delegation and networking
propensities among its policymakers" while the disembedded region (one with lower
RSI potential) will have policy organisations that "tend to be exclusive, reactive,
authoritarian and hierarchical". While the evidence presented here and in Chapter 4
will indicate that the Scottish system of innovation displays some of the
characteristics of the former category, the discussion in Chapter 7 (and in particular
Section 7.4) will indicate a worrying tendency towards exclusivity and hierarchy
amongst some government actors.
Turning to the biotechnology sector in particular, Peters and Hood (2002) believe
that Scotland has led the way in the UK in the development and application of cluster
thinking to exploit the development potential of biotechnology. While recognising
that Scotland has important assets on which to build in terms of the excellence of its
life sciences research, these authors do, however, warn that the Scottish
biotechnology cluster still has some way to go before it achieves critical mass and a
high level of integration both locally and internationally. Peters and Hood (ibid.)
describe the core of the cluster (drug discovery and development) as relatively
dynamic and innovative but caution that the core is small relative to the ring (i.e.
services and support including medical devices). Furthermore, both are
geographically dispersed and local linkages are still only developing. These authors
conclude that the core and the ring are activity rich but have yet to develop the scale
density and depth associated with fully developed Porterian clusters (Porter 1990).
They note the continuing challenge of consolidating significant numbers of spin out
and start up companies into "meaningful and well-founded companies" and express
concerns that the Scottish biotechnology cluster is currently too fragmented and
lacking in flagship companies to make Scotland a credible world force in the global
biotechnology industry.
Again, factors external to the SSI are significant in the success of the biotechnology
cluster. While the Scottish science base is an important driver for new firm
formation, Peters and Hood (2002) stress that many of the main engines of business
growth lie beyond the cluster's local boundaries such that it is not possible for
Scotland to influence many of the forces shaping the global biotechnology industry.
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The Scottish Enterprise Cluster Action Plan 1999-2004 (Scottish Executive 1999)
aimed to increase the number of participating organisations, improve the
performance of existing companies and increase the number and nature of linkages
within the cluster and was seen as a motor to drive forward the knowledge economy,
creating wealth and high quality jobs (Scottish Executive 2000b). While some say
that the Edinburgh biotechnology cluster may be set to rival those in Cambridge
(UK) and Boston, they believe that its emergence has come about as much by chance
as planning (Nicholson 2002).
In reviewing Scottish Enterprise's related vision for the electronics cluster, Molina
and Kinder (2001) conclude that it has not been informed by a holistic, proactive
constituency building perspective so that the clustering process has not been as
"deep" as it could have been (e.g. networking between firms has been rather
superficial rather than sustainable knowledge networking). One of the reasons the
authors give for this is that Scottish Enterprise is not a single unified body in charge
of practical policies for the different Scottish regions because the LECs had
considerable autonomy which led to fragmentation of effort and a lack of a common
goal. They identify a number of "governance elements" as problematic including:
• short-term rather than long-term thinking
• simple cause/effect thinking rather than holistic/systemic thinking
and conclude:
...it is clear that there are deep rooted cultural, structural and
institutional policy factors and practices which require substantial
changes if the most conducive environment for clustering is to be
created. These governance issues must be faced squarely ifpolicy efforts
are either to engage in the long-term pursuit of more sustainable
dynamics than the present situation, or, remain consciously inside the
modest confines allowed by the present governance (Molina and Kinder
2001)
Since this paper was published in 2001, Scottish Enterprise has undergone a number
of organisational changes leading to greater integration of the Enterprise Network
and a change of policy focus away from foreign direct investment and clusters
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policy. Nevertheless, Molina and Kinder offer some important insights here for the
regional governance of STI in terms of holistic approaches and closer integration of
both government policies and of the various government agencies involved, and it is
to these issues that we now turn.
3.6 Government intervention in the Scottish System of Innovation -
The need for an integrated approach
The foundations for today's STI policy were laid in 1993 with the publication of the
first UK White Paper on science and technology for over 20 years (OST 1993). The
White Paper's failure to co-ordinate STI policy sufficiently (Lyall 1993) should be
seen in the context of Ronayne's analysis that intra-departmental rather than overall
co-ordination would seem to be the preferred policy mechanism in the UK, where
individual agencies are allowed self-determination while trying to avoid undue
duplication of effort or pursuit of conflicting goals in different parts of government
(Ronayne 1984, p.41). In practice, co-ordination in Britain still tends to mean cross-
membership of committees: an "insider's world" where a relatively small group of
senior civil servants, elite scientists, and influential industrialists move from
committee to committee (Ince 1986, p. 12).
In the 1990s, governments began to focus on their countries' specific strengths via
the NSI model and the clusters approach to innovation, discussed above, became
increasingly influential on policy. Thus, policy directed towards industry was
designed to be delivered at the local level and a clear trend, even before the
devolution agenda, has been towards giving greater responsibility to agencies closer
to the target audience. Decentralisation should encourage heterogeneity in national
and regional technological capabilities and create opportunities for closer contact
with firms but it can bring with it a loss of control and potential loss of learning as
feedback to the centre may be lost (Dodgson and Bessant 1996, p. 174).
Keating (2002) reminds us that policy-making is typically an incremental process in
which the weight of existing commitments limits the scope for innovation. Before
devolution, the Scottish Office was tied to the Whitehall policy machine through a
dense network of ministerial and official contacts and committees but, while the
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Whitehall departments generally took the lead in joint policy-making there was no
formal hierarchy. Keating (2002) argues that the devolution settlement builds on this
administrative heritage with the effect that, over large areas of public policy, there is
now no "centre" at all.
Charles and Benneworth (2001) highlight the limitations of a governance system in
which central departments are reluctant to cede powers to regions, as in the UK.
They describe how the current UK system was established by the White Paper (OST
1993) whose "central rationale...was to create a system of scientific governance
which generated excellence in UK science to boost the competitiveness of UK
business". However, these authors point out that a House of Commons inquiry
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2000) found that there was
little coherence of research activity between government departments and they find
that the problem with the system of scientific governance in the UK is that changes
in science and technology policy do not fit well with other changes in the policy
environment. Their claim that "...a top down scientific governance system weakens
UK economic performance if it cannot direct scientific policy to create capacity for
growth and development throughout its constituent regions" finds particular
resonance in the context of devolution, in a situation where science policy is
dominated by the DTI and the top down approach to science policy can have
negative regional impacts leading to a concentration of STI activity in SE England
(Charles and Benneworth 2001).
As noted in Chapter 1, there are limits to what a region-state can achieve when it
seeks to use STI policy to foster regional economic growth. Masked and Tornquist
(1999, p.50) have described regional development policy as mainly a process of
"making do" and indeed the Scottish Executive has been criticised by some for
failing to do anything more substantive in terms of regional policy than re-badging
old policies and departments (Gillespie and Benneworth 2002) and those institutions
that have had the greatest impact in the short period of devolved government are
those that were already operational, such as Scottish Enterprise.
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As Latouche (1998) demonstrates with the example of Quebec, politics can both
enhance innovation and governance at the regional level but can also constrain it in
the Quebecois situation where a major obstacle to the formulation of STI policy has
been finding a proper framework to integrate the myriad of federal and provincial
initiatives. Regional states are limited in their legislative and policy aspirations:
although they often claim to be in a better position to intervene in many areas, certain
responsibilities are outwith their remit, having been assigned to another level of
government, as the discussion of the SSI in Section 3.5 has attempted to demonstrate
in the case of Scotland.
Industry is affected by many facets of government policy including a vast array of
laws, regulations and voluntary agreements such as tax law, employment law, and
anti-discrimination legislation, only a few of which are the result of specific policies
aimed at influencing the growth of industry (Coombs et al. 1987, p. 199). Jacobs
(1998) identifies four government roles in innovation policy:
• providing material and knowledge infrastructures
• organising the necessary processes in order to define and achieve certain concrete
policy objectives
• providing the intellectual framework to enhance understanding of the knowledge-
based economy
• setting the overarching vision and ambition of the nation
but, as Porter (1990, p.626) notes, the agenda of nearly every government agency
touches national competitiveness in some way but is the principal agenda of few
bodies and in most governments the issue cuts across traditional ways of organising
the social and economic policy agenda. He suggests (ibid., p.618) that what is
needed is a different and more varied role for government where even parts of
government that appear far removed from economic policy are engaged in a




Policy integration across levels of governance, for example from EU to UK to
Scotland, depends mainly on the ability to communicate effectively across system
boundaries and the institutional structures determined by government policy-making
at the highest levels has a major influence on the effectiveness of such
communications (Lyall and Tait 2004). For example, integration and communication
across the EU/UK boundary are relatively effective and well practised, while the
situation across the UK/Scotland boundary appears less satisfactory and the
comments above from Charles and Benneworth (2001) also emphasise this point.
Vertical integration is thus mainly a function of the institutional structures
determined by policy-making at senior government levels and its most important
constituent is effectiveness of communications across levels of government. Ideally,
vertical communication across these boundaries should be a two-way process, but
effective vertical integration often implies top-down control. In the context of STI
policy, this raises questions about how successfully stakeholders at the regional level
can engage in the policy-making process: the danger is that the focus rests on the
public sector and does not include private business and other interested parties, a
point that will be explored further in Chapter 4. Peters (1998) argues that, although
the typical conceptualisation of policy co-ordination is a top-down hierarchy
dependent on central agencies, the continuing devolution of policy to lower levels of
governance makes the issue of policy coherence and co-ordination more difficult:
governments can now no longer depend upon the formal structure of the public
sector to provide co-ordination so that, as more open conceptions of governance
become the norm, then networked versions of co-ordination involving interest groups
also become more common (Peters 1998).
3.6.2 Horizontal integration
Horizontal integration takes place across departmental boundaries, for example the
ideal, but so far patchy, integration between science and technology policy and social
and environmental policies in the UK in the development of new approaches to
governance. There have been various examples of amalgamation of government
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departments, with integration as one of the main aims, where the staff involved have
continued to operate within their pre-existing boundaries and it would seem that, in
these cases, integration poses similar challenges to that of interdisciplinary research
in academic organisations (Tait et al. 2002; Bruce et al. 2004). As with
interdisciplinary research in academia, each policy area has its own specialist
language and this leads to difficulties in effective communication across boundaries
(Tait and Lyall 2001). Likewise, career structures for public servants reward those
who specialise and it is difficult to make a career by "trespassing" across traditional
boundaries. Most important, the impact of effective horizontal integration is a
loosening of control and the introduction of greater complexity into policy
implementation processes. Thus, horizontal policy integration cuts across the career
structures of public servants, raises communication difficulties and lessens the ability
of individual departments to exercise control in their own spheres (Tait and Lyall
2001).
Prior to devolution, commentators from the scientific community {e.g. Royal Society
of Edinburgh and Royal Society of London 1999) were emphasising the necessity of
co-ordinating the roles of STI policy actors in order to make best use of Scottish
resources. Boulton (1999) noted that this would require the roles of these actors to
be defined and structures or policies put in place which would facilitate "more
extensive, more innovative and more productive interactions". Similarly, an analysis
of responses from Scottish business to the Consultative Steering Group (Brown and
McCrone 1999) showed that most respondents emphasised the necessity of a cross-
cutting approach to the Scottish Parliament's committee work, although many did
not want to abandon departmental divisions. The Executive's own analysis (Elogg
2000) of how best to ensure the right conditions for translating cross-cutting policy
into joined up service delivery found that the Executive's policy development
processes and policy management structures were not all fit for purpose to deliver
cross-cutting policy objectives. Significantly, the focus of Hogg's study was on
policy implementation and one of his key recommendations was listening to delivery
agencies in order to ensure effective delivery of policy objectives rather than
involving a broader group of policy targets/stakeholders in the actual process of
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developing policy which, as we shall see in Chapter 4, remains the prevailing model
of "participative" policy-making.
3.6.3 Integrating research and innovation policy
More than ever, government policies for science, technology and innovation need to
be presented as an integrated package ofmeasures as the following quote from Neal
Lane, former Director of the US National Science Foundation (NSF), illustrates13:
the question is not, where the dividing lines are between science and
technology, or between basic and applied research, but rather how do we
take better advantage of the interrelationships in order for the nation to
reap the full benefits of its integrated investment in science and
technology
So rather than drawing distinctions between government support for the science base
and technology-based SMEs, what is needed is an integrated research and innovation
policy to create scientific and technical knowledge and provide the incentives for
innovation (Branscomb 1999, p.5). Such a policy to stimulate innovation must also
include policies toward competition, regulation, etc. (Porter 1990, p.631) and should
focus on long-term investments in knowledge-based infrastructure and foster an
economic climate that encourages private investment in R&D and the effective and
innovative use and absorption of technology by firms and organisations. Substantial
direct investments in basic research in science and technology will continue to be
needed because private firms tend to under invest in both long-range research and
research for the public good. Helping firms to acquire technical knowledge and skill
means providing access to all available technology, not just the most recent
knowledge. It also means developing a trained workforce at all levels (not just
graduates), supporting institutions whose function is the diffusion of science and
technology and encouraging regional initiatives to bring together firms, universities
and research institutions (Pavitt and Sharp 1993).
Government policy must recognise that a "one size fits all" approach is unlikely to
work. Every industry is different and government agencies must use a range of
lj
Quoted in Branscomb and Keller (1999, p.122).
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policy tools - direct (R&D funding) and indirect (tax and economic policy,
regulations, standards, export promotion, procurement) - to encourage R&D co¬
operation, access to capital and enhanced innovation. A mix of policy tools should
be adapted across regions and industries to address local needs. Policy interventions
should address information promotion and diffusion and include networking and the
decentralisation of policy design and implementation (Dodgson and Bessant 1996,
p. 170). Innovation based development strategies, particularly those that are regional
in nature, should seek to integrate innovation programmes with training and
education (Branscomb and Keller 1999, p.483). Commentators note, however, that
when it comes to government intervention in STI policy, "many political
programmes have intentionally only a symbolic effect on firm behaviour", "a
political rather than an economic purpose" and "political action and engagement are
often required to symbolise governmental rigour" (Masked 1998).
In the UK, the cri de coeur of the current Labour Government is for "joined up"
policy. The Modernising Government initiative (HM Government 1999) has as its
goal a more integrated approach to policy-making and a series of Cabinet Office
publications (e.g. Cabinet Office Performance Innovation Unit 2000; Cabinet Office
Strategic Policy-making Team 1999) have been issued with the aim of improving
policy formulation and implementation in areas that cut across the policy boundaries
of traditional government departments but the generally fragmented nature of
government policies to promote innovation presents businesses with a "bewildering
array" of support mechanisms and runs the danger that "the government itself will
lose focus in the administration of a plethora of unconnected initiatives" (Anon
2001a).
The shift of OST from the Cabinet Office to DTI following the publication of the
1993 Science and Technology White Paper (OST 1993) was seen as an attempt to tie
STI policy more closely to the competitiveness agenda and has resulted in a trend to
direct spending towards exploitation of technology and technology transfer. This led
to concerns that priorities in the science budget allocation are shifting from long-
term, basic research to more applied work on shorter timescales (Diederen et al.
1999, p.32). But on the other hand, the UK appears to emphasise more explicitly the
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competitiveness issue when targeting government support than other European
countries and Diederen et al. {ibid., p.51) claim that this focus on competitiveness
has created a more integrated approach across sectors.
However, the main message of a recent House of Lords report (House of Lords
Select Committee on Science and Technology 2003), which examined the role of the
Regional Development Agencies in the exploitation of science and technology, is
still the need for rationalisation of all the activity (at regional, national and European
levels) that encourages the exploitation of science, engineering and technology (SET)
for economic gain. According to the Select Committee, the primary need is for a
clear sense of national direction and purpose to create the conditions in which
stakeholders can optimise their contributions and the Committee called for
coherence, longer-term perspectives and reduced bureaucracy in this policy field,
concluding that the key to success is "coherence, connectivity, co-ordination,
communication and co-operation". While they comment on the utility of a single
department in the Scottish Executive covering enterprise and higher education, the
report noted that there was "a long way to go before there was an integrated strategy"
in Scotland (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 2003,
p.59).
It would appear that at EU, UK and Scottish levels, there is so far a general lack of
integration between the modern approaches to governance being developed in the
social policy arena and policies for science, technology and innovation which still
seem to be driven by an old-fashioned, linear conception of innovation systems (Tait
and Williams 1999). As later chapters will show, even within the area covered by
science, technology and innovation policies, as demonstrated by Scotland's Science
Strategy, these linear assumptions seem likely to discourage the flexible approach
needed for effective, participative policy-making.
3.7 Participation in the policy-making process
Devolution was intended not only to transfer powers downwards territorially but to
foster a new type of politics with more participation on the part of backbenchers and
civil society more generally (Keating 2002) that would lead to stronger
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Parliamentary committees, and power sharing between the Executive, Parliament and
the civil service14. It was also anticipated that proportional representation would lead
to coalition and result in a policy process operating more by consensus than the
Westminster parliamentary process (Brown et al. 1998, p. 120). However, existing
systems of policy-making have shaped the policies to which the Scottish Parliament
succeeded, including significant elements of STI policy that predate the Parliament.
This can lead to policy inertia and inherited styles of policy-making (Brown et al.
1998, p.97).
Examples of policy communities or networks of the type discussed in Chapter 2
existed pre-devolution in some areas of autonomous policy such as education,
housing and health, reinforced by distinctive Scottish institutions such as the legal
and education systems and led by Scottish elites in the form of politicians, business
men, civil servants, lawyers and academics (Brown et al. 1998, p. 109). While
acknowledging that Scotland has long had its own interest groups and policy
communities, Keating (2002) notes that there has been an important change in style
and operation since devolution. These groups now have to confront each other in an
open political system, vying for attention and resources and, according to Keating,
many groups have found the transition from lobbyist to participant in the policy¬
making process difficult: in the past they could simply raise issues whereas now they
are asked how they would improve the situation. While there has been a growth in
think tanks, Keating points to a remaining shortage ofpolicy-making capacity in civil
society.
It was intended that the Scottish Parliament's committees would play a significant
role and draw in many more actors to the policy process, leading to more open
government and proper democratic oversight of government quangos. Committees
are where individual petitions are considered, and where individuals and civic
14 Does the Scottish Parliament Matter? Mark Shephard, University of Strathclyde. University of
Edinburgh, Social Policy Seminar, 5 December 2003.
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organisations may be called to give written or oral evidence to help Committees
reach their views (Scottish Civic Forum 2003). Committees are encouraged to
engage with civic society; to increase their visibility to the public, and help the
Parliament meet its commitment to being open and accessible. Funds are available
to committees for such activities, and they are encouraged to try different methods,
locations and formats in doing this. The Scottish Civic Forum {ibid.) cites as an
example of this the work of the Procedures Committee, which recently published a
report on how the Parliament was performing in terms of sharing power,
accountability, accessibility and equal opportunities. The report was informed by
three public meetings (Hawick, Paisley and Ullapool), by oral evidence from 100
witnesses, and by the written submissions of 230 groups and individuals.
Of greater relevance to STI policy, the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee
experimented with various methods of evidence gathering and engaging with the
public and stakeholders beyond formal committee meetings (Enterprise and Lifelong
Learning Committee 2003). These included Case Study Visits where small cross-
party groups of committee members examined aspects of the inquiry subject at a
local level, allowing members to talk direct to businesses, students, employees, etc.
rather than hearing solely from their representative organisations.
The Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee also held Conventions of
Stakeholders such as the Business in the Chamber event in October 2000 where
around 100 invited businesses debated the Interim Report on Local Economic
Development Services and voted on its interim conclusions. The event led to some
changes in the Committee's recommendations, particularly on business advisers.
Stakeholders also participated in pre-report debate workshops. Prior to the
Parliamentary debate on the Committee's New Economy Report the Committee
arranged a small workshop with participants from the new technology and financial
services sectors which sought the views of the industries so that they could be taken
into account and introduced into the debate.
The Committee reports (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee 2003) that
such events have resulted in significant changes in their thinking on some important
95
issues, and have helped to generate a consensus within the relevant sector, noting
that:
This is more likely to create confidence in the committee's
recommendations within the Scottish Executive and beyond and increase
the likelihood of their implementation (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning
Committee 2003)
One of the fears voiced by critics was that the open committee system might simply
give unprecedented opportunities for pressure groups to lobby rather than genuinely
opening up the policy process to groups that have never previously been involved
(Brown et al. 1998, p. 122) and indeed many groups have sought to strengthen their
policy capacity by hiring researchers, policy consultants and parliamentary liaison
officers. They have also sought to reorient their lobbying and networks to take
account of the new three level politics (Keating 2002) and many national (UK) level
representative bodies have now opened Scottish offices or Scottish branches.
Turning from the Scottish Parliament to the Scottish Executive, the Framework for
Economic Development in Scotland (FEDS) (Scottish Executive 2000a), described in
Section 3.4.1 above, is couched in terms ofworking in partnership with the agencies
of the Executive, the local authorities, the various business and academic groups, and
individual enterprises and talks of formulating policy "in close collaboration and
after a detailed dialogue with all other key interested bodies" (Scottish Executive
2000a, p.76). These interested bodies include:
those who already have implementation responsibilities in the field of
economic development, those who seek to increase our knowledge from
the academic standpoint, those who are customers and active in business,
and others with key insights to contribute (Scottish Executive 2000a,
p.76)
FEDS also acknowledges (ibid., p.29) that the public sector may have a role to play
in facilitating the development of institutional networks that are not always self-
generated within the private sector, noting that such networks can promote the flow
of information, knowledge and collaboration that contributes to the lowering of the
costs of doing business and opens up opportunities for further advances in
productivity.
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However, the language and tone of the document suggest that it is still the
Executive's view which is to be imposed:
What is important in any partnership is a clear delineation of the
problem and the respective responsibilities of those involved and this is
what the Framework must stimulate. It must also define the priorities that
should shape detailed thinking and action. It is because of the
importance of partnership and collaboration throughout all areas of
economic activity that achieving a common understanding of the way
forward and of the Economic Framework is so important (Scottish
Executive 2000a, p.3).
FEDS describes how the Executive must seek to influence the contributions of other
bodies whose activities have an important impact on progress towards the
Executive's vision and objectives, but which rest outwith the direct control of the
Executive stating that:
The Framework seeks to embrace all the channels through which these
objectives might be addressed by moving towards a systematic, well-
directed and coherent approach to its influencing activities (Scottish
Executive 2000a, p.74)
in particular in the private sector where:
...the Government may feel it has no direct policy or expenditure role
but, nonetheless, wishes to exhort and catalyse private sector decision¬
makers into pursuing particular objectives within their enterprises
(Scottish Executive 2000a, p.74)
FEDS identifies four target groupings for such influencing: other public sector
agencies within Scotland with an interest in economic development; the Scottish
private sector; Whitehall Departments with responsibilities and powers that bear on
Scottish objectives (particularly with respect to UK macroeconomic, employment
and tax/benefit policy); and the EU. But the implication is that these groupings are
to be influenced by government policy rather than government policy being
influenced by these groups. Each grouping is "playing a key role in the achievement
of the Executive's objectives'" (emphasis added) (Scottish Executive 2000a, p.74)
rather than a true sense of working together to identify jointly the objectives in the
first instance.
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Finally, FEDS talks about how to raise the quality of policy-making and of spending
decisions through enhanced monitoring, evaluation and feedback (Scottish Executive
2000a, p.80) but does not appear to consider the benefits to policy-making of
involving users in the initial stages. While the Parliament does actually seem to be
"walking the talk" in terms of wider participation in the policy-making process,
albeit in policy areas other than STI, the Scottish Executive still seems to be
entrenched in the rhetoric of partnership without actually yet demonstrating real
commitment to the engagement of policy targets in setting the policy agenda.
Interviews with business leaders (Brown and McCrone 1999) showed that the
division of powers between the Scottish Parliament and Westminster may have a
differential effect on business in Scotland depending on size, sector of business and
other factors. Large firms based in Scotland that are generally owned and regulated
at the UK and EU levels and trade in UK and global markets thus tend to focus the
attention of their representative groups at UK level but do need to pay more attention
to the Scottish level than in the past (Keating 2002). Small firms tend to be locally
owned, trade locally and are more dependent on local enterprise support services.
They also tend to be less well integrated into UK-wide networks of influence hence
are more focused on the Scottish level of governance, although this may not hold true
for the more globally-oriented biotechnology SMEs that are the focus of the
empirical part of this study.
Business groups are fairly unanimous in opposing anything that could be seen as
erecting economic barriers within the UK, which makes them a force for policy
convergence (Keating 2002). At the same time, in small countries like Scotland,
informal contacts and personal networks are likely to be important due to the overlap
of elites, as is the growing emphasis on microeconomic rather than macroeconomic
factors such as creating partnership between government and business to facilitate
local economic development (Brown and McCrone 1999). Brown and McCrone
{ibid.) note that modern government is multi-layered and business has to address
issues at different levels local/Scottish/UK/Europe as well as global. In this context
it is simply not an option for business in Scotland to "do nothing".
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Prior to devolution, commentators suggested that the borrowing of ideas for policy
from elsewhere would gradually become more acceptable so that sources of policy
would become more diverse, both because of new ways in which civil society would
be able to influence it and because Scottish policy-makers would be more relaxed
about seeking inspiration from other places (Brown et al. 1998, p. 123). Chapter 4
will test whether this suggestion is borne out by the experience of policy targets since
devolution.
3.8 Reprise
STI policy today is no longer just a matter of resource allocation for research as it
was in the early days of UK science policy. It is now a complex process involving
multi-level governance at the national, sub-national and supra-national levels, which
requires careful co-ordination to ensure effective policy integration. While
discussions of competitiveness policy preoccupy national government, as much or
more attention is necessary at the regional level in areas such as university education,
infrastructure, and local research initiatives. Some argue that today the role of
regional government is potentially as great or greater than the role of national
government in ensuring competitive advantage (Porter 1990, p.622). This chapter
has introduced the key institutional actors and has discussed their role in the Scottish
system of innovation. It has demonstrated that, as a newly devolved region, Scotland
faces a tough challenge to co-ordinate strategies for science, technology and
innovation within this system across the multiple tiers of Scottish, UK and European
policy and has posited that its scope for success may be limited by the constraints of
the devolution settlement.
However, it has also demonstrated that the new system of governance provides an
added impetus for developing new ways of working, with coalition government
encouraging more consensual working practices. There are stated commitments to
partnership and evidence-based policy at both UK and Scottish levels and, in
Scotland, the Parliament has already demonstrated that it is capable of innovative
forms ofpolicy engagement with stakeholders although not, as yet, in areas related to
STI policy.
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Scotland is a small country with a population of under five million concentrated
within the central belt which facilitates linkages within this regional system of
innovation and affords multiple opportunities for networking and interactions
between policy-makers and policy targets. In terms of existing institutions, there are
several government agencies in Scotland working towards the exploitation of
knowledge for economic benefit that are apparently committed to working with each
other and with stakeholders and have a track record in attempting to "join up" STI
policy through, for example, the Technology Ventures Scotland initiative.
Devolution has further encouraged the emergence of new network builders in the
form of industry representative bodies that are seeking to expand their policy role.
Having explored the nature of the Scottish system of innovation, Chapter 4 will now
seek to establish whether these factors provide the right conditions for actors within
the SSI to coalesce into an effective policy-making network for STI policy in
Scotland.
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Chapter 4 Scottish Policy Networks: Extant, Extinct or Emergent?
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 has described how regional boundaries and distinct institutions and policy
agendas confer on Scotland a characteristic regional system of innovation which
affords multiple opportunities for networking and interactions between policy¬
makers and policy targets. Coupled with the coalition nature of Scottish government
and the concurrent character of many aspects of science and innovation policy, one
might infer that Scotland should offer a set of circumstances congenial to the
operation of policy networks as outlined in Chapter 2 and that such networks would
facilitate policy integration within the Scottish system of innovation.
As previously discussed, Scotland has a long-established and well resourced regional
development agency, unparalleled in the rest of the UK, combined with the
intellectual property and know-how of a world-class research base. Optimists
believe that devolution has spurred activity and describe a sea change in relationships
between the relevant STI actors from the academic, industrial and financial sectors
where senior people across a range of sectoral boundaries are seeing the benefit of a
well-devised and reasonably integrated strategy. The pessimists, on the other hand,
still see a yawning chasm of understanding between these actors.
Policy targets stress the need for consistency and transparency of government policy
and the avoidance of a multiplicity of different innovation support schemes.
Although the government is seen as much more pro-science than previously, an
attitude that is filtering down to intervention and support at a local level, there is still
a tendency amongst policy-makers to favour policy initiation over policy delivery.
Nor is the Scottish biotechnology sector a homogeneous group. Many of these small
companies do not yet understand how the wider world impacts on them and do not
have significant policy concerns; those in the middle of their development phase are
more concerned with business opportunities and perhaps local incentives and cultural
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barriers for entrepreneurs; while mature companies are concerned about financial
initiatives and international regulatory environments. This presents a challenge for
the trade bodies trying to impart a joint view to policy-makers (Interview with
industry representative, 1030702).
Although formal and informal links exist between policy-makers and stakeholders,
there is historically less of a consensus-seeking tradition in UK politics than in some
other European countries such as Germany as we shall see in Chapter 6. But is this
now changing in Scotland with its coalition government and are Scottish policy
institutions embracing the opportunities for change offered by devolution? Policy¬
makers publicly concede to giving the "impression if not reality that we are involved
with the community" and "facilitating network rhetoric"1 and one could question
whether the explosion of intermediary organisations in Scotland actually facilitates
or hinders effective, direct interaction between these players.
As outlined in Chapter 1, Chapter 4 is the main empirical chapter and presents the
findings from the survey of policy-makers and policy targets which set out to
investigate whether self-organising policy networks for STI policy exist or are
emerging in Scotland post-devolution. This survey took the form of a series of semi-
structured, qualitative interviews steered by a topic guide (see Appendix), which
aimed to explore, through a series of relatively open-ended questions, whose voices
are heard by policy-makers, whether a coherent policy network exists and what
processes are used to influence the policy agenda within the multi-level governance
context. By seeking answers from the interview data to the questions outlined in
Table 4.1, this chapter examines the status of policy networks in Scotland and
attempts to gauge whether the impact of Scottish devolution on the government to
governance shift is borne out in reality. (The research method and analytical
techniques are discussed in more depth in Chapter 1 and further illustrations of the
data analysis approach are given in the Appendix.)
1 Public remarks from Scottish Enterprise representative at Scottish Enterprise/Scottish Development
International Seminar, Stirling, 16 January 2003.
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Table 4.1 Analytical framework
• Who participates in policy-making at the regional level in Scotland and through
what mechanisms are policy targets engaging in the policy process in Scotland?
• Has participation in the policy-making process been facilitated by the
establishment of the Scottish Parliament?
• Is there evidence that this engagement is leading to the formation of a distinct
Scottish policy network for STI?
• Is there any evidence of changes in practice or outcomes ("policy learning") as a
result of this dialogue between policy-makers and policy targets?
4.2 Policy participants and mechanisms
4.2.1 Ad hoc consultation
In the UK, interaction with stakeholders has traditionally been seen as consulting in
an ad hoc way on each particular issue rather than an ongoing interaction with users:
in Britain politicians will ask for your opinion when they want it and have
traditionally not had mechanisms for dealing with uninvited information (Interview
with European policy-maker, P240902). This seems to be the opposite side of the
coin from the "small country neurosis which makes [Scottish] businesses
instinctively recoil from too close an association with political players" (Baur 2002).
Although the theory of participative policy-making has been discussed for a long
time, this way of making policy remains relatively untested and there is still a
tendency for all government levels to equate "consultation" with "engagement".
However, in many cases, consultation is at least a step forward (Interview with
European policy-maker, P240902) even if respondents describe participation in the
policy-making process through consultation as "surprisingly minimal and poor"
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(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603). Policy consultation is frequently still
seen in terms of inviting people to an event:
we ran a seminar and attracted...40, 50 people to come along to hear a
few people speaking and then we split down into working groups and as
a result a report was produced about actions that might be useful
(Interview with policy-maker, PI80203)
and stakeholder engagement is often only apparent at the end of the policy process in
the context ofmandatory policy evaluation (Interview with policy-maker, PI70403).
The advantage of stakeholder consultation from the policy-makers' point of view
seemed to be as a way of ensuring an easy ride:
we knew there might be sensitivities and we thought, we will go to town
on this, we '11 not try and push this through without the involvement and
the backing of the research community. And as a result, it's all, so far,
touch wood, it's all gone through very smoothly (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI 80203)
So although these types of activities appear to be involving the right stakeholders,
this type of engagement, where events are at the policy-makers' behest, seems to fall
short of a policy network because it is primarily government actors who set the
agenda.
While there is recognition by government that there needs to be more dialogue with
stakeholders, this type of ad hoc consultation activity can, in fact, produce negative
consequences and exasperation with the "endless rounds of discussion papers on
which one is asked to comment" (Interview with academic, A220403) and the
constant reviews that do not appear to produce any results (Interview with service
provider, 1150702).
Despite this apparent avalanche of consultation, it is recognised within the Scottish
Executive that other countries in the EU are traditionally more consultative (for
example, prior to the implementation of regulation) and are better at involving
coalitions and social partnerships, such that the policies that emerge reflect
consensus (Interview with policy-maker, P280202). The UK, even after devolution,
is still more centralised and the top-down approach persists where policy targets are
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simply told what the Scottish Executive intends to do (Interviews with service
provider, 1020503; biotechnology CEO, 1280802; and policy-maker, P280202).
This consultation process is, itself, often seen as flawed, as one respondent described:
[the consultation] was only open for two weeks... in the middle ofAugust
-you know, the peak holiday time...Ifyou were cynical, one might say
they were doing that at a time where they wouldn't get too much
interference and we have yet to have any response to our submission to
that (Interview with service provider, 1020503)
4.2.2 Bilateral relationships
Ad hoc consultation is therefore a one-way process that allows policy targets to
participate in policy-making, however imperfectly. The next level appears to be the
development of bilateral relationships either with individual firms or universities or,
more usually, their representative bodies. Here some organisations have achieved a
more formal and recurring contact with policy-makers at various levels within the
Scottish Executive, either with civil servants or Ministers, where discussions are of
an ongoing nature and the representative body is able to flag up forthcoming issues
• • • • 2
(Interview with university representative, A110303) .
While some might criticise "how little effort many Scottish companies are making to
learn about - let alone engage directly in - Scotland's government" (Baur 2002),
some of the larger Scottish players do have more formalised dealings with the
Scottish Executive and Scottish Enterprise but these still tend to be demand driven,
i.e. at the request of the policy target (Interviews with university representative,
A311002 and policy-maker, P240303). However, such formalised interactions did
not appear to be the norm and were most usual where there was a funding
relationship between the Scottish Executive and the policy target. Interactions with
civil servants were often just seen as "teeing up Ministerial involvement in some
way" with little interaction at a policy level (Interview with service provider,
2
In particular, some stakeholder groups on the more social or general business side (for example,
STUC and COSLA) have formalised their relationship with the Executive in the form of a
Memorandum of Understanding which provides a formal structure for relationships and discussions
with the Executive and for them to influence policy.
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1160702). Thus, engagement with policy targets most often revolves around briefing
a Minister for a forthcoming event or company visit and, although civil servants see
this as engaging with users (Interview with policy-maker, PI80203), it is not a very
overt way of involving policy targets in the development of policy. Furthermore,
access to the relevant Minister was seen as increasingly problematic since the early
days of devolution (Interview with service provider, 1150702). Although generally
attributed to the large Enterprise and Lifelong Learning (ELL) portfolio, there was
also a hint that civil servants are sometimes obstructive:
I would like to see more interaction there but again, to get access to the
Minister, you 're stalled by your civil servants and I know that his diary is
very full and it can be very difficult (Interview with policy adviser,
P280203)
Officials report "no shortage of contact" in the form of bilateral meetings with bodies
such as CBI and the universities but recognise that a networked, multilateral type of
interaction might be desirable:
one of the things that...I think we've been recognising within the
Executive is that there's probably much more that we could do - not so
much in terms of bilateral relationships with individual
organisations ...but on a more multilateral, joined up sort ofway - you
know, when we talk to the CBI, do we talk to others at the same time as
part of a similar group and are there ways of improving multilateral
relationships rather than bilateral? (Interview with policy-maker,
P020403)
4.2.3 Active engagement?
Navigating the labyrinthine civil service seems to be problematic even for the
professional lobby groups (Interview with industry representative, 1260602) although
relations with civil servants are most usually described as cordial and open
(Interviews with industry representative, 1260602; biotechnology CEO, 1090603; and
service provider, 1020503). Successful interactions with Ministers are seen as being
dependent on that individual's personality and interests (Interview with directors of
research institutes, R290702 and R210203). Many respondents commented on the
time required to build up a relationship with Ministers and expressed irritation at the
lack of continuity and consistency of support where Ministers, and to a lesser extent,
106
civil servants, do not stay in post long enough to develop a good working
relationship. Such a turnover of staff results in institutional memory being lost with
inevitable, negative consequences for policy learning. In this context respondents
also highlighted the importance of long-term relationships that lead to trust
(Interviews with biotechnology CEOs 1090603, 1280802 and 1120203; and with
service providers 1020503 and 1150702), a point that is further discussed in the
contrasting case ofGerman STI policy (Chapter 6):
somebody is given a job to do something and because there is such a
turnover ofpeople then they 're almost at a startingfromfirst principles I
suppose all the time (Interview with service provider, 1020503)
I know who I'm dealing with [at the DTI] [but] with Scottish Enterprise
it's different names every time, looking after different things, not quite
sure who. A lot ofmovement in terms ofpeople andfunctionality which I
have to say I don't really understand (Interview with biotechnology
CEO, 1280802)
I'm on my second Chief Medical Officer and my second ChiefScientist
and I think the third Minister for Health and the second for Enterprise
and Lifelong Learning (Interview with academic, A220403)
Another respondent emphasised the importance of regular and sustained contact with
policy-makers otherwise "you lose touch very, very quickly, you know, once you're
out of that swim for three to six months" (Interview with university representative,
A311002).
Industry very clearly sees the advantage of developing a long-term dialogue with
policy-makers. Their representative bodies regard this type of two-way dialogue as a
way of avoiding potential crises in their industry and in essence describe their
aspirations for a fully functioning policy network (Interview with industry
representative, 1040702) which, as we shall see in Chapter 6, appears to work better
in some industries and at some levels of governance than others.
At the same time, policy-makers in parts of the Scottish Executive do express a sense
of obligation to at least listen to users' views:
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There's a general sense of, you know, we should really meet anybody
that seeks a meeting with us in a completely open way...if they think they
want to talk to us, well, let's hear what they've got to say (Interview with
policy-maker, PI40403)
But the question still remains as to the extent to which the Scottish Executive
actively seeks to engage in an ongoing dialogue with its user community. One
respondent, who reported virtually no engagement with government departments or
agencies and no dealings with MSPs, typifies the attitudes of the sector when he said
that, if invited, he would be happy to advise government or to take part in a working
party but that he had never been approached by government to do so:
I will help Scotland when asked. But I just don't have the time to go
knocking on doors saying how can we help because it's hard enough in
the current economic climate running this company (Interview with
biotechnology CEO, 1280802)
There is undoubtedly more dialogue with 22 Scottish Ministers in comparison with
the much smaller number prior to devolution so there are many more opportunities
for interaction but, in reality, the number ofMinisters who have a direct involvement
in policy-making as it affects business are few in number and the social agenda has
tended to dominate much more of the Executive's policy agenda in the first session
of the Parliament (Interview with policy-maker, P240303). Policy-makers express
the view that there is much more interaction between business and government than
ever before and opportunities for a much wider range of businesses to meet Ministers
in Scotland now than was the case prior to devolution. These Ministers are seen as
being "much closer to the grass roots of what's happening in Scotland" than
previously and "have an opportunity to take account of the views much more than
they had before" (Interview with policy-maker, P240303).
Respondents described interactions with the various departments of the Scottish
Executive, the Scottish Enterprise network and also at the UK level with DEFRA,
Department of Health, Home Office and DTI. Where these were largely resource
dependent and not overtly policy relationships these were seen to be entirely
satisfactory and complementary:
108
I mean, we do have a very close and good working relationship with
Scottish Enterprise Edinburgh and Lothian...The resource input...it's
been a partnership and they've got back from us, in terms of spin-out
companies and so on, I think what they wanted (Interview with director
of research institute, R210203)
There was a perception that the Scottish Executive is more willing to engage than
Scottish Enterprise:
With the Scottish Executive...you have a constructive dialogue. It's
positive and it is as open as it can be. With Scottish Enterprise, there's
always a challenge to establish dialogue in the first place. There's
always a challenge to find out who you should actually be establishing a
dialogue with - and there's always a challenge to actually get them to
listen to you, to actually engage (Interview with service provider,
1020503)
Some firms seemed to find it more productive to go directly to the Ministerial level
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603) although others found that such direct
links were not good (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1291002) which perhaps
demonstrates the privileged access that some firms, and some individuals, have over
others as discussed below (see Section 4.5.2).
During the course of these interviews with policy-makers and policy targets, multiple
avenues for approaching government, either unilaterally or through a representative
body, were mentioned including:
• MSP visits and placements with industry
• Proactive briefings and one-to-one meetings with MSPs and party workers
• Government - industry interaction through the administration of grant aid
schemes or assistance such as RSA, SMART, SPUR
• Private dinner meetings with the Minister involving university research directors,
people from industry, and Scottish Enterprise
• Indirect routes to influencing, for example, the Treasury via interactions with
venture capitalists
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Evidence presented by the Scottish Civic Forum suggests that the majority of people
who have contact with the Scottish Parliament are happy with the experience but that
the workings of the civil service are often incomprehensible and officials are seen to
act as gate-keepers, a point to which we shall return in Section 7.4. While people
apparently do feel engaged in the democratic process, they want an ongoing
relationship with policy-makers and urge them to get participation right at an earlier
stage. If anything, people tend to feel over-consulted but not consulted at an early
enough stage so that the impression is often that the consultation document is in its
final form. The Scottish Civic Forum {ibid.) points out that information sharing is
not consultation and, furthermore, consultation is not the same as participation.
There is a clear need for effective feedback so that those consulted can understand
how their input is analysed in order to demonstrate how external contributions
influence policy. Significantly, a key theme of the Scottish Civic Forum's research
deals with engagement with committees and cross-party groups but few policy
targets interviewed for this current study had had any contact with individual MSPs
other than Ministers and although the committee work was seen as much quicker and
more accessible in Holyrood than in Westminster, there was no reported contact
between policy targets and these Parliamentary committees, presumably because the
majority of policy affecting this industry is not the responsibility of the Scottish
Parliament.
However, scepticism remains about the outcome of all of these types of interactions
and their ultimate impact on policy:
We do have a lot ofdiscussion; we do have a lot ofcontact. I'm not sure
it goes anywhere (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1120203)
while others criticise the one-way nature of the interaction:
I was invited to a Lifelong Learning and Enterprise meeting at the end of
last year in the Grand Hall at the Castle and I stood there along with a
crowd of others for some considerable time, sipping white wine, eating
3
Scottish Civic Forum Event, Scottish Parliament, 25 November 2003.
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canapes and then the Minister ...came in, gave a rousing speech and then
left. I don 7 think I'll be going to another one. I'm more than happy to
hear about what's happening but, you know, I'm not interested in the ra-
ra, to be honest (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1280802)
For the biotechnology industry, in particular, there are issues about company
maturity: small firms do not have the time or the personnel available to take part in
lengthy policy interactions. While the larger companies have dedicated staff tasked
with government liaison who understand the multi-level nature of science and
innovation policy, smaller firms admit that they do not understand the intricacies of
the policy process and rely on bodies such as the BIA to represent their views
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1291002). The biotechnology sector is
fragmented and in an earlier stage of evolution than the pharmaceutical industry
which is more homogeneous and can act in a more concerted manner. Although
there was seen to be the intellectual capacity in biotechnology to develop an
organised approach, this was felt to be hampered by the heterogeneous leadership of
companies "a mishmash of scientists through to development people through to
commercial" (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1280802). More seriously, despite
the fact that a lot of policy is being made in the name of these small technology-
based companies, policy-makers do not always seem to see the necessity to engage
them in the process:
biotech SMEs are still too small to influence, I would think, or be at that
stage where they need to influence seriously perhaps (Interview with
policy-maker, P280303)
This means that smaller companies do not have a voice if the DTI engages primarily
with the BIA which is regarded as representing only the larger, well-established
firms (Interview with industry representative, 1040603). Within the companies
themselves there can be a fatalistic tendency to believe that, however loud they
shout, they cannot change the situation and that it is better to focus their energies on
developing their business and just accept the policy environment as it is (Interview
with service provider, 1160702). Even those companies who understand the political
scene and have multiple interactions with MSPs and Scottish Ministers do not feel
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that they have a great deal of influence on policy matters that really affect their
business (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1120203).
Universities are also viewed by some as disadvantaged in the process of influencing
policy:
there's no doubt at all in my mind that there is a very clear route of
contact through OST, DTIfor industry to lobby and it is quite clear that
they know the avenues and use their own corporate position...But I
would argue that perhaps the universities aren't given the same kind of
hearing, yet they are a major contributor to education, wealth and
employment (Interview with academic, A220403)
These interviews demonstrate that interactions between policy-makers and policy
targets do take place in Scotland and that there are various mechanisms for doing so:
I think if I really wanted to, you could be heard. No question of that
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1291002)
However, the tendency to use consultation as a substitute for ongoing, collaborative
engagement prevails. Lobbying can have an impact but sometimes this can be to
correct policy disasters that have come about because of lack of prior consultation:
instead of having open dialogue to help form the delivery of a policy,
they [Scottish Enterprise] almost decide on delivery in a vacuum or in
isolation, or making unilateral decisions about how policy should be
delivered ...Instead of[consulting us at] an informative stage, we have to
lobby at Ministerial, senior Scottish Enterprise board level and it's only
by lobbying those levels to get literally the Scottish Enterprise board to
question Scottish Enterprise's executive - why are you delivering this
stuffwhen there's no market failure - are we actually getting any results
(Interview with service provider, 1020503)
4.3 The impact of devolution
So far there is the feeling that the Parliament has left the Scottish biotechnology
sector well alone. Devolution may, in fact, be less relevant to the biotechnology
sector because most significant policy is still reserved to Westminster and scope for
major change may have been limited by pre-existing institutions such as the regional
development agency (Interviews with academic, A220403; researcher from NHS
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facility, R021002; industry representative, 1040603; and biotechnology CEO,
1090603). Many see the Parliament as quite irrelevant, the tiers of government either
above or below being the ones that matter:
Asfar as the Scottish Parliament's concerned, I'm honestly not sure what
influence it has on anything... the area that concerns me most, both
positively and negatively I think, are the [local] Councils...planning,
infrastructure, transport (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1120203)
Some partially credit devolution with invigorating Scottish Enterprise by exposing it
to greater Ministerial scrutiny and enabling greater interaction between the RDA and
policy-makers and Ministers (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1291002). Others
are more emphatic:
I'm sure it's given the Scotland players a greater sense ofpurpose, a
greater sense of self-determination and strengthened...it's given
Ministerial backing to what they do, given a greater flexibility (Interview
with industry representative, 1030702)
Devolution has certainly given greater flexibility to both the Scottish Executive and
bodies such as SHEFC and Scottish Enterprise, particularly in terms of funding,
where ELLD is credited with kick-starting a number of initiatives that would
possibly not have occurred pre-devolution (Interviews with service provider,
1150702 and university representative, A311002).
Devolution has therefore brought new opportunities, but potentially also a new threat
as far as the biotechnology industry is concerned by introducing new layers of
governance that may be increasingly problematic as companies get nearer to market
and worry that the Scottish health system might present an extra, unhelpful layer of
bureaucracy. In this respect, dealings with policy-makers have become more
complex because companies now have to negotiate these multiple levels of
governance:
if [the Scottish] Parliament started to meddle, then it would very rapidly
increase the complexity oflife without many offsetting benefits (Interview
with biotechnology CEO, 1090603)
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Officials, on the other hand, see devolution as simplifying the situation: in many
respects Scottish government was always a rather opaque, two-tier system and
devolution has actually clarified policy roles and remits for both policy-makers and
the wider world and had a positive impact on science because it has raised its profile
and taken a more strategic view (Interview with policy-maker, PI80203). Thus,
devolution has enabled the Scottish Executive to debate and promote science and
innovation in a way that would not have been possible before because there was not
the interest from Ministers who were fewer in number and more focused on activities
in Whitehall (Interview with policy-maker, PI80203).
But as far as the DTI is concerned, devolution has had little impact as most major
strategic policy issues are UK-led and firms favour engagement with central
government over the devolved administrations (Interview with policy-maker,
P280303). Moreover, most biotechnology businesses are probably more concerned
by the constraints of corporate "red tape" on a day-to-day basis than on issues
specific to the biotechnology industry and these policy areas remain, by and large,
reserved to Westminster (Interview with service provider, 1160702).
Others complain that devolution has merely brought a lot of displacement activity
(Interview with university representative, A200203). While the support systems for
biotechnology have increased with many institutions organising themselves on a
Scottish level (Interview with European policy-maker, P240902), the real issue
remains the lack of understanding by politicians of the key issues affecting the
biotechnology industry because politicians generally take a short-term view and
therefore focus on "inappropriate metrics", such as numbers of jobs and numbers of
companies (Interview with university representative, A200203).
In many respects, Scotland is striving to get the best of both worlds from devolution.
On the one hand, in terms of research funding, the universities want to remain part of
the UK science base (Interview with policy-maker, PI70403). On the other hand,
Scotland is trying to innovate with initiatives, such as the Proof of Concept fund, in
order to capture value from Scotland's research excellence and address the imbalance
between research excellence and a business base that under-invests in R&D
114
(Interview with policy-maker, P070302). Scotland therefore seeks to use whatever
approach is more advantageous - to wave the Saltire where appropriate or to be a
small part of a big country, when that is more beneficial (Interview with European
policy-maker, P240902). Businesses "want consistency in areas where it doesn't
bring them any competitive advantage. If they believe there's a competitive
advantage and difference then that's fine" (Interview with policy-maker, P070302).
Above all, biotechnology is a global industry that recognises the dangers in being
isolationist if too much reliance is placed on the Scottish agenda (Interview with
industry representative, 1030702).
Many of the differences do seem to work to Scotland's advantage and users in the
higher education sector, for example, have seen the benefits that devolution can bring
with the Cubie settlement4, increases in research funding, Proof of Concept funding,
Scottish Enterprise/RSE Fellowships, and the support provided by the LECs. These
additional funding mechanisms are the envy of research institutes in England and
Wales and have increased support for divergence among the research sector
(Interviews with director of research institute, R290702, and university
representative, A110303)5.
4.3.1 Increased consensus?
The voting process for the Scottish Parliament sets the tone for a more consensual
way of working (Interview with university representative, A110303) and some civil
servants do see the Parliament as an agent for inclusivity in policy-making and a key
part of the policy development process (Interview with policy-maker, P020403).
This difference was attributed by one observer as being the result of consensus
politics:
The committees are more powerful. They're also more balanced in terms
of numbers and if the committees are going to achieve anything in
Scotland, they have to do some consensus building... Therefore they all
4
Regarding the Scottish Parliament's decisions about student fees.
5
However, the debate about university top-up fees is a current cause for concern amongst Scottish
HEIs.
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have to do the same kind of give and take and...the outcome...is that
when a committee says something...the Minister does have to listen way,
way more than they have to listen to the Select Committee in England.
So...when the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee take an
interest in commercialisation, the Minister can't just shrug it off. It
forces the Minister to do things that they otherwise wouldn't have. Now,
those structures have meant that the Parliament has done things it
wouldn't - that no government would have done. So that's the first
aspect in which devolution has made a difference (Interview with
university representative, A110303)
Officials would like to believe that Scottish government has always been more
consultative, criticising Whitehall departments for devising policies without
consultation. Partly, this is ascribed to geography where it is possible in Scotland to
consult with all the key people in one room: "we've always been more consensual
because you can get people in and talk it round with them and, you know, avoid
some of the depth charges" (Interviews with policy-makers, PI 403 03 and P260203).
Although access to government agencies is seen as being significantly easier in
Scotland than it is in the rest of the UK (Interview with biotechnology CEO,
1120203) this may simply be a factor of size and is not necessarily a result of
devolution.
The scale factor undoubtedly makes a difference in the way that policies can be
developed and implemented in Scotland (Interview with policy-maker, P070302):
the "inertia of government" may be less because there are fewer people to bring on
board (Interview with industry representative, 1030702), there is a greater possibility
for ongoing dialogue (Interview with academic, A220403) and more scope for multi-
agency partnerships, for example between funding bodies (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI 30503):
The small is beautiful -potential to innovate rapidly because we 're small
- is definitely there (Interview with academic, A220403)
This fact can be exploited by brokering organisations such as the Royal Society of
Edinburgh which are also seen as being unique to Scotland (Interview with policy¬
maker, P260203).
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The weakness of this model is, as discussed later in Section 4.5.2, that there is a
limited pool of people on whom to call and a danger of losing depth and diversity
(Interviews with academic, A220403 and policy-maker, P140303). There is also the
danger of adopting a parochial outlook:
Research is an internationally competitive endeavour and to play the
little Scotlander card is fundamentally to he missing the point on science
policy. So that we've always viewed that side of it with a degree of
anxiety (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403)
4.3.2 The role of Ministers
Devolution has increased the interactions between officials in the Scottish Executive
and Scottish Enterprise and between civil servants and MSPs6 and it has brought
more direct Ministerial contact with government agencies and their user
communities. Hence simply in terms of osmosis, the fact that Ministers are exposed
to the biotechnology industry on a fairly regular basis and civil servants work more
frequently with Ministers, there should be greater opportunities for policy targets to
influence policy (Interviews with policy-maker, P260203 and director of research
institute, R290702).
Potentially, Scottish companies are at an advantage in that they have more immediate
access to Ministers but there is a danger of raising expectations:
[Ministers must] work to maintain that because that... is one of the huge
advantages and ifyou can get accessibility, you at least believe that you
have a greater chance of changing policy (Interview with service
provider, 1150702)
If users engage in the policy-making process and do see that it can have a positive
impact, they will be more willing to take part in the future (Interview with university
representative, A110303) but the question remains as to whether this interaction with
Ministers truly does have an impact or is it the case that "if you're in tricky job, you
6 In particular, list MSPs who do not necessarily have constituency concerns to deal with and are more
likely to take an interest in other issues.
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want to talk to people whose views are consonant with yours" (Interview with
biotechnology CEO, 1140802)?
Devolution has brought with it policy legitimacy. In terms of science and innovation
policy, Scotland is coming out from under the wing of the DTI and allowing the
Executive to control the agenda rather than hanging on to the DTI's coat-tails and
"tartanising" policies developed at the UK level (Interviews with policy-makers
PI40303 and PI70403). Under the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Executive has
conducted a series of reviews, notably the review of the Enterprise networks and the
publication of Smart Successful Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001b), discussed in
Chapter 3, which created the framework for economic development in Scotland and
set out the broad policy guidance to the Enterprise network at a level that had never
been provided before by the Scottish Office (Interview with policy-maker, PI70403).
Whereas the Scottish Office was a federal organisation with departments reporting
directly to the Secretary of State, the departments within the Scottish Executive
report to a Cabinet Minister and there is (at least in theory) parallel machinery
through the First Minister and the Cabinet as a whole to liaise with departments and
co-ordinate activities (Interview with policy-maker, P020403). But the biggest
change is seen to be the way Ministers have thought about their role differently and
strategically and want to be inclusive both with stakeholders and users of public
services (Interview with policy-maker, P020403):
I think it's devolution that's made a big impact and it's devolution more
than the Parliament that's had the impact (Interview with policy-maker,
P020403)
while there's personality differences between the Ministers and there's
been policy differences, if there's a theme, it's that they want to be
participatory and they want to prove the worth ofthe Parliament - of the
devolution changes and to do that, they have to be seen to be doing
things (Interview with policy-maker, P020403)
Many of the drivers for change could be attributed to the change ofUK government
from Conservative to Labour (Interviews with policy-makers, PI70403, P020403 and
PI40303) but although the Ministers have changed, is it the case that the civil service
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is carrying on as before, held back by the institutional inertia of a public sector
bureaucracy? The Scottish civil service is, by and large, staffed by the same people
that worked under the previous regime and while they might embrace the idea of
devolution, many may be continuing in a "business as usual mindset". Some
respondents question whether enough attention was paid in pre-devolution
discussions to learning a new, participative working method that developed the
outward-looking, public side of policy-making that Ministers profess to espouse
when many civil servants have their whole work experience in a pre-devolution civil
service environment and may feel that their work is essentially unchanged (Interview
with European policy-maker, P240902).
Many have criticised the calibre of politics and politicians in Scotland and MSPs
have been described as inexperienced in policy matters, more susceptible to special
pleading and less able to see the bigger picture (Interviews with policy-maker,
PI40403 and director of research institute, R290702). Officials see the dangers of
Ministers who are too responsive to public opinion and the need for the civil service
to exercise control over them:
there is a very real sense that the micro politics within which we operate
now has become...an order of magnitude more pronounced with
devolution... and this sort ofmicro politics is much the most significant
impact now ofdevolution and much the most significant undercurrent in
terms of policy development, simply because you've now got Ministers
being either mischievously misinformed or innocently misinformed by a
whole raft of people that you can't possibly predict or forestall
(Interview with policy-maker, PI40403)
but for others this is the genuine power of devolution:
policy-making is now much more, you know, one person might call
populist but the other side of the coin of that is it's much more in touch
with what Scottish people want, which is exactly what devolution is all
about (Interview with policy-maker, P020403)
4.3.3 The challenges of multi-level policy-making
While multi-level governance may have doubled the opportunity for influencing
policy-makers (Interview with industry representative, 1260602) and afford the
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advantage that policy targets can now choose which level is most appropriate for
their particular needs (Interview with European policy-maker, P240902), there is an
upside and a downside to multi-level governance. Respondents question the degree
to which Scotland is able to take a policy lead, whether the Scottish science system is
the real agenda setter and point to the tendency to look to England for endorsement
(Interviews with academic, A220403 and policy-maker, P070302).
Local control of programmes can make government more responsive to customer
needs but at the same time increases the complexity of the policy systems that users
are trying to influence (Written communication with US biotechnology strategy
consultant, March 2002). The more tiers of governance, the more opportunity there
is for political influence and this can have a negative impact on, say, funding regimes
where the smaller the area that is distributing the money, the greater the degree of
political influence that can be brought to bear (Interview with university
representative, A311002). Ultimately, doing it differently is not an option for
Scottish businesses who want consistency and do not want to cope with different sets
of rules and working practices at different levels of governance7.
Some believe that businesses and their representative bodies are sophisticated and
able to cope with the multi-level nature of science and innovation policy (Interview
with policy-maker, P240303) but others are more doubtful:
it's unclear to me, to be honest, where policy starts and stops in terms of
regulations because ...you '11 get Ministers who are just lookingfor a vote
who will jump up and down on their hobby horse about GMOs or
something like that and they may in fact have no power whatsoever over
them. So it's not always clear to them where their power starts and stops
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1291002)
7
As an example of this, one respondent expressed concerns that the creation of the Health
Technology Board for Scotland (the Scottish equivalent of NICE) had introduced an unnecessary,
extra regulatory tier (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603).
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Most of the major companies recognise that the drivers for policy derive from an EU
or international framework and they do not operate on a regional or national basis
(Interview with policy-maker, P280303). Many firms reiterate that real policy,
particularly in terms of the regulatory and fiscal regimes that affect business, is made
at higher levels of governance (Interviews with industry representative, 1260602 and
service provider, 1160702):
In terms of high level policy, I'm not sure - well, it's not evident to me
what influence the Scottish Executive actually has...I think the
Parliament and the Scottish Executive is almost struggling to find a role
- all the important stuffstill tends to be done in London, at least at major
policy level (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1120203)
although overstated prospects of devolution (a view possibly fostered by politicians)
has left the Scottish government having to manage expectations where Scottish
businesses overestimate how much policy is actually devolved (Interview with
policy-maker, P280202). The Executive perhaps was not prepared for the fact that
people would identify with the Scottish level of governance to such an extent
(Interview with European policy-maker, P240902). This could also be symptomatic
of a lack of engagement with business in policy-making process: greater participation
might lead to increased appreciation ofwhere policy responsibilities lie.
Devolution appears to have simplified some policy interactions and complicated
others (Interview with policy-maker, P260203). It has undoubtedly brought added
communication difficulties and, with London-based civil servants complaining about
the "newness, just unfamiliarity, not forgetting to consult with colleagues...Not being
sure who to talk to" (Interview with policy-maker, P270303), how much harder must
it be for those outside the political system to negotiate the labyrinth?
Much of the split of responsibilities at devolution was done on a pragmatic rather
than necessarily a logical basis:
I suppose that had a certain amount of logic and also a certain amount of
political fudge at the time and... as things evolve and as new things come
up, then I think... how they fit in is... it's done pragmatically (Interview
with policy-maker, P270303)
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Each department of the Scottish Executive has a Memorandum of Understanding
with the other UK departments which prescribes how they will work under the
devolution settlement and when problems do occur they tend to be errors of omission
exacerbated by staff changes (Interview with policy-makers, P240303 and P280202).
Attempts at co-ordination between the Scottish Executive and Whitehall are
improving but could still be better:
I think I would be exaggerating if I was saying that the links were
brilliant and they all worked very smoothly but I think it's fair to say that
there's a willingness to make these links and the links are being made
and I think they will work (Interview with policy-maker, P270303)
However, a number of funding issues have fallen between the tiers. The obvious one
cited by several respondents was the Genetics Knowledge Parks initiative which
matched DTI funding with UK Department of Health funding from which Scotland
was excluded (Interviews with academic, A220403, policy-maker, PI40303 and
policy adviser, P280203) but there have been other similar mismatches in veterinary
and cancer research where Scotland was initially excluded from national funding
initiatives. Although not insurmountable, these errors have been annoying for those
involved (Interview with policy adviser, P280203).
Following a difficult birth, when central government was suspicious about the
coalition nature of the new Scottish government and cautious about sharing policy
information with the Scottish Executive, the situation is reported to be settling down
again (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403). But some things never change:
the Office of Science and Technology was always an arrogant
organisation that really seeks nobody's opinion but their own - tends to
send something up to the devolved administration saying, could we have
your replies by Friday...So that side of it - that hasn't changed with
devolution (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403)
There is still some question of the status of devolved administrations in Whitehall
where they are often no longer equal partners in the official Whitehall community
(Interview with policy-maker, P020403). Nevertheless, there is a belief that
devolution has shifted the balance of power and that the UK government now has to
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take notice of the Scottish level of governance. While the legal powers of the
Scottish Executive are effectively the same as under the Scottish Office, there is the
sense among some Scottish civil servants that relationships have changed and are
now less of a hierarchical and more of a two-way process so that interactions with
Whitehall are now much more a "meeting of equals" (Interview with policy-maker,
P020403).
Some officials did not see any problems arising from the concurrent nature of
science, arguing that everyone is clear that science and innovation policy is
concurrent and, because of the potential for errors, people handle these issues with
care (Interview with policy-maker, P240303). Others are less sanguine:
the UK has a dedicated science Minister, who very much sees Scotland
as part ofhis remit. The DTI run initiatives on a UK basis...Except when
they don't...I mean, in principle, they run things on a UK basis. It's just
that...the UK generally finishes round about Luton (Interview with
policy-maker, P260203)
4
there was always an element in DTI offorgetting that Scotland existed
and it's still there and in some senses exacerbated with some people
thinking -Scotland, oh that's alright, they do their own thing now, it's
OK, we don't have to think about them. And not realising that in quite a
few of these areas ofconcurrent powers, they are meant to cover the UK
as a whole and it's not devolved (Interview with policy-maker, PI40303)
there is a discontinuity at the border and there are DTI initiatives that
are poorly understood up here and Scottish initiatives that are poorly
understood, ifat all, down south. And therefore that can engender some
sort of - maybe resentment is too strong but lack of understanding of
each other which doesn't help (Interview with service provider, 1160702)
Even if there is no difference in policy approaches, Scottish policy-makers feel the
need to keep a watching brief:
I think that it's difficult for Whitehall to grapple with all the implications
of devolution and they 'd rather not bother if they could. So we have to
keep battling away...Reminding them it's different in Scotland and when
you're talking about the UK and England, it's two different things
(Interview with policy-maker, PI80203)
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but the difference in scale is a challenge with much smaller numbers of Scottish civil
servants trying to keep abreast of UK issues (Interview with policy-maker,
P180203)8.
While Scotland is seen to be more innovative in comparison with many of the
English regions (Interview with policy-maker, P070302), it is harder to decipher the
degree to which Scotland is a leader or a follower, to disentangle the degree to which
the influence of UK-level policy for science and innovation is setting the agenda for
Scotland and whether Scotland is really optimising the freedom that devolution
offers (Interview with policy-maker, P070302). But there is a general feeling that
devolution has increased motivation both within the Scottish government and
amongst Scottish businesses and has boosted self-confidence, so that devolution's
biggest impact has perhaps been internal and psychological (Interview with service
provider, 1160702). Devolution has forced the Scottish Executive to demonstrate
that it is developing policies within the scope of its powers that are best fitted for the
purpose rather than simply adapting something that has been developed by the UK
government (Interview with policy-maker, P070302). Devolution has given Scotland
the ability to focus more on what policy-makers consider to be the priorities of which
one is clearly biotechnology (Interview with service provider, 1160702).
But while the benefits of devolution should be that stakeholders are closer to policy¬
makers and have greater opportunities for interaction, this does not necessarily seem
to be happening from the companies' point of view (Interview with biotechnology
CEO, 1280802). On the downside there is the danger that policy-makers become too
parochial and isolated as a small country rather than as part of a bigger nation. So in
many ways the impact of the Scottish Parliament on the policy-making process
presents something of a mixed picture with few actual changes. At the same time
there is the potential for some disadvantage where we forget to communicate across
8 This is not simply a problem for policy-makers as UK representative bodies are also accused of
neglecting Scottish policy input (Interview with university representative, All 0303).
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the borders. While there is undoubtedly the capability to do things differently, the
more layers, the more interventions, the more tiers of governance are introduced, the
more opportunity there is for political influence that is not necessarily to policy
targets' benefit.
4.4 Engagement in policy networks
Officials describe using a range of opportunities to engage with their user community
including formal surveys, workshops, one-to-one meetings and major consultation
exercises, and recognise the value of user engagement:
anything we do has to be realistic and meaningful in relation to the user
community and, without consultation, that's not possible. You can't
expect to get the best outcome (Interview with policy-maker, PI70403)
Although, as we shall see below, there are examples of where Scottish Enterprise has
set out to engage more systematically with key people from the private sector with a
view to attaining more regular input to inform the decision-making process
(Interview with policy-maker, PI70403), the tenor of this exchange still implies that
it is the policy-makers who are impressing their ideas on policy targets rather than
listening to what users actually need. Despite, or perhaps because of the fact, that it
is a small country, Scotland still tends towards "jostling and competition", rather
than a natural propensity to co-ordinate (Interview with policy-maker, P170403).
There are too many links in the chain and too many actors and government
innovation schemes (Interview with academic, A260603) a point clearly recognised
by the SSAC (Wojtas 2004) as we shall see in Chapter 5.
There are certainly ample opportunities to network:
you could, in Scotland, go to an event almost every night of the
week...and see the same people there (Interview with biotechnology
CEO, 1291002)
but participants complain that networking is over-rated, its utility difficult to measure
and its key proponents mainly consultants and advisors. Networking for a purpose is
seen as useful if there is a targeted project where people are brought together to
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achieve a specific goal but the type of networking promoted by Scottish Enterprise is
criticised by the biotechnology sector:
anyone who thinks they have anything to do with biotechnology can turn
up, you know, and by meeting each other it will create an industry. It
just doesn't happen (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603)
Individual companies often have narrow horizons (Interview with industry
representative, 1030702) and from a practical standpoint find it difficult to respond to
invitations at short notice (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1291002). How then
do we encourage industry to participate in, for example, informal dinners with
policy-makers where much of the key discussion and influence takes place, and
prevent these events being populated by academics, government officials, service
providers and "dead beat" companies (Interviews with biotechnology CEOs, 1291002
and 1090603).
Thus, while networking undoubtedly happens, it is regarded as being of arguable
benefit and appears to do little to inform policy. The new generation of Scottish
biotechnology firms are led by management teams with international experience who
regard the Scottish Executive as unfamiliar and perhaps uneasy when dealing with
senior industry representatives who are confident, knowledgeable and politically
experienced (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603). Although trade bodies
play an important role on companies' behalf, the Scottish biotechnology industry
consists of a diverse and not necessarily cohesive group of companies so it often falls
to individual firms to state their own case to policy-makers (Interview with
biotechnology CEO, 1291002): not easy when the Executive's tendency is not to deal
with individual companies (Interview with policy-maker, PI40303).
In the past, it was "not the done thing" for academics to interact with government but
attitudes in the scientific community are changing (Interviews with director of
research institute, R290702 and academic, A220403). Nevertheless, scientists are
still criticised by one of their own for their inability to share their views and think
strategically (Interview with policy adviser, P280203). Although policy-makers may
find it easier to engage with universities than with industry (partly because they are
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fewer in number and their publicly funded status fosters a closer relationship with
government) (Interview with policy-maker, P270303), they are criticised for failing
to exploit the policy expertise of universities sufficiently and urged to change their
attitude to seeking information, placing less emphasis on the short-term, low-cost,
one-off consultancy culture and more on long-term, ongoing dialogue based on
properly funded research (Interview with university representative, A110303).
Business people recognise what a policy network is and have seen them operating in
the pharmaceutical industry in the UK and overseas but are not aware of the same
processes operating in Scotland (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1280802).
They contrast the situation with the US where policy-making is seen as more
proactive and interactive and often much more driven by elected representatives and
their agendas as opposed to intermediate government agencies. Although more
politicised, the US system is also seen as more accessible than the UK policy
process:
you can get to see your Congressman or Senator remarkably easily in the
States compared to the palaver you have to go through here (Interview
with biotechnology CEO, 1090603)
In some senses, Europe is seen by respondents as a model for participative policy¬
making: although it takes a long time, it is seen as a very inclusive process that
operates on a network basis and encourages a common agenda at national levels
where industry and government are all trying to influence a large pool of others
(Interviews with university representative, A200203 and industry representative,
1030702). Certainly, respondents were as likely to mention interactions with MEPs
as they were with MSPs (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603) and were also
developing links through Scotland Europa's bio-regions network (Interviews with
industry representative, 1260602 and policy-makers P240902 and P070302).
Closer to home, SHEFC describes a very interactive relationship with stakeholders
and clearly articulates the benefits of involving others in policy development
(Interview with policy-maker, PI 30503). The smaller size of the Scottish HE sector
in comparison with its English equivalent is obviously a factor here but there is,
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nevertheless, an institutional mindset that is geared to working with their user
community and this is seen as aiding the funding council's credibility with its
stakeholders (Interview with policy-maker, P130503). Again the small country
factor means that cross membership of committees (such as, for example SHEFC
Council and SSAC) can be helpful although one observer was very critical of this
situation:
there is a deep feeling that I have that committees are constituted of like-
minded yes men...I think it's true in general but I've been shocked at the
extent of it in Scotland (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1140802)
Officials acknowledge that many of the most successful policy developments post-
devolution have actually come through advisory committee or independent
committee processes and recognise that allowing stakeholders to set the agenda, so
that Ministers are then in a position of deciding whether or not to accept policy
recommendations, rather than "dreaming it up from the first principles", is actually a
very effective way of getting buy-in and bringing authority and legitimacy to the
policy process (Interview with policy-maker, P020403).
The policy community claims that it wants to hear from real businesses and believes
"it's far easier to lobby government because there's a process for doing it, either
through the Parliament or directly with the Executive" although admits the process
may be more complicated because of the relative roles of the Parliament, the
Executive, Scottish Enterprise (Interview with policy-maker, P020403), a point
which will be explored further in Chapter 7. But ultimately the following quotes
illustrate that the aspirations of this policy-maker are not realised in the experience of
at least one leading biotech CEO:
Ifsomeone in a biotechnologyfirm has got something to say, if they say it
clearly to one or more of them, people will listen...there's a very, very
receptive audience out there (Interview with policy-maker, P020403)
we keep participating with Scottish Enterprise to try and bang the drum
for Scotland but that's it. As I say, we 're wheeled out with a hat and
cane saying isn 't this wonderful, it's an example ofwhat Scotland can
do. But we do our act and then we go back and that's it. So I'm not sure
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how deep or how robust the process is, ifat all indeed it exists (Interview
with biotechnology CEO, 1280802)
4.4.1 Networks, fora and steering groups
During the course of interviews respondents alluded to fora that might be considered
to be policy networks. For example, the Bioindustry Steering Group which was set
up during the development of the Scottish Enterprise biotechnology clusters strategy
around 1998 when the first Frameworkfor Action was launched. Although Scottish
Enterprise staff still speak about the Group in the present tense, others described it as
essentially moribund and there are obvious questions about its survival with the
advent of the ITI Life Sciences9 and other more recent developments described in
Chapter 8. During the development of their clusters strategy Scottish Enterprise
recognised (or were persuaded) that it would be useful to have a means by which
industry fed in its views on a long-term basis, not just to producing the initial clusters
strategy document but also to its implementation and future development. The
Group considered issues such as globalisation, skills, access to finance, reducing
entry barriers for venture capital, and gave feedback on research reports. The Group
was deliberately devised so that it covered a cross section of the industry and started
with a core group of six members although relatively few members had a policy
background (Interview with policy-maker, P140403)10.
Described as a "structured discussion forum" (Interview with policy-maker,
PI40403), the Group met approximately three times per year, primarily, in the early
days, to provide feedback to Scottish Enterprise on their Framework for Action
(Interviews with policy-maker, P260203 and university representative, A200203)
and to act as a "sounding board" for Scottish Enterprise (Interview with university
9 Launched by Scottish Enterprise in 2003 with £450 million funding over 10 years, the Intermediary
Technology Institutes (ITI) in Life Sciences, Energy and Techmedia aim to facilitate co-operative
R&D and commercialisation, and encourage local and foreign investment to ensure that new and
existing high growth, technology-based companies foster economic growth (see
www.itilifesciences.com) (last accessed 28/10/04).
10
The Group eventually increased in size up to a dozen core members with a wider group of
participants drawn from the Enterprise Network who did not attend each meeting.
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representative, A311002). The impression from members was that the Group was set
up by Scottish Enterprise rather than as a policy response to user demand. Although
Scottish Enterprise set the agenda for meetings, they seem to have steered it with a
fairly light touch:
we have a reasonably clear idea of what we want to get out of the
meeting. Though the Group don't always see it that way... if they want to
go in a different direction, that's fine...if they think that something is
important and they want to discuss it and they want to tell us it's
important, that's fine because that's what it's for (Interview with policy¬
maker, P260203)
The interaction within the Group was described as "hugely helpful" (Interview with
policy-maker, PI40403) but essentially the success of the Group lay, according to its
members, in its role as a successful networking vehicle:
I mean, as much as anything else, for the people you met as the topics
you actually came to discuss (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403)
it was a good networking opportunity but it went more than that because
you were actually working together and we had very specific focus
groups with topics that we were trying to do, to identify what the key
constraints were and it led to reports which, of course, went into the
Scottish Enterprise system (Interview with university representative,
A311002)
given that they didn't precisely set themselves anything other than a
target ofhaving a really good informal mechanism for listening, in that, I
think it's probably been outstandingly successful (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI40403)
but it was less clear to members (both from industry and the policy-making
community) whether it has informed public policy (Interview with biotechnology
CEO, 1120203):
More generally - how far has it informed our policy? - specifically not
really. It's much more a general sense of- there's only so many ideas
under the sun at the time and it's always hard to say quite how you
arrived at them (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403)
Significantly, the feedback process was not transparent to members, for example how
information supplied by the Group informed Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish
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Executive's policy process, and there was a strong sense that Scottish Enterprise was
something of a "black hole":
I'm not quite sure exactly what the impact the steering group had
because unfortunately I think the communications with Scottish
Enterprise are not the best. Information is gathered by Scottish
Enterprise largely through the use of consultants but occasionally
through those fora /i.e. the Bioindustry Steering Group] and the reports
are then lost or certainly are not distributed outwith Scottish
Enterprise...if you're in my sort ofposition, what happens is that...we
participate frequently in a lot of surveys for consultants paid for by
Scottish Enterprise and it's always the same survey again every 12
months (Interview with university representative, A311002)
Another example of an existing Scottish discussion forum is the Pharmaceutical
Liaison Group. Set up by the Scottish Executive Health Department, it consists of
representatives of all the main pharmaceutical companies and meets approximately
twice per year. The group was created with devolution in mind so that Scotland was
not sidelined because it had none of the key pharmaceutical companies' headquarters
or major facilities. This group was established to discuss issues of common interest
so that the Executive could use it as a sounding board about issues relevant to
members' businesses (e.g. clinical trials, ethics) and seek their views on strategy
(Interview with policy-maker, PI40403). Although this sounds good in theory, in
reality other commentators observe that the Health Department is actually much less
likely to interact with policy targets from industry than ELLD (Interviews with
industry representative 1260602 and service provider 1160702).
Others might argue that the Scottish Foresight Forum which includes representatives
from universities, SHEFC, Scottish Enterprise, CBI Scotland and small business
organisations, represented a policy network as it contributed to OST's policy
discussions (Interview with policy-maker, P140303) but in reality this group's task is
primarily cascading information and practical policy implementation.
SHEFC has also set up a task force on knowledge transfer (SHEFC/Scottish
Enterprise 2002) to develop national priorities and strategies in knowledge transfer
from the perspective of the Scottish higher education sector. Its membership is
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drawn entirely from the public sector (Scottish Executive, Scottish Enterprise,
Universities Scotland, HEIs) and, although there is much to be applauded in its aims,
it has been criticised for lack of industry input (Interview with director of research
institute, R290702) and there appear to be obvious overlaps with the remit of the
SSAC (see Chapter 5).
The fieldwork also tried to identify whether there had been any policy issues that had
brought policy targets together to influence government collectively, but
stakeholders still appear to coalesce more at the UK level where the bioindustry's
trade bodies have certainly worked together to influence government policy on R&D
tax credits, the availability of venture capital funding and the regulation of the use of
animals in research (Interviews with industry representatives 1260602 and 1030702;
and biotechnology CEO, 1291002). Although many point to the uniqueness of the
Scottish Proof of Concept fund (Interviews with industry representative, 1040702;
university representative, A110303; policy adviser, P280203; and policy-maker,
P260203), it is questionable how much this initiative was a response to grass roots
lobbying and how much it was political expediency at a time when Scottish
Enterprise's inward investment projects were drying up, there was "'money in the
wrong place" and it was in various peoples' interests for this funding initiative to be
launched (Interview with policy-maker, P260203):
It's distinctly Scottish and the Proof of Concept is a good concept but,
again, it was an initiative that was launched by Scottish Enterprise at the
behest of the Minister at the time saying we needed this to go through, so
there's a political statement that this should be done (Interview with
university representative, A311002)
While it is undoubtedly possible to lobby government and to influence policy in
Scotland, it remains a difficult process. There is a slow recognition that there is a
need for more concerted action, integrating or interacting with policy-makers and an
acknowledgement that we have not yet got the process right (Interview with service
provider, 1150702), but it still takes time and substantial effort from all parties to
establish a dialogue that will generate sufficient momentum to influence policy
(Interview with academic, A220403). The impetus for such dialogue generally
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seems to come from the policy targets and the prevailing model is still one of ad hoc
consultation where interaction takes place on an isolated, one-off basis (Interview
with policy-maker, PI70403).
There is certainly no shortage of contact and indeed some nascent networks of which
the SSAC, described in more detail in Chapter 5, is one example. In the UK,
initiatives such as Foresight have, to a certain extent, encouraged government-
industry interaction (Interview with industry representative, 1040702). But policy¬
makers do not necessarily make it easy. Certain people's voices are listened to and
bodies such as Scottish Enterprise can be a help or a hindrance, depending on the
personalities involved and on how driven they are by the Executive. Such
interactions are often cyclical with policy targets complaining that they have "been
here before" (Interviews with biotechnology CEO, 1291002; and university
representative, A311002). Authors such as Diederen et al. (1999, p.42) are probably
right to say that the voice of industry and the voice of academia are heard quite often
and quite loudly in the corridors of power and that policy does react to these voices
but, while networking certainly takes place in Scotland, it is doubtful that it goes any
further:
to describe these things as a policy network in the sense of having
channels of information flow and information exchange ...if they exist -
they're partial and accidental. People do network, they do bump into
each other, they do exchange information but the extent to which that has
a substantive influence on the Executive, SHEFC, [Scottish Enterprise],
institutional policy in individual universities - I would say is highly
questionable (Interview with policy-maker, PI70403)
4.5 Policy learning
Some commentators (Parry 2000) have suggested a "policy-making deficit" in the
Scottish Civil Service and have noted that, while officials are "masters of the
technicalities of the game", they do not "get to grips with the way that policy outputs
are to be achieved and real differences made". Some respondents from the policy¬
making community are much more optimistic about the impact that devolution has
had on the quality of Scottish government policy and claim a positive correlation
with policy-oriented learning:
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the decision-making process is faster so there are policies which can be
put through in Holyrood which would never have made their way onto
statute in Westminster just because of lack of time. But there are some
fairly obvious, fairly high-profile examples of how business thinking has
fed into Executive policy-making and I think transport is one of them
(Interview with policy-maker, P240303)
Other policy-makers recognise that devolution provides an opportunity for different
parts of the UK to try different things and learn from each other (Interview with
policy-maker, P270303), but other respondents stress the potential disadvantages and
the need for everyone to work harder to ensure proper co-ordination while
acknowledging that this, in itself, may not necessarily always be a problem:
one of the benefits of working harder is that then you gain a more
detailed learning. If somebody is a special case you then, in order to
understand what you have to do, you have to dig in deeper and that's not
a bad thing (Interview with industry representative, 1030702)
While some believe that all industry can really do is raise issues and then hope that
policy-makers will eventually take notice (Interview with biotechnology CEO,
1030603), other policy targets consider that policy-makers do appear to learn as a
result of dialogue with industry, but are, nevertheless, critical of the quality of policy
emanating from the Scottish Parliament:
I think the normal knock about in the Parliament is meaningless and the
policy, when it tends to emerge through the various committee structures,
tends to be sort ofbland (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1120203)
and complain that Ministers never stay long enough in a position to have an impact
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1120203).
It is often difficult to discern what influence stakeholders might have had on policy
because of poor (or often non-existent) feedback from policy-makers (Interview with
university representative, A311002) and several respondents criticised Scottish
Enterprise's approach to policy in particular (for example, interviews with university
representative, A311002 and service provider, 1020503) as still being very "top
down" rather than "bottom up":
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there are times Ifeel we 're sometimes playing catch up, that, you know,
decisions have been made...what we're trying to do now is to slightly
modify the decisions so the consequences won't be quite as bad
(Interview with university representative, A311002)
However, some policy targets are quite optimistic about communication channels to
policy-makers and the feedback mechanisms through the Enterprise network to
ELLD although this view is perhaps coloured by the fact that this respondent was
often able to provide the Executive with "good news stories":
I'm sure it gets back [from Scottish Enterprise to ELLD], yes. I mean,
they use us as a sort of shining example of how an institute like X can
feed the economy of the area. I mean, you can see it even in the
documents coming from Scottish Enterprise that they utilise us as
examples (Interview with director of research institute, R210203)
Other respondents were able to recount direct experience of how it is possible to
influence policy:
[that involvement with the House of Commons select committee] made
me aware ofhow it was in fact possible to have direct influence and that
it was possible for substantial changes to be made in terms ofhow policy
mechanisms [get established] (Interview with academic, A220403)
But effecting policy changes is a long-term and resource-intensive process and this
respondent from the university sector emphasised that, although it is possible to
influence the policy agenda at both UK and Scottish levels, it is not necessarily an
easy process. Although no one was placing specific impediments in his way, it
nevertheless takes considerable commitment of time and money, particularly difficult
if those trying to influence the process are grant funded (Interview with academic,
A220403).
However, simply listening to views is not the whole process: it is what policy-makers
do with the information and this is the black art practised by civil servants who
complain that MSPs do not have the necessary experience to do this well:
The need to distinguish self-interest and public interest and the
underlying impression that the Parliamentary committees have difficulty
in weighing up the evidence of an authoritative spokesperson of a
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particular industry who will have huge influence. The Parliamentary
committees just haven't had the experience... They 're bewildered by all of
this information that's thrown at them - how you influence this black box
ofgovernment (Interview with policy-maker, P020403)
4.5.1 Lobbying or dialogue?
This then brings us to the question of whether these interactions between policy
targets and policy-makers are simply lobbying or whether they reflect a genuine two-
way dialogue and consequently policy learning.
Interestingly, the working groups that resulted from the Pharmaceutical Industry
Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF), discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, were
considered by policy-makers to have actually reduced lobbying:
Rl: They do raise the level of debate and they do provide genuine
debate. It may not always be totally unacrimonious...
Q: And does it influence the policy that results?
Rl: Oh yes. I mean, they are proper working bodies. They are a
proper network. It's a proper dialogue between industry...
R2: in a sense, it actually reduces the lobbying
Rl: Yeah
R2: Because - because you had the framework, you didn't have the
ad hoc lobbying (Interview with policy-maker, P280303)
a notion which is supported by Maclntyre-Kemp's (2003) approach to policy
networking which seeks to eradicate the lobbyists' "them and us" attitudes:
In a communocratic approach there is no separation ofpeople and state
- just an entire community agreeing a shared way forward so there is no
need to lobby anyone (Maclntyre-Kemp 2003)
At the Scottish level, Scottish Enterprise present their interactions with stakeholders
as a two-way dialogue (although interestingly they see interaction with firms as
being more straightforward than interaction with universities) (Interview with policy¬
maker, P260203) but many other respondents refute this; as illustrated by the earlier
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comments about Scottish Enterprise being a "black hole" (Interview with university
representative, A311002) or remarks about the need to lobby the higher echelons of
Scottish Enterprise to correct policy mistakes (Interview with service provider,
1020503).
"Lobbying" is often regarded as a pejorative term:
it's very difficult a lot of the time to make a distinction between lobbying,
which lots ofpeople still see as just nasty, and shouldn't be done, and
policy influencing (Interview with European policy-maker, P240902)
and policy-makers point to the need to distinguish self-interest from public interest:
1 think sometimes we listen too much and sometimes the challenge is
making a distinction between what might be seen as sort ofself-interested
lobbying by a particular company as opposed to a more public interested
view about what is good for the biotechnology sector (Interview with
policy-maker, P020403)
As a consequence, trade associations are trying to educate member companies to see
interaction with policy-makers as a long-term, ongoing relationship, rather than
lobbying on specific issues:
I think this comes back to having an embryonic company base...they
don't quite understand why you have to continue your engagement with
policy-makers and I think this is where we got the problem with lobbying
because sometimes...well, lobbying is only mentioned when... "I have a
problem therefore I'm going to moan or take issue with my Member of
Parliament", and what we want to do is move awayfrom that. We 're not
coming with issues. We 're coming with awareness and trying to raise it
before there is a problem, maintaining an ongoing dialogue with policy¬
makers and not just going to them when you've got an issue but this is
only just starting to happen in Scotland (Interview with industry
representative, 1260602)
Others in government take a rather disparaging view of the role of trade associations:
it is possible to have a dialogue with industry on broader matters
but...they tend to be operating on shorter time horizons than the time
horizons forpolicy (Interview with policy-maker, PI 70403)
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While there is genuine interaction in some cases, there is not yet an established
policy network in Scotland that is bringing government and other actors together:
I think we've got to keep working at it. I think the problem is to be
honest there are too many agendas round the table. And at the end ofthe
day, it's Scotland/UK and we have to put personal agendas aside
(Interview with industry representative, 1260602)
The private sector is starting to be more vocal about their concerns and how they
want to be involved in the policy process but the regular dialogue is still seen as
being between the Executive and Scottish Enterprise rather than between the
Executive and the private sector (Interview with service provider, 1160702). Some
pin their hopes on the development of the BIA in Scotland to become the driving
force, taking over some of the devolved activities of Scottish Enterprise and
coalescing with some of the more locally organised biotechnology groups in order to
add power and value (Interview with service provider, 1160702), but there is clearly
still a perception that the public sector, in general, and parts of Scottish Enterprise, in
particular, is "a bit of closed door" (Interview with industry representative, 1260602).
Likewise, others report, using the same terminology, that while lobbying is possible
in certain areas, in others it is a "closed door for industry" (Interview with
biotechnology CEO, 1291002). Some are quite emphatic that nothing has changed:
we haven't actually moved beyond the lobbying process towards a two-
way dialogue (Interview with academic, A220403)
At the UK level, the DTI sponsor division for biotechnology takes the lead on
making strategic policy for the bioscience industry sector within the UK: it mediates
between companies and regulators and describes an ongoing relationship with
individual companies to help inform the government's productivity and
competitiveness agenda (Interview with policy-maker, P280303). This relationship
is described as a "coalition" between the industry, the research sector and
government departments:
in a sense kind ofsitting in the middle and trying to influence or direct if
you like in some measure, a framework where...the regulation is
elsewhere, ...the research councils are elsewhere, so you're there in the
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middle influencing or trying to but from a position of no direct power, if
you like...trying to sort of induce a harmony of relationships (Interview
with policy-maker, P280303)
But in reality it sounds as if little has changed since this researcher performed this
role herself ten years ago in the precursor DTI division. Respondents still talk in
terms of starting the process of dialogue rather than describing a mature policy
network:
my colleagues at the moment are starting to go out and actually meet
with biotech companies in the sector and find out their views ofwhat's
happening in industry and what they think should be done in trying to
feed those views sort of into the department and see what can be done
about that (Interview with policy-maker, P280303)
Industry's representatives are much more positive about their interactions with the
UK level of government:
Oh, genuine dialogue and for example, we gave evidence to the Trade
and Industry Select Committee yesterday afternoon and they were asking
us for ideas. Civil Servants ask us for ideas saying it's time for us to put
up our bids to the Treasury. So there's definitely a desire from
government ...and also, of course, all governments struggle with their
own internal problems of not being able to join up people and
departments. So anything that we can do which cuts across boundaries,
that sheds a wider perspective helps to give them ammunition to do
something they want to do (Interview with industry representative,
1030702)
[Policy-makers] need to learn what the industry's doing so ifwe could
help them take different perspectives, they will also of course raise
questions and seeing those questions, help inform us where their
thinking's going. So it's very much a two-way process...Secondly, we
can actually assist them. We can see where their thinking is going and
where their funding squeezes, what their pressures are. [Q: So they need
you as well as you need them?] Yeah, absolutely. It works both ways
(Interview with industry representative, 1040702)
However, there seems to be some variation between Whitehall departments. While
relationships with the Department of Health and parts of the DTI seem genuinely
interactive, OST appears to take a more controlling approach to dialogue, making
sure that it is conducted on their own terms:
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what we try and do is make that a two-way process by consulting on
specific things. When we 're in a position to... there are times when we 're
sort of involved in an internal debate on things so you can't be
particularly open (Interview with policy-maker, P270303)
In general, there would appear to be greater dialogue between policy-makers and
other public sector bodies, for example, the PSREs and the health trusts where there
is a funding relationship (Interviews with director of research institute, R210203; and
policy-maker, PI40403) than between policy-makers and the private sector where
policy-makers clearly like to be "in the driving seat" (Interview with policy-maker,
PI40403). Perhaps dialogue can be achieved between government and these public
bodies simply because they are all civil servants, bound by the same (albeit
diminishing) public service ethos that facilitates trust and the sharing of information.
This can make life difficult for those not inside the public sector fold who are,
nevertheless, tasked with engaging constructively with government:
it does come down to individuals and some are more than happy and
others - and I think it is, you know, the more traditional the person is, the
more traditional civil servant values they hold, the less likely they really
are to come to us or to share information with us (Interview with policy
adviser, P280203)
4.5.2 The "star" system
Furthermore, the government's interaction is piecemeal and often very
individualised, involving the "usual suspects", i.e. a limited number of key
stakeholders whom one might term "stars", be they academics or, more usually,
entrepreneurs with a high-profile reputation, rather than a more comprehensive form
of policy interaction or policy network:
I think the kind ofpeople who tend to be consulted and involved are
generally pretty well known, so when some consultation or enquiry is
happening on a particular subject, it's pretty well known who could and
should be invited to it, whether from industry or from academia. So
that's an advantage ofhaving a relatively compact geography (Interview
with policy-maker, PI70403)
You get successful people who've made it and the government will
literally seek them out (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1291002)
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So we have one or two pet people in companies: [A at Company B] for
instance is very good value for money and, you know, we tend to wheel
him out ifwe possibly can (Interview with policy-maker, P140303)
we set up a meeting with [C ofCompany D] - he's another one ofthe key
individuals that we kind of wheel out at times (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI40303)
they will listen to a group - a number ofexperts who will talk on certain
things...it tends to be that they will interact with this one, that one, this
one...So you've got maybe one or two academics who they'll draw on
now and again (Interview with university representative, A110303)
While the small size of Scotland can be an advantage if it facilitates regular
interactions between policy-makers and policy targets in can also exacerbate the
"star" system, meaning that some companies get over-exposed, and limiting the
scope for policy learning if policy-makers are only consulting a small number of key
players and perhaps excluding other views:
The weakness of that model, of course, is that you 're asking the same
people, you 're calling on a limited number of individuals and you might
lose depth (Interview with academic, A220403)
A further issue which militates against constructive policy learning is the perceived
lack of feedback from policy-makers in response to policy consultation:
I genuinely have no concerns that they will ask us the questions, whether
they will act upon the answers we give them...is more variable...So
Scottish Executive can phone up and ask us any question — we will
always answer and we can ask them some questions and they may not
necessarily answer. So when we have some lobby campaign initiatives,
we will get a two-line response but none of the ideas will be taken up or
progressed (Interview with university representative, A110303)
Others bemoan the fact that once the dinners and lunches with business
representatives are finished there is no follow up (Alex Neil MSP)11 or warn about
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the dangers of raising expectations about public engagement without subsequent
feedback (SCVO representative) .
4.5.3 Failure to learn
Finally, although the Intermediary Technology Institutes (ITIs) (see footnote 9) were
not a particular focus of the fieldwork for this research when the data were analysed
there seemed to be such unanimity of responses, from policy targets and policy¬
makers alike, to this £450 million policy initiative that it perhaps serves as a valuable
example of how the "policy learning" approach can fail. As the following quotes so
graphically illustrate, the ITIs provoked an unprompted and heated reaction from
respondents:
It's a flawed model...they [Scottish Enterprise] think or like to think that
they've consulted the industry in the development of the ITIs and I have
to say I think that's token and they haven 7. And I don 7 know any of the
more experienced CEOs in Scotland who think the ITIs...are going to
work (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603)
they [universities] haven't been properly consulted about really how
these things will work and the problems of actually getting intellectual
property out of the universities. There's a feeling out there that they just
haven't been adequately involved in the whole process (Interview with
policy-maker, PI80203)
it wasn 7 very clear in the beginning that this was an idea that essentially
had already been decided to do and that the consultation was token on
something that was at an advanced stage and we 're all extremely busy
people. We have to prioritise our time and I don 7 think there was a - I
think there was a - what's the right word? A faked or sort ofphoney
attempt at consultation where it wasn't clear why people like myself
should have given up time at the time it was offered to pay attention to it
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603)
I think one of the major problems is the lack ofconsultation and the fact
that you can get some very mixed messages from different people in
Scottish Enterprise as to what these are about, how they are going to
work...They've done it in isolation (Interview with policy adviser,
P280203)
11 Contributions to Centre for Scottish Public Policy conference "The Scottish Parliament, Politics and
the People", 30 August 2003.
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Ifyou look at the ITI project, there is no industry demand, there is no
industry support and there is no engagement with Scotland (Interview
with university representative, A200203)
these were people from industry saying, here's why these won 7 work.
And instead of learning from that or instead of saying, this is what we
want to achieve, how do we go about it - I mean, they are creating an
opportunity to fund research. We don't need any more research
(Interview with university representative, A200203)
the Intermediate (sic) Technology Institutes are a classic example.
Major programme, major impact on the research community, the
financial community, the technology community ...The amount of
consultation was virtually zero (Interview with service provider,
1020503)
using ITIs as an example, that was one of the patchier ones I think where
we did involve them early on but I don 7 think Scottish Enterprise
involved - I don 7 think they recognised early enough quite how vital
getting the academic sector on board was...whilst they have very good
relationships with ourselves...I don't think they took on board just how
important it was (Interview with policy-maker, PI40303)
Scottish Enterprise do things in a way that nobody can quite
understand...Zero consultation. Nothing...Consultation as Scottish
Enterprise describes it...If anyone in Scottish Enterprise tries to tell you
that there has been consultation, I would say it depends what you mean
by consultation...But, as of the time — as of now, as far as I'm aware,
we've yet to see something on paper which explains how these will work.
We've seen a couple ofpresentations and a bit of chat but...we're not
even clear what we're consulting [on] (Interview with university
representative, A110303)
Middle-ranking policy-makers within Scottish Enterprise appeared, even some time
after the public announcement of the ITIs, reluctant to discuss the initiative:
I can't really talk about the ITIs because it's something that's under
development andpeople are currently being recruited at the moment. So
I can't give you detailed information or views about the ITI process
(Interview with policy-maker, PI70403)12
12 The research design had not been devised to incorporate any element of iteration of information
between sources although, in this particular case, such a procedure may have been informative. This
quotation is, however, extracted from an interview which took place some weeks after those cited
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From these reactions, the ITI initiative appears to have been a top down policy with
no apparent willingness on the part of Scottish Enterprise to learn from the
experiences of stakeholders. This was evidently not a policy response to market
demand and this failure to learn necessitated an extensive post hoc PR exercise to
sell the ITIs to the market.
4.6 Reprise
When asked about the impacts of devolution, policy-makers tended to focus on the
increase in ministerial involvement. For officials, this has meant more opportunity to
influence Ministers and a higher profile for Scottish STI where Ministers can now act
more autonomously. On the downside, this much readier access to politicians has
lead to micro politics and far greater opportunities for Ministers to be swayed by
interest groups. The representative bodies interviewed certainly tended to agree that
the Scottish Parliament has opened up opportunities for dialogue with government
and this group of respondents generally recognised that there were some advantages
in having easier access to politicians. This group also acknowledged that devolution
had given Scottish government actors greater flexibility, the ability to focus more on
Scottish priorities (of which one is clearly biotechnology), and perhaps a greater
sense of purpose. But many policy targets, particularly the SMEs, saw little real
change as a result of devolution and instead highlighted the dangers of becoming too
insular and isolated as a small country and expressed concerns about the potential
added complexities that another layer of government bureaucracy might bring to
their businesses.
Multi-level governance issues were generally recognised by policy-makers as
presenting both an advantage and a complication for STI policy. While some policy¬
makers inevitably tried to portray the impact of devolution on relationships with
Whitehall as entirely positive, many owned up to communication difficulties
between the different levels of governance, partly because of nervousness on the part
earlier in this section and would have permitted Scottish Enterprise some right of reply had they
wished to avail themselves of this opportunity.
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of the UK Labour Government regarding the coalition nature of Scottish government
but, more generally, simply the fact that departments such as the DTI tend to forget
that many aspects of STI policy require them to perform a dual function with a remit
that, in some respects, covers the whole of the UK and, in others, only England.
Policy targets, especially the SMEs, and to a much lesser extent the representative
bodies, tended to emphasise a similar lack of clarity about levels of policy
responsibility and the potential for some disadvantage where we forget to
communicate across the borders.
Policy-makers did tend to promulgate the rhetoric that devolution is an opportunity
for different parts of the UK to try different policy approaches and then learn from
each other and see what works but there was little evidence of this happening in
practice. Some policy-makers did maintain that policy-making in Scotland is now
closer to the grass roots in some respects but others accentuated the challenge of
distinguishing between self-interest and public-interest industry lobbying, identifying
that the key issue was not the amount of lobbying but whether such viewpoints
actually had any impact on policy outcomes. This was echoed by policy targets
where the general sense from all types of respondents (SMEs, universities and
representative bodies) was that, while there is undeniably quite a lot of engagement
with policy-makers in Scotland, there was a distinct lack of feedback on the
outcomes from this interaction and no evidence of policy-oriented learning as a result
of this interaction.
So while policy-makers recognise that networking does take place, some question the
extent to which this has a substantive influence on the Scottish Executive, SE1EFC,
Scottish Enterprise, etc. There is generally, although not universally, a view
expressed among policy-makers that engagement with policy targets tends to be via
one-off isolated consultations, and a growing recognition that there is more that they
could do to foster a greater degree of co-ordination within the Scottish system of
innovation by improving multilateral, network-based relationships rather than the
current focus on bilateral relationships with individual organisations. At the
moment, those policy-makers who are reflexive about the policy process do
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recognise the desirability of a policy network approach as a way of fostering
information flow and information exchange but acknowledge that, if they exist at all
in Scotland at the moment, they are partial and accidental. Similarly, policy targets
generally acknowledge that networking happens in Scotland but question its utility.
Some recognise that it is possible to lobby government and to influence policy but
stress that it is a difficult process that requires substantial effort to establish an
ongoing channel of communication: policy-makers are not proactively seeking input
from users and the onus is on the policy targets, be they representative groups,
universities or individual firms, to establish this dialogue.
In his pre-devolution study, Macleod (1996) took a rather optimistic view of the
"networked regional village" that brought together bodies such as the Scottish
Office, STUC, CBI Scotland, COSLA, SCDI and the regional development bodies to
provide "the interactive synergy for a relatively informal order for governing
economic development". However, one of his respondents did, nevertheless, draw
distinctions between Scottish competences in social and business networking:
We are quite good at social networking, but what we do not seem to do
is the business networking that appears to happen almost as a matter of
routine in the United States (Scottish Enterprise official speaking in
1995, quoted in Macleod 1996)
This present study takes this theme one stage further. Whilst the interviews reported
in this chapter demonstrate that business networking undoubtedly does take place, in
part perhaps as a result of the regional development initiatives reported by Macleod
(ibid.), this networking does not necessarily, or overtly, inform policy and there is
little evidence to suggest that policy networks of the type described in Chapter 2
exist within the Scottish system of innovation post-devolution.
In Scotland, interactions between policy-makers and policy targets are still conducted
by and large via the tried and tested method of policy consultation but the
effectiveness of these exercises is frequently criticised and they reinforce the "top-
down" style of government rather than the more inclusive, associative governance
approach. While the government is clearly prepared to make use of leading
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companies to showcase Scottish biotechnology, there is a general feeling amongst
respondents from the sector that they have little real impact on government policy.
The situation is further exacerbated by the "star system" whereby policy-makers rely
on inputs from a select group of industry advisers.
Routes to influencing the Westminster Parliament are well-established, whereas there
is still clearly a learning curve to be surmounted in terms of effective engagement
with Holyrood. Although access to the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Executive
and civil servants is in some respects relatively easy, at least for civic society, access
does not equate with influence and there is a perceived hierarchy of evidence and the
sense that traditional, establishment views prevail. While representative bodies such
as the BIA are developing their role in Scotland, much of their policy interests lie
outwith the Scottish level of governance and it is doubtful that such professional fora
are yet in a position to promote policy learning (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993,
p.232). Understandably, given the timescales involved, policy-makers at the UK
level of governance have a more mature relationship with trade associations (as we
shall see in Chapter 6 when discussing the activities of various joint industry-
government task forces) whereas relations between Scottish policy-makers and trade
associations are nascent, with Scottish Enterprise historically taking on many roles
that one might expect the private sector to fulfil (for example, in terms of networking
or training activities).
This fieldwork has revealed few, if any, multi-actor Scottish networks with a clear
remit to develop policy in the area of science and innovation. Those fora that do
exist, such as the Scottish Foresight Forum or the Health Department's
Pharmaceutical Liaison Group, appear to be responding to a government-led agenda.
Others such as the Bioindustry Steering Group seem all but extinct or made
redundant by new policy initiatives and appear to have had a limited, or at least not
an overt, impact on policy whilst, nevertheless, performing a valuable networking
function. In other cases it is probably too soon to judge the performance of emerging
networks although the following chapter will explore to what extent the creation and
activities of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee are pioneering a new
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relationship with policy-makers and whether this reflects some of the ideals of a
policy network.
Universities Scotland has called for an intelligent approach to public policy that
utilises interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral networks to engage in an ongoing
dialogue with elected representatives and officials. Their aspiration is that this:
would result in public policy which was better informed by the best
evidence available, where long-term thinking was the norm, and where
new ideas were emerging and being discussed all the time (Universities
Scotland 2002, p.l 1)
Respondents from the biotechnology sector also clearly articulate the benefits of an
interactive, learning approach to the policy-making process but do not see this
happening yet in post-devolution Scotland. Instead they criticise bogus consultations
that are essentially information dissemination exercises and cite recent examples of
failure to learn on a grand scale with the introduction of the ITIs.
So far in the field of STI policy, Scottish policy-makers and policy targets appear to
have achieved "interaction but not interconnectedness" (Beesley 2003). Devolution
might have fostered the development of Scottish governance models in areas of
social policy such as education and justice but similar networks are not yet evident in
science and innovation. Furthermore, it is clear that STI policy networks in Scotland
do not "self-organise". Instead they require an impetus such as a charismatic leader
(and former Minister Wendy Alexander was often spoken about by respondents in
these terms) or an event such as the pharmaceutical industry's threat to abandon the
UK which prompted the establishment of the Pharmaceutical Industry
Competitiveness Task Force, discussed in Chapter 6.
Above all, associative governance means achieving long-term, ongoing networks that
do not simply coalesce over a specific issue and then disperse. However, as Chapter
7 will demonstrate, the gate-keeping roles of large bureaucracies still present
significant barriers to the effective operation of STI policy networks in Scotland and
militate against an integrated approach to science and innovation.
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Chapter 5 Scotland's Science Strategy
5.1 Introduction
In recently devolved territories, key policy actors tend not to have significant
expertise in policy development and often favour a linear approach to STI policy,
thus Cooke et al. (2000, p. 134) suggest that the first challenge for the regional
governance level is to facilitate learning processes that look both internally
(matching policy to regional needs) and externally (learning from good practice
elsewhere).
Chapter 4 presented the findings from a broad survey of policy-makers and policy
targets to explore the extent to which users are involved in the policy-making process
for STI; to gauge whether Scottish devolution has had a positive impact on the
government to governance shift; and to assess whether this move towards a more
participative form of policy-making is manifested in the emergence of policy-making
networks.
Chapter 5 develops this theme of user engagement in the policy process further and
takes the specific example of the Scottish Executive's science policy document, A
Science Strategy for Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001a) as an exemplar of regional
STI policy post-devolution. It examines the consultation process that preceded its
publication and the establishment of the ensuing Scottish Science Advisory
Committee in order to analyse the extent to which policy targets' views influenced
the content of this strategy and consider whether this process has supported the
development of policy networks and facilitated policy learning. This examination of
Scotland's Science Strategy is highly relevant to the concurrent power theme because
science policy is not wholly devolved. One might suppose that, under the terms of
the devolution settlement, Scotland would have greater autonomy with respect to
innovation policy than science policy, and perhaps infer that the Science Strategy
was an attempt to integrate these two areas but, as we shall see, this has proved not to
be the case: this chapter will argue that, rather than using the opportunity of greater
policy autonomy to achieve greater policy integration, the current approach is in
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many respects perpetuating the linear model of science and innovation (Tait and
Williams 1999).
5.2 Consultation
5.2.1 A multi-stage process
The production of the Science Strategy was a multi-stage process that took just under
two years to complete (Table 5.1). Only months after the establishment of the
Scottish Parliament the then Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning (ELLD)
set up a Science Strategy Review Group to conduct a scoping study which would,
firstly, identify the questions that needed to be addressed in order to put a Science
Strategy for Scotland in place and, secondly, identify what additional mechanisms
would be required to answer these questions and to implement such a Strategy.
Table 5.1 Timeline for Scotland's Science Strategy
September 1999 Science Strategy Review Group appointed by the Scottish
Executive
13 April 2000 Report of the Science Strategy Review Group published and
circulated for consultation
30 June 2000 Consultation closed
February 2001 Draft sent to Ministers
27 August 2001 A Science Strategyfor Scotland published and launched at the
Glasgow Science Centre by Wendy Alexander
17 December 2001 Chair of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee appointed
April 2002 Members of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee
appointed
7 May 2002 First meeting of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee
13 January 2004 First report of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee
published
*See annex to this chapter for membership
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The Science Strategy Review Group was chaired by the Head ofELLD and consisted
of 15 members including inter alia Principals and Vice Principals of a number of
Scottish Universities, the Directors of a Scottish government agency and a publicly
funded research institute, the then President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and
Chair of the UK Committee for Public Understanding of Science, two senior
scientists from industry and the Scottish Social Work Commissioner (see annex to
this chapter for full details). The Review Group identified 41 questions under six
main themes (see annex to this chapter) that they believed needed to be addressed in
the development of a Scottish science strategy. Interested external parties were then
invited to contribute their thoughts on what the answers to these questions might be.
The consultation on the Review Group's report and the subsequent drafting of the
Science Strategy were carried out by a small team of civil servants (the Science
Strategy Team, SST) under the overall direction of the Head of ELLD. Although
initially intended as a six-month project, the final draft was not submitted to
Ministers until February 2001.
Some would claim that the origins of the Science Strategy lay in the Royal Societies'
report on devolution and science (Royal Society of Edinburgh and Royal Society of
London 1999) which raised, amongst others, the issue of whether Scotland needed a
Chief Scientific Adviser. Soon after the publication of this document the Executive
conducted an internal, unpublished study into whether Scotland needed a science
strategy (Interview with academic, A210202).
The Review Group that was set up following this internal study did not consult any
external experts during their deliberations and the process of preparing this
consultation document does not seem to have been particularly well conceived1. The
process was reported as having little sense of structure or focus on the broader
questions about the nature of science or the purpose and scope of the strategy, in
particular whether it would orchestrate science activities within the Scottish
1 It is not clear whether anyone on the Science Strategy Review Group ever had sight of the
preliminary study conducted by the Scottish Executive but it was suggested that the Review Group
was there to test whether the Executive's conclusions were correct. The Group was later told that it
had confirmed the Executive's views: so in a sense the role of the Review Group had been to validate
the Executive's own findings as a preliminary to a lengthy consultation process (Interview with
academic, A210202).
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Executive (Interviews with academic, A210202, and policy-maker, P050502). The
final report was a long, rather unstructured document, consisting primarily of a list of
issues to be addressed (see annex to this chapter). The Review Group's work
essentially ended with the publication of their report in April 2000 and the civil
servants then took over the somewhat lengthy consultation process which has been
criticised for adding little to the final science strategy document (Interview with
academic, A210202).
The strategy document took a number of forms before settling on the one in which it
was eventually published (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403). Several reasons
have been suggested for the delay in approving the final draft (Interviews with
academic, A210202, and policy-maker, P050502) including the need to redraft to
9 • • •
make the document shorter ; the intractability of Ministers (in particular the debate
^ • • •
about "the agriculture question" ); competing Ministerial priorities; the political
handling of the recommendation to set up a new science committee at a time when
there was an initiative to cut the number of quangos (Scottish Parliament 2001); and
the apparently protracted debates about the desirability of including engineering and
social sciences in a "science" strategy.
Responsibility for SST oscillated around various departments within the Executive
during the prolonged gestation of the Science Strategy. Although this should have
helped to facilitate a balanced strategy, ELLD was the overall champion and what
emerged from Ministerial discussions was a diluted version of the draft with a clear
emphasis on ELLD policy preoccupations (Interview with policy adviser, P280202).
This has probably served to reinforce the pre-devolution policy trajectory, which
emphasised the commercialisation of university research, and has not helped to
promote a more joined-up approach to STI policy within the Scottish Executive and
its agencies, a theme that will be taken up again in Chapter 7.
2 Ministers apparently wanted a four-page document, presumably along the lines of their insubstantial
and propagandist policy document Doing it Differently (Scottish Executive 2002).
3
Agriculture being a high-spending department within the Scottish Executive where the issue of
whether it is right to spend this amount was seen as a political question and not one for civil servants
to answer.
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SST was a rather isolated policy team within the Executive. Whether this was
deliberate to ensure independence and buy-in from all departments or the converse so
that all of the departments equally could disown it, in the event, it was generally
viewed within the Executive as a non-contentious policy area that, minor territorial
skirmishes aside, received inter-departmental support (Interview with policy adviser,
P280202). Civil servants have, however, spoken publicly about the "long and
tortuous production of the strategy" and the length of time it took to get buy-in from
departments4.
5.2.2 User engagement
The consultation on the report of the Science Strategy Review Group was described
as open but not necessarily very proactive (Interview with policy-maker, P050302).
According to Scottish Executive records, 656 individuals from around 460 different
organisations received a written invitation to comment on the report. As Table 5.2
shows, of these consultees, over half (54%) were from Scottish government and the
tertiary education sector (this figure increases to 61% if other UK government
departments and agencies are included; see also Figure 5.1). Industry represented
only 8% of the mailing list in the form of trade associations and individual
companies and, significantly, the companies consulted in writing included only two
biotechnology SMEs.
Unsurprisingly, given this asymmetric sample, there were very few written responses
from industry. Of the 106 written responses on file in the Scottish Executive library,
only five (5%) were from industry or trade associations, 34% were from the tertiary
education sector and 19% from local government (Table 5.2, Figure 5.2).
In addition to the written responses, the Science Strategy Team also conducted a
number of meetings with a total of 147 individuals (Table 5.2, Figure 5.3), the
majority of whom were other civil servants (48%) and tertiary education
representatives (20%) but this time 15 people from companies, including one from a
biotechnology SME, and four from trade associations were included in the survey,
4 Contribution to SURF (Centre for Sustainable and Urban Regional Futures) seminar, University of
Salford, 12 May 2003.
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representing 13% of the sample (Table 5.2). Despite the biotechnology sector being
regarded as one of Scotland's academic, and potentially economic, strengths there
was little representation from this sector. Although organisations such as the
Scottish Bionetwork Association, ABPI, CIA, Unilever, and Cyclacel were
apparently invited to comment there is no record of them actually doing so or that
SST followed up their written invitation with a meeting (Table 5.3). This asymmetry
in responses and the focus on the public sector (government departments, agencies
and HEIs) suggests that, from the outset, the Scottish Executive's intention with the
Science Strategy was to continue its pre-devolution policy focus on the
commercialisation of the science base and not to develop an integrated research and
innovation policy for Scotland in which industrial R&D actors might have a role in
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Figure 5.1 Analysis of invitations to comment
13%
□ HE/FE or representative body
Q Scottish government department or agency
□ Local government
□ Industry (inc trade associations)
B NHS Trust or Health Board
□ UK government department or agency
□ Science education*
□ Research Institutes (SABRIs & Roslin)
■ Other**
Figure 5.2 Analysis of written Figure 5.3 Analysis of meetings
responses
Notes to Figures
* Science education category includes schools, school-related organisations, science centres,
other public understanding of science activities and Education Business Partnerships.
** Other category includes inter alia trade unions, water authorities, charities, and EU-related
bodies.
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Table 5.3 Companies and business organisations involved in consultation
Company Written response Meeting




Elvingston Science Centre y
Federation of Small Businesses y y
Freelight Systems y
Institute ofDirectors y
Institution of Electrical Engineers y
Intelligent Applications Ltd y
Lamellar Therapeutics y
LINC Scotland y
New Park Management y
PPL Therapeutics pic y
Provis y
Royal Bank of Scotland y
Science Policy and People Ltd y
Scottish Chambers of Commerce y
SCDI y
Targeting Technology y
Technology Ventures Scotland Ltd y y
The Forum of Private Business y
The Object Factory y
The Quantum Fund Ltd y
VIS Interactive pic y
Voxar Ltd y
Data provided by Scottish Executive
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5.3 Recurring themes
Two recurring themes are strongly apparent in the 106 written responses to the
consultation that were made publicly available. These encompass:
• Better co-ordination between "science" and "innovation" and the need to co¬
ordinate the science strategy with the multiplicity of initiatives and organisations
already addressing many of the issues raised by the Review Group
• Improving "industry pull"
As Scottish Enterprise noted in its response to the science strategy "this is already a
very busy space" (written response5 from Scottish Enterprise dated 12 July 2000) and
several respondents indicated that many of the issues raised by the Review Group's
report had already been the subject of debate and consultation in Scotland in recent
years (written response from SHEFC dated 22 June 2000) and, indeed, were already
being progressed by existing organisations, some of which had only relatively
recently been created (written response from SHEFC dated 22 June 2000; written
response from Technology Ventures Scotland Ltd dated 3 July 2000). In pointing to
the many different government technology transfer schemes, managed by a range of
different departments and agencies at both the UK and Scottish levels, the Wellcome
Trust suggested that some of this confusion and duplication could be obviated by a
clear strategy that set the variety of funding schemes for technology transfer in
context, allowing for greater synergy and the possibility of comparative evaluation
(written response from Wellcome Trust dated 30 June 2000).
The need for co-ordination and coherence was a common theme and the University
of Glasgow was one of a number of bodies calling on the Executive to ensure that
there was an integrated approach to policy development, which would necessarily cut
across the departments and agencies involved (written response from University of
Glasgow dated 23 June 2000; see also Institute of Biology (29 June 2000), SUPRA
(28 June 2000), Technology Ventures Scotland Ltd (3 July 2000), Scottish Council
5 Refers to a written response to the Scottish Executive's consultation on the Review Group's report.
These were made available to the researcher via the Scottish Executive's library.
158
Development and Industry (10 July 2000), Institute of Directors (25 May 2000)).
The RSE noted that:
Over-compartmentalisation between government departments and
between scientific disciplines, and lack ofco-ordination across the wider
SET base, will frustrate an effective, integrated use ofthe science base in
policy formulation (written response from Royal Society of Edinburgh
dated 10 July 2000)
while the Executive's key agencies expressed the belief that "significant benefits
could be achieved by seeking greater co-ordination among the various agencies in
Scotland that are involved in science policy" (written response from SHEFC dated
22 June 2000) and called for "a close alignment between frameworks for science,
innovation and economic development, supported by close working between
respective organisations" (written response from Scottish Enterprise dated 12 July
2000).
Although a policy area such as science presents "an excellent opportunity to practise
the ideas of joined-up government and other holistic thinking" (written response
from Scottish Council Development and Industry dated 10 July 2000), SCDI pointed
out in their response that it would be very difficult to get the support of industry and
the universities behind a Science Strategy "if government has not got its own house
in order" (written response from Scottish Council Development and Industry dated
10 July 2000). Thus an overriding priority identified for the Scottish Executive was
to fully integrate R&D policy into other related policy areas, especially economic
development and education (written response from Scottish Council Development
and Industry dated 10 July 2000) and not to restrict the focus too narrowly to science
(written response from University of Glasgow dated 23 June 2000). As SHEFC
noted, many of the questions posed by the Review Group raise wider issues about
innovation, enterprise and economic development which go beyond the scope of a
science strategy and SHEFC suggested that an important prior question should have
been whether Scotland needs a co-ordinated research and innovation strategy rather
than simply a "science strategy" (written response from SHEFC dated 22 June 2000).
Significantly, the Report omitted to mention the strategic need to encourage more
industrial R&D in Scotland and many responses pointed to the fact that universities
are limited in their capacity to be engines of the economy if the corporate R&D
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capacity is a limiting factor (written responses from University of Glasgow dated 23
June 2000; Institute of Biology dated 29 June 2000). The considerable emphasis
placed on encouraging commercialisation of research-generated ideas in Scotland in
recent years highlights one of the major weaknesses of the Scottish economy where
there is an absence of locally-based businesses capable of developing such ideas and
the RSE noted in its response that the model promoted by the Executive was very
much one of academic "push" rather than "industry pull" (written response from
Royal Society of Edinburgh dated 10 July 2000). In a similar vein, several
respondents called for a better understanding of the capacity of the demand-side
(written response from University of Glasgow dated 23 June 2000) and greater focus
on the development of relevant "industry pull" as part of a science strategy for
Scotland (written responses from COSHEP (now Universities Scotland) dated 4 July
2000; Heriot Watt University dated 15 June 2000).
But despite these clearly articulated views from a range of different policy targets,
there is a strong sense, reinforced by both respondents and policy insiders, that at the
end of the day it is neither the users' nor even the politicians' views but those of the
civil servants that prevail:
I think a lot of the civil servants' views will prevail... in a way it's good
that they do all these consultations but I sometimes wonder if they do too
much...because it's really hard work to do a consultation properly - to
really analyse it well and to reallyfeed that in and say, well these are the
key things that are coming out, so this is what we should be doing...and
kind ofcomparing that with what their own views are. I think... when you
look on the Executive website, there's just hundreds of consultations and
I do wonder how well can any of these actually be done (Interview with
policy adviser, P280203)
a radical approach needs to be adopted to put in place a science
strategy for Scotland...[t]he implementation of the findings of the
consultation may require the thinking of the unthinkable. Then again, as
so often in the past, it may merely turn out to be cosmetic (written
response from Chartered Biologist dated 29 June 2000)
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5.4 Launch
When A Science Strategy for Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001a) was finally
published in August 2001 it appeared to have been written very much as a
framework, setting out the Scottish Executive's aspirations for science and indeed is
described as such on the Executive's website:
This Strategy sets the framework which will inform the detailed
development ofpolicy for the support and use of science to achieve the
Scottish Executive's objectives6
The Strategy took as its starting point a vision of Scotland as a modern, dynamic
country where the role of the science strategy is to meet the challenges of global
competition, making the nation more prosperous and its economy more competitive.
It focused on five key objectives:
• maintaining a strong science base
• increasing the effective exploitation of scientific research
• ensuring that enough people study science to meet the future needs of Scotland
• promoting the awareness, appreciation and understanding of science across
society
• ensuring the effective use of scientific evidence in policy formulation and
resource allocation by government
Although promoted by the Scottish Executive as an "integrated" strategy that "marks
the start of a more 'joined up' approach to policy and investment decisions from the
laboratory to business" (Scottish Executive 2001c) and despite the arguments for a
coherent and co-ordinated approach to science and innovation set out by many of the
respondents to the consultation (described in the previous section), the thrust of the
final document was on supporting the science base in Scottish universities and
encouraging them to commercialise their inventions in order to foster a vibrant,
technology-based, SME community in Scotland. The imagery and language
throughout the strategy document imply that science is what takes place in
6
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library3/education/ssfs-02.asp (last accessed 28/10/04).
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laboratories in universities and publicly-funded research institutes, so it is very much
grounded in the "treasure trove model" where universities are exclusively seen as the
source of innovation.
This notion was reinforced at the official launch of the Strategy at the Glasgow
Science Centre on 27 August 2001 where the audience was dominated by
representatives from universities and other public sector bodies (Table 5.4, Figure
5.4) and the programme for the event focused on the commercialisation of university
research, showcasing a number of successful Scottish Enterprise/RSE Enterprise
Fellowships. In her speech, the then Minister for ELLD, Wendy Alexander, spoke
about an audience of "educators, researchers and entrepreneurs" and described the
Strategy making a difference in a number of areas that were all clearly grounded in
the science base:
it will guide Executive departments towards better policy and investment
decisions
it will position Scotland better for the future with the Science Advisory
Committee helping us identifypriority areas
by appointing a prominent scientist to act as Chair of the new
Committee, we will be establishing a new, authoritative voice in public
debates on scientific issues in Scotland
above all the Strategy is designed to maintain and enhance Scotland's
international reputation. Scientists have always worked as part of a
global network. We must maintain and enhance this international
reputation and ensure that Scotland is viewed as an attractive and
desirable place to invest in scientific research (extracts from speech by
Wendy Alexander dated 27 August 2001)
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Table 5.4 Analysis of audience at Science Strategy launch
Category Number %
HE/FE or representative body 27 32
Scottish government department or agency 26 30
Science education 13 15
Industry 8 9
Local government 3 3
UK government department or agency 3 3
Other** 7 8
TOTAL 87 100
Based on delegate list.
Notes to table
* Science education category includes schools, school-related organisations, science centres,
and other public understanding of science activities.
** Other category includes inter alia commercialisation promoters, research institutes and a
charity.
Figure 5.4 Analysis of audience at Science Strategy launch
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5.5.1 Creation of the SSAC
The publication of the Science Strategy was described by the Scottish Executive as a
"major milestone" which resulted in the appointment of a Minister for Science7 and
increased resources for university science as well as increased funding for Proof of
• R
Concept and RSE Enterprise Fellowships .
• • R
One of the most tangible outcomes, described as the "best achievement" was the
establishment of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee (SSAC) to provide
independent, expert advice to Scottish Ministers on scientific issues, including
science priorities so that funding can be directed strategically. Professor Wilson
Sibbett, Professor of Physics at the University of St Andrews, was appointed Chair of
the Committee and the Executive's chief adviser on strategic science matters on 17
December 2001 and the SSAC held its first meeting on 7 May 2002. Although the
membership of the Committee represents a breadth of expertise across a range of
scientific disciplines, its members are predominantly senior academics with little
representation from technology-based businesses (see annex to this chapter for
further details).
The SSAC was established under the auspices of the Royal Society of Edinburgh,
with funding from the Scottish Executive and was tasked with providing advice to
Scottish Executive Ministers on "science strategy, policy and priorities to allow the
Scottish Executive to make effective use of available scientific advice, knowledge
and techniques in formulating and implementing policies to support the full range of
its objectives"9. The SSAC is to take a medium- to long-term, horizon-scanning,
strategic view in formulating its advice to Ministers and its role is specifically not to
provide advice to the Executive on particular scientific matters, such as the previous
situations with BSE or foot and mouth disease. The Scottish Executive will continue
to get advice from a wide range of bodies and organisations including: the Council
for Science and Technology, the established system of UK and European scientific
7 An addition to the already very large portfolio of the Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning.
8 Contribution to SURF seminar, University of Salford, 12 May 2003.
9
http://www.scottishscience.org.uk/main_files/terms.htm (last accessed 28/10/04).
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advisory committees which provide independent expert advice on a wide range of
specific scientific subjects, the Foresight programme and advice from organisations
including the Food Standards Agency Scotland, the Scottish Agricultural Science
Agency and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. The Scottish Executive
apparently provided the SSAC with a steering brief, which identified a number of
key topics for the SSAC to address based on the commitments contained in A
Science Strategyfor Scotland.
However, the goals of the Strategy itself with some 55 commitments, many of which
are given in very general terms, are not very precise, making performance
measurement problematic and the SSAC was publicly reported10 to be finding the
identification of science priority areas a challenge. Even policy insiders seem
unclear about how these priorities will fit in with national or even Scottish Foresight
programmes (Interview with policy-maker, PI80203). Above all, the SSAC is only
an advisory committee and cannot tell the Executive what to do:
It can only provide advice... ifwe deem the committee to be functioning
properly, it'll be advice that we would want to take (Interview with
policy-maker, PI80203)
5.5.2 Establishment of cross-cutting science group
The Science Strategy has been credited by policy-makers with helping to galvanise
action by the Scottish Executive and its agencies and one of the positive outcomes
has certainly been that it has led to the establishment of an internal group to co¬
ordinate the various departments within the Executive that have a responsibility for
science policy.
When the SSAC was established, the Executive realised that it needed an internal
group, not just to shadow the SSAC but, significantly to improve joint working
across the Executive more generally on science issues. This problem is illustrated by
the sheer number of consultations the SST had with people across the Executive's
10
Contribution to SURF seminar, University of Salford, 12 May 2003.
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departments1 . Every Scottish Executive department was asked to nominate
members including Agricultural Biological Research Group, ELLD, Health,
Education and the two main research bodies Fisheries Research and Scottish
Agricultural Science Agency (SASA) plus a number of representatives from
departments without a key science role but who attend with a "watching brief'. In
the early stages, the agenda of this group focused primarily on the way the Science
Advisory Committee was working so that civil servants could feel confident that it
was providing "what ministers want it to deliver" (Interview with policy-maker,
PI80203); and secondly, on internal presentations and discussions about science-
related issues within the Executive but it proved difficult to focus on how to progress
the Science Strategy because the format of the group did not lend itself to a
discussion of the 55 commitments in the science strategy (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI 80203).
Predictably there seem to have been some teething problems in establishing this
group and a sense that the Cross-Cutting Science Group has taken quite a while to
gel and for trust and unity to develop between some of these key players (Interview
with policy adviser, P280203):
The Science Advisory Committee hasn't really gelled into deciding what
it's gonna do...and they seem to be struggling to pin down what their
role and remit will be and I think the cross-cutting group, since they 're
meant to shadow that, are probably playing a waiting game at the
moment. Useful to meet, listen to what the advisory committee are
talking about, share a wee bit of information, probably more often in the
margins of the meeting when they're standing having a coffee - this is
always the way (Interview with policy-maker, PI40303)
Although there is apparently "a move to...cross-portfolio working within the
Executive now" (with policy-maker, PI80203), there are no representatives from
either Scottish Enterprise or SHEFC on this Cross-Cutting Science Group and little
free flow of information between the Group and the SSAC, prompting the
observation that:
11 Of the 147 individuals consulted in person by SST, 34 (23%) were other Scottish Executive civil
servants and 19 (13%) were individuals in Scottish Executive agencies.
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the Executive preaches collaborations for everybody else, they 're not so
good at doing it internally ...It's very much the civil service mentality
of...we can't share with people outside (Interview with policy adviser,
P280203)
5.5.3 Making the right connections
The Scottish Science Advisory Committee's first report Science Matters: Making the
Right Connections for Scotland (Scottish Science Advisory Committee 2004b) was
launched on 13 January 2004. It called for all aspects of science activity in Scotland,
including science funding via the research councils and the three main Scottish
Executive departments (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning; Environment and Rural
Affairs; and Health), to be brought into a better integrated framework to ensure that
Scotland is more able to realise its full potential as well as improved access to and
engagement with the science base for the public and policy-makers (Scottish Science
Advisory Committee 2004a). According to its Chair, Wilson Sibbett, "the report
challenges the Scottish Executive to avoid insularity between different government
departments" (Wojtas 2004).
In launching the report, Sibbett called on the Executive to add value through greater
connectivity but acknowledged that a more integrated approach was difficult to
achieve as it required interlinked policies, better connections within and between
departments of the Scottish Executive, and better connections within and between
government, HEIs, the NHS and industry so that "organisational boundaries should
be [viewed as] conduits and not barriers"12.
The report's seven recommendations span science education, excellence in the
science base, knowledge transfer from the science base, and science and society (see
Figure 5.5). In particular, the SSAC takes the view that:
to ensure the long-term viability and sustainability ofscience in Scotland,
it is essential that there is a suitably broad appreciation of science and
that all government departments must work together with the best
12
Speech by Professor Wilson Sibbett at the launch of SSAC report Science Matters: Making the
Right Connections for Scotland, 13 January 2004 in Glasgow.
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possible coherence and complementarity to realise shared ambitions
(Scottish Science Advisory Committee 2004b, p. 15)
noting that this is particularly significant where new initiatives are being introduced,
where there are "clear advantages to be gained by combining efforts and visions
across and between departments and sectors" (Scottish Science Advisory Committee
2004b, p. 15).
The report also addresses the multi-level nature of STI policy and stresses the
importance of Scottish connections with UK and European science policy
discussions, calling on the Executive to establish "robust links into UK and EU
networks, at both official and ministerial level, to ensure that the views and
aspirations of Scotland are well represented" (Scottish Science Advisory Committee
2004b, p. 15). This section of the report also notes the need to develop "a
network/forum to facilitate regular exchanges between the science base, policy¬
makers, funders and users of science" in order to "share visions and aspirations in
respect of future planning". According to the SSAC, such a network should involve
the Scottish Executive and its agencies with a range of organisations, including
universities and higher education institutes (HEIs), SHEFC, NHS Scotland, research
institutes, SEN, HIE and the newly-formed Intermediary Technology Institutes
(ins).
The report's section on Science in Scotland concludes with the point that:
The framework for the support of science in Scotland should be made
more effective through closer and better-connected interactions within
and between the Executive Departments involved in developing policies
that involve science. These connections should be extended to include
those bodies, such as SHEFC, SEN, HIE and the Research Councils, that
are involved in the distribution offundingfor science activities. This will
require better linkages being established between Departments and
public agencies to promote connectivity within Government and this
should extend to UK and EU bodies. (Scottish Science Advisory
Committee 2004b, p. 16)
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Figure 5.5 The SSAC's recommendations to the Scottish Executive
Recommendation 1
The SSAC recommends that the optimisation of the science base should be a principal component in
the development of government policies and strategies in Scotland.
Recommendation 2
The Scottish Executive should implement with due urgency the recommendations presented in the
SSAC paper, Why Science Education Matters: Supporting and Improving Science Education in
Scottish Schools.
Recommendation 3
The Scottish Executive should continue to address the issues of short-term viability and the longer-
term sustainability of Scotland's science festivals and science centres such that they become a national
network that fulfils identified educational and cultural roles.
Recommendation 4
The SSAC recommends that the Scottish Executive, SHEFC, SEN, HIE, HEIs, the SEERAD-
Sponsored Bodies and the Research Councils should act more collectively and creatively to support
exceptional cases for the recruitment, career development, retention and resourcing of outstanding
talent in the science base in Scotland.
Recommendation 5
It is recommended that there should be a significant reshaping to optimise the science base in
Scotland. This reshaping must focus on globally-competitive areas of science, promote strategic cross-
sector collaborations and encourage high-risk, high-reward activities. The Scottish Executive, SHEFC,
SEN, HIE and the Research Councils should invite and support proposals for new integrated
structures that would lead, where appropriate, to the creation of Scottish Centres of Scientific
Excellence.
Recommendation 6
The SSAC recommends that with regard to future planning cycles, the Scottish Executive must ensure
that resources are made available for the simultaneous pursuit of excellence in research and the
nurturing of knowledge transfer activities. SEERAD, Scottish Enterprise, SHEFC, NHS Scotland, the
Research Councils and ITI Scotland should together identify and calibrate intellectual property within
the science base in Scotland to promote a better understanding of its scale and value. A major
objective must be to establish a new culture for the generation of linkages between relevant aspects of
knowledge generation and its subsequent exploitation.
Recommendation 7
The SSAC recommends that the public and policymakers should have improved access to and
engagement with the science base in Scotland. The SSAC believes that the Executive, working with
organisations such as the BA and the RSE, should provide a means to improve public engagement on
key issues arising from current and future scientific research, recognising the need to foster a wider
scientific literacy among Scottish citizens.
Scottish Science Advisory Committee 2004b
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and this need for greater connectivity is emphasised again in the report's concluding
remarks:
The SSAC believes that Scotland can deliver more effectively, not only in
areas of leading-edge research but also in areas of teaching and training
through to knowledge transfer and engaging with society. A major
component of this endeavour involves a new level of connectivity that
engages all of the stakeholders such that planning strategies should
extend from elementary science education through to the exploitation of
science and associated policy generation (Scottish Science Advisory
Committee 2004b, p.52)
The SSAC was set "a rather amorphous and potentially sizeable agenda" (Interview
with policy-maker, PI40403) and this is reflected in its report. Given that the SSAC
was afforded a relatively high profile by the Executive, some observers felt that it
would be difficult for the Executive to ignore the Committee's advice (Interview
with director of research institute, R210203) but others are more sanguine:
It will be interesting to see whether or not that committee can exercise
influence — I'm sure it will be used. It would be a disaster if it's not
used...A key question will be whether it's used reactively or proactively.
Unfortunately, most of what we do...we tend to be reactive (Interview
with academic, A220403)
Other observers criticise the fact that the SSAC's role is to give advice to the Scottish
Executive, not the Scottish Parliament, and point to the need for Parliament to have a
source of advice on science independent from that of Ministers (Interview with
academic, A210202). Others imply that the Committee is a rather grand science
lobby group (Interview with director of research institute, R210203), a point that is
possibly borne out by the new remit of the SSAC, issued in March 2004:
With reference to the strategic relevance to the Scottish economy and
quality of life, to provide advice and make recommendations on the
strategic priorities for the science base in Scotland, including priorities
for expenditure (SSAC Remit Phase II13)





• The distribution of public investment in the science base in Scotland; areas where
expansion of investment is justified; areas where ceasing or reducing activity
may need to be considered.
• New and emerging areas of science and research that could be of particular
strategic relevance for Scotland.
• Consider whether existing funding structures are consistent with the new
strategic priorities that emerge and how they or modified structures might best
• 1 ^
facilitate the development of pan-Scotland initiatives
Rather than optimising the interactions between policies to promote the science base
and enhance industrial innovation, one early observer's suspicions that the Scottish
Science Strategy might turn out to be "well how much money are we going to put
into biotechnology" (Interview with academic, A210202) may well have been
justified. Moreover, despite all of the exhortations to "make the right connections",
it is not evident that the foresighting role of the new ITI Life Sciences initiative will
be integrated with the work of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee which is
tasked with advising the Scottish Executive on science funding priorities14.
5.6 Perpetuating the linear model
The SSAC is attempting to look at science across the breadth of the Scottish
Executive's remit without being bound by civil service policy "silos" and, through a
series of working groups, has examined mechanisms to promote excellence in the
Scottish science base; the quality and content of science education; and public
engagement with science and the use of science in policy-making. However, it is
clear from the Executive's steering brief that the real priority is the science base, the
commercialisation of its outputs, and the identification of science funding priorities
however much of an anachronism this long discredited approach to "picking
winners" might be (Interview with policy adviser, P280203):
What the Executive are looking for is [for the SSAC] to say, well, we
want you to put your money... in X, Y and Z and they 'd go off and they'd
be delighted because they can then just write the policies round these
14
Response to question from floor from the researcher at ITI briefing event, 22 October 2003.
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areas and SHEFC will be putting money into these areas, SEERAD will
be putting money into those areas, Health Department will be putting
money into these areas (Interview with policy adviser, P280203)
With so many other organisations already tasked with STI-related priorities,
including within the Executive itself, where SEERAD and the Health Department
already have clearly articulated research funding priorities, this draws attention to the
fact that ELLD is the department that does not have such priorities, which may
explain its ardent quest for the SSAC to deliver on this aspect of the Science
Strategy.
But from the outset, there have been mixed messages about whether the strategy is
simply about science policy or whether it is about co-ordinating science and
innovation. The report of the Science Strategy Review Group made the case for
developing a coherent and co-ordinated strategic approach, linking the science base
with industry but, although it raised the issues of how to foster increased "industry
pull" in Scotland and how best to link a science strategy into a related economic
framework for Scotland, the report maintains that this "raises wider issues beyond
the scope of a science strategy" (Scottish Executive 2000c, p.5).
According to the EC (Anon 2003), "innovation primarily takes place in enterprises,
so they need to be involved in developing policies" but Scottish firms certainly view
the Science Strategy as being very much about the science base and the membership
of the SSAC as being predominantly academic - "the usual suspects" (Interviews
with industry representatives, 1260602 and 1040702). Policy insiders also criticise
the remit of the SSAC for taking far too narrow a view of science and feel that it was
wrong of the Executive not to integrate enterprise and innovation with science
(Interview with policy-maker, P020403). As discussed above, the SSAC, itself,
advocates the adoption of a more integrated framework in their report to the Scottish
Executive (Scottish Science Advisory Committee 2004b).
However, as it stands, neither Scottish Enterprise nor SHEFC has a role on the
SSAC, even as observers, nor are they members of the Scottish Executive's Cross-
Cutting Science Group and instead they must rely on contacts with members to try to
influence outcomes (Interviews with policy-makers, P260203 and PI30503).
Despite the integrationist rhetoric, a policy gulf exists between these key policy
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actors, a point that is further developed in Chapter 7 which examines some of the
barriers to the effective operation of policy networks. In the meantime, it is evident
from interviews that there is a mismatch between the SSAC, which is seen as looking
after the science base, and Scottish Enterprise, which sees its role as carrying out
commercialisation:
It's important that the individuals on the committee [SSAC] are aware of
what we [Scottish Enterprise] do and they probably are... the majority of
them will be. I think... the sorts of things they're deliberating on are
things that we...Scottish Enterprise...don't necessarily have a view on.
We, individually, certainly have a view on it but that is - we are never
going to come to a corporate view because it's not important enough for
us to do so ...Whichever one they do, there will be commercialisation
opportunities for us. It will just be different ones (Interview with policy¬
maker, P260203)
As discussed in Chapter 2, accepted wisdom about innovation has evolved from
thinking that information flows in one direction from basic science to technology and
thence to the production and diffusion of new products, and instead conceptualises
the innovation process as interactive, non-linear and characterised by learning across
firms, sectors, regions and national systems (Mytelka and Smith 2002). Although
public technology policies underpinned by these linear models are now seen as
unhelpful (Williams and Edge 1996) and a significant body of work exists that
demonstrates that thinking has moved on from the linear conception to produce a
more realistic model of innovation15, nevertheless many commentators16 point to the
fact that this linear approach is still implicit in much STI policy at both the UK and
European levels: the European Commission openly acknowledges that its current
structures for innovation policy are:
overwhelmingly based on separate departments with limited interchange
between them, and the predominant perception of innovation is still a
very narrow, research-derivedprocess (Anon 2003)
Nightingale (1998) suggests that the enduring success of this approach "is more to do
with how easily it provides a justification for the public funding of science and how
15
See, for example, Nightingale (1998) or Massey et at. (1992, pp.58-85) for a review of the relevant
literature.
16
See, for example, Nauwelaers and Wintjes (2002), Edler et al. (2002), and Tait and Williams
(1999), previously discussed in Chapter 2.
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well it fitted into established theoretical frameworks, than any empirical validation"
and certainly the Scottish Executive's recent, rather defensive, response to the
SSAC's report (Scottish Executive 2004c) focuses primarily on public investment in
science. While paying lip service to collaboration between different departments
within the Scottish Executive, it presents a very one-sided view of science policy and
makes no attempt to foster a co-ordinated research and innovation strategy.
Although the pharmaceutical and life sciences sectors most closely resemble the
linear model, it is far from typical of innovation as a whole. Industrial R&D is a key
knowledge source for new technical advances and the knowledge contributions of
public sector research are more often indirect (Faulkner and Senker 1995; SUPRA
2000; Bechhofer et al. 2001). Tait and Williams (1999) also offer a number of
explanations for the resilience of the linear model of innovation including the
suggestion that it provides an attractive metaphor for policy-makers who are looking
for a straightforward means to influence the highly complex processes of technical
change. The Scottish science strategy has been criticised for its focus on "putting
science to use" rather than on promoting innovation17 and, indeed, the approach
being adopted by Scottish policy-makers is epitomised by Howard Newby's
criticisms of the linear model when commenting on the 1993 Science and
Technology White Paper:
It leads to a disproportionate emphasis on "getting the science right"
and insufficient emphasis on the business processes required to bring
technology to the market place (Newby 1994, quoted in Tait and
Williams 1999)
As discussed in Chapter 3, Scotland has a history of pre-devolution policy
institutions and a certain track record in regional economic development. In
comparison with other emerging regions in Europe, it is perhaps not quite the policy
novice that the opening quote from Cooke et al. (2000) in the introduction to this
chapter implies although clearly in the early days of devolution, the Scottish
Executive has recognised the need to develop internal policy capabilities rather than
17 Contribution to SURF seminar, University of Salford, 12/05/03.
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the self-confessed "tartanising" and implementation of policies developed in
Westminster that was previously the case.
However, in attempting to facilitate regional innovation, Scotland must resist the
tendency to place artificial boundaries around science and innovation. Such
boundaries reinforce the linear model and ignore the fact that innovation does not
simply result from research undertaken in universities (Lyall and Tait 2004). These
points were made by many of the respondents to the Scottish Executive's
consultation exercise, discussed above, who clearly articulated the need for better co¬
ordination between "science" and "innovation" and measures to improve "industry
pull" rather than simply focusing on "science push". What is needed in Scotland is
an integrated strategy for research and innovation that can begin to address the
"mismatch between the capacity of the knowledge base and an industrial base that is
structurally unable to exploit it" (Boulton, quoted in Dalton 2001). While some see
the glimmer of a shared agenda between the various players in this game beginning
to develop and the slow recognition of the nature of this mismatch (Interview with
academic, A210202), if Scotland's key policy instrument for the governance of STI
continues to adhere to a discredited model and its focus remains on university spin
outs, we will only ever address half of the equation and will not solve the problem of
increasing the innovative capabilities of existing firms.
5.7 A missed opportunity
The SSAC has been described by its Chairman as "clearly a very direct and
potentially efficient route of access into the consideration of policy matters"
(Institute of Physics 2003). Setting to one side whether it is actually influencing
policy-makers (and it is probably too early to make any such evaluation in any case),
a question that might be asked is whether the SSAC is performing as a policy
network for STI policy in Scotland. In fact, a better question is whether SSAC has
the potential to form a node around which other policy networks might coalesce but,
as we shall see, the Scottish Executive missed this opportunity, and the failure lies,
not with SSAC but with the scoping of the precursor Science Strategy.
Steward (2001) puts forward a range of criteria with which to characterise a policy
network, including:
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• Membership • Autonomy
• Mobilisation of business interests • Role of the state
• Function • Power relations
• Rules of conduct • Integration
Some of these aspects have already been addressed in the previous section where we
have seen that the membership of the SSAC is thought by some to be unduly
academic and not sufficiently inclusive of business interests. This also reflects the
lack of integration between a committee essentially tasked with advising on the
science base and the much more extensive, multi-actor arena of STI policy in
Scotland. SSAC does not evidence overt links to other key policy actors such as
Scottish Enterprise or SHEFC, although these relationships are mediated informally
through cross-membership of various committees and personal networking and it
does seem that Scottish Enterprise is seeking to use the SSAC as a conduit to the
Scottish Executive:
I would hope that the work that we do with the individuals on the
Scientific Advisory Committee gets fed back into the Scottish Executive
by a variety ofdifferent routes (Interview with policy-maker, P260203)
Although the SSAC operates independently of the Scottish Executive, it is funded by
the Scottish Executive via the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) and was
established under the auspices of RSE, appointments being made by the President of
the RSE, following the approval of the RSE Council after an open advertisement and
selection process. The Scottish Executive defined the terms of reference for the
SSAC in association with the RSE and the Chair of the SSAC and provided the
committee with a steering brief, which identified a number of key topics for the
SSAC to address over their first year, based primarily on the actions and
commitments contained in A Science Strategyfor Scotland.
It is worth reflecting on the fact that networks also do a job of exclusion and one
could argue that the establishment of the SSAC was a conscious attempt by an
influential scientific body, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, to gain a powerful
position in science policy in Scotland. The Royal Societies' report Devolution and
Science (Royal Society of Edinburgh and Royal Society of London 1999) had made a
176
high-profile contribution to the science policy debate prior to the establishment of the
Science Strategy Review Group and the RSE's President at that time, who was also
the former Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK government, was a member of that
Group. Membership of the first phase of the SSAC also demonstrates an "inner
circle" of elite, academic scientists, the majority ofwhom are Fellows of the RSE, an
organisation that although it prides itself on being "multidisciplinary" (in contrast to
• • • 1R
the Royal Society in London) is, nevertheless, dominated by natural scientists .
Although the SSAC was at pains to define science in a broad way19, commentators
warn against adopting an approach that sustains science for its own sake, rather than
its role in supporting much broader societal goals (SUPRA 2000): in a committee of
19 members there is no public interest representation, virtually no industry
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representation and only one representative from the social sciences.
The SSAC has not therefore had an entirely free rein in terms of its rules of conduct
and is not completely autonomous from either the Scottish Executive or the RSE.
This means that the SSAC is in an anomalous position because it is not entirely
independent of the state but nor is it an NDPB and its members and secretariat are
not civil servants.
Much of this links back to the debate about whether Scotland should have a Chief
Scientific Adviser, either permanently or on secondment to the Scottish Executive
(as is the case for the Chief Medical Officer), and the resulting compromise, where
the Chair of the SSAC provides scientific advice to the Executive without actually
having the official status of CSA, smacks of political fudge. This has not facilitated
smooth relations with higher levels of governance: because Professor Sibbett is not a
civil servant he does not have any formal relationships with Whitehall and is not
permitted to represent the Scottish Executive or act as an observer on the UK Chief
18 This may, of course, change over time as the SSAC advertised for new members in March 2004 and
was reported to be seeking greater representation from industry.
19 SSAC interprets the term "science" to encompass "the life, physical, computational, medical and
veterinary sciences through to engineering and technology" (Scottish Science Advisory Committee
2004b, p.l 1).
20 The membership includes one serial entrepreneur and one CEO of a university spin out company,
neither of whom represent the life sciences sector.
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Scientific Adviser's Committee (CSAC) or the UK Science and Engineering Base
Co-ordinating Committee (SEBCC).
This demonstrates another stratum of power relations, not simply those between the
SSAC and the Scottish level of governance but also the multi-level governance of
STI and science policy in particular. Early interviews with OST (Interview with
policy-maker, P260202) revealed some anxieties about Scotland "going off and
doing its own thing" in an area of concurrent policy and a degree of distrust about
Scotland taking responsibility for science in such a visible way which has not
necessarily been assuaged with the establishment of the SSAC (Interview with policy
adviser, P280203)21.
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that a partnership approach is analytically distinct from
a policy network as a mode of governance since the creation of a partnership does
not imply that relations between actors are conducted on the basis of mutual benefit,
trust and reciprocity which characterise the network mode of governance (Lowndes
and Skelcher 1998). The relationship between the Scottish Executive and the SSAC
does not yet even seem to represent a partnership: in contrast to the Framework for
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Economic Development in Scotland (FEDS) (Scottish Executive 2000a) which is
written very much in the language of "partnership", a textual analysis of A Science
Strategy for Scotland for references to language that might illustrate a collaborative
approach to policy-making does not suggest the same strong commitment to
collaboration (Table 5.5). While the Executive is regarded as being quite willing to
take advice from outside organisations, the SSAC is not within the civil service
envelope and constantly has to negotiate relationships in order to access what some
civil servants regard as privileged policy information: there is not a two-way flow
and information sharing can prove problematic. In order to foster policy networks,
or even to achieve the precursor partnership stage, the civil service perhaps needs to
reappraise how it operates and change attitudes and internal processes to overcome
21 This is mirrored by remarks made at the Royal Society of Edinburgh's What next for UK science
policy? event (9 December 2003) where it was noted that there should perhaps be more dialogue
between OST and SSAC to ensure Scottish expertise was included in Foresight.
22 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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the "them and us" mind-set that prevails, particularly amongst civil servants of long¬
standing, when dealing with outside bodies (Interview with policy adviser, P280203).












Network 8 Three refer to Scottish Enterprise Network and four to the
Scottish science centres
Partnership 8 Solely in the context of partnership with other levels of
governance




Although promoted by the Scottish Executive as an "integrated" approach (Scottish
Executive, 2001c), this chapter has sought to demonstrate that the thrust of the
Science Strategy throughout the policy development process from inception, to
consultation, to publication, and then to implementation has been on the public sector
and on supporting the science base in Scottish universities and encouraging them to
commercialise their inventions in order to foster a vibrant, technology-based, SME
community in Scotland. Despite the claim that "science has been interpreted to
encompass the development, understanding and application of the physical, life and
social sciences" (Scottish Executive 2001a, p.7), the imagery and language
throughout the strategy document and the activities of the subsequent advisory
committee imply that science is what takes place in laboratories in universities and
23
Based on search of document at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library3/education/ssfs-08.asp (last
accessed 28/10/04).
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public sector research establishments (PSREs), and a major role for the strategy is to
hasten the transformation of this knowledge into new products, processes and
services. Without wishing to down-play the value of what is included in the strategy
document or the work of the SSAC, this apparent adherence to the linear model of
innovation is disappointing but not unexpected.
Chapter 2 described how policy networks can take a number of forms ranging from
policy communities, which are stable, highly interdependent, and with a restricted
membership who share core values and attitudes, to issue networks which represent a
much looser set of interests and are less stable, non-exclusive and populated by a
wide and unpredictable number of participants (Rhodes 1997; Parsons 1995, p. 189;
Atkinson and Coleman 1992). Significantly, as noted in Chapter 2 but worth
repeating in the context of the SSAC, issue networks primarily involve policy
consultation rather than shared decision-making (Rhodes and Marsh 1992) and such
an exchange of information is unlikely to have much effect on policy outcomes
(Smith 1997, p.83).
It remains to be seen whether the Scottish Executive is merely paying lip service to
the SSAC or whether it will act on its advice, but for the time being the SSAC clearly
conforms to the model of a government advisory committee rather than that of a
policy network. For reasons that are discussed further in Chapter 7, various barriers
are preventing the SSAC from facilitating a joined up approach to STI policy in
Scotland. When it developed A Science Strategy for Scotland, the Scottish
government missed a valuable opportunity to facilitate the creation of a broader
policy network of research and innovation with the SSAC at its core, acting as a
central node in that network and cementing roles between policy-makers in different
government departments and agencies and with policy targets across the science base
and technology-based industry. This lack of co-ordination within and between key
government departments and agencies was highlighted in many of the written
responses to the consultation exercise and again in the SSAC's report (Scottish
Science Advisory Committee 2004b). The SSAC is not able to perform in
accordance with the governance model proposed in Chapter 2 as power and control
reside with the Executive which is still, and always has been, the agenda-setter dating
back to the precursor study to the Science Strategy Review Group. This suggests,
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first, that a strongly government-orchestrated style of policy-making prevails and,
secondly, that Scottish policy-makers are not developing a policy learning capability
but simply repeating old routines.
In their discussion on the new modes of knowledge production, Gibbons et al. (1994)
conclude that science and technology policies can no longer be regarded as
functionally separate from innovation policies (ibid. p. 159) and describe how
distributed knowledge production leads to the de-concentration of loci of advice
whereby sources of science advice are more diverse and governments are no longer
able to manage outcomes (ibid. p. 165). This chapter has tried to demonstrate that,
although the SSAC has possibly made some very preliminary steps on the way to
catalysing an independent, integrated, and interactive policy network, the
government is still firmly in control and we are not yet seeing the elision of STI
policy envisioned by Gibbons et al. (ibid.)24. As indicated in this chapter and
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, sub-optimal co-ordination between key policy
actors within the Scottish system of innovation presents significant barriers to the
effective performance of integrated policy networks for STI in Scotland.
24
Nevertheless, SSAC has achieved some successes where it has encouraged the Scottish Executive
to think about improving its internal co-ordination of policies for science through the Cross-Cutting
Science Group and has publicly raised the profile of policy integration in its calls for greater
connectivity in its first report to the Executive.
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5.9 Annex to Chapter 5
5.9.1 Report of the Science Strategy Review Group: Summary of Key
Questions
Extracted from Scottish Executive (2000c)
Science and the Economy
• How to link the provision and use of science with economic growth and wealth generation in
Scotland.
• How to foster technology transfer and uptake.
• How to stimulate entrepreneurship.
• How to target investment in science and technology with this in mind.
• How to manage and co-ordinate the continuing strong science base in Scotland, including the
prioritisation of investment in research.
• How to improve Scotland's track record in exploiting the outputs of its science and engineering
base
• How to link a science strategy into a related economic framework for Scotland.
• How to foster increased "industry pull" in Scotland (although this raises wider issues beyond the
scope of a science strategy).
• There are questions concerning entrepreneurship and business appreciation among scientists and
engineers, and questions of technology management in business and industry.
• How to facilitate technology transfer at the interface between academic research and industry.
• Should there be an additional emphasis on supporting pre-competitive development and
application.
• Should increased public funding be made available for this purpose cf Scottish Enterprise's
"Proof ofConcept" fund.
Science and Government Policy
• How to provide an advisory framework which builds on existing systems in a co-ordinated way.
• How to ensure the best and most relevant scientific advice is available to Scottish Ministers and
the Scottish Executive.
• How to ensure improved coherence and consistency within the Scottish Executive for the
provision of science to underpin aspects of policy making.
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• How to achieve an increasingly objective and evidence-based approach to policy making.
• How to define and put in place a Scottish scientific advisory system which is integrated where
necessary into UK and European systems, and which at the same time ensures that the best and
most relevant scientific advice on specific Scottish issues, or on wider UK and international
issues which have an impact on Scotland, is available to Scottish Ministers.
• How to engage the social sciences not only in the development of the Scottish Executive's social
policies but also in the development of its economic and environmental policies as well.
Science and the Public
• How to generate a better understanding and acceptance of scientific uncertainty and risk.
• How to secure a debate on scientific issues with the public.
• How to assist the media in presenting science and its role in policy.
• How to address the issues of communication skills for scientists, and help improve public
understanding of science (in which school education can also play a significant role).
• How to build up the degree of trust between scientific experts and the public when different
scientific opinions on a difficult or novel piece of science may be equally defensible in the light
of existing knowledge.
Science and Education
• How to arrest the fall-off in interest and attainment at upper primary and lower secondary levels
(at a time when pupils are beginning to develop ideas on choices for the future).
• How to address the relatively low levels of scientific training in primary school teachers (and a
concomitant lack of confidence in teaching the general science curriculum at that level).
• What mechanisms should be put in place to provide for the continuing professional development
of specialist science teachers in secondary schools as scientific knowledge expands.
• Whether the existing emphasis on a general scientific education and scientific literacy - and its
relevance to modern lifestyles and careers - is sufficient.
• Whether there is adequate provision for those pupils who wish to specialise in science and pursue
it in the tertiary education sector.
• How to provide the enhanced physical infrastructure (laboratories and equipment) that is required
in many schools, and the implications of this for the effectiveness of science teaching.
• How to build on existing activity by companies supporting science education in schools and to
engage new companies in such activities.
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The Science Base in Scotland
• How to preserve and enhance the excellence and diversity of the Scottish science base.
• How to strike the right balance between encouraging competition and promoting collaboration.
• How to encourage multidisciplinary working as scientific problems become more complex and
require a range of disciplines and skills for their advancement.
• What balance to strike between, on the one hand, research aimed at scientific curiosity and the
pursuit of new knowledge for its own sake, and on the other, the generation of knowledge and
technology - through applied research - which is more immediately relevant to user communities.
• How to maintain the skills base and specifically to provide adequate career paths for research
staff.
• How to set a framework of policies, priorities and objectives which could help shape the Scottish
Higher Education Funding Council's (SHEFC's) funding of science in order to meet these various
requirements in a balanced way, and to ensure that the criteria on which funding of research in
Higher Education is based, are appropriate to the needs of Scotland in the 21st Century.
• How to achieve a coherent and co-ordinated approach among the various funders of research.
• How to set priorities for research spend across these various budgets.
The UK and International Context
• How a Scottish science strategy how would link into science policy both at the UK level and in
Europe and beyond.
• How to address distinctive needs in Scotland while continuing to link into the wider context and
drawing as necessary on the UK science base.
• How to ensure that Scottish scientists are able to continue to contribute to science and science
policy-making in UK and international fora, and represent Scottish science at those levels.
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5.9.2 Membership of Science Strategy Review Group
Mr E W Frizzell, Secretary, Scottish Executive Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department
(Chairman)
Professor J S Archer, Principal of Heriot-Watt University
Professor G S Boulton, Vice Principal and Regius Professor of Geology and Mineralogy, University
of Edinburgh
Professor G R D Catto, Vice Principal and Professor of Medicine and Therapeutics at the University
ofAberdeen; Chief Scientist, Scottish Executive Health Department
Professor J Cheetham, Social Work Commissioner, Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland
Ms M P Henton, Director of Environmental Strategy at the Scottish Environment Protection Agency
Professor V van Heyningen, Medical Research Council Human Genetics Unit, Western General
Hospital, Edinburgh
Dr G A Kenney-Wallace, Managing Director and Vice-Chancellor of British Aerospace SYSTEMS
Virtual University
Professor B King, Principal and Vice Chancellor of the University ofAbertay, Dundee
Professor P J Lillford, Chief Scientist, Unilever Research Colworth
Professor J McQuaid, Director of Science and Technology and Chief Scientist, Health and Safety
Executive (1995-99)
Professor T J Maxwell, (now former) Director of the Macaulay Land Use Research Institute
Professor A Miller, (now former) Principal of the University of Stirling
Dame B M Ogilvie, (now former) Chair of the UK Committee for Public Understanding of Science
(COPUS); former Director of the Wellcome Trust (1991-98)
Professor Sir W D P Stewart, (now former) President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh; former Chief
Scientific Advisor to the UK Government (1990-95)
5.9.3 Membership of the Scottish Science Advisory Committee (First
Term)
Professor W Sibbett, Chair of SSAC and Wardlaw Professor of Physics, University of St Andrews
Professor G Boulton, Vice Principal and Regius Professor of Geology and Mineralogy, University of
Edinburgh
Professor J Bower, Professor of Entrepreneurship, Glasgow Caledonian University
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Dr D Bruce, Director of the Society, Religion and Technology Project, Church of Scotland
Professor M Calder, Professor ofComputing Science, University of Glasgow
Professor J Coggins, Director, Institute of Biomedical and Life Sciences; Dean, Faculty of Biomedical
& Life Sciences and Professor ofMolecular Enzymology, University ofGlasgow
Professor G Durant, (now former) Professor of Science Interpretation and Communication and Deputy
Director, Hunterian Museum, University of Glasgow
Professor T Durrani, Deputy Principal and Professor of Signal Processing, University of Strathclyde
Mrs S Fletcher, Principal Teacher of Physics, High School of Dundee
Professor M Gill, Director of the Macaulay Land Use Research Institute, Craigiebuckler, Aberdeen
and Honorary Professor in the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, University of Aberdeen
Professor P Grant, Head of School of Engineering & Electronics and Professor of Electronic Signal
Processing, University ofEdinburgh
Professor S Macintyre, Director, MRC Social & Public Health Sciences Unit, University of Glasgow
Dr S Monro, Scientific Director, Our Dynamic Earth and Principal Geologist, British Geological
Survey
Dr J Nicholls, Chief Executive, Photonic Materials Ltd, Bellshill
Professor A Nolan, Dean of the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine and Professor of Veterinary
Pharmacology, University ofGlasgow
Mr I Ritchie, Entrepreneur
Professor J Savill, Head of College of Medicine and Veterinary Medicine and Professor of Medicine,
University of Edinburgh
Professor D Wallace, Vice-Chancellor, Loughborough University
Dr J Whitelock, Team Leader, Applied Sciences, Fife College of Further & Higher Education
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Chapter 6 Contrasting Policy Networks at Different Levels of
Governance
6.1 Introduction
Improving policy design through undertaking public involvement initiatives has
become an "integral part" of the policy-making process according to the UK Cabinet
Office (Cabinet Office 2002, p.4), whose advice to policy-makers recognises the
distinctions between consulting and engaging with the public in policy-making.
Although these policy-making guidelines do not explicitly use the term "policy
network", their description of participation as a relationship with government where
policy targets actively define the process, in contrast to a consultation on a pre-
identified issue, approximates to what the political studies literature would recognise
as a policy network (see Figure 6.1).
In order to avoid an overly parochial view of Scotland's STI policy, Chapter 6
therefore changes tack slightly and attempts to make some comparisons with related
policy activities taking place at different levels of governance throughout the UK and
beyond. In order to do so, this chapter analyses the conduct of two examples of
industry participation in national (UK level) STI policy networks in the form of the
Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF) and the Bioscience
Innovation and Growth Team (BIGT). It then explores the role of policy networks in
a successful regional biotechnology system in Cambridge, UK and concludes with an
international comparator in the shape of the German STI system and the BioRegio
scheme.
These four case studies adopt a comparative perspective rather than presenting a
highly developed comparative case study (see further discussion in Section 1.5).
They, nevertheless, enable some lessons to be drawn for Scotland on the role of
policy networks in the multi-level governance of science and innovation. These four
cases are based on documentary analysis of primary and secondary data sources
(including the reports published by PICTF and BIGT and a number of academic
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papers) together with interviews with key informants including a small sample of
policy-makers and policy targets (analogous to the Scottish case) from the
Cambridge region and, for the German case, researchers who had themselves studied
participative governance in Germany1.
This chapter will also question whether taskforces, so beloved of the New Labour
government in the UK, can truly be equated with policy networks. As Daniel (1997)
notes, involving business in government taskforces is clearly regarded as adding
gravitas and credibility but is often less about participatory democracy than about
marketing and policy delivery.
Figure 6.1 Cabinet Office definition of participation in policy-making
Consultation: a two-way relationship in which government asks for, and receives, citizens'
feedback on policy proposals. Typically, consultation might be used when extensive
responses are required to a specific policy proposal in order to gather views from the public
and civil society groups (CSGs), for example, through publishing consultation papers,
organising public meetings, or deliberative polling.
Participation: a relationship based on partnership with government in which citizens
actively participate in defining the process and developing the policy. Participation
activities might see citizens involved directly to draw up policy proposals and develop
solutions to a problem. They might include CSGs working with a government department
to help develop new operating frameworks by co-opting CSG representatives on to
government bodies or stakeholder committees. Methods for engaging the public include
referenda, citizens' juries, citizens' panels, or direct delegation of authority to citizens to
make decisions (Extracts from Viewfinder: A Policy Maker's Guide to Public
Involvement, Cabinet Office, 2002)
1 This chapter also draws on data gathered from the main body of the interview survey where other
respondents also provided information germane to this discussion.
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6.2 UK national level: Government-industry taskforces
6.2.1 Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force
The Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force (PICTF) was established
in April 2000. It brought together the expertise of industry leaders with senior
government policy-makers to identify and report to the Prime Minister on the
measures needed to retain and strengthen the competitiveness of the UK
pharmaceutical industry. PICTF was co-chaired by the UK Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Health and the Chief Executive of Astra Zeneca. Its
membership included for the government: the Minister for Science and Innovation,
the Minister for Education and Employment, the Minister for Housing and Planning,
the Financial Secretary and the Permanent Secretary at the Department of Health and
from industry the CEOs of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham, the Chairman
of Novartis (who was also then President of the ABPI), and the ABPI Director-
General. The secretariat was provided jointly by industry and the Department of
Health.
According to the official government line, PICTF was established following a
meeting in November 1999 between the Prime Minister and the CEOs of Astra
Zeneca, Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham. At that meeting, industry
described how:
the traditional factors that underpinned the UK's past success in
pharmaceuticals were no longer on their own sufficient to guarantee
good performance, and an initiative was required to ensure the UK
retained its competitive edge. They expressed particular concern about
issues relating to market access, and intellectual property protection
(PICTF 2001, p.4)
The unofficial view from civil servants was that there were more emotive reasons
following the considerable disquiet in the pharmaceutical industry over the National
Institute for Clinical Excellence's recommendation that Glaxo Wellcome's anti-flu
drug Relenza was not cost effective and should not be generally available on
prescription. At which point "industry barnstormed Number 10" leading to some
very stormy exchanges between the Prime Minister and the then chairman of Glaxo
Wellcome, Richard Sykes (Interview with policy-maker, P280303). The general
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view of the pharmaceutical industry was that government did not take them seriously
and that government policies were not helping the competitiveness and productivity
of the industry. In response to threats from the pharmaceutical industry that they
"were all going to sort of stamp off in a huff and take the ball with them" (i.e. that
they were going to take their businesses overseas) the Prime Minister agreed to set
up the competitiveness task force (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403).
Industry's view puts a more positive spin on the origins of PICTF claiming buy-in
from the top down: "we've been pushing at a very open door...very much driven by
the Prime Minister's concern" (Interview with industry representative, 1040702).
The Task Force was responsible for setting out the detail of its work programme
from the framework of topics set out in its Terms of Reference (Figure 6.2) and was
free to add further items for inclusion in the work programme with the consent of the
co-chairmen. PICTF established six working groups in the following areas:
• Developments in the UK Market
• Intellectual Property Rights
• Regulation ofMedicines Licensing
• Science Base and Biopharmaceuticals
• Clinical Research
• Wider Economic Climate
and reported in March 2001 (PICTF 2001) with a report that included 69
recommended actions.
After the Task Force reported, a Ministerial Industry Strategy Group (MISG) was
established to oversee the follow-up to PICTF, including ensuring that PICTF actions
were followed through and taking forward the ethos of PICTF by taking a joint,
strategic view of UK competitiveness. This Group published its report
Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force: One Year On in May 2002
(Ministerial Industry Strategy Group 2002).
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Figure 6.2 PICTF's terms of reference2
1. Identify all the criteria for maintaining and developing the competitiveness of the UK as a
successful and effective base for an innovative pharmaceutical industry in a global market.
2. Address the following specific issues:
2.1. Given the role of NICE in relation to judgements about clinical and cost-
effectiveness and other measures intended to improve the quality of prescribing in
the NHS, consider how the home market can best support the international
competitiveness of innovative medicines produced for the home and international
market by the R&D industry in the UK.
2.2. The recognition of intellectual property for pharmaceuticals in the context of:
resolution of the tensions caused by national pricing of medicines and the free
movement of goods within the European Single Market; global trade in
pharmaceuticals.
2.3. Evaluate the importance of the clinical research infrastructure of the NHS and the
benefits and costs of its use by industry as a location for clinical studies.
2.4. Consider the aspects of the economic climate in the UK which foster or constrain the
competitiveness of an innovative pharmaceutical industry, and identify any changes
which would significantly strengthen that environment for the industry.
2.5. Identify further steps that might be taken to foster the development of a vibrant
biopharmaceuticals sector, including examination of the potential for technology
clusters to develop, taking into account the interface with land use planning.
2.6. Identify the potential for promoting further partnership between the industry and
academia and industry and government.
2.7. Consider the future development from a competitiveness point of view of the
European medicines licensing system especially in relation to the respective roles of
the EMEA and national agencies.
3. Assess, in the light of the Task Force's work, how well the UK is currently meeting the
criteria identified at (1) above and what further action is needed.
2
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.Uk/pictf/index.htm#tor (last accessed 28/10/04).
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Policy-makers saw one of the key aims of PICTF as providing a more formal,
structured way of getting industry, civil servants and Ministers together to talk about
the issues facing the industry and explore jointly how to resolve them, rather than the
previous linear approach where companies complained to the civil servants who
would then make recommendations to the Ministers who ignored them (which was
how policy-makers characterised industry's view of the situation) (Interview with
policy-maker, P280303). PICTF is credited with raising the profile of the industry-
Government relationship and with elevating the dialogue "to a far more strategic
level than hitherto" (PICTF 2001, p. 14). This improved understanding is said to
have engendered "real trust between the partners, which will help to condition
perceptions of top decision makers in both industry and Government" (PICTF 2001,
p. 14). In their respective prefaces to PICTF's report the Prime Minister and the CEO
of Astra Zeneca describe an "effective partnership at the highest levels between
Government and industry" and a "structured, action-oriented platform for effective
dialogue between Government and the pharmaceutical industry" which
"strengthened industry-Government relationships, significantly increased mutual
understanding and delivered some valuable outputs" (PICTF 2001, pp. 1-2).
While the PICTF report (ibid., p.2) expresses delight that "a high level successor
mechanism to PICTF has been identified", civil servants believe that PICTF
established or re-established a more detailed level of communication, putting
government/industry relations on a firmer footing. There had also been and
continues to be an industry strategy group which meets four times a year that brings
together senior officials and senior directors from the Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) to discuss industry policy matters, industry strategy
matters. This group, which involves Ministers, company chairmen and the ABPI,
discusses issues that are broader than the work strands that were discussed in PICTF
and it is generally at the level of the ABPI where the policy issues and the strategic
issues identified particularly by PICTF are taken forward. However, industry does
not necessarily see this distinction:
When you talk to industry, industry will see this is a continuing process.
There's a slight dichotomy of views in that from the government's point
of view, the taskforce per se was always a specific time-limited exercise
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where its role finished with the publication of the final report and
recommendations. What continued after that is an expansion ofa formal
group existing, pre-existed, to continue the dialogue and to take forward
the recommendations, to ensure the recommendations are implemented
(Interview with policy-maker, P280303)
PICTF brought industry together in a concerted way to influence government and, in
industry's view, clearly demonstrates evidence of actors having an impact on policy
(Interview with industry representative, 1040702). PICTF was seen as having a
much bigger impact than other government-industry initiatives such as Foresight
because of the way it operated with co-chairmen from industry and government and a
joint industry-civil service secretariat and because it linked civil servants and
industry more closely with targets and follow-up monitoring. Nevertheless,
although it is cited by industry as an example of good practice in
industry/government relations it was still just a one-off, time-limited activity
(Interview with industry representative, 1040702).
PICTF did help to break down barriers and demonstrated to both industry and
government that they were all moving in the same direction (Interview with industry
representative, 1040702) but the Task Force did not operate in a devolved way
because the devolved administrations were not considered to have strong links with
the pharmaceutical industry (Interview with policy-maker, P280303) and relations
with the industry are generally regarded as a reserved matter. Nevertheless, PICTF's
findings clearly apply UK wide and the fact that it was a very English-based
discussion did prompt the Scottish Executive into developing its own liaison with
representatives from the pharmaceutical industry (Interview with policy-maker,
PI40403), as discussed in Section 4.4.1.
Joint working between government and the pharmaceutical industry through PICTF
was reported as being a success not just in the official report and in interviews with
the protagonists but also by those not directly involved in the Task Force. PICTF's
policy of "no surprises" (PICTF 2001, p.7) where new policies are not viewed in
isolation, but as part of the overall policy environment and are discussed prior to
implementation through a senior, ongoing relationship between government and
industry is acknowledged by Scottish firms. A CEO of a Scottish biotechnology
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company who was not actually a member of PICTF still felt "inextricably linked" to
that group and was "in the loop", believing that, partly as a result ofPICTF there was
ready access to the UK government and UK Ministers (Interview with biotechnology
CEO, 1280802). This same CEO contrasted his experience of PICTF with the
Scottish situation where he had "no idea" of what was happening in government
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1280802). Other observers have suggested that
there is little sectoral focus in Scottish STI policy and that Scotland might benefit
from a PICTF-type approach to its biotechnology industry (Interview with industry
representative, 1040702).
6.2.2 Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team
The Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team (BIGT) was set up in December 2002
following discussions between the DTI, the UK Department of Health and the
Biolndustry Association under the chairmanship of Sir David Cooksey, a leading UK
venture capitalist. The establishment of Innovation and Growth Teams (IGT) to look
strategically at a range of business sectors including the automotive, chemicals and
aerospace sectors had been proposed in the 2001 Competitiveness White Paper (DTI
2001). According to the DTI, the IGT concept represents "a new approach to the
formulation and delivery of policy, bringing together a wide range of stakeholders in
a strategic look by Government and industry at the future of the sector" (DTI 2003a).
Those in the industry clearly make the link between BIGT and the similar process
undertaken by DTI for the pharmaceutical industry in the form of PICTF, describing
BIGT as "son of PICTF" for the biotechnology industry (Interview with
biotechnology CEO, 1090603).
The task of BIGT was to identify barriers to growth in the UK bioscience industry
and to make recommendations on what action should be taken to overcome these
barriers. It was publicly stated by the DTI that these recommendations would "help
influence the future shape ofGovernment policy"3.
3 See http://www.dti.gov.uk/bio-igt/bio-igt-index.html (last accessed 28/10/04).
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A ten-strong Steering Group was established consisting of the chairman plus three
civil servants (from the Prime Minister's Office, the Department of Health and the
Treasury), two academics, two representatives from bioindustry trade bodies and two
biotechnology chief executives. A further four working groups each led by industry
representatives were set up to study the issues of finance and investment,
biomanufacturing, the European Market and NHS/Industry partnerships. Workshops
were held in April 2003 and in total some 70 researchers, industry representatives
and government officials were involved with BIGT.
BIGT's report, issued in November 2003 (BIGT 2003) made the following six key
recommendations aimed at securing the UK's leadership in the biosciences:
• Building a mutually advantageous collaboration between the NHS and industry
for patient benefit through the creation of a National Clinical Trials Agency
• Creating a public and regulatory environment supportive of innovation
• Ensuring availability of sufficient and appropriate funding is available
«
• Building a strong bioprocessing sub-sector within UK bioscience
• Developing, attracting and retaining a high quality scientific and managerial
talent base
• Creating the Bioscience Leadership Council (BLC)
Of these recommendations, the final one is most germane to the present study. The
Bioscience Leadership Council (BLC), which will be led by Sir Richard Sykes,
Rector of Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine, London, and
former Chief Executive of Glaxo Wellcome, will be composed of six leaders of
bioscience companies and six strategic stakeholders (e.g. from academia, NHS, etc.).
It will be responsible for implementing BIGT's recommendations and will provide "a
forum for Government and industry to work together to develop a successful
bioscience industry" (BIGT 2003, p.5).
The BIGT report notes that without such a mechanism for nurturing and monitoring
co-operation between government and the bioscience industry "it is likely that much
momentum will be lost, and the opportunity for the UK to become a world leader in
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bioscience may be missed" (BIGT 2003, p.l 14). The Council will meet four times a
year and report to the Minister of Health and DTI Ministers biannually.
Again, as with PICTF, there was no overt engagement of the devolved
administrations in the BIGT process other than through the involvement of industry
members who happened to be from Scottish firms (Interview with biotechnology
CEO, 1090603). Although it was envisaged that there would be an opportunity for
Regional Development Agencies and devolved administrations to input their views
to BIGT, (Interview with policy-maker, P280303), no Scottish agencies are
mentioned in the resources section of the BIGT report under the heading of regional
development.
The Chairman's introduction makes it clear that the BIGT report "is not a
Government report, approved by Ministers and stating official policy" (BIGT 2003,
p.3). Instead it is described as a report to government as well as to industry and the
financial and research communities. The establishment of the Bioscience Leadership
Council is, however, a very positive step towards developing an ongoing policy
dialogue between industry and government.
6.2.3 Are taskforces a proxy for policy networks?
The early years of the New Labour Government were characterised by the
establishment of numerous taskforces (Daniel 1997) but can such transitory
assemblages of "experts" ever be considered a policy network? Taylor (2000)
describes how the Labour Government's response to the imputed "hollowing out of
the state" has been to promote "joined up" government by the use of taskforces that
are now "a permanent, highly visible and important feature of British government".
Taylor's thesis is that, rather than devolving power, taskforces reinforce central
control and he argues that the growth of the taskforce is not a corollary of the process
of hollowing out but a form of co-ordination of specialisation by central government.
As such, Taylor describes taskforces as "the epitome of steering rather than rowing"
although one could also argue that they can sometimes seem more like bailing by a
government keen to shift some of the responsibility and (dare one say) blame, for
certain policy decisions.
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For Taylor, a taskforce is composed of a group of experts from relevant organisations
combined with a ministerial network that allows access to, and influence over,
relevant existing networks and he offers the following definition:
A taskforce is a politically inspired, time-limited, institutional response to
complexity, validated at the highest level of the political executive,
designed to respond quickly to a closely specified issue(s) of complexity
and/orpolitical sensitivity. Organisationally the response takes the form
of an expert team drawn primarily, but not exclusively, from the centre
promoting an innovatory policy response through the co-ordination or
recombination ofexisting policy networks and resources within the heart
ofthe core executive territory (Taylor 2000)
While PICTF and BIGT correspond to the first part of this definition in that they
were both politically motivated and championed by senior government Ministers
from the Prime Minister down, their membership was less dominated by the centre
than Taylor's definition would imply. They were both, however, acting across major
policy departments (DTI and Department of Health) and did draw in existing
networks in the form of industry representative bodies. One could take issue with
Taylor's assertion that taskforces demonstrate a change of function away from
advising policy-makers towards policy-making: as the quote from the Chairman's
introduction illustrates (vide supra), the BIGT report was not a government report
stating official policy but a set of recommendations to government Ministers.
Taskforces do embody many of the characteristics of policy networks described in
Chapter 2 and certainly underpin the current UK government's approach to
governance with its focus on policy integration and partnership. As discussed in
Chapter 2, policy networks and, in particular, policy communities (Rhodes 1997) are
often regarded as a source of stability and continuity and because of this can
sometimes be resistant to change (Rhodes and Marsh 1992). Tensions can therefore
arise between the traditional depiction of networks in the literature as institutionally
dense, cumbersome and slow moving and the new governance literature on networks
as flexible and dynamic alliances: as such, the establishment of taskforces can
present a considerable challenge to the authority of some of the more traditional and
well-established policy networks (Hay and Richards 2000).
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The temporary, ad hoc nature of taskforces such as PICTF and BIGT means that,
while they do appear in many respects to be a close proxy, they do not necessarily
conform to the model of a policy network as an ongoing relationship between policy¬
makers and policy targets of the type characterised by the Cabinet Office as
"participation" as opposed to "consultation" at the beginning of this chapter (Cabinet
Office 2002). Although industry participants like to present one of the key outcomes
of PICTF as the continuing policy dialogue with Ministers, this was downplayed in
interviews with policy-makers (Interview with policy-maker, P280303). The
situation with BIGT is, however, rather different because one of the publicly stated
outcomes of this taskforce has been the establishment of the Bioscience Leadership
Council (BLC) which, while not exactly tasked with policy development is,
nevertheless, responsible for facilitating government-industry co-operation and
providing a forum to discuss "issues management" (BIGT 2003, p. 114). More time
is needed to gauge how successful the BLC will be in these tasks and also whether it
develops any form of remit in the devolved territories which is currently lacking
from its present incarnation.
6.3 UK regional level: The Cambridge biotechnology cluster
PICTF and BIGT were both national initiatives involving the biotechnology industry.
This section shifts the focus to the regional level of governance to explore whether
there are any lessons for Scotland from the operation of regional policy networks
elsewhere in the UK. Cambridge is the most obvious UK regional exemplar with
one of the leading biotechnology clusters in Europe, encompassing emerging and
mature life sciences companies with a focus on therapeutics and an abundance of
science parks and incubators located in the East of England with a strong
concentration around Cambridge (Anon 2001b). Much has been written about the
Cambridge phenomenon in terms of, inter alia, the commercialisation of bioscience
research, regional collective learning and regional innovative capacity (see, for
example, Cooke 2001b; Keeble et al. 1999; Lawson and Lorenz 1999) but the
question to be addressed here is how the actors in this cluster engage with policy¬
makers at both the regional and national levels.
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At the regional level there are currently three main policy actors of which the
regional development agency (RDA) (East of England Development Agency,
EEDA) and the Government Office for the East of England (GO-EAST) are in the
public sector and the third, Eastern Region Biotechnology Initiative (ERBI), is an
industry-led membership organisation. However, compared with its sister cluster in
Cambridge USA, the UK cluster has less sub-national innovation support from the
public sector (Cooke 2002a) and has only recently developed any regional
governance structures.
So EEDA is a relative newcomer, established in 1999 as one of the nine regional
development agencies created by government to bring a new focus to economic
development in the English regions by stimulating stronger regional policy networks
and "joining up" some of the gaps that existed between regional economic policy and
many other policy fields that influence regional planning and development (Roberts
and Benneworth 2001). With a budget of £90 million and a staff of around 200,
EEDA's resources are very modest by Scottish Enterprise's standards4, for a
comparable population size.
In common with the other regional development agencies (RDAs), EEDA is seeking
to establish linkages with regional stakeholders but is faced with the problem of
writing a strategy for an area with "little sense of being a region or history of
regional co-operation" and its success is predicted to be limited by the necessity of
joining up "disparate and indeed divergent purposes under complex and
countervailing political pressures" (Roberts and Benneworth 2001).
Institutional tensions have inevitably existed during this transition period. With the
establishment of EEDA, the government office (GO-EAST) is trying to redefine its
role and the differentiation of activities between the two organisations (Interview
with industry representative, 1040603). GO-EAST sponsors EEDA which means
that it is involved with DTI in the process of developing and approving EEDA's
4 Scottish Enterprise's budget is currently £453 million and it employs 2,408 FTE staff (Scottish
Public Bodies Directory, www.scotland.gov.uk/government/publicbodies/more.asp?ID=53; last
accessed 28/10/04).
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corporate plan, the financing of that plan through grant-in-aid and the processes of
appointments and performance assessment across the range of the RDA's activities
(Interview with policy-maker, P040603). In part, GO-EAST's role is to help to keep
the bigger picture in focus in terms of UK competitiveness so that issues to do with
national policy are fed into and joined up with the local decision-making process
(Interview with policy-maker, P040603). GO-EAST describes itself as "DTI's eyes
and ears in the region" (Interview with policy-maker, P040603), facilitating DTI's
communication with business about government policy and acting as a channel for
business opinions back to the DTI5. In a sense, GO-EAST mediates between the DTI
head office and the economic development agency, although the DTI Bioscience
Unit with whom GO-EAST would have only infrequent contacts (reportedly around
a dozen times a year (Interview with policy-maker, P040603)), also has direct
contacts with EEDA. GO-EAST has a role in reporting back to the centre on the
state of the local economy and current issues for local businesses and, as part of this,
organises a programme of contacts with business and business organisations such as
CBI and the Chambers of Commerce (Interview with policy-maker, P040603) in
order to establish "relationships with the regional business community and by
working with regional partners to raise awareness and promote the delivery of the
DTI agenda at the local level"5. As is the case with Scottish civil servants (see
Chapter 4), much of this engagement with business revolves around organising
ministerial visits where GO-EAST will advise on suitable firms in order to meet the
Minister's "parameters about what sort of firm would suit the objectives of the
particular visit" (Interview with policy-maker, P040603). GO-EAST aims to
develop a rapport with the businesses in the area, actively trying to seek the views
and opinions of businesses and the information gathered through that interaction is
then fed back to the relevant sponsor division within Whitehall. Again, there is
recognition that companies have very limited time available, but a belief that, if a
means can be found of allowing firms with a minimum expenditure of their own time
5http://www.go-east.gov.uk/About_Us/Business_Groups/Corporate_Relationships_and__Europe/
Business_Relations/ (last accessed 28/10/04).
200
to achieve some sort of visible result or be convinced that their views are being fed
into the right quarters, that such firms are keen to engage with policy-makers
provided they believe it is not just a token consultation. Visits were described as a
useful means of getting an in-depth understanding of the issue of concern to the firm
(Interview with policy-maker, P040603) but much of the language used to describe
these activities (vide supra) implies a one-way, top-down relationship where
government informs business of its policy or government decides which firm to visit
in order to advance government policy, rather than a genuine, two-way dialogue.
Indeed, evidence from interviews suggests these interactions are very selective. One
start-up company interviewed reported no dealings with the regional development
agency and no knowledge or experience of the services or benefits that EEDA or
GO-EAST might provide to start-up companies (Interview with biotechnology CEO,
1030603). Nor had this company experienced any direct contacts with policy-makers
at the national level. All of this company's interaction with government was
mediated through the BIA (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1030603) and, as
with Scottish companies, there appeared to be a fatalistic tendency to accept the
policy status quo and to focus their energies on developing their business (Interview
with industry representative, 1160702):
ifI'm candid, 99% ofmy time is spent trying to run the company with the
structure as it is, accepting the fact that this is how it [government
policy] works (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1030603)
RDAs might present a powerful new mechanism for steering sub-national policy
networks (Bache 2000) but it seems that the government's regional agenda is still
driven by the centre rather than by local companies. The system has been set up to
ensure that companies engage with local governance structures:
The only way that money can be accessed is through the development
agencies ...it's actually the DTI's national money... So if we...want to
access it...we have to do it through the RDA (Interview with industry
representative, 1040603)
This is seen by companies as a way for the government to develop more partnerships,
and to further its regional agenda but, although being closer to the local situation
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should mean that the government agency spends the money more wisely, this can
also introduce "more petty politics" which is not reported to be the case at the
national level (Interview with industry representative, 1040603).
Eastern Region Biotechnology Initiative (ERBI) predates EEDA by two years and
was established with the goal of enhancing the growth and development of
biotechnology in Cambridge and the East of England by promoting local, national
and international networking, supporting new ventures and infrastructure
developments and generally assisting in activities to improve communications and
networking in the local biotechnology sector. Although EEDA established a
business-led life sciences strategy group, EEDA does not have any sector specialists
and works closely with ERBI to provide much of its biotechnology expertise,
particularly in relation to the region's inward investment activities (Interview with
industry representative, 1040603).
But despite this new regional focus, the national level still remains more important to
biotechnology firms in the Cambridge area in terms of trying to influence
government policy. That said, their regional representative bodies are not
particularly active at national level but, at the same time, also somewhat sceptical of
the significance of the regional governance level:
We 're not as politically active as maybe we should be but the question is
what are we going to get out of it? If it's at a national level, it [DTI]
listens to the BIA and to some extent it does the regional thing but I think
it's a bit oflip service (Interview with industry representative, 1040603)
It requires effort to engage with national policy-makers and the impetus for these
meetings generally comes from stakeholders:
ifI said, what have the DTI done to contact me in the three years or so,
the answer is virtually none (Interview with industry representative,
1040603)
Regionally-based biotechnology networks are also critical of government efforts to
over-manage and over-politicise attempts to co-ordinate regionally-based learning
and networking activities (Interview with industry representative, 1040603) and
question the independence of organisations such as the BIA that are heavily funded
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by the government. Contrary to the government's decentralisation agenda, the DTI
has developed a close relationship with the BIA and focuses on funding national
initiatives through the BIA rather than at the regional level (Interview with industry
representative, 1040603).
This then leads us to ask whether a policy network exists within the Cambridge
region that involves both government and non-government actors. The answer from
the public sector is:
In a very, very embryonic form...the extent to which the different
agencies that are involved do get together and do agree on a common
approach to it is very limited at the moment (Interview with policy¬
maker, P040603)
While acknowledging that greater collaborative activity and joint working is an
aspiration of central government, this is not yet happening in Cambridge and instead:
all that happens at the moment is that each agency individually is aware
of the target when it sets its corporate plan - who knows how much real
attention they pay to that one rather than other things and they don't
really seek very much to influence what each other does (Interview with
policy-maker, P040603)
This situation demonstrates one of the problems with the notion of "self-organising"
policy networks (Rhodes 1997, p. 15) when policy-makers concede that stronger
compulsion and someone in overall charge at the regional level would improve the
situation (Interview with policy-maker, P040603). The private sector also calls for a
partnership approach to co-ordinate activities of the various groups in the region such
as ERBI, EEDA, Invest East of England and the Genetics Knowledge Park and notes
that:
public sector intervention ...without consideration of the issues, needs
and ideas of the private sector ...was generally seen as unlikely to be
successful (ERBI 2003)
The origins of the Cambridge cluster lie, not in public policy, nor in the
commercialisation of university research from the University of Cambridge, but in a
land development initiative by Trinity College which owned the land on which the
original Cambridge science park was built (Interview with research representative,
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R290702). The development of the Cambridge cluster was market-driven and, in
contrast to Scotland, public funding bodies were not central to its success (Cooke,
2001b). Scotland and the Cambridge region therefore epitomise the two extremes of
cluster development where significant public money has been ploughed into the
development of the biotechnology cluster in Scotland in contrast to Cambridge,
where it has developed on its own without public intervention (Interview with
industry representative, 1040603). The fact that the Cambridge cluster of
biotechnology companies predates the establishment of regional governance
structures such as EEDA and GO-EAST has also had an impact on the evolution of
policy networks. Success seems to be despite, rather than because of, the
government economic development agencies. The most effective lobbying is
reported to have been from the Cambridge Network (companies from the high
technology cluster plus the university) which created a favourable environment
where the business community worked together to effect change and encourage the
government to take a more joined-up approach to enable growth to take place
through affordable housing programmes and improved transport infrastructure
(Interview with policy-maker, P040603) but this is a classic case of business
lobbying, rather than a collaborative initiative involving both the private sector and
policy-makers as equal partners:
I suppose what's happening in Cambridge is an example of the business
community having an impact on policy, you know, they have I think done
lots to turn the tide in terms of a sort ofprevailing anti-business, anti-
growth sort offeeling to the position that is now reflected in the regional
planning guidance and the county structure plan which is about
accommodating growth. And I think business has been much to the
forefront in lobbying government to do its bit (Interview with policy¬
maker, P040603)
There is certainly a perception that, in Scotland, companies can engage with policy¬
makers and Ministers, in particular, on much more mundane matters than can
companies in the English regions where, even if a firm managed to get direct access
to a Minister, it would probably be on very high level issues (Interview with policy¬
maker, P240303). There is also clearly the view that there are more sources of help
and advice for firms at the Scottish level, at least partly as a result of devolution
where more organisations, such as the BIA, have developed a regional presence in
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Scotland (Interview with policy-maker, P240902). There is currently no equivalent
layer of government in the English regions where companies are likely only to have
access to Ministers through the RDA or through an industry trade association where,
in each case, the interaction would be one step removed.
This Cambridge case study illustrates the considerably disjointed nature of regional
economic development policy in the UK and the dichotomies that exist both between
the various regional actors and between the regional and national levels of
governance, particularly for a sector such as biotechnology. Much of this is echoed
in the recent House of Lords report (House of Lords Select Committee on Science
and Technology 2003) which calls for "coherence, longer term perspectives and
reduced bureaucracy" at the regional level and asserts that "[T]he picture has become
more complex with the establishment of the RDAs". While EEDA might still have
the potential to encourage a policy network to coalesce, at present it seems to be
simply adding another layer of bureaucracy for the local biotechnology industry for
whom the national level remains the key policy driver.
Biotechnology companies north and south of the border are sometimes wary of
accepting government funding because it comes with strings attached (Interviews
with biotechnology CEO 1090603 and industry representative, 1040603).
Nevertheless, EEDA does not seem to be attempting to engage with biotechnology
companies in the Cambridge area (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1030603).
This might partly be because the development agency arrived too late into a region
where the biotechnology sector had already developed into an effective cluster
without public sector intervention and EEDA believes that there is no case for
putting additional public resources into it (Interview with industry representative,
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1040603). But what impact does this then have on the RDA's ability to engage
effectively with its policy targets? In the Rhodes Model (see Chapter 2), even
though the state does not occupy a privileged sovereign position within the policy
network, government policy actors still have a role in steering networks to varying
degrees depending on the sector, the issue and the point in time (Rhodes 1999) but
this is not very evident at the Cambridge level where multiple government and
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private sector agencies are not well co-ordinated and a "governance gap" (Edler et al.
2003, p.l 1) exists between the regional and national levels.
6.4 Cross-national comparison: The multi-level governance of German
STI policy
Moving to the international level, German biotechnology policy networks might
provide a helpful comparator for a number of reasons. First, and most obviously,
Germany has a long tradition of regional governance and well-established
institutional actors interacting across federal and Lander levels of governance. There
is a closer interaction between government and interest groups and less of a clear-cut
divide between public and private sectors in the German administrative structure than
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of policy-making (Diederen et al. 1999, p.4). The
German academic tradition takes a slightly different view of the associative model,
regarding policy networks as a new form of governance; as a mechanism for
mobilising political resources in situations where these resources are widely
dispersed between public and private actors; and as a specific form of public-private
interaction based on non-hierarchical interaction (Marsh 1998a; Borzel 1998).
Finally, a strong biotechnology sector has been developed largely as a result of
public intervention through initiatives such as the BioRegio competition (BRC).
Perhaps surprisingly, Heald and McLeod (2002) point out that the Scottish
Parliament has more decision-making power over taxes than any of the German
Lander. In comparing Scotland with the German Lander, Jeffery (1998) notes that
the Lander retain exclusive legislative competences in only a limited number of
aspects of regional economic policy and that the legislative autonomy of the Scottish
Parliament is in fact far more considerable than that of the Lander governments. He
also observes a clearer sense of accountability of decision-making in Scotland than in
Germany and suggests that this might be "more conducive to high levels of citizen
interest and participation in the work of the Scottish Parliament".
Nevertheless, Germany does have a well-established, powerful system of regional
governance arising from a post-war constitution that was designed to share
responsibilities between the Federation and the Lander, and thereby avoid a
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concentration of power (Schiermeier 2003). Most Lander have their own regional
programmes, having established industrial development agencies in the 1960s
(Newlands 1999), and the recession of the 1980s provided a further impetus for the
Lander to make greater use of technology programmes as a tool of regional policy
(Wilson and Souitaris 2002). Government support for research laboratories, agencies
and universities is split evenly between the federal government and the Lander
(Schiermeier 2003), a system that allows the research community to benefit from
being part of a strongly interactive federal system while having strategic and applied
capabilities that are part of the regional system of alliances with industry and Lander
governments (Boulton 1999).
The federalist structure of Germany is said to have both advantages and
disadvantages for the management of knowledge infrastructure, providing, on the
one hand, certain flexibility to the Lander in how they handle STI policy issues, but
on the other hand, entailing complex decision-making procedures that can lead to
significant delays in adapting to change (Diederen et al. 1999, pp.203-204).
Regionalisation has been a key feature of the evolution of German STI policy in the
belief that greater decentralisation ensures better support for regional clusters and
research networks with the Lander being in a better position to help co-ordinate the
needs of industry with the universities and research institutes (Reinhard 1999).
National programmes tend to focus on large firms while Lander initiatives are
targeted at SMEs and, as in Scotland, regional innovation policy in Germany
promotes innovation, commercialisation and technology transfer (Reinhard 1999).
Despite the powers of the Lander, there has, however, been a move towards
centralised decision-making, a degree of financial centralisation (Newlands 1999)
and, in particular, a move to simplify the research sector (Anon (Editorial) 2003).
In Germany there is a historical culture of networking and associative governance
involving large firms, banks, government and universities, and the involvement with
civil society and interested parties runs very deep in German policy-making
(Interview with German specialist, A260503). Firms are embedded within networks
of trade and industry associations, as well as labour organisations (Casper and
Matraves 2003) and these organisations are consulted on a regular, but often informal
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basis, by civil servants (Diederen et al. 1999, p. 172). Organisations such as German
Chambers of Commerce often have a regulatory role and are far more powerful
institutions than their equivalents in the UK (Interview with German specialist,
P270303). Given the highly complex situation in Germany, it is particularly difficult
for small firms to negotiate through all these levels of governance, which probably
goes some way towards explaining why trade association membership is higher in
Germany where firms rely on such organisations for assistance and Chambers of
Commerce and trade associations appear to regard this service element as an
important part of their function. Such organisations therefore have a tangible role in
explaining the complexity and run a number of training schemes to talk members
through the various processes of government (Interview with German specialist,
P270303).
There are two types of trade association in Germany, those responsible for technical
standards and training and others that are essentially employers' associations similar
to the UK CBI. Larger firms are more likely to have closer interactions with, and
assistance from, the relevant government agencies whereas smaller companies with
specific needs tend to rely on their Chambers of Commerce (Wilson and Souitaris
2002). However, in the biotechnology sector the skills base mainly derives from
universities so there is less of a training need which means that the biotechnology
trade associations are less powerful than some of those in more traditional industries
(Interview with German specialist, A260503). In the new economy fields such as
ICT and biotechnology, firms are less likely to be members of an industry
association and instead use alternative ways of engaging with policy-makers
(Interview with German specialist, P270303).
In many aspects of German policy there is more of a social partner approach in both
policy-making and policy implementation. There is much more emphasis on
consulting employers and employees, and the views of the trade associations or,
indeed, individual firms are actively sought in order to inform the policy process
(Interview with German specialist, P270303). German civil servants stay in the same
job for longer than they do in the UK where civil servants move post quite frequently
and the impression is that this has a positive impact and means that German STI
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policy is a more participative, inclusive activity (Interviews with German specialists,
P270303, A260503).
In an early study of the German biotechnology industry, Jasanoff (1985) examined
the impact that Germany's tradition of corporatist decision-making had had on
industrial policy and found that, in the case of biotechnology, the corporatist
approach created a consensus for the adoption of a comprehensive R&D programme
but had an overall detrimental effect on competitiveness:
the reliance on established peak organizations to formulate policy has
discouraged structural changes that could have enhanced Germany's
early competitiveness in biotechnology (Jasanoff 1985)
Jasanoff (1985) describes how the 1974 DECHEMA6 study "effectively laid the
groundwork for a coherent federal funding policy" and ensured the support of the
major interest groups (large corporations, trade associations and labour
organisations) for the programme so that the Federal Ministry for Research and
Technology (BMFT) could begin immediate policy implementation without the need
for further political negotiation. This approach also facilitated "incremental
regulation of the new technology, defusing demands for potentially constraining
legislation" (Jasanoff 1985).
However, despite this apparently successful example of user engagement in the
policy-making process, Jasanoff (1985) goes on to describe how the impact of
corporatism can place constraints on the government's ability to formulate
innovative policies, instead allowing powerful interest groups to seize the initiative
in policy formulation:
corporatist interest mediation seems in certain respects antithetical to the
notion of an activist industrial policy, especially one geared to the
promotion of new technologies...The essence of corporatism is
cooperative rather than competitive, favoring continuity over quick
change. A new technology policy, by contrast, demands flexibility and
6 German Society for Chemical Engineering, now the Society for Chemical Engineering and
Biotechnology.
209
the rapid adaptation of existing institutional forms to meet competitive
challenges (Jasanoff 1985)
Jasanoff concludes that the record of corporatist decision-making is mixed. On the
positive side, this approach can prevent conflict but involving large, private interests
as equal bargaining partners can result in a loss of autonomy for the state and, more
significantly, institutional paralysis and ideological conformity which can undermine
innovation (Jasanoff 1985). Taking up this theme, Bartholomew (1997) suggests that
modern day Germany owes at least some of its competitive advantage to "its highly
co-ordinated government policies and institutionalized structures for bridging the gap
between scientific research and technological development". This is further
supported through "extensive cooperation across government, research institutions,
industry, banks and interest groups"7 but Bartholomew (1997) considers that, while
this system is effective at incremental adaptation to technological change, it is not
suited to the rapid commercialisation of new scientific developments in sectors such
as biotechnology or pharmaceuticals (Casper and Matraves 2003).
However, by 2001 Germany had caught up with, and in fact exceeded, the UK in
terms of numbers of biotechnology companies (Ernst & Young Life Sciences Group
2001)) although German companies tend to be smaller and less mature than those in
the UK (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1030603). Kettler and Casper (2000)
highlight the role of government policy in promoting the rapid growth of the German
biotechnology sector through initiatives such as the BioRegio competition but also
point to differences in national institutions and note that the focus of German
biotechnology policy in recent years has been on start up rather than sustainability.
The BioRegio competition (BRC) was seen as a departure from traditional
technology policy in Germany because it recognised that the region might be the
governance level best suited to promote knowledge creation and diffusion (Dohse
2000). The German Federal Government launched the BioRegio initiative in 1995 to
7 One example of which would be the high-level participation in the Chancellor's Council for
Research, Technology and Innovation which was established in 1995 with around 20 members plus
expert panels to ensure the involvement of participants from politics, universities, industry and trade
unions in developing a "well-rounded innovation policy" (Reinhard 1999).
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encourage regions to build up their cluster infrastructures in biotechnology with the
aims of:
• improving knowledge and technology transfer within the regions
• supporting start ups
• improving regional competitiveness (Georghiou 2003)
BioRegio was considered to be an innovative policy instrument that opened:
new perspectives for a more effective technology policy by taking the
regions seriously and givingprominence to the well-functioning interplay
ofthe various elements ofregional innovation systems (Dohse 2000)
The initiative was heralded as a success, resulting in increases both in employment
and in the number of firms operating in the biotechnology area with the number of
dedicated life sciences companies apparently rising from 75 in 1995 to 222 in 1998
(Georghiou 2003). Enhanced communication and co-operation among the key
regional actors were seen as being BioRegio's major successes, while its major
shortcoming, according to a user survey (Dohse 2000), was that it failed to reduce
regulation at the national level which suggests a lack of impact of policy targets on
policy-makers. Some believe that, while the BioRegio example allowed the Lander
considerable flexibility to shape development in particular cases, it also kept strategic
responsibility firmly at federal level (Wilson and Souitaris 2002). Others are more
optimistic about the positive impact BioRegio had on the role of the regions:
We conclude that the BRC, in taking the regions seriously, sets new
yardsticks not only for technology policy but also for traditional regional
policy: the regions are the key actors, the real protagonists in the BRC
whereas in traditional regional policy their role is essentially passive as
they are merely recipients of assistance from national or supranational
(EU) structuralfunds (Dohse 2000)
The German multi-level governance system for STI allows for more experimentation
than the UK system (Interview with German specialist, A260503). In an empirical
study of the multi-level governance of innovation policy in Germany, Wilson and
Souitaris (2002) report that the balance is shifting from formal and binding co¬
ordination mechanisms to informal and voluntary methods as a result of a
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combination of factors, including the decline in federal expenditure and an increasing
use of competitions such as the BioRegio initiative. The authors take a broad view
of what counts as co-ordination and conclude that there is co-ordination to an extent
but that "German officials are familiar and comfortable with the areas of untidiness
which result": in a nice inversion of national stereotypes it would appear that British
civil servants are more concerned about having everything neatly allocated to their
rightful level of governance (Interview with German specialist, P270303).
There is certainly a perception that in well-developed federal systems, such as
Germany, regional and national policies are woven together and mutually agreed, in
contrast to the UK where regions are not seen to be involved to any significant
degree in national STI policy . However, Reinhard (1999, p.59) claims that the
apparent close co-ordination between federation and Lander in technology policy is
not borne out in practice and Gotz (1992) (quoted in Wilson and Souitaris (2002))
concludes that joint federal/Lander processes act as a constraint in some policy areas
(aspects of higher education and research policy), although the Lander can exploit
their greater authority in the more "social" parts of the innovation agenda. To test
this, Wilson and Souitaris (2002) sought evidence of interaction between governance
levels in three aspects of innovation policy (innovation infrastructure, promotional
programmes and individual projects) and noted that these three areas "represent a
spectrum of declining formality" in interaction mechanisms. They attribute this shift
partly to political changes in the relationship between Federation and Lander, and
partly to the more general global trends in innovation policy towards less formal
mechanisms of policy interaction. Although a move towards greater competition
between governance levels might be a corollary of this shift away from joint
decision-making, the authors disagree that this should automatically mean less co¬
ordination and conclude that "the system is still typified by large elements of
collaboration" (Wilson and Souitaris 2002).
8 Contribution to SURF (Centre for Sustainable and Urban Regional Futures) seminar, University of
Salford, 12 May 2003.
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Unlike the UK, where post-devolution working has been handled through
Memoranda of Understanding between the individual departments, there are more
political structures in Germany that mediate between the federal and Lander levels,
providing co-ordination and funding. Despite this long-established dialogue and a
procedural framework for interaction between Federation and Land, the German
system still relies very heavily on personal contacts and people knowing who is in
the network:
even when the Federation and the Land...are arguing, the officials
themselves actually get on very well and most of the ire tends to be
directed at politicians... and that's almost kind ofpart of the game, that
they all know the game they 're playing (Interview with German
specialist, P270303)
In the UK, government policy promotes networks because the evidence points to
networking as an important driver in innovation, but there is not the same tradition of
associative governance in the UK. This attitude works in Germany because
networking has been systematically encouraged as an approach to industry policy for
over a century but it is not possible to graft a culture of networking on to the UK:
There are no quickfixes there. Ifyou think networking and those types of
associative relationships are important drivers of innovation, you 're not
going to be able to get that overnight. You 're going to have to say this is
a long-term project (Interview with German specialist, P270303)
The other concern is that the UK is becoming more like the German situation but
without some of the safeguards to clarify flashpoints. The lack of a constitutional
court means that solutions to disputes about the jurisdiction of different governance
levels will always ultimately be determined by the UK level government (Interview
with German specialist, P270303).
Wilson and Souitaris (2002) looked for evidence of policy co-ordination beyond the
formal, constitutionally entrenched, joint decision bodies and found that the
pressures facing innovation policy in Germany reflected some of the issues affecting
Federation-Lander relationships more generally. They conclude that these pressures
are reinforcing a shift away from formally co-ordinated to voluntarily co-ordinated
policy-making. While recognising that consensus-based decision-making is one of
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the prominent features of German policy-making, Diederen et al. (1999, p. 172) also
confirm that, in contrast with other consensus-oriented countries, there are fewer
formalised links between interest groups and government departments in Germany
and a higher degree of "self-organisation". However, as Jasanoff (1985) makes
clear, too much industry involvement can be a bad thing. Although there are
sometimes procedures within representative groups, such as strict rules on job
rotation to prevent regulatory capture (Diederen et al. 1999, p. 172), over-formalised
consultation and partnerships, particularly where there are very well-organised
lobbies for the status quo amongst both employers and employees, can have a
negative impact and actually impede change (Interviews with German specialists,
P270303, A260503).
However, despite this German tradition of associative governance, the type of
innovation policy that will make headlines will probably not have resulted from a
significant process of consultation and stakeholder involvement. For example, the
development of the Munich biotechnology cluster has apparently resulted from a
high level, top-down political imperative to move away from old industry to new
high technology industry and not in response to start-up biotechnology firms calling
for more incubator sites or science parks (Interview with German specialist,
P270303).
Ultimately, it probably is easier for policy targets to have an impact on government
policy in Germany, but only if they are part of the formal structure: in contrast to the
UK, it is harder to be heard if you are an individual firm in a new industry area (such
as biotechnology):
Whereas I suspect that in the UK, because it's not... as channelled, there
probably are more opportunities for sort of...left-field interventions
(Interview with German specialist, P270303)
6.5 Reprise
Some informants recommend a "Scottish PICTF" to help focus the minds (Interview
with industry representative, 1040702) and there are clearly benefits to be derived
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from a project-driven, cross-cutting taskforce of the type represented by PICTF and
BIGT that can take the broader view and foster government-industry relations.
However, one of the key messages from the examination of these UK-led initiatives
is the importance of continuity. Although such taskforces can make valuable
contributions to the process of informing policy, the true worth of such a dialogue is
in the ongoing relationship between policy-makers and policy targets so that trust can
be established, input sought at an earlier stage, and policy learning can occur. These
elements are much less evident in the relationships represented by a one-off, time-
limited taskforce. PICTF did include some follow up in the form of the Ministerial
Industry Strategy Group (MISG) but opinion was divided as to whether this was truly
an ongoing policy network or merely something of a sop to the industry
(interestingly, it was industry who appeared to suggest the former, and civil servants
the latter). BIGT, on the other hand, was more overt in its call for a permanent
policy forum and the establishment of the Bioscience Leadership Council (BLC)
might yet prove a significant development. The role of the devolved territories and
co-ordination with regional biotechnology strategies has not so far been a facet of
this initiative and it will be instructive to observe how Scottish actors from both the
industry and policy communities involve themselves in BLC.
Wilson and Souitaris (2002) report the important catalysing effect that federal
institutions in the USA can have on local technology-based networks, and the
Cambridge case study, although sited in a different type of political system,
nevertheless illustrates the importance of the public sector in establishing and
steering policy networks. While acknowledging that the Cambridge case (like the
Scottish case) represents a system in transition, four years after the establishment of
the regional development agency there is still a considerable lack of coherence in
public sector involvement and no evident regional policy network for biotechnology.
Biotechnology firms and their representatives do not appear to interact at a policy
level with regional policy-makers to any significant degree and are more likely to
engage with the national level of governance, although this interaction is irregular
and not well-refined. The Cambridge case suggests that, despite a thriving
biotechnology cluster, the involvement of industry in the regional governance of STI
is, if anything, less well-established than in Scotland.
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Turning finally to Germany, a country with a long tradition of associative
governance, Wilson and Souitaris' (2002) study confirms that national (STI) policy
objectives "are increasingly being met by the federation seeking to harness the
associative resources and concentrated expertise of regional innovations (sic)
systems" while at the same time "effective innovation policy in a Land depends on
the ability of its actors to draw on national and federal resources in a coherent and
focused way".
Informants point to the importance of informal contacts (particularly between
officials at different levels of governance) and the tolerance for ambiguity between
different levels within this governance system (Interview with German specialist,
P270303). Significantly, however, both the literature and informants highlight the
fact that there are pros and cons in involving policy targets in policy-making in the
German system (Interview with German specialist, P270303) (Jasanoff 1985;
Batholomew 1997).
There is a less strongly institutionalised structure in the UK compared with Germany
which leads UK government departments and agencies to do things that otherwise
industry associations could do (Diederen et al. 1999, p.62). While this might foster
closer government-industry relations it can also lead to a dependency culture, as
discussed in the next chapter. Bodies such as Scottish Enterprise might learn from
the German situation and consider devolving some of their training and information
dissemination activities to the private sector and indeed this is beginning to happen
with the Scottish BIA. However, we cannot expect Scotland to emulate the German
system of associative governance overnight. In long-established federal systems
such as Germany, regional and national policies are closely interwoven and mutually
agreed between broad groups of actors but we are still a long way from this
relationship between governance levels in the UK.
It has been suggested (Jeffery 1998) that the Scottish system might in fact encourage
higher levels of participation than the German system because of a more transparent
parliamentary decision-making process but, while Chapter 4 has demonstrated that
networking between users in the Scottish biotechnology community undoubtedly
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takes place, there is little evidence to support the notion of a self-organising network
of policy-makers and policy targets in the Scottish biotechnology sector. The
comparative case studies presented in this chapter suggest that there are strong
historical and cultural reasons for the prominence of self-organising policy networks
in Germany but that, in the UK, the public sector still has an important role both in
providing a conducive policy environment for their emergence and in steering their
activities, as evidenced by the activities of the PICTF and BIGT taskforces and the
absence of a coherent policy network in Cambridge. However, as the following
chapter will demonstrate, there is an important balance to be struck when involving
the public sector in policy networks.
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Chapter 7 Barriers to the Effective Operation of Scottish Policy
Networks
7.1 Introduction
Following its inquiry into the delivery of local economic development services in
Scotland, the Enterprise Committee could not "stress highly enough that the first
crucial step to improving effectiveness of services to consumers must be to bring an
end to competition between publicly funded organisations" (Enterprise and Lifelong
Learning Committee 2000). This same report highlighted the "congestion, confusion
and duplication in the provision of economic development services from local
enterprise companies, local authorities and enterprise trusts", sentiments that were
almost precisely echoed by the House of Lords Select Committee (House of Lords
Select Committee on Science and Technology 2003) three years later in its study of
the role ofRDAs in science and innovation policy and more recently, as discussed in
Chapter 5, by the Scottish Science Advisory Committee in its report to the Scottish
Executive (Scottish Science Advisory Committee 2004b).
The Modernising Government White Paper was intended to ensure that government
was both inclusive and integrated (HM Government 1999, p.6). It highlighted the
need for a range of agencies to work in partnership to develop more holistic solutions
to complex policy problems (Newman 2002, p.59), resulting in a policy-making
process that was able to learn from experience. The New Labour Government
justified its emphasis on integrated policy as a way of dealing with the fragmentation
and loss of control from the centre that resulted from the actions of the previous
Conservative administration (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, p. 13; Newman 2002, p.59).
As such, the prevailing governance approach may simply be a way of tackling
government's reduced ability to steer and "joined up" policy a way of keeping
control of devolved agencies, etc. rather than a natural and desirable consequence of
the government to governance shift.
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It might be reasonable to assume that a more integrated or "joined up" approach to
the governance of science and innovation in Scotland might be a precursor to a fully
functioning policy network that spanned different levels of governance but, if policy
often results from "an uncoordinated fight between government bureaus (sz'c)" (John
1998, p.44), can devolved administrations hope to integrate policies where national
government has failed? If central government departments are themselves not well
integrated and UK policy networks are still characterised by "a series of vertical
compartments...each segment inhabited by a different set of organisational groups"
(Richardson and Jordan 1979, p. 174) does devolution really present opportunities to
"join up" activities in Scotland as Scottish Executive officials have claimed
(Interview with policy-maker, P020403)
Chapter 2 described the ideal conception of how a policy network might function
within a governance system while Chapter 3 suggested that the Scottish system of
innovation might provide a favourable set of conditions for the operation of such
policy networks for science and innovation. Chapters 4 and 5 discussed whether
there are actually examples of successful or emerging policy networks in Scotland,
and Chapter 6 suggested reasons why policy networks might work better in other
governance systems. Chapter 7 draws these chapters together and demonstrates why,
despite apparently having all of the necessary precursors to facilitate a network-based
regional polity for STI, Scotland is still failing adequately to integrate its policies for
science and innovation or foster more cohesive policy networks.
Macleod (1996) has suggested that the close interpersonal relations spanning the
public-private divide in Scotland encourage inter-organisational co-operation but, as
Chapter 4 has demonstrated, these interpersonal networks have not so far led to
inter-organisational policy networks so that, in the field of STI policy, in contrast to
1 Also lecture by Barbara Doig, Head of Europe and International Affairs Division, Scottish Executive
"Operational Activities of the Scottish Executive", 16 January 2002, University of Edinburgh Politics
Department seminar.
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some areas of social policy, Scottish policy-makers and policy targets appear to have
achieved "interaction but not interconnectedness" (Beesley 2003).
As discussed in Chapter 3, in order for a country such as Scotland to benefit fully
from its investments in STI, it must exploit the interrelationships between science
and technology, and between basic and applied research. It might therefore seek to
adopt an integrated research and innovation policy to create scientific and technical
knowledge and provide the incentives for innovation (Branscomb and Keller 1999)
rather than draw distinctions between government support for the science base and
technology-based SMEs. However, as the House of Lords report on the RDAs
stressed (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 2003), the
primary need is for a clear sense of national direction and purpose with coherent,
long-term perspectives and reduced bureaucracy. Although this report commented
favourably on the utility of a single Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department in
the Scottish Executive, it noted that there was still a long way to go before Scotland
had an "integrated strategy" (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and
Technology 2003, p.59).
A key aspect of associative governance means achieving long-term, ongoing
networks that do not simply coalesce over a specific issue and then disperse.
However, as this chapter will demonstrate, the predominance of the public sector and
the gate-keeping roles therein still present significant barriers to the effective
operation of STI policy networks in Scotland and militate against an integrated
approach to science and innovation.
7.2 Predominance of the public sector
7.2.1 Dependency culture
Cooke (2002a) describes associative governance as a system where key regional
administrative bodies are interactive and inclusive with respect to other regional
actors. He suggests that the regional administration's role in this system is to
facilitate "associativeness among representative bodies inside or outside public
governance" without seeking to dominate the process. According to Cooke, this
might involve a government agency "letting go" of, or at least sharing, a function
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with what he terms "legitimate private governance bodies such as chambers of
commerce or business organisations".
Moss (2002) notes that it is at the level of regions, where hierarchical and sectoral
structures of government are often weakest, that expectations in new forms of
governance are particularly high. He warns that the reality has failed to live up to
expectations, prompting scepticism in the ability of "regional governance" to affect
substantially mainstream policy beyond isolated model projects. Moss suggests that
self-organised regional governance is widely understood as the classic, even ideal,
model of governance epitomised by Rhodes' notion of "governing without
government" (Rhodes 1997). However, where dependence on government agencies
and conventional decision-making processes is high, the effectiveness of this model
is limited (Moss 2002). Bache (2000) has also tested whether Rhodes' notion of
governing without governance provides an accurate description of regeneration
policy networks. Bache uses case studies from Yorkshire and Humberside to show
that, while Rhodes' narrative has value in explaining the transformation of the
institutions of the Westminster model, the transformation to governing without
government is "far from complete" in terms of economic regeneration policy. In
these examples, the decentralisation of policy delivery has been coupled with the
centralisation of financial control and, significantly, central government also retains
control of many non-financial resources including allocating participation rights
within the policy networks studied, which makes central government a pivotal actor
within these networks. Bache concludes that policy networks will only be allowed to
run their own affairs where they present least challenge to the policies of central
government (Bache 2000).
There are direct parallels here with the role of the public sector in Scotland where the
Scottish Executive and Scottish Enterprise have traditionally been seen to be driving
the STI agenda, rather than merely catalysing its formation. Respondents point to
examples in the biotechnology sector where matters that could be devolved or
outsourced to the private sector are being held onto by Scottish Enterprise
(Interviews with service provider, 1160702 and industry representative, 1260602). As
a result of this, respondents criticise the reliance on public funds and the
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"dependency culture" that this engenders (Interviews with service provider, 1160702
and biotechnology CEO, 1120203), claiming that, in some respects at least, Scottish
Enterprise has stifled private enterprise and created its own market failures
(Interview with university representative, A200203):
the Scottish Parliament was very much concerned with the delivery of
public sector support to the enterprise sector...there is always some
assumption that the public sector's going to fix this. Whereas actually it
needs collaboration between the public and private sectors and other
sectors (Interview with service provider, 1020503)
I certainly perceive there to be more ofa reliance on soft money north of
the border than there is when you go and visit companies in Cambridge
who view any government money they get as a bonus rather than the
reason that keeps them afloat (Interview with service provider, 1160702)
there was a view within the research organisations ...that the LECs, and
Scottish Enterprise in general, was there to hand them money, that this
was their God-given right to be given money and they didn't have to
justify what that funding was for (Interview with service provider,
1150702)
Some link this public sector mentality to Scotland's inability to deal with the
possibility of failure, suggesting that the prevalence of public funding leads to risk
aversion and, in particular, an unwillingness to take risks with public money
(Interview with academic, A260603).
7.2.2 Leadership vs. self-organisation
Although, from a governance perspective, the state is only one of many institutional
actors and fora where the role of government is perceived as merely steering society
and the economy, theories of governance that focus on self-organising networks tend
to side-step the issue of state power (Newman 2002, p.20). It is, however, crucial to
remember that government and government agencies usually retain a dominant role
because the relationships within the network are asymmetric and government actors
often control access to resources (Smith 1997). Peters (1997) asserts that
governments are not simply the "passive recipient of the demands being placed upon
them by autonomously forming networks" but have the power to create networks
themselves and, moreover, "the clever state actor can...manipulate the network to
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produce his or her desired results" (Peters 1997). Taylor (2000) also argues that
networks do not emerge fully formed and that the centre can, nevertheless, dominate
by determining their operational parameters and objectives (which is what appears to
be happening with the examples discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). As central
government still has the financial and legal powers and political legitimacy that
enable it to impose its preferences on a network, Taylor {ibid.) questions to what
extent the "hollowing out" thesis holds true.
This seems to be rather at odds with Rhodes' conception of "self-organising" policy
networks (Rhodes 1997) discussed in Section 2.4 (a point to which we shall return in
the final chapter) and suggests that there may still be a role for the state in providing
leadership for such policy networks. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, p.213) also
highlight the possible role of professional fora, particularly in promoting learning
across coalitions and this then raises the question about the extent to which Scottish
representative bodies such as BIA Scotland are in a position to provide leadership or
whether, because of the traditional dependence on the public sector discussed above,
this role must automatically fall to state actors.
The role of representative bodies is still maturing in Scotland, particularly in the
biotechnology sector and there is a question mark over where they fit in the policy¬
making process. Although bodies such as the BIA would like to be seen in an
advisory capacity, feeding in to policy debates (Interview with industry
representative, 1260602), the Scottish Executive, to date, has had very limited, direct
involvement with trade associations and seems to take a very compartmentalised and
# 'y
bilateral approach to engagement which is generally only on specific issues . This
contrasts with the situation in Germany, discussed in Chapter 6.
Where there is an active trade association, officials do acknowledge that there can be
significant benefits and admit that such organisations can often act as a conduit for
2
Very recent developments, discussed in Chapter 8, suggest that this might be beginning to change.
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early stage intelligence on, for example, planned European legislation, before it
reaches the Scottish Executive through official channels (Interview with policy¬
maker, P280202). Although the Executive has well-established links with generic
business representative bodies such as the CBI, in the early stages of devolution it
did not have good links with sectoral trade associations which have traditionally been
the domain of Scottish Enterprise. However, these sectoral associations are seen as
being more effective than general representative bodies because they can talk in
details rather than in the abstract (Interview with policy-maker, P280202). The
Scottish Executive therefore regards it as increasingly important to get more directly
involved with trade associations and to educate them in the policy process so that
they are able to produce better quality responses (Interview with policy-maker,
P280202).
The DTI has much closer links with technology-based trade associations than the
Scottish Executive. As we have seen in Chapter 4, sectoral sponsorship issues still
reside primarily with the DTI which does appear to be more confident in its dealings
with such representative bodies. Indeed, it is quite open about the benefits of regular
interaction with organisations such as BIA and ABPI and actively seeks their advice
on issues such as the factors that influence the competitiveness of their industry,
enabling policy-makers to put forward informed comment and drive policy decisions
on issues such as the operation of government support programmes for the
biosciences sector (Interview with policy-maker, P280303). This can, however, raise
concerns about the independence of such representative bodies as discussed in
Section 6.3.
The Scottish STI arena spans a panoply of organisations, remits and objectives, so
how might one foster a common agenda and inject a sense of leadership from
someone with personal authority and influence who is able to use their position to
further network goals that are wider than their own personal or organisational goals?
Respondents see this issue as very personality dependent: ultimately networks are
driven by individuals, who are open and willing to engage, rather than being brought
about by institutional change. The previous leader of the Scottish Enterprise
biotechnology team was highly regarded and was seen to provide strong leadership
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to the sector (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603) and many respondents
held Wendy Alexander in similar high regard when she was Minister for Enterprise
and Lifelong Learning (although as we shall see later in the chapter, she was not
always as willing to consult as the following quotes imply):
someone like Wendy [Alexander] was out consulting with the outside
world all the time and probably respected the outside world far more
than she respected her civil servants (Interview with policy adviser,
P280203)
[Alexander] recognised that you had to take people with you, so it wasn't
a question of...develop a solution and tell people that's what they're
getting. It was a question of - I've had this idea and I think you
should...put some flesh on the bones of that and then go and talk to
people and persuade them this is a great idea (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI40303)
However, these individuals were both within the public sector fold and it is much
harder for the civil service to open itself up to outsiders, despite the fact that people
with different experience from industry might be able to reinvigorate policy thinking
within the higher echelons of the Scottish Executive (Interview with director of
research institute, R290702). Maclntyre-Kemp (2003) suggests that capturing the
knowledge needed to allow the business community to prosper requires the creation
of a shared purpose and skilful facilitation which he terms "communocratic
leadership". He argues that the reason that traditional networking and business
associations struggle to make the transition to communities of influence is that they
are too dependent on lobbying, creating a "them and us" situation rather than
involving all the influencers from the start of the policy process to design a shared
goal.
But the evidence presented in previous chapters suggests that policy networks in
Scotland do not self-organise but need an impetus such as a charismatic leader or
government endorsement in the form of, say, a taskforce, as discussed in Chapter 6,
around which to coalesce. The industry representative bodies emerging in the
Scottish biotechnology sector do not yet seem to be sufficiently mature or
homogeneous to provide leadership and are hampered by the traditional dominance
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of the public sector in Scotland. This means that the leadership role is automatically
granted to government actors (Interview with university representative, A110303):
Well, I think these external inputs are sought and they are used - there's
no doubt about that. But it's more on an organised basis. Anything I've
described here or anything I've identified has really been on an
organised basis, rather than something that is kind ofco-ordinated on a
selforganising basis (Interview with policy-maker, PI 70403)
7.3 Lack of "joined-up" government
Tait et al. (forthcoming) note that the need for a more integrated approach to policy
is "a consistent theme" throughout the governance agenda in order to remove:
contradictions, inconsistencies and inefficiencies caused when policies or
regulations emerging from different government departments or different
levels of government ...contradict one another or provide incompatible
signals to policy targets (Tait et al. forthcoming).
These authors also suggest that policy integration is needed to deal with the
complexity and uncertainty associated with many decisions concerning STI. Charles
(Regional Studies Association 2003) explains the lack of integration in this policy
arena by pointing out that science policy systems are centred on national actors while
innovation and technology policy are increasingly regionalised. In order to achieve
successful integration both science and technology policies must be embedded within
the regional context and this requires commitment from both national and local
policy actors. Moreover, Charles et al. (2004, p.25) point to "a high degree of
ambiguity about mechanisms for linking science investments to economic
development and uncertainty about how to measure their impact" and emphasise the
need for STI policy to focus on getting the policy mix and linkages (both within the
regional innovation system and across governance levels) right. A key role for
regions can therefore be "[bjuilding linkages from all elements of the regional
science system into innovation, commercialisation and technology transfer" in part
because "regions tend to have a better sense of the full system rather than merely
understanding those elements of which the state is in control" (Charles et al. 2004,
pp.13-14).
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Tait et al. (forthcoming) suggest that policy integration has become more difficult as
the diversity and policy competence of interested stakeholders has increased but for
astute business organisations this provides opportunities to increase their influence in
the policy process:
of course, all governments struggle with their own internal problems of
not being able to join up people and departments. So anything that we
can do which cuts across boundaries, that sheds a wider perspective
helps to give them ammunition to do something they want to do
(Interview with industry representative, 1030702)
Peters (1998) describes how complaints about lack of co-ordination date from the
time when government began to separate into ministries and departments. The
nature ofmodern government, with the devolution of powers to government agencies
or to separate territorial administrations, further exacerbates this co-ordination
problem. Peters (1998) notes that, while decentralisation can have benefits, it
produces difficulties in policy co-ordination, particularly as societal issues are
becoming increasingly cross-cutting and no longer fit neatly into departmental
"boxes". Peters suggests that the ideal situation of policy co-ordination is one where
there is "minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae" so that, at the very least,
government organisations should be aware of each others' activities and "make good
faith efforts not to duplicate or interfere". While some duplication and "border
spats" must be inevitable, especially in the Scottish situation given the permeable
nature of the system boundaries (see Section 3.5), surely this should go beyond
"good faith" so that agents of government residing at the different levels of
governance are charged with making real efforts to be complementary and mutually
supporting?
Taylor (2000) observes that government is seen to be losing its ability to govern
because of the increasing dominance of autonomous, self-organising policy networks
and that Labour's response to this "hollowing out" of the state has been to promote
"joined-up" government by use of the taskforce as described in Chapter 6.
Fragmentation reduces central control, and the existence of such complex networks
of organisations that are difficult to steer has reduced government's capacity to plan
and co-ordinate increasingly autonomous and expert agencies. Taylor maintains that
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"the problem of policy coherence is endemic to government" where the traditional
departmental policy silos limit information flows between departments so that:
government is traditionally viewed as a series of vertically integrated
policy networks under a sponsoring department with few horizontal
linkages to separate, but often related, policy networks (Taylor 2000)
This situation is aggravated by a civil service culture that still tends to be
departmental and hierarchical in contrast with the cross-sectoral
(public/private/voluntary) partnerships emphasised by the governance approach that
relies on a systematic dialogue between policy networks so the taskforce is an
explicit attempt by government to impose horizontal linkages on vertical networks
(Taylor 2000):
The governance thesis holds that the centre is losing control to complex
policy networks and there is a tension between limited government and
government's attempts to control its environment (Kooiman 1993, quoted
in Taylor 2000)
7.3.1 Within the Scottish level of governance
The policy community claims that it wants to hear from real businesses and believes
"it's far easier to lobby government because there's a process for doing it, either
through the parliament or directly with the Executive" (Interview with policy-maker,
P020403) but officials concede that the process may be more complicated because of
the relative roles of the Parliament, the Executive, and Scottish Enterprise (Interview
with policy-maker, P020403).
Scottish Executive
Interaction between policy-makers and policy targets is further complicated by the
enduring partitions between policy domains within the Scottish Executive.
Respondents note that, while "the Executive preaches collaborations for everybody
else, they're not so good at doing it internally" (Interview with policy adviser,
P280203) and point to the slow impact of the supposedly cross-cutting Science
Strategy on intra-departmental working:
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I don't think that it's made a huge impact yet on... that true cross-cutting
working. I think things within the Executive are starting to change but I
think it's a very slow process (Interview with policy adviser, P280203)
While the existence of the SSAC and the findings of their first report (Scottish
Science Advisory Committee 2004b) are probably encouraging the Executive to
reflect on the need to take a more co-ordinated approach to research and innovation
policy in Scotland, respondents highlight problems with persistent boundaries.
While SEERAD and ELLD are both significant funding bodies, they are regarded as
very different entities: the impact of devolution on SEERAD, at least to outside
observers, was not significant whereas ELLD was a newly created department
(Interview with service provider, 1150702). Respondents cite differences in policy
approaches between these departments, little evidence of co-ordination and, as a
consequence, only fairly recently developing links between Scottish Enterprise and
SEERAD (Interview with service provider, 1150702).
Likewise, managing cross-cutting relations between ELLD and Health is described
as "difficult" and "problematic" and developing a partnership approach involving
ELLD, Health and Scottish Enterprise is challenging, partly because of sensitivities
over operational rules governing funding and the lack of a centralised, co-ordinating
role (Interviews with academic, A220403 and service provider, 1160702). Civil
servants describe a "hierarchy of contact" between Scottish Executive departments
which is largely informal (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403) but only a limited
amount of policy interaction between ELLD and Health which has in recent times
been focused on common interests in innovation and managing the relationships with
Scottish Enterprise (Interview with policy-maker, PI40403).
Within ELLD itself, STI policy is spread across the Science Policy Unit (now called
the Science and Higher Education Branch) and the Innovation Policy Unit (described
in Section 3.4.2), where the Science and Higher Education Branch covers high level,
over-arching science interests within the Executive and is responsible for research
through SHEFC and liaison with Whitehall (principally OST and DFES on science
funding matters). The Science and Higher Education Branch also has overall
responsibility for delivery of the Science Strategy but it is not entirely clear what
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"science" means in this context. The Executive continues to distinguish between the
science base and the innovation process. Indeed, the word "technology" was
dropped from the Science Policy Unit's original title because this was felt to be fall
within the Innovation Policy Unit's remit (Interview with policy-maker, PI80203).
Although the Science and Higher Education Branch describes its remit as "almost
anything to do with research", and maintains that this research can take place "across
the whole range of bodies and institutions that can have an impact on the economy
and quality of life in Scotland" (Interview with policy-maker, PI80203), the clear
impression is that "science" is what is happening in the universities and research
institutes and not something that involves the company base which is the domain of
the Innovation Policy Unit and Scottish Enterprise.
Despite the reserved and concurrent nature ofmany aspects of science policy and the
external influences on innovation from reserved macro-economic powers, there is
little interaction between these policy units and the Scotland Office (Interview with
policy-maker, PI80203). Science and innovation are not seen by Scotland Office
officials as being difficult cross-cutting issues (Interview with policy-maker,
P240303) and yet co-ordination problems clearly persist:
any future developments in policy ...could be inhibited by the range of
things that are already on the ground and until those are actually
examined, the ability to perhaps develop a more coherent support system
is inhibited. And, to some extent, that's in the Scottish control between
the Scottish Executive, SHEFC and [Scottish Enterprise] but, given that
there are DTI and other UK and European Union programmes, it's not
by any means totally within Scottish control (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI 70403)
This complexity, in turn, is seen as having a negative impact on the effectiveness of
policy and respondents criticise the lack of a national policy unit in Scotland that is
able to take an overview (Interviews with university representative, A200203 and
director of research institute, R290702):
there are different bodies with, in some way, a remit to fund or promote
science, technology and innovation, commercialisation of research and
so on. There is a very, very complicated set ofpublic sector support
mechanisms and I think... this has got to be an issue in terms ofefficiency
and effectiveness (Interview with policy-maker, PI70403)
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Scottish officials inevitably take a positive view of the impact of devolution on
policy integration while, nevertheless, acknowledging that challenges remain:
...there's been a much great element of joined-upness in the devolved
administration than there ever was in Whitehall ...I think the perception
is it works very well here but...for every one who says it works well,
there's always challenges and there's always difficulties and there's a
big change in mindset (Interview with policy-maker, P020403)
While this lack of integration between governance levels can sometimes be to the
benefit of companies (in that it can permit "double dipping"), it may take lobbying
from business to get all parts of government to act coherently (Interview with
industry representative, 1030702) .
The small country benefits undoubtedly help to rescue Scotland from the
shortcomings of these institutional policy monoliths, so that personal contacts
between actors from the Executive, Scottish Enterprise and the biotechnology sector
can sometimes mean that Scottish players are more nimble-footed than their
counterparts at the UK level:
DTI were quite stunned, I think, by the way that we all came together [on
planning a conference] ...it is a function of knowing each other so well.
You can just sit and say things like that in a way that they probably
couldn 't do. So the joined-upness of the approach, I think, was quite
evident to them at that point... they were very impressed by that ability to
just say... "yes, we'll do that"...and we all knew what parts the others
wouldplay (Interview with policy-maker, P140303)
but there is still much more to be done in terms of joining up STI policy at the
Scottish level:
you've got the pearls, now let's make the necklace (Interview with
service provider, 1160702)
3 As was the case of the Cambridge Network, described in Chapter 6.
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Scottish Enterprise
As discussed in Chapter 3, the creation of Scottish Enterprise should have provided
an institutional basis for policy integration in Scotland because it meant that one
body was responsible for training, enterprise, local economic development,
regeneration, innovation and land reclamation and had the "latitude in its relationship
with the Scottish Office to pursue a number of quite distinct agendas" (e.g.
promoting clusters and entrepreneurship in the mid 1990s) (Gillespie and
Benneworth 2002). As we have seen above, the Scottish Executive has traditionally
relied on Scottish Enterprise as their primary source of industry briefing and conduit
for "practice into policy". However, interviews with respondents from a range of
organisations highlight some role confusion within Scottish Enterprise as to whether
the agency essentially exists to implement government policy developed by the
Scottish Executive, or whether they also play a part in policy development. This
distinction seems not even to be clearly understood by Scottish Enterprise insiders:
our primary objective ...is delivery. Developing the policy is good
because that helps to support delivery in the long term but...we are paid
for delivery (Interview with policy-maker, P260203)
but contrast this with the same interview:
there has to be a development element in there. We have...a close
relationship with what is actually happening on the ground in the
industry, both in the company base and in the university base and that is
not the case with [officials in ELLD] (Interview with policy-maker,
P260203)
As an agency, Scottish Enterprise has considerable freedom in how it delivers targets
set by the Scottish Executive, which leads in turn to issues of ownership and control
(Interview with service provider, 1020503):
Scottish Executive cannot dictate to them [Scottish Enterprise] how they
do things but they can lobby them to do things in a particular way so we
lobby the Executive to lobby SE (Interview with service provider,
1020503)
and even Scottish Executive officials seem unsure of the boundaries:
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The theory is that we set the high level strategy and that Scottish
Enterprise are responsible for the implementation and tactical operation
level decisions...The process is not perfect. There are times they do
things and we only find out afterwards and we get mildly upset about it
(Interview with policy-maker, PI40303)
A turning point in the relationship between ELLD and Scottish Enterprise was the
publication of Smart Successful Scotland (Scottish Executive 2001b) which is
credited with establishing a Scottish approach to enterprise issues that had never
previously existed and led to a change whereby policy-making was more focused in
the Executive than in Scottish Enterprise (Interview with policy-maker, P020403):
Because of that...we developed much more of a policy approach and a
policy steer for the Enterprise networks. What they gained was
legitimacy. It gave them a role that they were delivering Executive policy
and for an organisation that has been criticised since it was conceived,
that was a huge benefit for them (Interview with policy-maker,
P020403).
Despite this change, Executive officials maintain that Scottish Enterprise was left
with "significant room for manoeuvre" which granted them a policy development
role as well as having independence on delivering it (Interview with policy-makers,
P020403 and PI70403) but Scottish Enterprise's consultation and engagement with
stakeholders seems to be primarily on the detail of implementation rather than on the
policy itself (Interview with policy-maker, PI70403).
But how well does Scottish Enterprise then feed back and communicate with the
Executive about the intelligence that is gathered via the Enterprise Network and the
implications that this might have on policy? Smart, Successful Scotland hinted at a
less than amicable past relationship between Scottish Executive and Scottish
Enterprise when it spoke of the need to build "relationships of trust" (Scottish
Executive 2001b, p.7) (see Section 3.4.2) and, while officials now maintain that this
process works well, results reported in Chapter 4 imply that somehow this circle is
not being closed. Although the links between the two organisations (Scottish
Executive and Scottish Enterprise) are reported to have improved, since devolution
and the review of the Enterprise networks, contacts between the two are inevitably in
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the civil service mode and "tend to be peer to peer rather than...more inclusive"
(Interview with policy-maker, PI70403).
Scottish Enterprise could be regarded as a once trail-blazing organisation that has
outlived its purpose and become ossified, no longer sufficiently responsive to
industry's needs, having lost track of the biotechnology industry and how the
industry has changed (Interviews with university representative, A200203 and
biotechnology CEO, 1090603):
I think it has become an end in itself instead of a means to an end
(Interview with university representative, A200203)
I think the organisation is jaded and I don't think it is developingpolicies
or strategies which are appropriate or well-informed and they're never
actually implemented...it's also stopping other things from happening
because the public sector support is all within Scottish Enterprise and if
they don't want to support it, then there isn't public sector support
(Interview with university representative, A200203)
I know how I'm going to build [my company] but I don't need Scottish
Enterprise to help me do it. If they'd like my advice on how to do it, I'll
give it but they're not asking the right questions (Interview with
biotechnology CEO, 1090603)
Scottish Enterprise is criticised for carrying on with old programmes that are focused
on company birth and small-scale start up rather than growth and sustainability4
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603) and observers call on them to
concentrate on "big ticket" expenditure items, such as infrastructure, rather than
organising networking events (Interview with service provider, 1160702). Although
Scottish Enterprise's activities are purported to be geared towards eventual handover
to the private sector, commentators do not see this happening in practice (Interview
with service provider, 1160702) and point to a contradictory strategy of customer
retention. This means that Scottish Enterprise adopts an insular approach to
4
Although this appears to be changing, at least in the rhetoric of Scottish Enterprise policy statements,
with an attempted shift in emphasis away from business birth rate towards sustainability (Scottish
Enterprise 2002).
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programme delivery in order to keep people in the SE network and is reluctant to use
third party organisations. The result is that they appear to prefer to maintain a direct
relationship with a firm rather than working through an industry representative body
(Interview with service provider, 1020503). Indeed, some respondents are quite blunt
in their assessment of relations with Scottish Enterprise:
they just won 7 engage people in debate. They won 7 take you into their
confidence ...I trust [others with whom I work in this network] and I can
talk to them and I know that I won 7 get screwed. I don 7 trust Scottish
Enterprise (Interview with service provider, 1020503)
However, others (significantly, from outside Scotland) are far more content with the
working relationship between Scottish Enterprise and the biotechnology industry,
describing how Scottish Enterprise encouraged the BIA to open a Scottish office and
take over various activities that enabled Scottish Enterprise to redirect resources to
other strategic priorities within the biotechnology sector (Interview with industry
representative, 1030702). However, the relationship between industry and civil
servants within the Scottish Executive has apparently been slower to develop largely
because they do not share activities in the same way (Interview with industry
representative, 1030702).
Representatives from Scottish Enterprise have talked publicly about the connection
with the Scottish Executive making life easier for Scottish Enterprise than the
equivalent relationship between the English RDAs and the UK government3 and
describe interaction "on a whole range of things from straightforward information to
inform discussions with the Minister; to accompanying the Minister on visits"
(Interview with policy-maker, P260203). They acknowledge that in the past there
has been an arm's length relationship between the Executive and industry because of
the presence of Scottish Enterprise. The relationship between Scottish Enterprise
5 Thistle Bioscience Forum, BIA Scotland Annual Meeting, Edinburgh, 13-14 February 2003.
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and ELLD is not yet a close one (Interview with policy-maker, PI80203) and steps
have only recently been taken to formalise it:
we've just instituted regular meetings [with the Innovation Policy Unit]
...they come up here for a day every couple of months and sit in this
office and we bring our clients to see them (Interview with policy-maker,
P260203)
but tensions remain:
I don't know how much influence they [Scottish Executive] actually have
on the day-to-day running [of Scottish Enterprise]...I imagine there are
tensions there (Interview with policy adviser, P280203)
A former insider notes that these two very powerful public sector bodies lack mutual
respect and often seem to be at odds with each other (Interview with university
representative, A200203). Despite the integrationist rhetoric, animosity and
professional jealousies remain between Scottish Enterprise and Scottish Executive
who have an imperfect understanding of each other's responsibilities and are
therefore less able to give out one consistent message to industry, academia, and the
public (Interview with university representative, A200203). Respondents suggest
that the answer is either for a more joined-up approach, or more radically, to disband
Scottish Enterprise and transfer a slimmed down version of their current role to
ELLD, which would result in one strategy and one government body developing
relationships with its user community (Interview with university representative,
A200203). Ultimately, however, it probably suits the Executive's political purposes
to maintain the status quo:
the Executive sometimes like to have their cake and eat it and the Scottish
Enterprise system is a very convenient means of them handing over
responsibility and blame for things they would actually like to do for
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political reasons but would not want to be accused of it being strictly on
a political agenda (Interview with university representative, A311002)6
SHEFC
Although, as noted in Chapter 3, this study is not about higher education policy per
se, and does not therefore address the role of SHEFC to any great extent, the funding
council is still a key policy actor. It has a dominant role in the creation of the science
base in Scotland and is playing an increasing role in the economic development
agenda through its work on knowledge transfer. As such, SHEFC was a key partner
in the Technology Ventures initiative and, indeed, direct relationships are now much
stronger between the Scottish Executive and SHEFC, and Scottish Enterprise is no
longer seen as driving the knowledge transfer agenda to the same extent:
Ten years ago, Scottish Enterprise would have said we need to get these
people round the table because this is what needs to happen. It seems to
me now that Scottish Enterprise gets invited to the table, rather than is
kind of promoting it and instigating it (Interview with university
representative, A200203)
In the recent past, the relationship between Scottish Enterprise and SHEFC has been
described as "a bit stormy" (Interview with policy-maker, P260203) but they are now
reported to be moving towards a better working relationship following a
Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies (Interview with policy¬
maker, PI30503). Scottish Enterprise's relationship with SHEFC is clearly mixed
and problems remain, relating to the disparity in staff numbers in the two
organisations and fundamental cultural differences. SHEFC has a policy of "no
surprises" and is more inclined to try to take stakeholders with them rather than
introduce major policy initiatives without the support of their sector (the surprise
announcement of the ITI initiative being a case in point - see Section 4.5.3). These
6 As discussed in Section 4.5.3, the research design did not encompass any specific iteration of
findings between informants. The views of all respondents were given equal weighting in the analysis
and, as detailed in the Appendix, Scottish Enterprise representatives were of equivalent seniority to
other interviewees in the sample and were therefore in a position to speak in a critical context
themselves.
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disparities make it difficult for the two bodies to behave in a totally joined-up
manner and a lot of effort has to be devoted to maintaining the relationship which
"would be helped enormously by there being more opportunity for sharing ideas
before [they are taken] forward" (Interview with policy-maker, PI30503).
SHEFC's key stakeholders generally believe that the funding council consults
appropriately, listens and gives feedback and, as a consequence, this interaction
appears to have an impact "or if it's not going to have an impact, they'll tell you
why" (Interview with service provider, 1020503). So why does SHEFC appear to be
more successful in its policy interactions with users than Scottish Enterprise?
Significantly, some ascribe this to very different corporate styles where SHEFC,
because it has a much smaller resource, sees its role as delivering through others
(Interview with service provider, 1020503).
Scottish Enterprise clearly does not have the same ongoing dialogue and
relationships with its stakeholders in the university sector and is censured for its poor
understanding of higher education (Interview with university representative,
A110303) and is further criticised for its lack of awareness of national (UK) issues,
resulting in a perceived lack of integration between national policies and local
economic development policy as developed by Scottish Enterprise:
there could be a higher degree ofawareness within Scottish Enterprise of
what policies are emanating from Westminster that have a profound
effect on their operation (Interview with policy-maker, PI30503)
Ultimately, it is apparent that, although efforts are underway to improve policy
integration within the Scottish level of governance, there is still much to be achieved:
The priorities [of key government agencies] are not the same and there
are enormous areas ofoverlap (Interview with policy-maker, PI 30503).
7.3.2 Between governance levels in the UK
Benneworth and Roberts (2002) find that the network approach has improved the
quality of Scottish policy-making (based on research in the context of policy for
environmental sustainability) but that building such "local regimes" (comprising
local government, local firms, government departments, pressure groups, etc.) is
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difficult when local actors have to deal with issues beyond their spatial boundaries.
Likewise in STI policy, the new multi-level approach to policy-making means that
research and innovation policy initiatives must be developed at the national, trans¬
national and the regional level which leads to a "governance gap of poor integration
and co-ordination" (Edler et al. 2003, p.l 1).
As already discussed in Chapter 3, political devolution is building on a well-
established system of administrative devolution in Scotland. In Section 3.6 it was
noted that, prior to devolution, the territorial offices were tied into the Whitehall
policy network through "a dense network of ministerial and official committees and
regular working contacts" (Keating 2002). However, the devolution settlement has
meant that "over large areas of public policy, there is now no 'centre' at all" (Keating
2002). Also, prior to devolution, Jeffery (1998) expressed concern that the
mechanisms to facilitate Scottish-UK co-ordination were unclear, warning that this
lack of formal procedures might cause particular difficulties if party majorities in
Holyrood and Westminster were no longer congruent:
It is unclear how UK traditions ofadversarialparty politics will impinge
in these circumstances on the necessity and practice ofpower-sharing
between units of government inherent in a devolved system of
government (Jeffery 1998)
In describing the regional governance of science and innovation in the North West of
England, Perry (2003) highlights both the lack of integration between national and
regional science policy and between science and innovation strategies, where policy
development and implementation processes remain parallel rather than fully
integrated across governance levels, such that "the relationship between the new
regional 'science' policies, regional roles in innovation and national science policy
remains disjointed and muddled" (Perry 2003). Instead, there is a "complex and
fluid pattern of interaction between regional and national actors within a multi-level
system" which is characterised by permeable policy boundaries, uneven
responsibilities across territorial levels, and a lack of any obvious interconnections
between the science and innovation strategies in the North West. As such, her case
study of a newly emerging regional STI governance system has strong resonances
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with both the situation within the Scottish level of governance and between the
Scottish and UK levels.
Some DTI officials admit to not having a clear understanding of the detail of Scottish
STI policy (Interview with policy-maker, P280303) and policy targets point to
persisting asymmetries and disconnections between national (UK) and local STI
initiatives:
I'm not sure if there's any overlap between the DTI and the Scottish
Executive. It seems terrible that they 're both trying to do the same thing
and an awful waste of resource (Interview with biotechnology CEO,
1280802)
It's my understanding there's very little connection, you know, between
those funds [University Challenge Fund] and what they're doing in
Scottish Enterprise (Interview with service provider, 1020503)
There is also a prevailing hierarchy of knowledge within the policy-making
community:
We have very good relationships with the DTI in the biotech
[team] ...[but] I think there's very much this mentality of - we're here
and you 're there and we know everything, you know nothing (Interview
with (Scottish) policy-maker, PI40303)
The DTI's Innovation Report (DTI 2003b) claims that the department will work in
close partnership with the RDAs and devolved administrations (DAs) to ensure that
national policy and priorities "take full account of devolved and regional priorities"
and that they "also shape more effectively what is delivered" in terms of regional
innovation. Although the report states that "[ejffective cooperation amongst the UK
Government, DAs and the RDAs requires a consensus on defining success and
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assessing progress" (DTI 2003b, p. 106), the primary focus of this report seems to be
on the English RDAs7 and not on co-ordination across the new levels of governance.
Although representatives of the Scottish biotechnology sector appreciate the
continuity of senior DTI officials and Ministers such as Lord Sainsbury, believing
that there is no one of the same calibre in Scotland (Interview with biotechnology
CEO, 1090603), middle-ranking officials in the DTI Biosciences Unit have few
contacts in Scotland:
Fairly limited...that interaction is largely with Scottish Enterprise rather
than the Scottish Executive. I have to say that when we've hadformal
consultation exercises with other government departments ...we've
had...very little response on anything from any of the devolved
administrations... something we probably ought to be doing more ofwhen
there are issues that affect Scotland per se is keeping them informed of
the discussion we have with the corporate body /i.e. pharmaceutical
firms] (Interview with policy-maker, P280303)
In turn, some Scottish biotechnology commentators report poor integration between
the governance levels:
I think the DTFs biotech team views Scotland as, at best, an irrelevance
and, at worst, a threat because of the ability that Scotland has, with its
small size and more cohesive structure, to be dynamic. And I think the
DTI views that dynamism as aggression. I know that words have been
had in the past about those damn Scots usurping the UK position. So I
think there is still an issue with regard to separation and certainly the
collaboration potential, I think, is not as strong as it should be (Interview
with service provider, 1160702)
Some express disappointment that trade and industry policy was not fully devolved
to Scotland "because the DTI just isn't interested in Scottish specific trade issues"
7 In the context of responding to the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee's report
(House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 2003) which called for simplified
performance measures to take better account of the importance of science and technology to economic
development.
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(Interview with university representative, A110303) and others find it much harder to
access business services at the DTI level:
organisations like Scottish Trade International ...are very accessible.
That is absolutely not the case with the DTI. The DTI has all kinds of
barriers in place to prevent access by people who use their services
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1120203)
But, in general, the UK bioindustry describes a "very open and supportive"
relationship with the DTI (in a way that firms in Scotland are much less likely to
describe relations with Scottish Enterprise) to the extent that:
[DTI] trust us with policy thinking as they develop it and trust us to keep
confidence and we have sometimes a relationship supporting Ministers'
initiatives directly (Interview with industry representative, 1030702)
However, other observers view the Scottish Enterprise model as positive compared
with the more centralised DTI model:
[Scottish Enterprise] has enough connection - enough pressure from the
centre but it is somewhat independent ...I suspect if Scottish Enterprise
had been set up today it would be a wing of the Scottish Executive as in
the DTI. The DTI don't let their biotechnology go (Interview with
director of research institute, R290702)
7.4 Gate-keeping role of key government agencies
The governance approach can lead to the blurring of state-society roles which can, in
turn, place an emphasis on the important position of intermediary organisations
(Ansell 2000). It is conceivable that such an intermediary function might be fulfilled
by the "ideal typical" RDA which Halkier et al. (1998) view as a multifunctional
agency that is semi-autonomous from central administration. This autonomy grants
the agency the latitude to adopt "integrated" policy strategies and to act as a hub in a
web of public and private actors. This agency might in turn act as a gateway in
many-to-many relations in order to facilitate interactions between non-
communicating parties (Ansell 2000).
This implies that less bureaucratic, hierarchical institutions might be more willing to
engage with users: interviewees' comments about the contrasting corporate styles of
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SHEFC and Scottish Enterprise would certainly seem to bear this out at the Scottish
level. Indeed, Mytelka and Smith (2002) suggest that, in contrast to more
hierarchical organisations (such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank), opportunities to influence policy-making have been far greater in ostensibly
weaker organisations that allow for greater diversity, such as the OECD and the
European Community.
Bureaucratic organisations tend to compartmentalise information and resources
which in turn leads to boundaries between policy initiatives. The networked
approach assumes a shared jurisdiction and authority and Ansell (2000) describes
how a shift from a bureaucratic to a networked polity can lead to a more inclusive
attitude that focuses on integrative solutions rather than specific programmes. State
actors with a high degree of centrality in the network should be in a position to
provide "facilitative leadership", adopting a critical brokerage role in bringing actors
together. Where this brokerage role requires mobilisation across departmental
boundaries or across the public-private divide, Ansell (ibid.) suggests that it may be
facilitated by the creation of semi-autonomous agencies, but in Scotland it would
appear that the key government agency, Scottish Enterprise, is too focused on
dedicated programmes (for example the Proof of Concept initiative) rather than on
integrative solutions and is too insular in both its policy development and delivery
roles (Interview with service provider, 1020503):
[Scottish Enterprise] is anything but an open organisation and they do,
by and large, see themselves as setting the scene and setting the
policy...there is a needfor a greater openness as to the decision-making
process ...there is definitely a need for them to respond to the user
community...What you don't do is make a decision and then
retrospectively try andjustify it (Interview with university representative,
A311002)
The BIA's annual report (BIA 2002, p.25) describes the establishment of BIA
Scotland and the fact that the trade body is now developing direct links with the
Scottish Executive and Scottish Parliament without the need to rely as heavily on the
efforts of Scottish Enterprise as was previously the case when Scottish Enterprise
essentially acted in lieu of a trade association. Prior to the establishment of the
Parliament, this was seen as working quite well (Interview with biotechnology CEO,
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1090603) but the industry recognised the potential for conflict and the need for an
independent voice:
Scottish Enterprise sort ofhalf accept it but half resent it and so we do
get some funny reactions when we actually quotes "lobby" 'cos they're
not used to it in Scotland (Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1090603)
Nevertheless, while firms do have opportunities to talk directly to Ministers and
government, Scottish Enterprise's very success is seen as being responsible for
starving policy-makers of interaction with industry (Interview with industry
representative, 1030702) and there is still the view that, if the Executive wanted an
opinion on some aspect of biotechnology, it would consult Scottish Enterprise rather
than industry directly (Interview with service provider, 1160702). Scottish Executive
policy-makers are rather unaccustomed to dealing directly with industry precisely
because, in the past, they have always relied on Scottish Enterprise as a conduit for
industry views (Interviews with biotechnology CEO, 1090603 and industry
representative, 1260602). This requires a cultural change for some Scottish
Executive officials in order for them to reach outside into the open industry
environment and recognise that other bodies such as BIA also have considerable
expertise in the biotechnology sector (Interview with industry representative,
1030702). Other observers are more forthright, claiming that civil servants in the
Executive do not have the skills and experience to deal directly with firms (Interview
with university representative, A200203).
Moreover, it is convenient for the Scottish Executive to use Scottish Enterprise as a
buffer (Interviews with university representatives, A311002 and A200203) and this
fragmentation is seen to suit the Scottish Executive's purposes (Interview with
service provider, 1150702):
there is a convenience in having a bit of a heat shield in Scottish
Enterprise and although there is a lot of talk about, you know,
downsizing, streamlining, etc., I think ultimately they quite like having an
arm's length organisation (Interview with service provider, 1160702)
In the end, the question is really whether we believe that knowledge flows and
influence in the form of company intelligence and the views of industry flow back
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and forward through the Scottish system of innovation and thereby inform the policy
process. Ansell (2000) contrasts "dense" networks which have high degrees of
connectivity and a predominance of symmetrical relationships with "sparse"
networks which have low degrees of connectivity and are predominated by
asymmetrical relationships. It is in Scottish Enterprise's interest to promote this
asymmetry in order to restrict access to government and preserve its status so that,
rather than being a virtuous circle where multiple interactions between Scottish
Enterprise, the Scottish Executive and firms help to inform the policy process, it is
actually more of a linear sequence. Perhaps a better analogy is that of an hour glass
whereby Scottish Enterprise is positioned in the middle and everything is channelled
through them:
I think possibly the dialogue is more between the Executive and [Scottish
Enterprise] on a daily basis than it is between the Executive and the
private sector...I think it's more of a two-way street with [Scottish
Enterprise] in the middle and I think there is a certain amount of vested
interest within [Scottish Enterprise] (Interview with service provider,
1160702)
At the UK level, the sponsorship role of the DTI Bioscience Unit gives it a specific
remit to act as a conduit for the two-way exchange of information between policy
targets (primarily biotechnology SMEs and pharmaceutical firms) in the life sciences
sector and other UK government departments such as the Treasury (HMT) or the UK
Department of Health (DOH) without preventing direct contacts between these two
groups of actors (see Figure 7.1). This contrasts with the Scottish governance level
depicted in Figure 7.2 where Scottish Enterprise mediates relations between policy
targets in the bioindustry and policy-makers within the Scottish Executive but
without seemingly a clear remit to channel industry views to policy-makers in order
to inform policy. Direct links between Scottish policy targets (especially those from
industry) and the Executive are weak, and only a very few of the Scottish policy
targets (e.g. one or two of the larger biotechnology SMEs) have any direct
engagement with the UK governance level. In this sense, Scottish Enterprise is
acting as a gate-keeper that regulates and restricts flows of knowledge and influence
in the Scottish level of governance rather than as a gateway that facilitates
knowledge flow and government-industry policy interaction. The contrasting roles
245
played by Scottish Enterprise and the DTI Bioscience Unit may be explained in part
by their status within government: in the case of the UK level, the intermediary is a
peer department whereas in Scotland the intermediary is a government agency trying
to protect its privileged knowledge base in an asymmetric power relationship with its
parent department.
Figure 7.1 Government-industry policy interaction at the UK level of
governance
Figure 7.2 Government-industry policy interaction at the Scottish level of
governance
Weak links between governance levels
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7.5 Reprise
Beesley (2003) notes that, while the necessity to establish communication,
collaboration and co-operation between industry and research is generally accepted,
there remains an unwillingness or inability for either party to liberate themselves
from the linear perspective of science. Until this occurs, rather than the interacting
networks of the triple-helix model (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000), Beesley
(2003) suggests that innovation systems will continue to be portrayed as interacting
but not interconnected systems. A directly analogous situation exists for the policy
model being sustained within the Scottish system of innovation post-devolution
where policy-makers and policy targets from technology-based companies and the
research base are interacting but are failing to exploit the full policy learning
potential of these interactions. This failure to learn results from institutional
separation both between and within key government departments and agencies, weak
relationships with policy targets, and different personal and institutional motivations
that are not necessarily oriented towards effective associative governance.
There are pockets of good practice within existing or developing networks (such as
SHEFC's strategic dialogue with stakeholders) but, as the Scottish Science Advisory
Committee (2004b) and many of the respondents in this study have reported, there is
still a pressing need to "join up" Scottish Executive funding and policy initiatives.
This is further illustrated by some unambiguous examples of recent policy
development in a vacuum, such as the establishment of the ITIs (see Section 4.5.3)
and the development ofSmart, Successful Scotland:
there was no consultation whatsoever about Smart Successful Scotland.
It was announced in a parade of...publicity and...we did lots of... selling
of it in a way. But it wasn't consultative at all and it was very much
dreamt up in Meridian Court and Atlantic Quay8...and while it was
written as, you know, a policy document for the Enterprise networks, it
8
Synonyms for ELLD and Scottish Enterprise respectively.
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effectively has become our economic strategy (Interview with policy¬
maker, P020403)
There is a recognition that debate and discussion can inform policy but there is not
yet a well-established, structured, integrated mechanism in Scotland to involve users
in agenda-setting in anything that might resemble a fully functioning policy network.
However, learning takes place over time and we should bear in mind that Scotland is
still in the early stages of devolution and learning how to function successfully in a
multi-level governance environment. This is an evolving situation and key questions
remain in terms of how the SSAC's role will develop and what might happen to
Scottish Enterprise: whether, for example, Scottish Enterprise might lose its gate¬
keeping role as trade associations develop their relationship with the Scottish
Executive directly. As we shall see in the final chapter, recent developments indicate
that the Scottish Executive might be reasserting its control over Scottish Enterprise
and taking steps to weaken this gate-keeping function. However, the reasons behind
this may well be inspired by politics rather than a desire to promote good associative
governance.
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Chapter 8 Concurrent Power: Closing the Governance Gap
Interdisciplinary work provides not so much the opportunity to learn about new things
but to open our eyes to different ways ofknowing thefamiliar (Rowland 2004)
8.1 Introduction
This thesis set out to explore the theme of "Concurrent Power" in the context of
science, technology and innovation (STI) policy in Scotland. As discussed in
Chapter 3, this term refers to policy competences that are shared between
Westminster and Holyrood and typifies the concept of multi-level governance.
However, devolution was intended not only to transfer powers downwards
territorially but to foster a new type of politics with more participation that would
lead to more consensus politics, stronger Parliamentary committees, and power
sharing between the Executive, Parliament and the civil service. This research has
therefore extended the concept of concurrent power to study relationships between
these key policy actors in order to examine how policy responsibilities for STI are
negotiated and co-ordinated and to determine whether Scottish devolution has
resulted in a more integrated policy approach in this area. Finally, a key focus of the
research has been on whether devolution has had a significant impact on the process
of policy-making for STI. It has adopted an ethnographic approach to examine the
interactions between policy-makers and policy targets to explore whether this
process has become more interactive and participative.
The theoretical context for this research was situated at the nexus between the
systems of innovation literature and the political studies literature on governance and
the role of policy networks. Drawing on this theme of concurrent power, the
research has addressed two perceived lacunae in academic deliberations on STI
policy: on the one hand, innovation systems models focus on interactions between
firms and learning processes within firms and pay less attention to policy interactions
and policy learning. On the other hand, the governance approach in general, and the
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policy networks model in particular, is more usually applied to areas of social policy
and neglects STI policy and its particular challenges. By considering the topic from
this dualist perspective, the research has looked at a range of relevant actors and their
interactions in a novel policy context and has used these observations to test existing
theories about policy networks and innovation systems in a complex and changing
political system. This approach has advanced understanding about emerging systems
of multi-level governance and has contributed to the growing and interdisciplinary
knowledge domain of the regional governance of science and innovation.
This research has shown that devolved Scotland might be on the cusp of achieving
good associative governance in the life sciences but is held back, not by the
concurrent nature of the policy domain, but by the lack of co-ordination between
institutions which continue to exhibit a number of characteristics that pre-date
devolution; a dominant public sector that is still operating in an essentially top-down,
consultative rather than participative policy network mode; and an adherence to an
old way of thinking about STI policy that continues to focus on the science base
rather than taking the opportunity to develop an integrated and inclusive research and
innovation model. The main obstacles to effective associative governance therefore
lie within Scotland in terms of co-ordination, integration and engagement with policy
targets, rather than between levels of governance: the light that devolution has shone
on the SSI has shown that long-standing issues are still more problematic than any
that devolution might have brought about. A key conclusion of this research is that
the governance gap that must be closed lies not between Scotland, the UK and
Europe but between the Scottish Executive, Scottish Enterprise and Scottish policy
targets.
8.2 Research questions revisited
Reflecting on the empirical data discussed in Chapter 4 and elsewhere in this thesis,
it is clear that, within the Scottish level of governance, network-based interactions do
take place but that there is a lack of cohesion. Moreover, the prevailing model is still
one of involving policy targets in ad hoc (and indeed often post hoc) consultation
rather than in agenda-setting. Analysis of various key policy documents (discussed
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in Chapters 3 and 5) also confirms that policy targets are not yet working effectively
with government to identify jointly the objectives for government policy. Hence, the
Scottish Executive still seems to be entrenched in the rhetoric of partnership without
actually demonstrating real commitment to the engagement of policy targets in the
policy-making process. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, post-devolution activities
such as the SSAC have not been granted the scope to develop into fully-fledged
policy networks but instead merely serve to reinforce this consultation model.
Our findings therefore support the general view of the present government's
approach which fails to recognise that participative policy-making goes beyond
"communication" to genuine dialogue (Parsons 2001) and we have adopted the
terminology of "interaction but not interconnectedness" (Beesley 2003) to describe
the process of engagement in STI policy in Scotland where a key challenge for
Scotland is to retain the good interpersonal contacts that exist by virtue of the small
country size without reinforcing the exclusive "star system" (see Section 4.5.2).
Furthermore, we have questioned the validity of the self-organising network model
(see Section 7.2.2) which is unable to flourish in a policy environment dominated by
the public sector. We conclude from this that, if STI policy networks exist at all in
Scotland, then we are seeing what Rhodes and Marsh (1992) would term an issue
network rather than a policy community1.
So, has participation in the policy-making process been facilitated by the
establishment of the Scottish Parliament? Many of the key policy drivers for STI are
reserved to higher levels of governance so that, for the Scottish life sciences sector in
particular, and probably the Scottish system of innovation more generally, our
findings imply that the Scottish Parliament is more or less an irrelevance despite its
achievements in promoting participation in other areas of public policy. This
1
As discussed in Section 2.4, an issue network involves primarily policy consultation rather than
shared decision-making because there is no shared understanding either among interests or between
the interests and the bureaucracy.
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reinforces earlier commentators' views (Kerley 1999; Sloat 2000a) that this is not
really a Parliament for business, and emphasises the notion that the governance ideal
is working in areas of social policy but not STI. The parliamentary committees and
cross-party groups that are the main conduit for participative governance do not have
a history of engagement with the biotechnology industry because so little policy
affecting this sector is actually devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Moreover, there
is an underlying concern from industry that the Parliament has the potential to
damage the competitiveness of the Scottish life sciences sector if it started to
introduce additional layers of bureaucracy.
However, before we condemn the policy-makers entirely for their lack of
engagement with this area, it needs to be borne in mind that STI is not a
homogeneous policy field that relates in a straightforward way to politics: unlike
education or health, STI policy is not a cohesive entity, nor is it necessarily seen as a
core function of government. Additionally, the equivalent "civil society" that is
necessary for good governance in other policy domains is only gradually beginning
to emerge in the Scottish life sciences sector. It seems rational to conclude that the
causes of this deficit in associative governance owe something to the devolution
settlement and the concurrent character of STI policy but are also related to the
nature of STI policy itself.
Nevertheless, there is still little firm evidence of changes in practice or outcomes as a
result of interactions between policy-makers and policy targets that might be termed
"policy learning". While Rhodes' approach suggests that policy networks can link
sub-national bodies to national bodies (Smith 1997, p.84), the current data highlight
the poor integration between governance levels which supports Benneworth and
Roberts' (2002) finding that building networks is difficult when local actors have to
deal with issues beyond their spatial boundaries. Likewise in STI policy, the new
multi-level approach to policy-making means that research and innovation policy
initiatives must be developed at the national, trans-national and the regional level
which leads to a "governance gap of poor integration and co-ordination" (Edler et al.
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2003, p.l 1). In turn, Scottish biotechnology commentators observe poor integration
between the governance levels, and the following quote bears repetition:
I think the DTI's biotech team views Scotland as, at best, an irrelevance
and, at worst, a threat because of the ability that Scotland has, with its
small size and more cohesive structure, to be dynamic. And I think the
DTI views that dynamism as aggression. I know that words have been
had in the past about those damn Scots usurping the UK position.
(Interview with service provider, 1160702)
The data point to the lack of a co-ordinating national policy unit in the Scottish
Executive that is able both to integrate within Scotland and co-ordinate with the rest
of the UK; to take an overview of Scottish STI policy; and to undertake a "boundary
spanning role" in order to facilitate more productive MLG relationships. In theory,
the DTI has this role for the whole of the UK but the collected evidence from DTI
representatives and others indicates that it does not do this successfully and
sometimes has difficulty managing its dual role as both a UK-wide government
department and the lead department on STI policy for the English regions. These
conclusions chime with the recent interim findings from the ESRC's Devolution and
Constitutional Change Programme which report that, although devolution across the
UK has been smoothly implemented, it is a fragmented project, lacking an
overarching UK-wide purpose. These researchers find no evidence to suggest
greater participation but do report that intergovernmental relations are under-
structured and the role of the centre unarticulated. At some stage in the future this is
a situation that would be exacerbated if the Scottish and UK governments were no
longer congruent.
In Scotland, we have seen that the public sector dominance, and the gate-keeper roles
played by some of these government actors, obstructs integration and learning. It
seems reasonable to assume from the evidence that we will not achieve effective
policy networks until these government actors properly co-ordinate. Above all, the
context is still one of promoting the linear model of innovation, with a continuing
2
Reported by Programme Director, Professor Charlie Jeffery, Politics Seminar, University of
Edinburgh, 20 October 2004. See also http://www.devolution.ac.uk/ (last accessed 25/10/04).
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focus on the supply side (i.e. the science base in Scottish universities) and a disregard
for the demand-side role that could be played by innovative Scottish firms. This
ongoing separation of science and innovation policy is reflected in the separation of
responsibilities between the Scottish Executive and Scottish Enterprise. As such, the
Scottish Science Strategy, which augured well in terms of a new emphasis on science
post-devolution, actually missed a great opportunity to promote an integrated
research and innovation policy for Scotland.
8.3 Recent developments
One of the challenges of undertaking contemporary research on such a political
system is that the situation is often dynamic, with changes occurring over time. Five
years into the Scottish devolution experiment, the actors who are charged with
weaving a new fabric of governance are still maturing and still heavily influenced by
past, pre-devolution structures and repertoires. As this study drew to a close a
number of announcements were made by the Scottish Executive and others that have
the potential to shape the future development of policy networks within the Scottish
system of innovation.
At the beginning of April 2004, the Enterprise Minister announced that the Scottish
Executive's Smart, Successful Scotland strategy was to be "refreshed" to take
account of developments in the Scottish economy, with the revised version expected
to be published in autumn 2004. Smart, Successful Scotland was first published in
2001 to give strategic direction to the enterprise networks, although, according to the
Minister's press release, it has since "gained wider acceptance and endorsement as an
overall enterprise strategy for Scotland" (Scottish Executive 2004a). Among other
things, the revised strategy will apparently aim to ensure a better link-up between the
strategy and other cross-cutting policy areas such as social justice, equal
opportunities, rural development and transport.
However, recent press criticism of initiatives to help Scottish business to create
economic growth (Sunday Herald 2004a) would indicate that the Scottish Executive
and Scottish Enterprise are still failing to "join up" their policies. Indeed, the newly
appointed Chief Executive of Scottish Enterprise has indicated publicly that he
wishes to divest the agency of many of its social responsibilities and "return to a
sharper focus on pure economic development" (Sunday Herald 2004b): while
welcomed by the business press, this statement would appear to run contrary to the
Enterprise Minister's desire to link the government's social and economic agendas.
A recent development of greater relevance to the argument of this thesis was the
announcement of a new government and industry advisory body to link the Scottish
Executive and Scottish Enterprise with senior figures in the life sciences industry.
This joint advisory body "will give senior industry figures an opportunity to
participate in policy-making, and allow the Scottish Executive and Scottish
Enterprise to tap into their expertise"; it will be chaired by Scottish Enterprise
(Scottish Executive 2004b).
It is clear from interviews reported in Chapter 4 that the Scottish Executive has not
had the necessity for direct interaction with the biotechnology sector in the past, but
this relationship is changing as a more vocal and policy-aware sector is beginning to
mature. Companies within the Scottish life sciences sector criticise the Enterprise
Network for engaging with individual companies in a piecemeal fashion rather than
interacting in a holistic way with the industry so that, up until recently, the feeling
expressed by leading industry figures was that they were not very high on either the
Parliament or the Executive's agenda in Scotland because "Scottish Enterprise had it
all taken care of and they didn't need to worry about it" (Interview with
biotechnology CEO 1090603). It would appear, therefore, that this new advisory
body is a response to industry lobbying for more regular, scheduled interactions
between both Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish Executive and the bigger
companies and the BIA. Some informants recommend a "Scottish PICTF" to help
focus the minds (Interview with industry representative, 1040702) and others suggest
that:
we could probably go a long way by having a small group ofpeople [in
Scotland] who have the relevant experience to be able to tell you or
remind you...and perhaps prioritise one or two simple things that could
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be done first in order to receive or establish the flow of information
(Interview with biotechnology CEO, 1280802)
Significantly, according to the Executive's press release, this new advisory body's
role will be to "provide expert advice on the implementation (emphasis added) of the
next Scottish Enterprise Life Sciences strategy for 2004-2007" (Scottish Executive
2004b). It is undoubtedly instructive to contrast this statement with comments from
the Scottish director of the BIA, quoted in the press following the announcement of
this new body, who claimed that "ministers and experts at Scottish Enterprise did not
understand the industry they were meant to be helping to develop" and said that "the
failure to consult properly meant policies were developed (emphasis added) without
understanding what was needed to help the key sector grow" (Williamson 2004)3.
This new joint body is certainly to be welcomed if it brings together all of the key
players in a constructive dialogue but these contrasting quotes suggest that it is still
predicated on the consultation model discussed in Section 4.2.1. This group cannot
be considered to be a policy network until there is evidence that the industry
members are actually having an impact on the shape and structure of new policy
rather than merely advising on the implementation of pre-existing policy designed by
the government actors. There is also an underlying agenda that would have been
interesting to explore further if time had allowed and this is the perhaps heretical
thought that the true purpose of this new joint body is actually to enable the
Executive to rein in its development agency, to exert greater control over its
activities in this key industry sector, and to try to challenge its gate-keeping role,
posited in Section 7.4.
Other actors have also moved on since the start of this study. Having published its
first report to the Scottish Executive in January 2004, the Scottish Science Advisory
Committee is now entering a second phase with a new membership and a revised
remit that will charge it with advising the Executive on narrower and more focused
aspects of the Scottish science base. However, the SSAC's most recent report on
J
These comments are reflected in more general criticisms in the business press which noted that
government policy needs to connect more directly with the business community's real agenda, instead
of the one "imagined by the bureaucrats and policy-makers" (Murden 2004).
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knowledge transfer (Scottish Science Advisory Committee 2004c) suggests that it is
still trying to push issues to do with the co-ordination of research and innovation up
the Scottish Executive's agenda.
New players have also emerged on the Scottish scene such as the Scottish Stem Cell
Network established in May 2003 as a "multidisciplinary forum bringing together
scientists and clinicians with the aim of improving the rate at which laboratory
research translates into therapeutic benefits for patients"4. While this might have the
potential to develop into a policy network at some future point, its current status is
more akin to a lobby group but it is interesting to note that it is essentially bypassing
the Scottish level of governance and lobbying primarily at the EU level, illustrating
once again the limits of the Scottish Parliament which has no devolved policy
competences in this field. Other recent co-ordination efforts include the launch of
the "Edinburgh Science Triangle" where seven scientific institutions and technology
parks in the Edinburgh area have joined forces to boost R&D competition (Buxton
2004). Finally, the emergence of the ITI as a potentially major player in the life
sciences sector and its interactions with the SSI may yet prove significant.
8.4 Implications forpolicy and theory
What these recent developments perhaps best serve to demonstrate is that current
political situations are unlikely to remain static for the duration of a PhD thesis and
that, especially in the case of contemporary, policy-focused research, a key concern
may be to get early insights out into the policy domain in order to inform the
development of that policy system.
Looking beyond Scotland, the European level of governance has not been a primary
focus but has nevertheless contextualised this research. Across Europe we see a
general trend towards regionalisation but significant differences in the devolution
models adopted in terms of scope and scale. Conflicts within the governance
perspective are evident at the European policy level where there is a danger that the
4
http://www.sscn.co.uk/default.asp (last accessed 28/10/04).
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EC's attempt to use the ERA to integrate European R&D might run contrary to the
increasing divergence of (and competition between) national, and increasingly
regional, systems of innovation (Edler et al. 2003, p.21). On the other hand, the
ERA could be a force for good if it is able to provide an effective co-ordination
mechanism across governance levels within Europe5.
Small countries such as Scotland should provide greater opportunities for people to
overcome professional boundaries and be in a better position to bring about
governance changes and systemic approaches (Edler et al. 2002, p.21). The Scottish
case described in this study therefore has broader relevance to discussions about the
regionalisation of research and innovation policy within multi-actor spaces and on
the role of these actors in the definition, implementation and evaluation of such
policies. Elowever, as discussed in Section 2.2.4, small countries can face their own
particular challenges with respect to innovation systems and the dominance of certain
key individuals can lead to policy-makers becoming too close to some parties while
excluding other legitimate participants from the policy process (see also Section
4.5.2 on the "star" system).
The governance thesis purports that the centre is losing direct control to complex
policy networks but the evidence does not support this for STI policy in Scotland.
One could either argue that, so far, there has been weak institutionalisation, whereby
the networks that do exist are interpersonal rather than inter-organisational or, on the
contrary, that there are actually very strong institutions {i.e. Scottish Enterprise) that
act as an obligatory point of passage, or gate-keeper, and are preventing policy
network formation. So, one of the things the present study has illustrated is the need
to understand better the differences that institutional trajectories can have on the
performance of regional governance systems, a point that Maskell and Tornquist
5
Moreover, the evidence from the successful Cambridge cluster (reported in Chapter 6) suggests that
the existence of a governance gap may be less significant if there are alternative mechanisms in place:
the Cambridge case has demonstrated that public support for networking activities was not a
prerequisite for a successful RSI.
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(1999 p.50) make when they describe the process of "making do" with the historical
legacy of institutions and routines (see Section 1.2).
Respondents to the Science Strategy consultation gave the Scottish Executive a clear
signal to get its own house in order and implement the ideas ofjoined-up government
and holistic thinking in order to integrate R&D policy fully with other related policy
areas (in particular, economic development and education) and not to restrict the
focus too narrowly to science. Indeed, its own agencies were telling the Executive to
consider the wider issues about innovation, enterprise and economic development
which go beyond the scope of a "science" strategy (see Section 5.2.3) and suggested
that an important prior question should have been whether Scotland needs a co¬
ordinated research and innovation strategy; yet the published strategy document is
very much grounded in the "treasure trove model" where universities are exclusively
seen as the source of innovation. For many years now governments of all political
persuasions have been pre-occupied with trying to get British industry to exploit
science, with comparatively little success (Lyall 1993; Wilkie 1991, p. 129) but
Scotland continues to pursue a blinkered vision of STI and Scotland's Science
Strategy does little to address this particular governance gap.
Transparency and co-ordination within an innovation system require a true
commitment to user involvement that goes beyond just offering the opportunity to
"participate in participation" (de la Mothe 2001a, p.8) and this is likely to fail if
pursued in a top-down fashion by a dominant policy actor (Cooke et al. 2000, p. 142).
We have found that the dominance of the public sector, combined with the fact that
sectoral trade associations are traditionally weaker in the UK than in other European
countries, leads to a dependency culture where Scottish technology-based firms are
seen to be more reliant on public subsidy than their counterparts in other regions of
the UK. But, there are signs that the life sciences sector is beginning to exert its
independence and demand more direct access both to policy-makers within the
Scottish Executive and to the policy-making agenda.
A key theme throughout this research has been the need for co-ordination and
coherence in order to tackle the over-compartmentalisation between government
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departments and agencies and the lack of effective integration across the wider
science and innovation policy sphere. While Scotland should have all of the
necessary precursors to facilitate a networked-based polity, the initial hypothesis was
that the nature of the devolution settlement, which resulted in the multi-level
governance of STI, would militate against the optimal performance of such networks.
Having used Scottish devolution to unpick the relationship between the innovation
system and the policy system, we have to conclude that devolution has so far had less
of an impact on the policy-making process for the life sciences sector than
anticipated. We have found that the Scottish system of innovation currently lacks the
necessary feedback loops that would create a virtuous circle whereby public policy
emanated from the Scottish Executive to Scottish Enterprise to policy targets which
then fed back to the Executive in order to reiterate and refine the policy process.
The idea of a policy network has informed both the study and practice of public
policy and has led to the theory and concept building described in this thesis. It has
done so by shifting attention from national institutions to sub-systems and sectors
and, by emphasising the links between actors at all stages of the policy process, has
provided a useful heuristic device to aid understanding of the governance of STI.
Networks may not, however, be a universal panacea and there is a growing
recognition that they are not without their problems: they can be closed to outsiders,
unrepresentative, relatively unaccountable, and difficult to steer (Bevir and Rhodes
2003, p.75), so it is important to remember that networks can also limit participation
in the policy process. Organically formed, "self-organising" policy networks are
thus often exclusive bodies. Likewise, by establishing a group such as the Bioscience
Leadership Council described in Section 6.2.2, the government is actually controlling
access to the policy process rather than opening up participation6. This belies the
notion of self-organising policy networks put forward by Rhodes (see Section 2.4) if
government still retains the financial resources, legislative powers and political
legitimacy that enable it to impose its will on a network (Taylor 2000; Marinetto
6 This is borne out by the policy-maker's comment (Section 4.5.1) that the establishment of PICTF
actually reduced industry lobbying.
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2003). The Rhodes Model of governance may only present a partial picture
(Marinetto 2003) and, indeed, some go so far as to predict the demise of policy
networks as policy-making is increasingly brought back "in-house" (Thompson
2003, p. 187). Others believe that networks only cohere around a specific problem
(such as, for example, the GM crops debate in the UK), by which time people have
taken entrenched positions, making it difficult to get them to work together as a
network (Bruce et al. in preparation). Conversely, there may also be the danger of
regulatory capture if policy-makers and policy targets get too close.
The governance perspective might just be "a simplifying lens to a complex reality"
as far as academics are concerned (Stoker 1998), but policy-makers at all levels of
governance believe that improved participation in the policy-making process will
create more confidence in the resulting policies and ensure more effective
implementation. As noted in Section 1.3, there appears to be general agreement that
an active civil society is necessary for a healthy democracy (Sloat 2002b), with many
of the prosperous regions of Europe also being regions of participatory politics
(Amin 1999). But this approach is not without its contradictions, and control issues
still remain in a network approach to policy. In the UK, the emergence of multiple
tiers of governance and the development of a more plural, inclusive policy process
has been accompanied by substantial conflict over political power (Newman 2002,
p. 162). While Newman finds some evidence of decentralised, network forms of
governance, the Labour Government's approach has been to intensify the "command
and control" style of governing (ibid. p.38). Thus, network-based governance under
New Labour exhibits a mix of centralisation and decentralisation and patterns of
inclusion and exclusion. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 137) note, the White Paper
on Modernising Government may recognise the need to manage networks but such
management by negotiation means agreeing the objectives with others beforehand,
which perhaps goes some way to explain why we find that the prevailing model is
still one that uses consultation as a proxy for genuine dialogue (see Chapter 4).
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8.5 Reflections on research design
Before reflecting further on the research design, it is worth considering whether this
thesis has judged the Scottish system of innovation too harshly from a critical
insider's perspective that may have emerged, in part, from the research design used7.
Outsiders may take a more positive view of the SSI, for example, commending
Scotland for its "relatively visionary policy approach towards economic
development" (Cooke 2003) and its apparent rationalisation:
we see Scotland as actually doing rather well in terms of academic
industry liaison...They've got a variety of initiatives up there, which are
more streamlined and actually attuned to what's required. I think
they're more nimble footed (Interview with industry representative,
1040702)
now that the Scots can do their own thing...they've actually simplified
their procedures within Scotland... They de-layered...it's a one stop
shop...we're not particularly close to the detail of the way it works but
that's something that seems to have served the Scots very nicely
(Interview with policy-maker, P280303)
The notion of differing insider/outsider perspectives was reflected by several
interviewees who, whilst themselves critical of Scottish policy actors, recognised that
others viewed the system more sympathetically:
from the European side Scotland is seen as a kind of well-functioning,
joined up - ha ha ha [ironic laughter] - policy community (Interview
with European policy-maker, P240902)
from abroad...people are envious at how cohesive we've managed to be.
So I think there's a danger that by navel gazing, we throw away what's
good...I think also there is a fairly cohesive network within Scotland,
albeit composed offragments, but those fragments are at least aware of
each other (Interview with service provider, 1160702)
7
As previously noted in Sections 1.5 and 4.5.3, although some elements of triangulation were
attempted in this research in order to draw data from a variety of sources and from different categories
of respondent, the research design did not allow for iteration of interview comments amongst
informants which may, in retrospect, have permitted a more nuanced critique.
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With this caveat in mind, it is also worth reflecting on some of the current fashions in
academic research. Some authors have described the so-called network paradigm as
"not so much a theory as a potentially rich analytical framework" (Cooke and
Morgan 1993). As we have seen in Chapter 2, the policy networks approach is
essentially a descriptive tool and is considered by some to be just a metaphor with no
explanatory value (Dowding 1995). The term "governance" has also been described
o
t
as a "rather promiscuous concept" without much theoretical grounding.
Nevertheless, these two paradigms are quite clearly the discourse of the day for many
researchers. They are also used extensively by public service practitioners.
Some might advocate a more institutionalised approach to this type of study by, for
example, focusing on the activities of one key government agency. However, the
data from the current research support John's (1998, p.49) proposition that actors
often circumvent institutions in order to pursue their own interests9 and that the
institutional approach presents a static view of the policy process that is less useful
during a period of change (ibid., p.53).
This study did not set out to conduct a systems of innovation analysis for Scotland
but to use the system as a jumping off point in order to explore the impact of
devolution on the policy-making process. In doing so, the research drew on
comparative case studies within the UK and elsewhere to demonstrate that there are
strong historical and cultural reasons for the prominence of self-organising policy
networks in some countries but that, in the UK, the public sector still has an
important role both in providing a conducive policy environment for their emergence
and in steering their activities.
An alternative inter-country comparison might have been provided by a study of the
life sciences sector in Denmark, a country with an acknowledged tradition of
8
"Modernising Governance", lecture by Professor Janet Newman, University of Edinburgh, Social
Policy Seminar, 22 November 2002.
9 This is borne out, for example, by the evidence that shows that the Scottish biotechnology industry is
now seeking to engage directly with Scottish Executive officials and Ministers rather than via Scottish
Enterprise.
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negotiative and consensual decision-making and formal, organised participation
(Bevir and Rhodes 2003, pp.96-98). Other comparative approaches might have
incorporated a form of longitudinal comparison (e.g. by comparing the role of STI
policy networks within Scotland pre- and post-devolution) or considered the wider
context of regionalisation within the rest of the UK and the developing role of the
RDAs (e.g. comparing the NW science strategy with the Scottish situation).
With any such comparative approach there can be difficult trade-offs. There are, for
example, significant differences in political structures between Scotland and either
other small, autonomous nations such as Denmark or federated states within a larger
country such as Germany. Indeed, even within the UK, the Cambridge case study
(Section 6.3) seemed to indicate that the English RDAs were currently too immature
to make any comparison sufficiently detailed. Ultimately, we chose to focus on the
Scottish case study because we had the resources to do this thoroughly and the
richness of the resulting data was felt to provide sufficient evidence to support the
argument of the thesis. That said, there are undoubtedly alternate interpretations of
the data and others might have opted to ground this research in alternate theoretical
frameworks.
As we have suggested above in Section 8.3, we are already seeing some
developments in areas related to participative governance with the launch of the life
sciences advisory group and planned changes to the remits of the SSAC and Scottish
Enterprise. It is hoped that this early study of the impact of Scottish devolution
should provide some base data for a future longitudinal study. Future research in this
area might also consider the role of public participation in STI policy-making in
Scotland, an area specifically excluded from this study but which is, nevertheless,
highly relevant given the advances that the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish
Executive and bodies such as the Scottish Civic Forum have made in other policy
fields.
European governance has been less of a focus of this research than anticipated,
possibly reflecting interviewees' more domestic preoccupations. It may be the case
that, while science is increasingly carried out across borders, science policy is still
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made by nations (Kennedy 2003), although other aspects of current European policy,
for example, pertaining to biotechnology regulation or international trade, clearly
have an impact on Scottish actors. A useful extension of this current study would be
to shift the focus on to the supra-national dimension of MLG in the context of the
European Research Area (ERA) to examine how Scottish policy targets and policy¬
makers can optimise their participation in these European debates given the reserved
nature ofEuropean policy.
Writing recently in the Times Higher, Rowland (2004) (see opening quote, this
chapter) claimed that interdisciplinary research is necessary and can lead to new
insights, particularly if academic knowledge is to address the problems of the wider
world. But he highlighted the danger of research that too readily transcends
disciplinary boundaries without any disciplinary commitment, on the grounds that,
while the ability to solve technical problems may be gained, an awareness of the
value of solutions and the need to exercise critical judgement may be lost. Rowland
warns that interdisciplinary work can be exciting, but it is hard: it involves
negotiating disciplinary boundaries, not removing them.
Devolution studies is a new, interdisciplinary field of enquiry within the UK and the
current research has drawn on theory, policy and practice in an attempt to advance
knowledge across several allied disciplines. The concurrent power theme has thus
provided insights into a relatively neglected area in terms of the geographic region,
the policy sphere, and the unit of analysis. First, it has provided a case study on the
impact of devolution on a particular policy domain (that of STI) which is relevant to
the regional studies community of academics and practitioners. Secondly, it has
taken the political studies concept of a policy network and applied it to a novel,
under-studied policy sphere. Thirdly, it has reversed the telescope within the
systems of innovation model and focused on the influence of system actors on the
policy-making process in contrast to the more usual perspective of the impact of the
policy regime on innovation actors, thereby providing a new contribution to the
innovation studies oeuvre.
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At times, this research may have felt like wading in Schon's swamp10 and the high,
hard ground of theoretical rigour may have presented a more attractive proposition.
Ultimately, however, there seems to be general agreement amongst scholars from
various academic disciplines of the benefits to be derived from the confluence of a
range of theoretical and empirical approaches under the umbrella of ''multi-level
governance" (Bache and Flinders 2004, p.l). Using this interdisciplinary approach
we have extended the knowledge domain of multi-level governance studies, more
usually reserved to the European policy context, into the area of STI policy. In doing
so, this research has demonstrated the utility of the MLG concept to the study of
systems of innovation by relating the vertical components of MLG theory (i.e.
interactions between governments operating at different territorial levels) to the
horizontal dimensions (i.e. interaction between government and non-government
actors) (Bache and Flinders 2004, p.3) in order to provide a deeper understanding of
the complexities of a new and developing political system.
10 See opening quote in Chapter 1.
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Appendix Research Notes
A. 1 Topic guide
Variations of the following topic guide were used to steer interviews with policy¬
makers and policy targets.
Policy concerns and interactions with government
1. What are your firm's current policy preoccupations (particularly in relation to
innovation)? (What are you trying to achieve and what are the barriers to
success?)
2. How do you raise these concerns with government?
3. With whom do you engage - Holyrood, Westminster, Brussels or all three?





























What are the types of interactions that you have with government in Scotland
and are these interactions likely to inform policy? E.g.
• One-to-one meetings with civil servants/MPs
• Attendance at govt sponsored events
• Membership ofworking groups (e.g. time limited on specific topics)
• Formal consultation on specific issues (e.g. Scotland's Science Strategy)
• Formal working relationship e.g. advisory role
Who takes part in these meetings from the company?
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6. How do you know which issues to raise at which levels of government
(Scottish, UK, EU) and with which part of government department/agency?
7. Does the Scottish biotechnology industry have a champion within government
cf DTI Biotechnology Directorate (or is their focus just on English based
companies now?)
8. If you don't have direct policy related interactions with government do you do
it through intermediaries/representative bodies? (See Q13)
Policy networks
9. Do you regard interactions with government as a one-way lobbying process or
is there genuine dialogue?
10. Is there an established policy network that brings together government and
non-government actors or is one evolving? Who is in the network? Is this a
Scottish network or UK wide?
11. Has there been a key policy issue that has brought the industry together to work
in a concerted way with government? If so, is there evidence that this had an
impact on government policy? i.e. do the actors in these policy networks
actually shape policy or is policy still being driven along some pre-existing
trajectory developed by pre-devolution institutions? (Does consultation mean
anything?)
12. Is your firm involved in any EU funded activities that promote networking? If
so what has been your experience of this network?
13. Membership of networks e.g. trade associations such as BIA or Edinburgh Bio-
Alliance
• what knits the network together
• what you get out of these activities
• what you are expected to put into them
• how you got involved
• whether it has specific, quantifiable, measurable goals
Perceptions of devolution
14. How has the situation changed since devolution?
15. Is there now an opportunity for firms to communicate more directly with
policy-makers at the local level or has the multi-level system made things more
complex?
16. Is there any evidence of policy-oriented learning as a result of dialogue
between policy-makers and policy targets?
17. How does the Scottish system compare with companies based in SE England -
is it easier to lobby government now there is a Scottish Parliament and does it
have a more immediate impact?
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A. 2 Interviews
Table A.1 Breakdown of category and location of interviewees
Category ofInformant
Academic Industry Policy Research Total
10 12 23 3 48
Location ofInformant (or locus ofexpertise)
Scotland UK Cambridge Germany
35 8 3 2 48
Category Type ofOrganisation (and Division, where No. of
appropriate) interviews
Academic Advisory body 1
Representative body 2
Service provider 1
University of Cambridge 1
University ofEdinburgh 5
Academic Total 10




Policy DTI (Bioscience Unit, Devolution Unit, 8
Government Office, OST & Trade Directorate)
Scotland Europa 1
Scotland Office (Economy and Industry Dept) 1
Scottish Enterprise (Knowledge Management, 4
Life Sciences & Commercialisation Teams)









The majority of the interviews summarised in Table A.l lasted one hour and
generally involved the researcher and one informant. In a small minority of
interviews, and only in the case of policy-makers, up to three informants took part.
All respondents were offered anonymity and are therefore classified by their role and
identified in the text by a code number based on the date of interview:
A = academic (i.e. based in HEI)
I = industrialist (includes individuals from representative bodies)
P = policy-maker
R = other researcher (e.g. based in PSRE rather than HEI)
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A.3 Data analysis
Figure A.l draws an analogy between the data analysis technique described in
Chapter 1 and a common purification method where the substrate (in this case the
interview data) is gradually passed through a series of successively finer filters in
order to condense and refine the information, resulting finally in a distilled,
analytical narrative and a few key quotes which are reported in Chapters 4-7.
As discussed in Section 1.5, N6 is a document management and data analysis
software package that enables code-based interrogation and searching of large
quantities of text. By gathering together all material related to a particular topic
under one "node" (a process known as "coding") the analyst can then browse and
explore everything grouped under that particular node and ask questions, find
patterns and begin to build and test theories about the data. Nodes can represent
concepts, processes, people, organisations, abstract ideas, places or any other
categories appropriate to the particular research project1. Nodes can be kept as
freestanding categories ("free nodes"), which can be useful for identifying early
ideas or apparently unconnected initial concepts, or can be organised hierarchically
into "trees". In N6, the node system is designed to be modified as the research
develops so early, "broad brush" coding (using primarily free nodes) can be reviewed
as new ideas or more nuanced understanding develop, allowing nodes to be
reorganised, combined or deleted and subcategories of node to be created into a more
• 9
sophisticated tree node structure". Figures A.2-A.4 represent the development of the
analytical framework through a sequence of evolving tree node structures which
were derived after several iterations. This process was guided by the topic guide,
some use of grounded theory to explore emerging themes, and by the analytical
questions discussed in Chapter 4 (see Figure A.5). Eventually, in the final iteration
Introducing N6: A workshop handbook by Lyn Richards (February 2002)
www.qsrinternational.com/resources/teachingmaterials/N6workbook.pdf (last accessed 08/02/05).
2
See Getting Started in N6 (May 2004) www.qsrinternational.com/products/productoverview/
Getting%20Started%20in%20N6.pdf (last accessed 08/02/05).
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depicted here in Figure A.4, the content coding was structured according to chapter
headings. In this way, as discussed in Section 1.5, careful coding and analysis of the
interviews was used to underpin the narrative structure of the thesis as well as
generating a selection of illustrative quotations.
Each transcript was also assigned a series of base codes relating to location and type
of respondent (see Figure A.6) which facilitated the development of a number of
search strategies summarised in Figure A.7. The symbol "fl" used in Figure A.7
indicates the intersection of a base code {e.g. the type of respondent) with a content
code so that the search strategies summarised in Figure A.7 reveal answers to
comparative questions of the type "what did policy-makers say about the evolution
of networks in comparison with SMEs' views on this subject?".
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Figure A.1 The Data Analysis Process




Figure A.2 Initial N6 coding framework (to interrogate text)
Free Nodes
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representative bodies/role in policy making
Scottish Executive
Scottish Executive/Buffer
Scottish Exec/relations with SEnt

















Figure A.3 Interim N6 coding framework (to identify analytical issues)
representative bodies







Intro & background/animal testing
Intro & background/skills related
Intro & background/start up companies
Intro & background/policy approaches
Intro & background/commercialisation
Intro & background/Foresight
Intro & background/policy concerns
Intro & background/cluster development














Role of govt and agencies
Role of govt and agencies/dependency culture
Role of govt & agencies/relations SExec & SEnt
Role of govt and agencies/Buffer
Role of govt and agencies/Scottish Enterprise
Role of govt and agencies/Scottish Executive
Role of govt and agencies/Scotland Office
Role of govt&agencies/Smart Successful Scot'
Role of govt and agencies/role ofgovt
Role of govt and agencies/DTI













































ZZ Organisational/Type of respondent
ZZ Organisational/Type of resp./Policy maker
ZZ Organisational/Type of resp./Rep. body
ZZ Organisational/Type of respondent/Firm
ZZ Organisational/Type of resp./Firm/SME
ZZ Organisational/Type of resp./Firm/MNE
ZZ Organisational/Type of respondent/Research
ZZ Organisational/Type of resp./Research/univ.
ZZ Organisational/Type of resp./Res./Institute
ZZ Organisational/Type of respondent/Other
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Figure A.4 Final N6 coding framework (to develop structure)
Chapter 4
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on 5/Policy learning
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Figure A.5 Analytical questions
1. Who participates in policy-making at the regional level in Scotland and through what
mechanisms are policy targets engaging in the policy process in Scotland?
2. Has participation in the policy-making process been facilitated by the establishment of the
Scottish Parliament?
3. Is there evidence that this engagement is leading to the formation of a distinct Scottish policy
network for STI?
4. Is there any evidence of changes in practice or outcomes ("policy learning") as a result of this
dialogue between policy-makers and policy targets?

















Figure A.7 N6 search strategies
Policy-makers fl Scottish Enterprise
Representative bodies fl Scottish Enterprise
SMEs fl Scottish Enterprise
Universities fl Scottish Enterprise
Policy-makers fl devolution




Representative bodies fl MLG
SMEs 0 MLG
Universities fl MLG
Policy-makers fl evolving networks
Representative bodies fl evolving networks
SMEs fl evolving networks
Universities D evolving networks
Policy-makers on policy impact
Representative bodies fl policy impact
SMEs D policy impact
Universities fl policy impact
Policy-makers fl policy learning
SMEs fl policy learning
Universities fl policy learning
Representative bodies fl policy learning
SME D Gate-keeper Q Scottish Enterprise
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The concepts in the original maps were colour coded to represent different themes




















Good Governance - the place ofresearch in informing
public policy and scrutiny in Scotland, Scottish Parliament
(SPICE)
Biotechnology in Scotland - Achieving its Potential, Bio-
Dundee
European Life Science 2001- an Industry Review, Glenn
Crocker, Ernst & Young
RSA and ESRC Urban and Regional Economics Group
seminar on clusters policy, University of Paisley
Launch ofScience Strategyfor Scotland, Glasgow Science
Centre
Does Scotland need its own science policy? Seminar at BA
annual meeting, University ofGlasgow
Does Scotland have the skills to support a knowledge
economy? Foundation for Science and Technology/Royal
Society of Edinburgh discussion
Stateless Nations in the 21st Century - The Case of
Scotland, lecture by Professor Dave McCrone at RSE
Inquiry into SHEFC reviews ofteaching and research
funding, Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee
Debate, Scottish Parliament
Science and the Parliament, Information day for MSPs
organised by RSC
Regionalising the Knowledge Economy, Regional Studies
Association seminar, London
ER - Operational Activities ofthe Scottish Executive,
lecture by Barbara Doig, Head ofEurope and International
Affairs Division, Scottish Executive. University of
Edinburgh Politics Department seminar
Biotechnology Scotland Beyond 2002, Scottish Enterprise,
Biotechnology Strategy day facilitated by Richard Seline of
NES
The Regulation ofScience, Hazards Forum and Better
Regulation Task Force, Royal Society, London
Rethinking Science Policy Conference, SPRU, University
of Sussex




















QSR N6 training workshop, University of Surrey
A Science Strategyfor Scotland, Foundation for Science
and Technology discussion dinner at RSE
Science and the Parliament, Information day for MSPs
organised by RSC
New Governance ofInnovation - The needfor horizontal
and systemicpolicy co-ordination, Fraunhofer ISI,
Karlsruhe, Germany
Modernising Governance, lecture by Janet Newman, OU.
University of Edinburgh, Social Policy Seminar
The Cambridge Phenomena - Can Midlothian be the
Cambridge ofthe North. SEEL Seminar, Edinburgh
Doing regional research in a devolving state:
methodological development and research strategy in the
post devolution UK. ESRC PG training workshop,
CURDS, Newcastle
Asia Pacific: Emerging Markets, Scottish
Enterprise/Scottish Development International Seminar,
Stirling, School ofManagement
CBIHolyrood Election 2003 Business Breakfast, Carlton
Highland Hotel, Edinburgh
Thistle Bioscience Forum, BIA Scotland Annual Meeting,
Crowne Plaza Hotel, Edinburgh
Science and the UK Regions: Towards Regionalisation?
Science and Society seminar, University of Salford
ESRC Residential Summer School on Evidence Based
Policy Research. ESRC Centre for Evidence Based Policy,
Queen Mary, University of London
The Scottish Parliament, Politics and the People. Centre
for Scottish Public Policy Conference, Edinburgh
Who's in charge? The challenges ofscience and
governance in the 21st century. BA Festival of Science,
University of Salford
Regional governance and science policy. BA Festival of
Science, University of Salford
Briefing on ITI Life Sciences, Norton House, Edinburgh













"What Do We Know About Innovation? " Conference in
recognition of the lifetime contribution of Professor Keith
Pavitt to the study of innovation, SPRU, Freeman Centre,
University of Sussex
Economic Governance Post-Devolution: Differentiation or
Convergence?, Regional Studies Association Conference,
London
Participation Summit, Scottish Civic Forum at the Scottish
Parliament
Does the Scottish Parliament Matter? Mark Shephard,
University of Strathclyde. University ofEdinburgh, Social
Policy Seminar
What nextfor UK science policy?, Royal Society of
Edinburgh seminar, Edinburgh
Launch of SSAC report Science Matters: Making the Right
Connectionsfor Scotland, Glasgow
What is the Scottish Strategyfor (and what are its key
values)? Wilson Sibbett, Chair, Scottish Science Advisory
Committee. Contribution to ESRC Innogen Centre's
workshop on Values, Policy and Innovation
Regions and European Union Governance: Lessons from
Scotland? Professor Andrew G. Scott, Chair ofEuropean
Union Studies, University of Edinburgh
PRIME Doctoral Conference, SPRU, University of Sussex
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This paper describes an investigation into the experience of researchers and research man¬
agers involved in the European Union Fifth Framework Programme (FP5) with its
ambitious encouragement of more integrated problem-oriented approaches to research. We
used a series of workshops, a questionnaire survey, individual telephone interviews and six
detailed case studies to examine the extent to which these ambitions for 'interdisciplinary
integration' were being met and the issues involved. Various models of disciplinary inte¬
gration were identified, which may be appropriate in particular settings. Whilst we found
disappointingly few projects that seemed by our criteria to be clearly interdisciplinary, parti¬
cularly in crossing the boundary between natural and social sciences, we did find a great deal
of learning taking place about how to conduct interdisciplinary research and how to over¬
come some of the difficulties experienced. Researchers emphasised in particular the impor¬
tance of careful consortium development and team building as a basis for effective
interdisciplinary research, and the time and effort needed to establish effective communi¬
cation between different specialisms. The paper identifies barriers to collaboration between
disciplines and some strategies and measures through which closer integration, and its asso¬
ciated benefits, might best be secured.
© 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, there are calls for more interdisciplinary approaches to problems,
along with encouragement for greater collaboration and networking among institu¬
tions and researchers [1]. Such encouragement is often based on the assumption
*
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that the research will contribute to more effective innovation and enhanced compe¬
titiveness. Pressure to encourage interdisciplinary research also comes from the
need to solve complex socio-scientific problems, where one discipline on its own
cannot provide an answer. However, this perceived need for interdisciplinary
research, despite considerable financial encouragement and verbal exhortation is
not being met by the research community, particularly when it comes to research
which crosses the boundaries between natural sciences and social sciences [2] and
there are few studies available on which to base policy recommendations for the
support and management of interdisciplinary research.
The European Union's centralised research activities during the period 1998—
2002 were set out in the European Commission's (EC's) Fifth Framework Pro¬
gramme (FP5). This was a conscious attempt to direct research into selected areas
with the objectives of increasing industrial competitiveness and improving the quality
of life for European citizens. The programme was divided into four main the¬
matic sub-programmes: Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources
(QoL), User-friendly Information Society (1ST), Competitive and Sustainable
Growth (Growth), and Energy Environment and Sustainable Development
(EESD). Research consortia consisted of multinational teams of researchers,
often involving several sectors: academia, industry, government and civic society.
A key feature of FP5 was an integrated approach to research and its exploi¬
tation. FP5 aimed towards more effective European policymaking in relation to
complex societal problems, as well as increasing the success of technological
innovation and economic competitiveness in major industry sectors such as
information and communication technology and life sciences [3], It was seen as
involving closer collaboration and interaction, on the one hand, between
researchers and practitioners (e.g. policymakers, industrialists) and on the other,
between disciplines both within and between the social and natural sciences. FP5
instituted a major departure from previous Framework Programmes (in addition
to bringing forward best practice from within them) in its strong focus on inter¬
disciplinary integration, particularly bringing socio-economic research perspec¬
tives into the major science and technology-based Research and Technological
Development (RTD) Programmes in a much more explicit way than had pre¬
viously been the case.1
2. Definitions and types of interdisciplinary research
Disciplines themselves have been described as stable systemic communities
within which researchers concentrate their experience into a particular worldview.
This has benefits in terms of the efficiency of communication and interaction within
the disciplines (including, for example, assessment of quality or the verification of
1 This paper is based on an EC-funded Accompanying Measure 'Interdisciplinary Integration in the
Fifth Framework Programme (II-FP5)'. The full Report, Executive Summary, Guidelines and Case Stu¬
dies from this project are available on the SUPRA website (http://www.supra.ed.ac.uk).
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knowledge claims) but puts limits on the kinds of questions they can ask about
their material, the methods and concepts they use, the answers they believe and
their criteria for truth and validity [4],
Pressures to cross disciplinary boundaries in conducting research can arise for a
variety of reasons and the resulting models and approaches have been subject to a
wide range of concepts and definitions. However, discussion of this subject has
shown little consistency of definition or, more usually, no definitions are provided.
In the course of a series of projects studying interdisciplinary research processes,
[5-7] we have found that the following basic set of definitions covers the most
important categories and makes useful distinctions:
Transdisciplinary research focuses on the organisation of knowledge around
complex heterogeneous domains, rather than the disciplines and subjects into
which knowledge seems inevitably to become organised in academic settings [8],
'transcending' the academic disciplinary structure. In the context of problem
solving, soft systems analysis has many parallels with transdisciplinary research
and attempts to devise approaches which are tailored specifically to the problem
context and do not rely on any pre-determined disciplinary bias [9]. References
to academic disciplines rarely feature in the literature from soft systems analysis
and these trans-disciplinary approaches specifically set themselves apart from
discipline-based academic structures. Such approaches may also seek to break
down the distinction within research programmes between researchers and sta¬
keholders from industry or civil society.
Multidisciplinary research approaches an issue from the perspectives of a range
of disciplines, but each discipline works in a self-contained manner with little
cross-fertilisation among disciplines, or synergy in the outcomes.
Interdisciplinary research similarly approaches an issue from a range of disciplin¬
ary perspectives but in this case the contributions of the various disciplines are
integrated to provide a holistic or systemic outcome.
Multidisciplinary research involves low levels of collaboration, does not chal¬
lenge the structure or functioning of academic communities and does not require
any changes in the academic worldviews of the researchers themselves. Effective
interdisciplinary research, on the other hand, requires new modes of thinking by
researchers and cuts across the traditional discipline-based academic structures and
systems of reward and resource allocation that are found in most universities and
many research institutes. Despite its important benefits in advancing and applying
knowledge, the work of interdisciplinary integration involves intellectual and prac¬
tical challenges and may thus be more difficult to achieve and hence less common
than multidisciplinary research.
The focus of the research described here is on interdisciplinary research. How¬
ever, among the researchers and projects we studied, we found many examples of
multidisciplinary research and also some examples of transdisciplinary research.
Within the category of interdisciplinary research, in the course of our studies of
interdisciplinarity, we have identified two fundamentally different motivations for
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conducting interdisciplinary research. Gibbons et al. 1994 [10] developed a
typology contrasting Mode 1 and Mode 2 research; the former corresponding
broadly to traditional disciplinary specialisms, and the latter referring to a 'new
production of knowledge' that cuts across disciplinary boundaries in order to
resolve complex societal problems. We have adapted this well-known terminology
to draw a parallel distinction, within interdisciplinary research, between:
Mode 1 Interdisciplinary Research brings together researchers from different dis¬
ciplines in order to overcome a blockage to further development within a disci¬
pline, or to enable the discipline to move into new and productive areas of
research. In the long run, it furthers the expertise and competence of academic
disciplines, for example through developments in methodology and instrumen¬
tation, and may even lead to the formation of new disciplines or sub-disciplines.
Mode 1 interdisciplinary research is thus one of the primary engines of the evol¬
ution of disciplines. Although in this sense, it supports rather than challenges
the discipline-based structure of academic and research institutions, in the short-
term (e.g. the timescale of an individual project) it can meet resistance from
existing academic structures just as much as Mode 2 interdisciplinary research.
Overall, the academic barriers to Mode 1 interdisciplinary research are not so
strong as for Mode 2 and there are fewer difficulties in evaluating and adminis¬
tering projects.
Mode 2 Interdisciplinary Research addresses issues of social, technical and/or
policy relevance where the primary aim is problem-oriented and discipline-
related outputs are less central to the project design. The relevant mix of dis¬
ciplines tends to be project specific. Researchers who develop a career working
on such projects build up expertise on the integration of disciplines in a range of
contexts and the management of other researchers from different disciplines
working together, skills not highly valued in an academic context. Mode 2 inter¬
disciplinary research is thus often regarded as undermining academic research,
taking its evolution in a direction with which many academics are uncomfort¬
able and is often seen by discipline based researchers as at best irrelevant and at
worst threatening. The barriers to this type of interdisciplinary research are cor¬
respondingly greater, as are the difficulties of evaluating and managing it.
The requirements for interdisciplinary approaches vary across different research
areas. In some cases, Mode 1 interdisciplinary research will be appropriate and, in
others, the focus should be on Mode 2. Sometimes there will be little justification
to go beyond a mono-disciplinary or multidisciplinary approach. It would promote
the overall quality of research and the effectiveness of research programmes if
clearer distinctions were made between projects where interdisciplinary work is
really valuable and where it is not so important for the outcomes and if consider¬
ation was also given to the different requirements of Mode 1 and Mode 2 approa¬
ches. There is thus a need to distinguish in programme specifications where
interdisciplinary research is most valuable and where single or multi-disciplinary
research would be more appropriate.
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3. Experience of research in the fifth framework programme
Our project (Interdisciplinary Integration in the Fifth Framework Programme
[II-FP5]) investigated the experience of researchers and others involved in FP5 in
responding to the European Commission's aim to introduce a greater degree of
interdisciplinary integration into its major Research and Technological Develop¬
ment (RTD) Programmes. The project aimed to create a better understanding of
the issues at the European level in integrating socio-economic research into the
major FP5 RTD programmes, and of how we can emulate and build upon success.
It had four major components:
1. Preliminary discussions and workshop;
2. A questionnaire-based survey and follow-up telephone interviews of FP5 project
co-ordinators;
3. Six detailed case studies;
4. Meetings to discuss project findings with groups of European experts in inter¬
disciplinary research.
The preliminary discussions and workshop identified a number of issues to be
explored, which were incorporated into the questionnaire. The questionnaire was
brief and was intended to give a quantitative assessment of the issues affecting
interdisciplinary integration in the FP5 research programmes, including integration
of socio-economic and natural science disciplines.
Questions related to:
• The interdisciplinary nature of the project;
• The respondent's experience of working in interdisciplinary projects;
• Development of the research consortium;
• Project management;
• Issues concerned with career development for interdisciplinary researchers;
• User/stakeholder involvement in the project;
• General experience of running cross-disciplinary projects.
The questionnaires were emailed to co-ordinators of FP5 projects in selected
Key Actions within the Thematic Programmes: QoL, 1ST, Growth, EESD.2 Co¬
ordinators were asked to self-categorise their project as interdisciplinary, multi-
disciplinary or monodisciplinary (in terms of our definitions as given above). Sixty
six percent classified themselves as interdisciplinary and a further 22% as multi-
disciplinary. Of the interdisciplinary projects, 30% (32 projects) included both natu¬
ral and social sciences, 61% included only natural sciences and 3% included only
2 One hundred and sixty responses were obtained from 754 questionnaires delivered (the survey was
also extended to a sample of projects under the 4th Framework Programme, though the low levels of
interdisciplinarity found provided little scope for comparative analysis).
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Table 1
Percentage of co-ordinators in each type of institution in the four FP5 thematic sub-programmes
EESD Growth 1ST QoL
Industry 36 53 60 10
Research institute 36 22 13 41
University 29 16 23 42
Other" 9 5 8
Total 100 100 100 100
a 'Other' category included: development support organisations, national food administrations, chari¬
table foundations, local government research organisations.
social sciences. Feedback from those who notified us that they chose not to com¬
plete the questionnaire on the basis that their project was monodisciplinary sug¬
gests that those who understood their project to be interdisciplinary were more
likely to reply. Therefore, respondents cannot be considered to be randomly dis¬
tributed across the survey population. However, the aim of the project was not to
carry out a random survey but to learn from the experiences of the inter¬
disciplinary projects.
The research consortia varied in size and in composition, with co-ordinators
coming from a range of institutions, including both industry and public sector
research. Table 1 summarises the percentage of co-ordinators from each type of
institution.
Follow-up telephone interviews were carried out with 21 co-ordinators who had
responded to the questionnaire, selected on the basis of the interdisciplinary nature
of the project or because their responses elicited some information which we wanted
to understand in more detail. A further six projects across the four thematic
programmes were selected for detailed case studies on the basis of apparent
strong interdisciplinary content. In practice, we found the degree of inter-
disciplinarity varied enormously among the projects rating themselves as inter¬
disciplinary, with very few projects fully integrating disciplines.
3.1. Why do interdisciplinary research?
Table 2 summarises researchers' motivations for developing an interdisciplinary
project, together with examples of perceived benefits.
There was strong agreement among respondents that collaborative research
involving several disciplines is interesting and stimulating. One respondent said:
You have always something new to learn. There are several points in common
in different disciplines which are not conceived at the beginning of the research
work. Sometimes results in a given discipline would be much better if another
point of view (discipline) was involved from the very beginning.
Of the reasons given in Table 2, only the last is in the category of Mode 1 inter¬
disciplinary research; the rest are Mode 2, reflecting the importance of contributing
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Table 2
Motivations for developing an interdisciplinary project and examples of perceived benefits
Motivations Benefits
The nature of the subject is interdisciplinary (e.g. trans¬
port, environment)
Researchers were transferring information from the lab¬
oratory to the real world
The research was user driven (not necessarily commer¬
cial) and heavily applied
The research was particularly relevant to policy and
many strategic issues can only be effectively addressed
by interdisciplinary approaches
Single discipline research had encountered a bottleneck
and more than one discipline was needed to make a
breakthrough
Bringing together parallel sets of knowledge to
achieve synergy between them
Better technology transfer in IT related
industries
More accurate understanding of markets and
opportunities
More effective research on complex application
areas, e.g. in regional development, health or
transport, where an interdisciplinary approach
is needed to cope with complexity
Overcoming bottlenecks in technological pro¬
cess development
to improved quality of life for Europe's citizens and greater competitiveness for its
industries as aims of FP5.
Those taking part in a Mode 1 interdisciplinary project are likely to find them¬
selves in a more long-term association of disciplines tackling a specific knowledge
generation problem which is relatively clearly defined, even if the solution is elusive
over quite a long period. Successful Mode 1 research can lead to the establishment
of a new direction for an existing academic discipline or even a new discipline, sup¬
ported by a departmental structure, a suite of academic journals and a readily rec¬
ognisable academic peer group. Recent examples of this process are the
development of bio-informatics as a new discipline, in response to the new problem
of dealing with very large biological datasets emerging from genomics-related
research, and the emergence of genetic veterinary epidemiology as a new subject
area. There are obvious career risks for those involved in unsuccessful Mode 1 col¬
laborations but where they are successful, there are real academic rewards.
Mode 2 interdisciplinary research, on the other hand, offers greater risks and
fewer rewards in academic career terms. Groupings and partnerships are often
more fluid and short term, and many researchers are forced to return to a disci¬
pline base rather than pursuing an interdisciplinary research career, even if they do
so reluctantly.
3.2. Perceived successes and problems in interdisciplinary research
In this study, the best collaborations were regarded as those which build on
existing consortia, contacts and links, supplemented by 'word of mouth' sugges¬
tions, informal contacts and meeting people at conferences.
Difficulties had arisen in some projects when taking on board participants whose
capabilities and track record were not known, e.g. through partner search services.
The problems of consortium building increased with the size of the consortium,
although there were cases where large consortia had been successfully developed
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(e.g. with more than 20 partners). Consortium building could be a slow process
requiring a significant investment of resources which could be wasted if a proposal
was unsuccessful, a risk which could be reduced by multi-stage funding models.
While these points would apply to any research project involving partnerships
and consortia, where an interdisciplinary research project (Mode 1 or Mode 2) is
closely integrated, consortium-related problems may be particularly important
because of the difficulties of identifying suitable partners and establishing patterns
of collaboration.
Perceived problems in conducting interdisciplinary research included language/
terminology and communication issues within the consortium, research institution
structures and problems in mutual attitudes across disciplines.
These difficulties are exemplified by the following quotes:
inside the same country, technical/specialised vocabulary that was not the same
among different disciplines, together with the consequent gap between parti¬
cipants' technical cultures [was a problem],
different tempo in industry and certain university institutions, different ambi¬
tions and accuracy of results.
Table 3 summarises factors which discourage interdisciplinary research and out¬
lines the ideal qualities of an interdisciplinary researcher. Some of the requirements
would be relevant to success in any collaborative project, even if mono-disciplin¬
ary, but all become even more important in the context of interdisciplinary
research.
Having an interdisciplinary background could be seen by researchers as either an
advantage or a disadvantage in career terms. In universities, it was more often seen
as a disadvantage while in industry and many research institutes, it was an advan¬
tage. The combination of disciplines was also seen as relevant, some being more
Table 3
Factors which discourage interdisciplinary research and ideal qualities of an interdisciplinary researcher
Factors which discourage interdisciplinary research Ideal qualities of an interdisciplinary
researcher
Poor career structures for academic interdisciplinary
researchers
Low esteem of interdisciplinary research by mono-disci¬
plinary colleagues
Lack of opportunities to publish research results in high
ranking refereed journals
Discrimination by referees against interdisciplinary
research proposals and publications
Curiosity about, and willingness to learn from,
other disciplines
Flexibility and adaptability




Good communication and listening skills
Ability to absorb information and its implica¬
tions rapidly
A good team worker
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marketable professional skills than others (for example in the progression from
industrial engineer to project manager). The impact on a person's career may have
an impact on their willingness to continue with interdisciplinary research and to
build on experience gained in an interdisciplinary project.
For both Mode 1 and Mode 2 interdisciplinary research, there was a common
view among survey respondents that personality and attitudes are at least as
important as discipline base and specialisation for the successful conduct (and
especially co-ordination) of interdisciplinary research. This was well expressed by
one respondent:
It is always a question of the personalities of the researchers who are involved if
they are willing to understand and to accept other methods than that of [their]
own field.
A good interdisciplinary researcher will also have a high tolerance for ambiguity.
This means not prematurely reducing a problem to a limited set of dimensions, but
taking time to explore a range of dimensions, to test several potential boundaries
to a problem (each of which may imply the involvement of different sets of relevant
disciplines) until the apparently optimum boundary and set of dimensions has been
identified. These explorations should be part of the teamwork conducted by the
project co-ordinator and the ability of team members to engage productively in
this process is very important to the project's success.
Researchers who have skills and knowledge in more than one discipline were
seen as particularly valuable members of interdisciplinary teams, but a mono-disci¬
plinary researcher with most of the above attributes should be capable of learning
rapidly to operate in an interdisciplinary environment.
Table 4
Qualities of good interdisciplinary co-ordinators/managers
A good understanding, not necessarily in depth knowledge, across the project's main discipline domains,
aided by a varied career trajectory and broad range of interests
A good understanding of the application areas, in industry or the public sphere, for the project's out¬
comes (particularly for Mode 2 research)
An ability to plan effective division of responsibilities related to disciplinary and organisational roles
of participants
A focus on work in teams and on practical results, to overcome differences in disciplinary orientation
and differences between, say, participants from public and private sectors
Respect for other disciplines, which in turn calls for an interest in these disciplines and some under¬
standing of the general principles that underpin them, as well as a recognition of the depth of knowledge
that exists in other fields
A good level of expertise in their own discipline, although not necessarily a burning ambition to pursue
a career in that discipline which would inhibit willingness to invest attention outside that discipline
Ability to balance openness to new ideas and maintaining the progress of the project
A good team leader which includes skills in building relationships, trusting the judgement of others,
good interpersonal and diplomatic skills and a pro-active approach to partners
A clear vision of the project and what it is trying to achieve
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Other characteristics which would be added for Mode 2 interdisciplinary
research include:
• An interest in real world problems.
• An ability to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
In addition to the qualities already identified as relevant to individual research¬
ers, good research co-ordinators and managers need additional qualities as sum¬
marised in Table 4.
3.3. The role of stakeholders and users
Stakeholders can play an important role in Mode 2 interdisciplinary research,
focusing attention on the need for relevance to real world problems and encour¬
aging the uptake of research results by industry or other end-users. User engage¬
ment is often perceived as a way of reinforcing the interdisciplinary nature of
research projects and can be seen as a way of 'broadening the mind' since users'
needs are rarely demarcated along disciplinary lines. Strong interdisciplinary pro¬
posals are often seen to be those that are designed in close collaboration with
potential users, not least because this can permit access to research data, research
subjects or additional funds.
However, it would be wrong to assume that users will automatically have a bet¬
ter understanding than academics of the 'real world' nature of problems. On the
contrary, user communities might have only a partial understanding of what their
problem is and, in certain cases, might compromise the quality of the research and
even lead it in unproductive directions. Though user involvement was seen by some
as an alternative to social science inputs in technical research and development pro¬
jects, the latter offered tools and concepts not necessarily possessed by users. Inter¬
actions with stakeholders can be problematic and a clear plan for stakeholder and
user engagement is needed given the different exigencies and concerns of stake¬
holders and researchers. For example:
• 'User participants' from industry and policy circles may move posts and lose
engagement with or be unable to continue for the full length of the project;
• The desire for commercialisation of research or the implementation of policy
may lead to pressures to deliver outputs prematurely;
• Delays in delivery of project outputs may jeopardise commercial applications.
Users may also lack a longer-term interest in the development of knowledge and
its broader application.
4. The process of integrating disciplines
Our research on this and other studies has given us some insights into the pro¬
cesses involved in successful interdisciplinary integration. An active strategy is nee-
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ded to provide for integration among different disciplines and different strategies
will be needed for different projects. Disciplines have survived for so long in the
academic world because they serve the very useful function of constraining what
the researcher has to think about. They set a boundary on the parameters of inter¬
est (what to include and what to leave out) and dictate the range of methodological
approaches that are relevant. They thus provide a clearly defined starting point for
a research project but they also pre-determine to a large extent what the outcomes
of the research will be. If this framework is removed, as is the case in inter¬
disciplinary research, inexperienced researchers can be overwhelmed by complexity.
In the early stages of an interdisciplinary research project, it is thus very impor¬
tant to set a boundary around the areas of concern which should be dictated by
the needs of the project and the issues it raises, rather than the discipline-based
experience of the researchers. Useful techniques for supporting such decisions can
be found in systems analysis [11], A deficiency in some of these systemic approa¬
ches, in common with other work which also comes into the category of transdisci-
plinary research, is that, having creatively reconstructed a boundary around a
complex project, they do not then re-engage with relevant discipline-based expertise
that could contribute to a better understanding of the issues and more useful out¬
comes for the project. Effective interdisciplinary research demands a greater under¬
standing of the methods and outcomes of different disciplinary components of the
research programme, to work out how they relate to one another and how they
should be combined to deliver an overall integrated outcome.
Interdisciplinary research does not occur automatically simply by bringing
together several disciplines in a research project. Hollaender et al. [12], in a survey
of research practices in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, found that whilst it
was easy to make a team member responsible for their own project, it was much
more difficult to make team members feel responsible for the group as a whole,
particularly when members of the team were evaluated at the level of their individ¬
ual results rather than the team's results. In our survey, co-ordinators indicated
that extra effort was needed to promote the formation of a cohesive research team
involving researchers from different disciplines, combining expertise from several
knowledge domains and overcoming communication problems among researchers
from different disciplines.
Many in our survey stressed problems of language and communication caused
by a range of factors. Different disciplines use different 'languages' and the same
word may mean different things in different disciplines, resulting in a great deal of
frustration until this is clarified. Communication problems were found in all types
of interdisciplinary collaboration: within the natural sciences; between natural and
social sciences, and between quantitative and qualitative social sciences. Differences
in research methods also caused problems in mutual understanding. All these fac¬
tors mean that it takes longer to bring together an effective interdisciplinary team,
the start-up phase of a project will take longer and the demands on the project co¬
ordinator will be greater than usual.
A related point made by some researchers concerned problems that might arise
where there was a failure to recognise or value contributions from other disciplines.
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This included cases where social scientists were unhappy about their token involve¬
ment in a science-led project and, on the other hand, a view among some scientists
that social science methods are inferior.
It can be time-consuming for people to develop an understanding of the contri¬
bution of other disciplines. As one project coordinator observed:
At first it took several meetings to synchronise people coming from different dis¬
ciplines. Some tend to see only their own position. As co-ordinator you have to
do a lot of communication to bring all partners to a common understanding of
the problem and a position where everybody accepts everybody without know¬
ing in full detail, what the other partner has to do. Also definition of interfaces
between partners and their work is highly time consuming.
Approaches that have been used successfully to cope with these challenges
include developing a commonly agreed glossary of terms and their meanings and
using a greater than usual number of exchange visits and meetings to improve inte¬
gration and including space for 'social time'. One particularly interesting tactic for
achieving integration was to ensure that each report or publication from the
research programme involved most members of the research team. Each such out¬
put was thus regarded as a whole group publication, authorship and overall con¬
tent being advised by the co-ordinator.
5. Conclusions
We found disappointingly few projects among those funded in the early calls of
the FP5 Programme that seemed by our criteria to be clearly interdisciplinary,
particularly in terms of crossing the boundary between natural and social sciences.
Although FP5 set ambitious targets for a step change in the amount and quality of
interdisciplinary research, there have been formidable constraints to the delivery of
these targets. Even where projects were interdisciplinary, the degree of inter-
disciplinarity varied. It tended to increase with time and with learning among the
partners. In addition, even where the adoption of genuinely interdisciplinary
approaches was relatively limited, the stimulus in this direction from the EC has
led to a great deal of learning about how to conduct interdisciplinary research and
how to overcome some of the difficulties experienced. Given continuity of these
aims in Framework Six and future programmes, as experience of interdisciplinarity
in the research community grows, it will become easier to set up interdisciplinary
consortia and the quality of synergistic outputs will increase.
However, the EC alone cannot deliver such an outcome. As we noted above,
many of the constraints operating against interdisciplinary research emanate from
academic systems in European universities, which still discriminate against inter¬
disciplinary research. In the UK, the Research Assessment Exercise is frequently
cited as an important driver of such discrimination [7], The demonstrated success
of interdisciplinary research in the life sciences, and also in information and com-
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munications technologies, has reduced discrimination against Mode 1 inter¬
disciplinary research.
These conflicting pressures can lead researchers to claim that they or their pro¬
posals are more interdisciplinary than is actually the case, raising problems for the
evaluators of research proposals and for EC research managers who are often not
themselves experienced in interdisciplinary research, in discriminating between pro¬
jects that are genuinely interdisciplinary and those which only claim to be so.
Given that interdisciplinary research requires more time and effort to be put into
integrating disciplines, additional resources are needed for interdisciplinary projects
compared to those involving only a single discipline. Interdisciplinary projects
should therefore be selected with care, concentrating on areas where the additional
resources can be put to best use.
There should be corresponding requirements of those developing inter¬
disciplinary research proposals to specify clearly why an interdisciplinary approach
is needed, which type of interdisciplinary approach is envisaged, which disciplines
should be involved, how they will be integrated and how the whole will contribute
in a synergistic manner to the project outcomes.
Evaluation by peer review of proposals and publications is one of the most con¬
tentious areas in interdisciplinary research. There were continuing concerns among
many of those taking part in this project that evaluators lacked the breadth of
expertise needed to assess the contribution of proposals with very different disci¬
plinary backgrounds, particularly where both natural and social sciences are
involved. While it would be unrealistic to expect every relevant discipline to be
represented on evaluation panels, greater attention to the range of expertise may be
needed. More important than the range of disciplines represented is the need to
involve evaluators who themselves have interdisciplinary experience and who can
judge the validity of decisions on discipline choice and the effectiveness of the inte¬
gration processes proposed. However, such a shift towards more effective consider¬
ation of the needs of interdisciplinary research should not be at the expense of
mono-disciplinary research where this is recognised as the most effective approach
to a particular research problem.
In the course of FP5, important experience has been acquired in the promotion
and running of cross-disciplinary research, applying different integration models in
different contexts. We have been able to identify ways in which interdisciplinary
collaboration could be enhanced with consequent benefits from greater inter¬
disciplinary interactions and synergies, given continuity in the goal of supporting
interdisciplinary research in the Sixth Framework Programme.
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Abstract
Measuring the effective impact of research and its relevance to society is a difficult undertaking but one that the public sector
is keen to embrace. Identifying end-users of research and capturing their views of research relevance are challenging tasks
and not something that has been extensively reported. The evaluation of end-use relevance demands a shift in organisational
mindset and performance indicators away from readily quantifiable outputs towards a consideration of more qualitative
end-user outcomes that are less amenable to measurement, requiring both a greater tolerance of ambiguity and a willingness
to learn from the evaluation process.
© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Policy makers are increasingly under pressure to
make sure that taxpayers' money is spent well and
produces useful and relevant research that repre¬
sents good "value for money" (NAO Comptroller and
Auditor General, 2000, 2001; HM Treasury, 2002).
This is not solely a UK concern and is being addressed
on the international science policy scene (Natural
Resources and Environment, 2001 a,b; Spaapen and
Wamelink, 1999). However, it is perhaps a particular
consideration in the UK where our reputation for ex¬
cellent science and poor application gives an added
impetus to ensuring that research is relevant and con¬
tributes both to the UK's economic competitiveness
and the quality of life of its citizens.
This paper reports on some of the methodolog¬
ical issues raised by a study of end-use relevance
conducted in Scotland on behalf of the Scottish Ex¬
ecutive Environment and Rural Affairs Department
(SEERAD). In autumn 2001 the Agricultural and Bi¬
ological Research Group (ABRG) within SEERAD
began a major research organisation assessment ex¬
ercise of seven Scottish agricultural and biological
research organisations' using a system of peer review
by Visiting Groups. The research organisation as¬
sessment exercise covered the period 1996-2001 and
included an assessment of each organisation's quality
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-131-650-6397;
fax: +44-131-650-6399.
E-mail address: c.lyall@ed.ac.uk (C. Lyall).
' These research organisations are: Biomathematics and Statistics
Scotland. Hannah Research Institute. Macaulay Land Use Research
Institute, Moredun Research Institute, Rowett Research Institute,
Scottish Agricultural College, Scottish Crop Research Institute.
0048-7333/$ - see front matter © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,
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of science and knowledge transfer and exploitation as
well as the end-use relevance assessment.
The remit of the end-use relevance assessment, re¬
ported here, was to provide the Visiting Group with
a briefing on the end-user interactions at the institute
level, investigating the impacts and benefits of the re¬
search programmes in seven of the ABRG supported
organisations. The study focused on a wide range of
end-users and clients and the relevance to their needs
of the research undertaken by the research organi¬
sations (ROs), reflecting SEERAD's requirements to
promote engagement with as wide a range of end-users
as possible.
Although the outcomes of this evaluation for each
RO were confidential to SEERAD and are not re¬
ported here, the study raised a number of method¬
ological issues pertinent to the wider assessment of
end-use relevance and the societal impact of research
and may offer some lessons for future development
in performance measurement.
Section 2 of this paper considers good practice in
end-user relevance assessment through a short liter¬
ature review; Section 3 outlines the assessment goals
and Section 4 describes the research methodology in
more detail. Section 5 reflects on the research method¬
ology and outcomes, offering some insights on issues
such as sampling processes, concerns about confiden¬
tiality, evaluation timescales, and the application of
policy learning in the public sector. The final section
draws some conclusions from these reflections that
we hope will be useful in future evaluations of public
sector research, particularly with respect to end-use
relevance.
2. Good practice in end-user relevance
assessment: a literature review
2.1. Qualitative or quantitative approach?
In 1988 the UK Department of Health and Social
Security commissioned a report on how to improve
and assess the use and dissemination of research
funded by the department (Richardson et al., 1990).
Richardson et al. adopted a largely qualitative ap¬
proach and sought to collect ideas about problems
and possible solutions rather than to collect data about
research use and dissemination. Their concept of re¬
search use was broadly defined. It included "gaining
information, clarification and illumination" as well
as translating research directly into policy or practice
and recognised indirect and long-term changes as a
result of research as well as more immediate use.
These authors recommended further studies of the
ways in which research is used in order to learn more
about how people find out about research, how they
use it and what can be done to increase such use.
They suggested that these studies might involve quan¬
titative and qualitative methods and that case stud¬
ies of individual programmes might be particularly
useful.
Richardson et al. (1990) note that measuring the
use and dissemination of research is not a simple is¬
sue. They contrast the ideal with what can realistically
be measured, stating that there is no single measure,
nor any combination of measures, which can begin to
address all these needs, however sensitively designed
and implemented. However, they do suggest that valu¬
able information can be derived from a range of mea¬
sures and propose some strategies including surveys
of users, researchers or research managers and case
studies of individual projects or programmes to create
a better understanding of the nature and constraints
of research use. These authors suggest that surveys
can be qualitative, quantitative, or a mix of the two,
noting that the quantitative approach can inform on
the extent of use while the qualitative approach may
explain why research is used or not. They do how¬
ever urge that any survey should include some qual¬
itative measures as this can help to give meaning to
statistics. They note that considerable methodological
development work on questionnaires is essential and
voice some serious concerns about reliability of any
survey data collected especially from research users,
as the recall of people may not be good if time has
elapsed.
In reporting the outcome from a workshop or¬
ganised by ARCISS2 on measuring value added in
research, Solesbury (2002) concludes that any such
indicators (whether qualitative or quantitative) must
derive from and express an individual organisation's
purpose and should be set by the organisation itself
not imposed upon it by others, while recognising
2 Association of Research Centres in the Social Sciences.
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that different indicators will have value for different
stakeholders.
2.2. The subjectivity of utilisation
While supporting the notion that the institution's
involvement in setting performance measures is key,
we believe that some form of independent, external
evaluation is nevertheless valuable. In the related field
of research impact assessment, the medical research
community seems to be leading the way and a recent
report from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts
and Sciences (2002) seeks to broaden the criteria for
assessing the impact of research on society, suggesting
performance indicators that highlight interactions be¬
tween researchers and stakeholders (van Weel, 2002).
This report suggests that feedback from stakeholders
and users of research output can make essential con¬
tributions to the evaluation but that self-evaluation and
external audits are also important elements in the as¬
sessment.
As part of an ongoing assessment process,
Richardson et al. (1990) also proposed some degree
of self-assessment by researchers who might be asked
to specify objectives related to the ways in which
their work will meet customers' requirements. While
proposing that issues relating to dissemination and
use should be explicitly considered by external asses¬
sors these authors urge that we should not go too far
in promoting the use of hard indicators for this aspect
of research performance and conclude that there is a
continuing need for some subjective judgements by
experienced personnel.
Caulil et al. (1996) propose the use of just this
type of subjective evaluation of end-use relevance.
They note that, while several methods for determin¬
ing quality of scientific research exist, there is no
satisfactory method known that can measure research
utilisation. They ascribe this omission to the existence
of a diversity in meanings of "use" and therefore
a lack of any consensus on criteria for assessing
use.
The disadvantage of using quantitative measures is
that it is very difficult to formulate what is meant by
"relevance" (Caulil et al., 1996). The use of research
(and hence its relevance) depends on many unpre¬
dictable factors outwith the control of the RO, possibly
reflecting the inadequacy of the linear model with its
oversimplified view of the innovation process which
implies that new technology based products derive
from the straightforward technology transfer of results
generated by scientific research (Tait and Williams,
1999).
Caulil et al. describe a semi-quantitative, four di¬
mensional model where research results are judged on
(1) the availability of transferable product; (2) the in¬
volvement of the potential user of research results; and
(3) the commercial benefits resulting from the research
results. Each project being assessed is then scored on
a four-point scale. The fourth dimension in the matrix
is the volume of the spheres that represent the num¬
ber of projects that achieved the same score. The au¬
thors conclude that it is hard to score the utilisation
dimension because it is not possible to assess whether
utilisation in one project was greater than in another.
They then propose an alternative "jury model"
where research utilisation was first described by the
researchers using precise and standard descriptions
to a jury, which then judges the utilisation results of
the projects numerically. The authors believe that this
jury judgement is less subjective than judgement by
one person and conclude that "the construction of the
concept of utilization is a very subjective matter and
therefore qualitative indicators should be used".
Researchers at the Science and Technology Policy
Research Unit (SPRU) (Molas-Gallart et al., 2002)
have recently advised the UK university sector
on methods for measuring third stream activities,3
which has some parallels with our own attempts to
measure end-user relevance in research institutes.
Molas-Gallart et al. (2002) discuss the main strengths
and weaknesses of a range of indicators for both the
exploitation and use of knowledge capabilities and
research activities. They conclude that collecting in¬
dicators is difficult as many third stream activities are
based on personal connections between individuals, a
point confirmed by Faulkner and Senker (1995). Such
relationships are not well understood by the parent
organisation which therefore finds it difficult to de¬
velop indicators for activities that involve the transfer
of tacit knowledge.
3 "Third stream" is a term used to describe the generation,
use, application and exploitation of knowledge and other univer¬
sity capabilities outside the usual academic teaching and research
activities.
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2.3. The indirect nature of impact
Molas-Gallart et al. (2002) also emphasise the in¬
direct and non-linear nature of research impacts and
distinguish two main sets of indicators that can be
used to measure third stream activities: indicators of
activity and indicators of impact. They note that it is
possible to measure the effort that organisations in¬
vest in engaging with non-academic users, or the re¬
sults of such efforts in terms of societal or economic
impact, but warn that attempting to measure the im¬
pact of third stream activities is very difficult for three
reasons:
1. Additionality: would the "effects" we are trying to
measure have occurred anyway, especially when
attempting to assess the impact of advisory and
consultancy activities?
2. Timing: it is generally recognised that the impact of
academic research is long-term and often indirect,
so when is it a good time to measure impact?
3. Serendipity: the outcomes, and therefore the im¬
pact, of research activities are by their very nature
unpredictable, and serendipity is an important el¬
ement, for example, when attempting to develop
new products. Given this uncertainty research
may not result in impact despite its inherent high
quality.
Bechhofer et al. (2001) argue that the user's ca¬
pacity to exploit public sector research depends partly
on the user's readiness and ability to absorb exter¬
nally generated knowledge—it is a two-way process.
Users are not passive recipients of research output;
they use the knowledge in combination with their
existing technical and social knowledge. Bechhofer
et al. (2001) cite Faulkner and Senker (1995) who
stress the relative importance of informal over for¬
mal channels for knowledge transfer. Earlier work by
Molas-Gallart et al. (1999) to assess research impact
on non-academic audiences also points out that the
outputs of research may not be taken up, not because
of any shortcomings in the research results or dissemi¬
nation strategy, but because potential users are unwill¬
ing or unable to exploit the opportunities presented to
them. Moreover, they caution that the transformation
of research into successful innovations is not simply
a function of the technical merits of the research but
depends on the absorptive capacity of firms with an
interest in this knowledge.
While Richardson et al. (1990) accept that some
research may prove of no immediate or direct use,
they argue that it is still appropriate to look for ways
of making all research as fully useful and utilised
as possible, particularly where funded by a govern¬
ment department. They do nevertheless stress that it
is very difficult to identify the use of research partly
because its effect is long term and indirect, and partly
because those using the research are often unaware
of the source of their ideas. As research generally
adds to the broad pool of knowledge and accumu¬
lates over time, they note that the assumption of im¬
mediate traceable impact from research to practice is
misplaced.
Molas-Gallart et al. (1999) also acknowledge the
indirect nature of impact and the problem of attribution
of research outputs as discussed in detail by Weiss (for
example, Weiss, 1980, 1982), but believe that direct
questioning and discussion can help to tease out an
assessment of the research impact. They also note that
such assessments will "always be qualitative and based
on qualified statements".
2.4. Users or beneficiaries
In discussing the general methodological difficul¬
ties associated with assessing impact, Molas-Gallart
et al. (1999) consider the differences between "users"
and "beneficiaries". In their definition "users" will di¬
rectly utilise the output of research, although they do
not necessarily have to recognise its origin while the
term "beneficiaries" refers to the much broader (and
difficult to specify) social groups that can be directly
or indirectly affected by the results of a study (Caswill,
1994). They reflect on the debate as to whether it is
feasible to make a distinction between "users" and
"beneficiaries", and whether this distinction accounts
for different forms of "impact", e.g. direct utilisation
of research results by "users" versus indirect impact
on a broader range of "beneficiaries". Molas-Gallart
et al. (1999) conclude that it is more fruitful to fo¬
cus on the channels of diffusion and on the forms
of research utilisation, rather than attempting to dis¬
tinguish the effects on "users" from the effects on
"beneficiaries" especially as these two groups are not
mutually exclusive.
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2.5. Contacting users
Molas-Gallart et al.'s (1999) discussion of tech¬
niques for the selection of interviewees is also rele¬
vant to our study. These authors suggest that the use
of standard sampling techniques (random or stratified
sampling) is not to be recommended when trying to
assess the impact of research programmes and initia¬
tives because studies on the outcomes of research and
innovation efforts show that most impact is attributable
to a very small number of individuals or projects.
Their recommended approach is a qualitative one
based on telephone surveys. Although basic quantita¬
tive data can provide insights if the population displays
uniform characteristics they note that such data are of
limited value when the potential user population is di¬
verse (as was the case in our own study). Molas-Gallart
et al. (1999) do not favour a mail questionnaire (de¬
spite the fact that this might be a cheaper option) as
this might not provide the clarity required and prevents
any dialogue between interviewer and interviewee.
These authors believe that face-to-face interviews
might be the optimal solution but are expensive both
in time and money, and they report no discernible dif¬
ferences between the data obtained through telephone
interviews and the results of face-to-face interviews.
2.6. Moving from outputs to outcomes
There is an increasing acceptance that performance
evaluation should be seen primarily as a learning
tool (Natural Resources and Environment, 2001a). In
these circumstances, fear of evaluation and the culture
of blame must be minimised to enable those being
assessed to respond positively to the evaluation and
learn from the experience. However, in order to learn,
those being evaluated need specific, timely feedback
which may be difficult to achieve in terms of end-user
relevance because of the time lag factor already
discussed.
This move towards a learning environment in turn
requires a shift in emphasis away from measuring sim¬
plistic, quantifiable and controllable (from the RO's
view) outputs towards a culture that seeks to assess
user-relevant and desirable outcomes from research.
Outcomes are often outwith the organisation's con¬
trol and may not be amenable to ready quantification.
Mayne (Natural Resources and Environment, 2001a)
develops this idea further into a 'results chain' where
the RO has activities and outputs aimed at a specific
target and an idea of what is supposed to happen as a
result.
Spaapen and Wamelink (1999) adopted a broadly
similar approach to our own methodology (see
Section 4). Their methodology included profiling the
research programme, a user analysis of stakeholders
and interviews with users. Spaapen and Wamelink
emphasised some of the same things as our approach
such as the need for specific criteria directed towards
the specific context of each research programme
(rather than the same criteria across all). They also
divided the research into (1) an evaluation from the
researchers' point of view and (2) an evaluation from
the stakeholders' point of view and then bringing the
two together. However, there were some significant
differences in that Spaapen and Wamelink were look¬
ing at individual university research programmes and
included a third stage of comparative feedback to stim¬
ulate discussion with the research groups about their
activities in relation to their mission. Their interest in
the learning approach to evaluation is epitomised by
the quote: "the road from research to practice is paved
by the mutual education of all interested parties".
While the issues of research impact, research util¬
ity and research exploitation are regular topics for
discussion in both the academic and more policy
oriented literature, very little appears to have been
reported to date on good practice in the assessment
of the end-user relevance of publicly funded research
especially with a practical focus on which approaches
might work successfully.
3. Assessment goals
With this in mind, our assessment attempted to
gain a more structured understanding of a number of
inter-related issues of strategic relevance to agricul¬
tural and biological research in Scotland including:
• the priorities that the research organisations give to
understanding the research needs of their end-user
groups, the mechanisms and activities used to build
end-user engagement and the impact that such en¬
gagement has on the content and nature of the ROs'
research activities; and
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• the perceptions by end-user groups and clients of
how well their commercial and other interests are
being served through the research programmes and
dissemination activities of the ROs and the effec¬
tiveness of the ROs in learning of end-user needs
and incorporating these in their research.
As specified by the client (SEERAD), the assess¬
ment work programme was undertaken in two sequen¬
tial phases: phase 1, assessment methodology scoping
study and phase 2, assessment of research organisation
end-use relevance. Phase 1 was particularly important
as it devised the methodology upon which the rest of
the study was based and also provided the baseline in¬
formation against which subsequent questionnaire and
telephone interviews were evaluated.
Our approach aimed to be:
• relevant to the agricultural and biological contexts
within which the research organisations operate;
• capable of identifying the scale, nature and sus-
tainability of the impacts and benefits within key
end-user groups;
and sought to address:
• the main areas of applied research undertaken in
each research organisation;
• end-user groups targeted by the RO;
• the nature of the end-use benefits expected by the
research organisations;
• benefits and impacts perceived by end-users, focus¬
ing mainly on Scotland and, to a limited extent, the
rest of the UK and internationally; and
• both qualitative and quantitative aspects of evalua¬
tion of the end-user benefits and impacts of research
organisation research.
4. Research methodology
Our assessment methodology therefore employed:
• desk and on-line research;
• structured personal and telephone interviews with
senior managers and researchers in each RO;
• a series of focus groups conducted with selected
end-users;
• a major postal survey of end-users, followed by a
number of telephone calls to a sample of respon¬
dents who had completed questionnaires; and
• regular discussions with SEERAD and the Assess¬
ment Steering Group.
We sought to involve a sample of existing and
potential end-users of each RO's research and devel¬
opment to evaluate their perceptions of the relevance,
impact and benefits of RO research, their views on
the effectiveness of its communications and their
priorities for the future. End-user groups were con¬
sidered on the basis of research priorities devised
by SEERAD, namely, Sustainable Agriculture; Envi¬
ronment and Natural Heritage; Nutrition and Human
Health; Food and Bioindustries; Rural Communities
and Development, and categorised according to their
type of interaction with the RO.
This study team was not required to assess individ¬
ual research programmes and their effects but instead
to look at output and outcomes at an institutional
level. There is currently little information on the size,
structure and nature of the prime end-user groups
of the ROs and thus it was impossible to construct
the evaluation around surveys based on random or
stratified samples.
4.1. Structuring end-user groups
We classified end-users according to their different
types of engagement with the RO and identified four
main end-user categories: upstream end-users, col¬
laborators, intermediaries, and downstream end-users
(described in more detail below). It is possible for the
same end-user organisation to interact with a research
organisation under more than one category, depend¬
ing on the purposes and outcomes of the engagement.
This general model covers all types of end-user en¬
gagement relevant to this group of ROs with the
exception of their engagement with the public as this
exercise did not extend to evaluating the general pub¬
lic as stakeholders or "beneficiaries" of the research.
The pattern of engagement will be different for
each RO with some more focused on interactions with
public bodies and some with private bodies; for some
upstream end-users will be more important than down¬
stream and vice versa; and for others a large proportion
of their engagement will be with collaborators. These
differences, outlined below, may reflect legitimate dif¬
ferences in the function of the different ROs as well as
different ways of understanding the end-user profile.
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4.1.1. Upstream end-users
The upstream category of end-user includes those
who have formal channels to influence the strategies
and programmes of a RO through:
• core or infrastructure funding;
• funding of individual projects or programmes;
• the creation of research needs or opportunities
through regulatory developments; and
• the production of government or other policy doc¬
uments indicating new areas of concern to be ad¬
dressed by research.
We distinguish two types of end-user in the up¬
stream category. First, Public Upstream which in¬
cludes bodies acting in the public interest, for example,
SEERAD itself, Scottish Enterprise, Local Authori¬
ties, Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), Scottish Envi¬
ronmental Protection Agency (SEPA), and the Food
Standards Agencies (FSAs); and secondly private up¬
stream such as commercial companies and other bod¬
ies acting on behalf of private or commercial interests,
including both multinational companies and small and
medium sized enterprises, and the trade associations
that represent them, e.g. Maltsters Association, Dairy
Groups, and the Meat and Livestock Commission.
4.1.2. Collaborators
Collaborators in the UK and internationally are
increasingly providing research organisations with
access to upstream and downstream sources of in¬
come and will also enhance the organisation's ability
to influence both sets of end-users. Such collabora¬
tors could be in the public or private sector and might
overlap with end-users in other categories (e.g. SEPA,
SNH). University collaborators and other research
institutes can also enable research organisations to
work on research funded by UK research councils4
and European collaborators are needed for access to
EC Framework Programme funds. Collaborators in
the UK and in other countries might also lead to new
downstream markets for a RO's knowledge and other
outputs or products.
Excellence in research will make an institute an in¬
creasingly attractive partner in research collaborations
and enhance its direct and indirect influence in the UK
4 In most cases the ROs are excluded from applying for Research
Council funding directly themselves.
and internationally. Academic communities are also
major users of the knowledge generated by ROs as
part of the free exchange of scientific information, but
with little direct benefit to the ROs themselves.
4.1.3. Intermediaries
Intermediaries provide channels to transfer knowl¬
edge to and from downstream end-users. They thus
include groups and organisations that transfer knowl¬
edge and advice generated by research organisations
to end-users further downstream and/or that trans¬
mit back information about downstream end-user
needs to research organisations and to public or pri¬
vate upstream end-users. They include farm advisers,
animal breeding organisations, National Institute of
Agricultural Botany, National Farmers Union, British
Nutrition Foundation, health visitors, the medical
profession, environmental groups, SNH and SEPA.
4.1.4. Downstream end-users
Downstream end-users are distinguished from up¬
stream in that the motivation for making links usu¬
ally comes from the sponsored bodies, as a means
to encourage knowledge transfer and application of
its research outputs or, increasingly, to get an addi¬
tional commercial return from its research outputs.
Downstream end-users (by definition) do not directly
commission research or influence the organisation's
research programme: if they do either they are also
included in the upstream category. However, they may
approach the sponsored body directly seeking advice
based on the research done by the sponsored body.
We included in the public downstream category
members of the public acting in a variety of roles, as
recipients of knowledge generated by research organ¬
isations related, for example, to health, environmental
and educational issues. In the private downstream cat¬
egory we included business users of information and
services provided by research organisations, e.g. farm¬
ers and other land managers, and users of diagnostic
and other RO services.
4.1.5. Modelling end-user engagement
The generic model described in Fig. 1 summarises
potential relationships between research organisations
and the seven categories of end-user identified above.
All links are of equal weight in the generic diagram
but when customised for individual (anonymous) ROs
80 C. Lyall el al./Research P',licy 33 <2004) 73~87
Flows of information or
advice
Low level of interaction
Medium level of interaction
Funding flows and
policy influences
High level of interaction
Fig. I. Generic model of research organisation end-user interactions.
(Figs. 2 and 3), some links are missing and those
that exist are of different weights.5 Considering first
the policy influences and funding flows, the solid
arrows show the influences from upstream end-users
to the research organisations, in the form of direct
funding of infrastructure and research programmes
or projects and also guidance delivered directly or
through policy documents and government papers.
5 In order to facilitate comparisons, in the final versions of
the RO end-user interaction diagrams we adopted a standardised
convention to represent low. medium and high levels of interaction.
There is also a two-way flow of influence between re¬
search organisations and collaborators and academic
end-users related to generating funding opportunities
from upstream end-users.
The broken arrows indicate the flows of informa¬
tion, knowledge and advice arising from the research
programme to the various categories of end-users.
In evaluating the quality of these outputs, upstream
end-users will be seeking evidence that they conform
to the guidance given at the research commissioning
stage and provide the expected outputs; collabo¬
rators and academic end-users will be looking for
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Fig. 2
evidence of research quality and relevance to their
areas of interest; and downstream intermediaries and
end-users will be looking for relevance to their needs
and applicability in practice. The multidimensional
nature of the end-user terrain, and hence of the con¬
cept of "relevance" and the corresponding end-user
engagement strategies of the research organisations,
thus constitute a complex and demanding set of
requirements.
For the exemplar RO shown in Fig. 2 we see a high
level of end-user interaction with private downstream
end-users in the form of flows of advice or informa¬
tion from the RO to the users. There is a medium
level of interaction in the opposite direction from
private downstream end-users to the RO and between
the RO and the private intermediary group of users.
Interaction with upstream end-users is less of a focus
of this RO's current work. In contrast, the sample RO
modelled in Fig. 3 has a much greater focus on inter¬
action with upstream end-users than with users in the
:. Model of research organisation end-user interactions for institute 1.
public and private downstream categories and its dom¬
inant interactions are with collaborators and academic
end-users.
The models show the major interactions that op¬
erate through the research organisations which they
experience directly and may be able to influence.
There is also a complex web of interactions among
all the end-user groups identified that is not shown
here. For example, public and private downstream
end-users and intermediaries will influence policy
makers and/or politicians in the public upstream
category about issues that are relevant to the ROs'
research programmes: an example of such influence
is the switch from agricultural research to food and
health-related research topics. There will also be
cross-linking interactions relevant to the research or¬
ganisations between public and private downstream
end-users and intermediaries. Some research organi¬
sations will also take advice on research needs from
downstream end-users and transmit this to public (and
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Fig. 3. Model of research organisation end-user interactions for institute 2.
perhaps also private) upstream end-users in proposals
for funding of research programmes and projects.
4.2. Research phase 1: analysis of ROs' end-use
strategies
Our understanding of the end-user engagement
policies and activities of the ROs and their recogni¬
tion of emerging end-user needs drew on information
gathered from desk research on documents provided
by the ROs (including their annual reports, corporate
plans, newsletters, website, etc.) and interviews with
RO staff. This phase generated a stakeholder analysis
and examined the scientific, technological, organisa¬
tional and end-user base of the organisation; reviewed
its research programmes to determine its goals in
relation to end-users; and identified its research dis¬
semination strategies and communication activities,
user engagement networks, policy translation roles
and academic dissemination.
Information from desk research formed the ba¬
sis for a structured series of questions for personal
discussion with the RO directors and other senior
staff, particularly those with an identified role in
end-user engagement. The interview transcripts were
analysed and information used to supplement our
analysis of the RO's end-use strategies. The is¬
sues covered in the RO interviews are outlined in
Table 1.
At the end of phase 1, utilising the information
provided by all seven ROs, a series of focus group
meetings was held to explore and identify issues rel¬
evant to end-users in order to inform the subsequent
development of the survey questionnaire used in
phase 2. These were not peer review groups as their
purpose was not to provide evaluations or judgements
on the ROs' performance. The key objective of the
focus groups was to allow end-users to define what
was important to them so that these issues could be
reflected in the questionnaire, rather than impose a




Are the research organisations correctly identifying and
specifying their end-use sectors?
Communication and influence
How well do the sponsored bodies communicate with
end-users about their needs?
Is there an ongoing strategic relationship by which the end-users
feel they are influencing the sponsored bodies' programme?
How well do the sponsored bodies deliver their outputs to the
end-users?
End-user needs
For the end-use sectors identified within criterion 1, are needs
being met by the research organisation?
Are there specific areas of need that are not being met?
Uptake of results
Have end-users made use of the outputs from the research
organisation (some sub division into types of outputs should
be possible)?
Does this differ for different types of end-users?
General relevance of the research
Is the work carried out in the research organisation generally
relevant to the end-users?
Do the end-users see a need for the sponsored body to
continue working in their current research areas?
priori assumptions from the assessment team in the
survey instrument.
Focus group participants were selected from nomi¬
nations made by the individual ROs and we attempted
to group together participants who would have a
broadly similar interest and relationship with the in¬
stitutes. The aim was to run a focus group for each
of the end-user categories identified in Section 4.1.
However, in the end, the private upstream group had
to be replaced by a series of one-to-one telephone
interviews as it was not possible to recruit a suffi¬
cient number of people for the focus group in the
time available. We surmised from this experience
that commercial end-users might have been reluctant
to discuss their experiences in an open forum with,
potentially, other competitors present.
Targeted end-users were invited to take part in the
focus group at the University of Edinburgh's premises
by means of a letter which also gave some background
to the study and an indication of the types of questions
which the focus group would address. The questions
broadly explored:
• what end-users were looking for from the ROs;
• how end-users recognised when they had obtained
what they were looking for;
• how end-users communicated their needs and pri¬
orities to the ROs; and
• how end-users provided feedback on the perfor¬
mance of the RO.
Four or five end-users attended each event (a total
of 17 end-users were involved in the process). The dis¬
cussion in each group was facilitated by one member
of the assessment team while another team member
took notes. Participants engaged very well with the
subject and the focus groups were very successful at
identifying relevant end-use assessment issues.
4.3. Research phase 2: the end-users' perspective
on the ROs' research
The main end-user engagement issues identified by
the assessment team from focus groups and RO inter¬
views were then used to develop a questionnaire to be
mailed to a sample of end-users and clients selected
by each RO. Translating these findings into survey
questions was mostly straightforward but occasion¬
ally required some ingenuity. In some cases the focus
groups raised more strategic issues than the question¬
naire could address and these more generic points
were reported to SEERAD as an adjunct to the final
report.
The ROs were asked to identify individuals for sur¬
vey in each of the five SEERAD end-use areas rele¬
vant to their end-user profile. We were concerned that
the ROs' involvement in the sample selection might
lead to bias, so to minimise this all surveyed end-users
were also given the opportunity to complete a second
questionnaire for a RO of their own choice although
only a small number of respondents opted to do so.
Questionnaires (2631) were mailed in early June
2002. The resulting database (810 responses) was
closed to responses by late July; and the survey anal¬
yses and tabulations were completed by late August
2002. We then identified respondents who had indi¬
cated that they would be prepared to give a follow up
telephone interview and where qualitative comments
on the questionnaire suggested that such an interview
would yield interesting additional information. We
conducted 42 telephone interviews.
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An individual confidential report was produced for
each of the seven research organisations under review.
These reports compared the outcomes from phases
1 and 2 of the project for each RO and set out our
assessment conclusions in relation to their end-user
engagement using criteria stipulated by the client,
SEERAD (see Table 1). Our individual institute re¬
ports also made recommendations on how end-user
engagement and end-use relevance could be further
strengthened by the ROs.
5. Reflections on research methodology and
outcomes
5.7. Piloting a new approach
An assessment of end-user relevance was a new ele¬
ment of the quinquennial review of the ABRG-funded
research organisations, and the assessment criteria
(Table 1) emerged during the course of the project.
The conduct of this evaluation therefore represented
a learning process for the assessment team, the Scot¬
tish Executive and its research organisations. We are
confident that our assessment style and methodology
afford a sensible approach to a difficult subject and
can provide a useful baseline for future evaluations.
Our research findings went beyond a simple assess¬
ment of end-user engagement and clearly identified
significant differences in the ROs' strategies.
5.2. Equal weight to all users
The questionnaire methodology gave equal weight¬
ing to the judgements and views of all responding
end-users. For example, the views of a key policy
maker in a government agency were given the same
weight and consideration as an overseas research col¬
laborator, someone who had contact with the RO in
the past, those who rated their research peripheral to
their interests, or even in extreme cases those whose
interests the RO might not wish to support. With hind¬
sight, our methodology could have been improved by
identifying a larger number of key policy people (this
is a limited group in Scotland so could have been
achieved) and extending the interviews we conducted
with them on their requirements from research out¬
puts while using the questionnaire approach for other
users.
Our evaluation also did not fully access stake¬
holders in the wider community—the beneficiaries
of RO outcomes rather than the users. The public
downstream group could not be reached effectively
by this methodology, for example, members of the
public who might have attended public events or ex¬
hibitions hosted by the ROs and this would need to
be evaluated in a separate exercise.
5.3. Sampling issues and survey outcomes
In general, the classification process adopted to
categorise different types of end-users, and the stake¬
holder analyses for each RO based on this classifica¬
tion, were satisfactory in the sense that we were able
to classify all of the stakeholders we identified within
this framework. However, having identified end-user
groups we then had to rely on each RO to provide
contact details for individuals within these groups
so that we could mail them the questionnaire. This
demonstrated some interesting variations in the level
of sophistication of the ROs' databases with some
able to provide contact details promptly for a wide
range of end-users and others providing only very
limited datasets.
Of greater concern, however, was the self-selecting
nature of our survey sample where the ROs being
evaluated effectively controlled the sampling process
by providing the assessment team with contact details
for those individuals whom they considered to be
their end-users. Although we had no evidence that the
ROs were using this as an opportunity to introduce
bias by, for example, only giving us contact details
for those individuals whom they believed would give
them a good review, we nevertheless recognise that
this could be a criticism of our approach. To overcome
this potential weakness in our methodology SEERAD
identified an additional group of end-users which
were included in the survey, and we also asked sur¬
veyed end-users to complete a second questionnaire
for a RO of their choice.
An alternative approach to sample selection would
have been to use the "snowballing" technique adopted
by Molas-Gallart et al. However, this method would
have been more time consuming in an already time
constrained study and may not have affected the out¬
come significantly as the Scottish RO community is
a much smaller world than the UK research context
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described by Molas-Gallart et al. and hence we be¬
lieve that we probably reached the majority of the
key end-users using the methodology adopted. This
would however be a consideration in larger research
communities.
The limited number of telephone interviews con¬
ducted with users (42) was also a cause for reflection
and we recognise that our findings may give undue
prominence to these interviews, especially as we had
selected for interview those questionnaire respondents
who had made generally critical comments. Our ratio¬
nale for this approach was pragmatic in that we usually
learn more from our critics than from our supporters.
Richardson et al. (1990) suggest the use of case
studies of individual projects or programmes to create
a better understanding of the nature and constraints
of research use and, in retrospect, this might have im¬
proved our understanding. We did however find that
our initial desk research and in-depth interviews with
key staff in the ROs provided valuable background
information on which to base the second phase of
the assessment. We strongly concur with Richardson
et al.'s comment on the considerable methodological
development work required when producing end-user
questionnaires.
Mention should also be made of the need to ensure
consistency when a team of researchers is working
on the evaluation of a number institutes. Some con¬
sistency and validation was achieved by virtue of the
fact that one assessment team member facilitated all
of the focus groups and conducted the majority of
the telephone interviews, and the team leader acted
as moderator by reading and commenting on all draft
reports. An agreed coding schema might have aided
consistency when analysing interview and free text
survey data but each institute under review was suffi¬
ciently different to necessitate a flexible, customised
analytic approach.
There was some evidence that questionnaire re¬
sponses were biased in different ways. For example,
there was a higher response rate from farmers than
from users in industry but this could just reflect the fact
that the different ROs target different sets of end-users
leading to differential response rates from different
categories of users. There was also anecdotal evidence
that the response rate from research collaborators was
high perhaps suggesting that they might be seeking
to protect their academic collaborations with the ROs.
One of our overall recommendations was therefore
that the seven ROs as a group should improve their
databases of end-users in the longer term so that fu¬
ture evaluators could not only sample end-users in a
more independent and systematic way, allowing strati¬
fied sampling from different user categories and hence
more sophisticated statistical analysis of questionnaire
responses, but also to provide evaluators with quanti¬
tative evaluation data from the databases themselves
in terms of categories and numbers of users across the
spectrum of ROs and research programmes.
The strength of our approach lay in combining the
quantitative questionnaire data with information gath¬
ered via the more qualitative interviews and focus
groups. The former provided a breadth of information
about experiences across the spectrum of users and
identified issues which we were then able to probe
more deeply in some of the follow up telephone in¬
terviews. Those of a more quantitative disposition
might query the robustness of such an approach since,
in some cases, the questionnaire returns for any one
institute from any particular group of end-users (e.g.
research funders) were small for the reasons dis¬
cussed above (in some cases only single figures). In
response to this criticism we reiterate that this was
essentially a qualitative study and that our method¬
ology did provide useful and useable performance
measurements.
5.4. Lags in end-user impacts
We recognise that our period of coverage (1996—
2001) will not be sufficient to identify some end-user
impacts and outcomes, particularly from the ROs'
more recent R&D outputs and activities. This is an
evaluation issue already identified in the literature re¬
view, and it is now accepted that most R&D requires
a lengthy period for full diffusion and adoption. This
is particularly the case for those ROs that adopted
new end-user strategies during the review period. We
do, however, consider that the results from our study
will provide SEERAD with a baseline for future
evaluations of end-user engagement and impact.
5.5. A two-way process
It was clear from our study that many users, par¬
ticularly those in the upstream category, recognised
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that end-user relevance was a two-way process where
they themselves, as an end-user, had a proactive
role in specifying their needs and priorities to the
RO. Our methodology sought to address this in the
questionnaire and follow up interviews by seeking
information about who initiated contact with the RO;
whether RO feedback was provided; how such feed¬
back was received; and what impact the end-users felt
they had on shaping the ROs' research programmes.
However, we did not have an opportunity within this
study to consider fully the capability of end-users—
in particular those in the downstream categories—to
define clearly their research priorities and needs
and to ensure the consideration of these by research
organisations.
Our findings reinforce the emphasis placed by
Bechhofer et al. (2001) and Faulkner and Senker
(1995) on the relative importance of informal over
formal channels for knowledge transfer as our survey
results highlight the importance of personal contacts
between users and staff in the ROs. This indicates
that trying to measure communication by quantitative
methods such as counting hits on websites or the ex¬
tent of circulation of the annual report may not be so
useful. As Bechhofer et al. (2001) note, exploitation
of research is typically an interactive process which
requires some kind of dialogue directly or indirectly
between researchers and users, and our survey con¬
firmed the value of longer-term relationships between
users and ROs to ensure mutual understanding.
5.6. Confidentiality
Bechhofer et al. (2001) also make reference to the
difficulty of obtaining end-user feedback because of
the fear of compromising relationships and/or confi¬
dentiality. This was certainly the case in our research,
especially in the scheduling of focus groups which re¬
quired sensitive handling and in some cases personal
telephone interviews with individuals who did not feel
able to share their views in a more public forum. One
institute under review also refused to disclose its com¬
mercial end-users and preferred to send out the ques¬
tionnaire to this group which again raises issues about
the robustness of the sampling process. However, our
interviews with RO staff were facilitated by the use of
confidentiality agreements signed by the assessment
team and RO directors.
5.7. A learning tool
As discussed above, many commentators refute the
value of quantitative measures of research relevance,
pointing out that organisations may artificially ad¬
just their activities to the indicators being used. This
has the potential to generate unintended consequences
by focussing performance on the selected indicators
rather than developing strategies to address issues of
research relevance that need real improvement.
A key concern is how we move away from one-off
performance evaluation based on outputs and move
toward impact assessment of outcomes and use this
as a continuous learning experience. The public sec¬
tor is beginning to recognise that it needs to apply
policy learning so that lessons about performance are
addressed and applied in future policy design and im¬
plementation, and that government departments and
agencies need to draw together and act on the common
lessons and good practice from a range of evaluations
(NAO Comptroller and Auditor General, 2000). How¬
ever, it takes a step change to move away from post
hoc evaluation of outputs towards an embedded and
continuous process that focuses on outcomes whereby
the results of the evaluation of end-use assessment, to¬
gether with the results of the evaluation of scientilic
quality, form the basis for improvements in research
quality and guide the ongoing development of institu¬
tional research strategies.
6. Conclusions
The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences (2002) makes the case for a single, widely
accepted methodology for the evaluation of societal
impact (in applied health research). Our experience
in assessing the end-use relevance of public sector
research organisations in Scotland leaves us less con¬
vinced that it is possible, or desirable, to produce a
standardised approach that yields an "off the shelf'
toolkit for end-use relevance assessment.
We believe that our methodology, which combines
a range of qualitative and quantitative evaluation tools,
including interviews, focus groups and a question¬
naire survey in conjunction with desk research, doc¬
umentary analysis and a stakeholder analysis, does
provide an effective insight into both an institute's
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end-use strategy and the perspective of the end-users
on the institute's performance. It is not, however, a
"one size fits all approach" and has to be guided by the
institute's research mission and tailored to the individ¬
ual institute's circumstances. This flexible approach
can lead to criticisms on the grounds of consistency,
reproducibility and robustness. Nevertheless, the over¬
all approach was regarded as helpful by the client and
it did allow us to draw meaningful conclusions for
each institute; to discriminate between the different
end-user engagement strategies of the different ROs;
and to evaluate the different end-users' experiences of
these strategies.
The evaluation of research relevance is undoubt¬
edly a challenging endeavour and we would cau¬
tion against raising unrealistic expectations amongst
end-users. Having started down the path of end-user
engagement, how you meet and manage the future
expectations of your users are crucial issues. Al¬
though the process critiqued in this paper provides a
useful baseline evaluation, its application within the
research institutes will be the true test of its worth.
Only by embedding end-user relevance in their strate¬
gic research planning and by using the assessment
process as a learning tool will the institutes and their
end-users gain the real benefit of such evaluations.
This requires ownership of the process by those be¬
ing evaluated rather than regarding it as a peripheral
activity required by a funder once every 5 years.
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Foresight
Foresight in a multi-level governance structure:
policy integration and communication
Catherine Lyall and Joyce Tait
Foresight is widely interpreted as the process of
fostering scientific research to support techno¬
logical innovation and hence regional and na¬
tional competitiveness. Policy integration, across
administrative levels, is seen as crucial to achiev¬
ing these goals. Our analysis looks at policies
and their integration in the contexts of science,
Foresight and governance at regional, national,
European and global levels and we draw some
conclusions relevant to their implementation,
particularly at the regional level. We use Scot¬
land as an illustrative example, where the recent
devolution settlement has, at least in some areas,
allowed greaterfreedom ofaction.
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T ALL INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS, Fore¬
sight responds to a wide range of societal
concerns including:
• risks and their regulation;
• prosperity and national wealth and how they are
generated;
• public health;
• education and training;
• employment;
• social inclusion; and
• public perceptions and acceptance of technologi¬
cal innovation.
To be effective, regional Foresight should ideally be
embedded in national and European Union (EU)
level systems. It should also take account of global
developments, with smooth interactions across lev¬
els. Within each level there should be horizontal pol¬
icy integration, particularly linking Foresight
policies to science, innovation and regional devel¬
opment strategies.
Foresight is often planned and organised at the
national level but implementation of Foresight poli¬
cies can take place at the regional level. Effective
implementation, with its attendant societal benefits,
will thus depend on good communications within
and across governance levels and also on ensuring
that interactions among policies are mutually sup¬
portive and not antagonistic.
Many of these issues are being addressed by the
development of new governance structures, for ex¬
ample, in the UK under the 'Modernising Govern¬
ment' agenda (Cabinet Office, 1999) and, logically,
one would expect Foresight to be a crucial component
of these structures. Yet despite frequent references to
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the need for more integrated approaches to policy
development, new governance initiatives are largely
socially-oriented and ignore science and Foresight-
related issues. Equally, Foresight policies fail to
recognise governance initiatives being developed in
other policy contexts (OST, 2000; Commission of
the European Communities, 2001; Scottish Execu¬
tive, 2001).
This paper builds on earlier research on policy
integration and Foresight in the context of the devel¬
opment and implementation of science strategies and
policies at regional, national and EU levels (Tait and
Williams, 1999; Tait et al, 2001b) and also on stud¬
ies for an European Commission (EC)-funded pro¬
ject.1 We are exploring the nature and extent of the
linkages and perceived gaps in decision-making
structures in these areas and the implications this has
for the regional development of Foresight. These
regional aspects are influenced by interactions at all
policy levels, up to and including the global level,
and can either promote or frustrate regional Fore¬
sight initiatives.
We draw particularly on experience in Scotland as
a case study, where the recent devolution settlement
and the re-opening of the Scottish Parliament have,
at least in some areas, allowed greater freedom of
action at the regional level. In the context of Fore¬
sight, this example raises interesting questions about
the relative importance of the size of the political
unit and its ability to act autonomously. For exam¬
ple, Scotland, a constitutional region of the UK, is
similar in size to Eire, Denmark and Finland but has
less political autonomy than these nation states.
Similar issues may arise in other European states,
such as Germany or Spain, where there is also
considerable devolution to the regional level but
some reservation of political powers to the national
level.
Foresight is widely interpreted to be about the
processes of fostering scientific research in order to
support technological innovation and hence regional
and national competitiveness, and in many cases can
be seen as reinforcing the much criticised linear
model of innovation (Tait and Williams, 1999). Pol¬
icy initiatives thus focus on:
• supporting science and fundamental research,
including deciding which areas of scientific re¬
search are most likely to reward investment; and
• deciding how to encourage the commercialisa¬
tion of the fundamental knowledge gained and
tailoring the policy environment to support
commercialisation.
Given the broad potential coverage of this paper, we
have structured it on the basis of the boundaries
relevant to key Foresight-related actors operating at
various administrative levels. We thus envisage a
hierarchical series of systems, some of which over¬
lap, vertically or horizontally. Each of these interact¬
ing systems can facilitate the work of others or
impose constraints on them. In the Foresight area
this is usually as a result of policy initiatives rather
than formal regulation.
New governance approaches and Foresight
In the most common current usage of the term,
'governance' is seen as implying a move away from
the previous government approach (a top-down
legislative approach that attempts to regulate the
behaviour of people and institutions in quite detailed
and compartmentalised ways) to governance (which
attempts to set the parameters of the system within
which people and institutions behave so that self
regulation achieves the desired outcomes), or, put
more simply, the replacement of traditional "powers
over" with contextual "powers to" (Pierre and Pe¬
ters, 2000). In such a governance system, permeable
and flexible system boundaries will facilitate com¬
munication and support the achievement of higher-
level goals. These assumptions underline the switch
from government to governance in debates about the
modernisation of policy systems, implying a switch
from constraining to enabling types of policy or
regulation (that is, from 'sticks' to 'carrots').
New approaches to governance are being devel¬
oped under a variety of labels at different institu¬
tional levels in many European countries. In the UK,
this on-going policy revolution has been referred
to as the "Third Way" (Giddens, 1998),2 with a
strong commitment to more integrated or 'joined up'
approaches to policy.
Over the past 30 years, there has been a steady
shift in the emphasis of research policies at national
and European levels, to obtain better value for
money from public investment in research, by ensur¬
ing that both curiosity-driven, fundamental research
and applied research contribute as much as possible
to improving competitiveness at national, European
and international levels.
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Effective policy integration would imply that
science and Foresight-related policies ought to be
crucial components of new governance initiatives
but, in our investigation of the relevant documents
concerned with science, technology and innovation,
we found little evidence of their inclusion. The mod¬
ernising government agenda concentrates almost
entirely on the social-policy arena covering social
welfare, crime, health and education, these being the
areas that focus groups tell government ministers are
of most concern to voters. Science, technology, and
innovation are apparently of lesser concern to voters
in Europe. They are not linked in the public mind,
and hence are less likely to be linked by govern¬
ments, to national competitiveness, which generates
the wealth to support the other functions.
Governance and science policy in the UK
Unlike many other countries, the UK did not begin to
expand state expenditure on R&D in the 1980s and
was the only one of 19 major OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries
during the period 1981-1985 where the growth in
R&D expenditure was lower than growth in gross
domestic product (GDP) (Nicholson et al, 1991, page
6). Priorities determined and choices made in this pe¬
riod have shaped many of the current weaknesses and
strengths of the national system of innovation.
To give just one example, in the 1980s and early
1990s the Conservative Government withdrew all
funding to universities and public-sector research
establishments (PSREs) for any research that could
be construed as "near market", this being seen as the
function of industry or commercial organisations.
On the positive side, this has led to a much leaner
and more competitive public-sector research envi¬
ronment in the UK. On the other hand, the policy
failed to encourage more effective transfer of
knowledge from public-sector research to commer¬
cial exploitation. More recently there has been a
complete reversal of this policy, with much of sci¬
ence policy being directed towards encouraging, and
also funding, universities and PSREs to engage ac¬
tively in downstream development of the outputs of
their research programmes.
Some believed that the creation of the
UK Office of Science and Technology
was a recognition of the inadequacies
of the market mechanism, with its
inability to deal satisfactorily with the
competing claims for resources for
research and development
In a surprise move in April 1992, the last Conser¬
vative Government established the Office of Science
and Technology (OST) and gave the UK a minister
of Cabinet rank with responsibility for science for
the first time since 1959. In creating the OST, the
Government was seen to be proclaiming a new obli¬
gation to science and technology; some believed that
this move was a recognition of the inadequacies of
the market mechanism, with its inability to deal sat¬
isfactorily with the competing claims for resources
for research and development (Goldsmith, 1992).
This new-found interest in science policy was
confirmed in 1993 with the publication of the first
UK White Paper on science and technology for over
20 years (OST, 1993). The White Paper's failure to
co-ordinate UK science, technology and innovation
(STI policy) sufficiently (Lyall, 1993) should be
seen in the context of Ronayne's (1984, page 141)
analysis that intra-departmental, rather than overall,
co-ordination would seem to be the preferred policy
mechanism in the UK, where individual agencies are
allowed self-determination while trying to avoid un¬
due duplication of effort or pursuit of conflicting
goals in different parts of Government. In practice,
co-ordination in Britain tends to mean cross-
membership of committees: an 'insider's world'
where a relatively small group of senior civil ser¬
vants, elite scientists, and influential industrialists
move from committee to committee (Ince, 1986).
In the 1990s, governments began to focus on their
country's specific strengths, and the clusters ap¬
proach to innovation, developed by Porter (1990),
became increasingly influential on policy. Thus UK
policy directed towards industry has been designed
to be delivered at the local level and a clear trend,
even before the devolution agenda, has been towards
giving greater responsibility to agencies closer to the
target audience. Decentralisation should encourage
heterogeneity in national and regional technologi¬
cal capabilities and create opportunities for closer
contact with firms, but it can bring with it a loss
of control and potential loss of learning as feedback
to the centre may be lost (Dodgson and Bessant,
1996).
In the UK, the focus on modernising the processes
of government, as outlined in the Modernising Gov¬
ernment White Paper (Cabinet Office, 1999), in¬
cludes a complete framework for excellence in
policy-making and a strong emphasis on learning
lessons from policy experience in other countries.
The over-arching ethos is 'what matters is what
works' with, at least in theory, a much freer flow of
ideas across governments and government depart¬
ments and from one level of government to another,
focusing on ideas that can contribute to an effective
system of governance, rather than on the ideology
that generated the ideas.
The cri de coeur of the current Labour Government
for 'joined up' policy is reflected in the goal of the
Modernising Government initiative to develop a more
integrated approach to policy-making, and a series
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of Cabinet Office publications (Better Regulation
Task Force, 2003; Cabinet Office Performance In¬
novation Unit, 2000; Cabinet Office Strategic Policy
Making Team, 1999) aims to improve policy formu¬
lation and implementation in areas that cut across
the policy boundaries of traditional government de¬
partments.Some parameters of the new governance-
based policy-making systems are relevant to science
strategy, including initiatives on:
• policy integration;
• evidence-based policy;
• the use of standards and guidelines linked to pol¬
icy evaluation;
• encouragement of openness;
• stakeholder involvement and consultation; and
• avoidance of unnecessary regulatory burdens.
However, this integrated approach has not yet been
extended to cover science and innovation policies
per se and is not, for example, linked to the Depart¬
ment of Trade and Industry (DTI) White Paper on A
Science and Innovation Policy for the 21st Century
(OST, 2000). Nevertheless, a Ministerial Committee
was set up to consider UK Government policies in
relation to scientific advances and public acceptance
of them.
To varying degrees, at all institutional levels, sci¬
ence policy should cover a wide range of societal
concerns but, although science is seen in some quar¬
ters as a passport to the worlds of innovation, quality
of life and globalisation and an important component
of competitive advantage, the policy framework
does not yet reflect this vision.
Charles and Benneworth (2001) highlight the
limitations of a governance system in which central
departments are reluctant to cede powers to regions,
as in the UK. They describe how the current UK
system was established by the White Paper (OST,
1993) whose "central rationale ... was to create a
system of scientific governance which generated
excellence in UK science to boost the competitive¬
ness of UK business". However, these authors point
out that a House of Commons inquiry (House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee,
2000) found that there was little coherence of re¬
search activity among government departments.
They find that the problem with the system of
scientific governance in the UK is that changes in
science and technology policy do not fit well with
other changes in the policy environment. Their claim
that "... a top down scientific governance system
weakens UK economic performance if it cannot di¬
rect scientific policy to create capacity for growth
and development throughout its constituent regions"
finds particular resonance in the context of devolu¬
tion, in a situation where science policy is dominated
by the DTI and the top-down approach to science
policy can have negative regional impacts leading to
a concentration of STI activity in southeast England
(Charles and Benneworth, 2001).
Evolution ofUK Foresight
Against this background, the UK has been in the
forefront of developing national approaches to Fore¬
sight since the first initiative was launched in 1994.
In evaluating the first phase, the Parliamentary Of¬
fice of Science and Technology (POST, 1997) high¬
lighted some key issues for OST to take on board.
Their report noted that, although barriers had been
reduced between academics and industrialists and
also between different disciplines and different
companies, much remained to be done to reduce the
cultural barriers among academe, industry, Govern¬
ment and financial institutions. POST also pointed to
concerns that Government departments were not
responding sufficiently to Foresight, thus losing the
opportunity to implement a more co-ordinated sci¬
ence policy across Government.
An analysis of the first round of UK Foresight
(Scottish Universities Research Policy Consortium,
1997) noted the need for more effective interdisci¬
plinary interactions, given that the programme was
structured around 16 technology sectors that did not
map naturally onto academic disciplines.
Foresight programmes were initially largely con¬
trolled by industry and the science community.
Commentators noted that they tended to yield disci¬
pline-based projections and that traditional panel
reviews are less appropriate for assessing prospects
for the interdisciplinary areas covered in many
programmes (Martin and Irvine, 1989, page 339).
Martin and Johnston (1998) also noted that the suc¬
cessful development of technology policy requires
the development of effective links among science
and technology and the financial and legal systems
and that "... the development of such links is
becoming more crucial".
The OST addressed many of these issues in the
second round of Foresight, broadening the composi¬
tion of panels to include a range of public as well as
private interests, and focusing on broad themes
(such as 'ageing population' and 'sustainable devel¬
opment') as well as more conventional business and
technology sectors. However, it was assumed (OST,
1998b) that Foresight II would not be fundamentally
different from Foresight I but would concentrate on
achieving its objectives more effectively, with its
more inclusive and global approach, allowing sys¬
tematic analysis of key issues and exploration of
themes in a visionary manner (OST, 1998c, pages 3
and 12).
A paper on the evaluation of Foresight II (Tait et
al, 2000) considered that, to be effective in meeting
its own terms of reference, it should succeed in set¬
ting up a new "social contract" which emerges
through discussion and engagement among diverse
actors (policy-makers, scientists, industry, publics).
To this extent, it is necessary for Foresight to mean
different things to different people and a diversity of
goals can be seen as an indicator of flexibility and
successful adaptation.
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Foresight in the UK thus developed from its ori¬
gins as a technically focused programme, geared
towards research policy and the nexus between
research and industry. Foresight II took on board
criticisms that this involved a 'linear' technically-
centred model of innovation and it pursued a broader
societal approach, reflected in its emphasis on inter¬
disciplinary working and interactivity. It sought to
promote new kinds of thinking and changes in social
relationships and networks across a wide range of
players. However, the difficulties in pursuing such
ambitious goals should not be underestimated.
A more targeted approach is now being promoted
with the range of topics to be considered reduced to
around four areas regarded by top thinkers from in¬
dustry and the sciences as vital to the future econ¬
omy. The idea of socio-economic integration into
Foresight and indeed, in some cases, of incorporat¬
ing panels dealing with social Foresight per se, has
not been abandoned but the focus has been moved
from the OST to other Government departments
more accustomed to dealing with such issues. It may
be premature to conclude that the experiment of in¬
tegrating a broader range of societal themes into
Foresight processes, alongside scientific and techno¬
logical concerns, has been abandoned, but current
indications would suggest that this may be the case.
Science policy and Foresight at the EU level
Similar trends are also beginning to emerge at the
EU level with important documents being published
on European Governance, the European Research
Area (ERA), and developments in the Sixth Frame¬
work Programme (FP6). As in the UK, there is evi¬
dence of difficulty in integrating policies and
particularly in spanning the divide between science/
technology and society.
European governance
The gap between innovative thinking on governance
in general and developments in science and technol¬
ogy related policies is also apparent at the EU level.
The White Paper on European Governance
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001)
The impression is that science-related
issues are of only peripheral interest in
European governance, coming into the
picture downstream, as a part of
policy implementation but not being
integrated at a high level into overall
governance and policy development
has only one brief reference to the word 'science' in
the context of managing "... the challenges, risks
and ethical questions thrown up by science and
technology". There are no references to 'evidence',
and for 'research' there is one mention of "research
centres" and one to the ERA, although there are ref¬
erences to scientific committees and the need for
their advice to be made publicly available.
The overall impression is that science-related is¬
sues are of only peripheral interest in the context of
European governance. They come into the picture
downstream, as a part of policy implementation but
are not being integrated at a high level into the over¬
all governance and policy development process.
However, this early reading of the Governance
White Paper does not take account of more recent
developments as indicated by the EC Science and
Society Action Plan (European Commission, 2002).
European science policy
There is a strong connection between the promotion
of industry-academia links and the requirement for
more interdisciplinary approaches to research in or¬
der to integrate the more complex array of issues
that comes into play when a wider range of actors
and stakeholders is involved in Foresight.
The document on the ERA is the main focus of
innovative EU thinking on science- and research-
related issues. One of its main policy planks is the
forging of closer links between the EU Framework
Research Programmes and the research systems of
EU member states. The ERA will be implemented
partly through FP6, involving also major changes in
the organisation of research in Europe.
Prior to the development of ideas on the ERA, and
influenced to some extent by UK thinking on the
development of Foresight, the Fifth Framework Pro¬
gramme (FP5) took a new direction by giving a
strong emphasis to interdisciplinary integration, par¬
ticularly between the natural and social sciences.
FP5 targeted Key Actions to socio-economic needs
and guided research collaboration among EU nations
in a manner that increasingly included socio¬
economic components.
It would be unrealistic to expect such a major
change in research orientation and management to
bear fruit within the timescale of a single Pro¬
gramme and it is unfortunate that FP6 has largely
abandoned the innovative approach on interdiscipli¬
nary research pioneered by FP5. Although essential
if Europe is to compete effectively in a global econ¬
omy, integrative approaches challenge many vested
interests in both academic and policy spheres and, as
we have noted, there have been strong reactions
against it from several directions.
Global governance issues
As outlined by Tait and Bruce (2004, in press), the
increasingly rapid pace of technological innovation
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and the increasing size and power of multinational
companies are leading to globalisation of production
and trading systems accompanied by pressures for
further trade liberalisation.
In the context of one of the main themes of this
paper, the rapid pace of technological change, sup¬
ported in many cases by effective Foresight, poses
enormous challenges for European nations to be in¬
ternationally competitive with other major trading
blocks in the global economy. Such questions are
amplified for regional Foresight in considering what
actions are appropriate and likely to deliver benefits
at the regional level.
The emerging system of global governance is be¬
ing mediated through international organisations
such as the World Trade Organisation. However,
such changes diminish the sense of power and influ¬
ence of individual citizens and appear to negate local
and national democratic processes, raising funda¬
mental questions of sovereignty and governance at
national and regional levels. They are also being
opposed by increasingly vocal and well organised
public groups acting against globalisation and the
pressures that are driving it. In the context of devel¬
opments in genetically modified crops, Tait and
Bruce (2004, in press) referred to the internationally
organised consumer boycott as "a new instrument of
global governance".
Giddens (1999) noted this tension between pro-
and anti-globalisation forces. He referred on the one
hand to "... the mobilising dynamic of a society bent
on change, that wants to determine its own future...",
and, on the other hand, he noted that we now live in a
world where innovation and technological change has
generated hazards that are regarded as more threaten¬
ing than so-called natural hazards.
Regional and national Foresight can no longer op¬
erate effectively without considering the pressures
and constraints imposed at the global level. These
include:
• international trading relationships;
• intellectual property rights;
• the relevance of regionally-based technology clus¬
ters in the context of modern information and
communication networks;
• public support for, or opposition to, individual
innovations.
Multi-level governance of STI in Scotland
The development or influencing of science policy is
one of the main instruments open to those engaged
in Foresight to encourage and foster the future out¬
comes that they identify as most desirable.
STI policy today is no longer just a matter of
resource allocation for research, as it was in the early
days of UK science policy. It is now a complex
process involving multi-level governance at the
national, sub-national and supra-national levels,
which requires careful co-ordination to ensure effec¬
tive policy integration. While discussions of com¬
petitiveness policy preoccupy national governments,
as much, or more, attention is necessary at the re¬
gional level in areas such as university education,
infrastructure and local research initiatives.
Today the role of regional government is poten¬
tially as great as, or greater than, the role of national
government in ensuring competitive advantage
(Porter, 1990, page 622). Policies pursued by re¬
gional governments can give a distinctive identity to
the regions in question, particularly where these re¬
gions are new and, in some cases, "even somewhat
artificial administrative units" (Cooke, 1998). These
points are borne out by our case study of the Scottish
system of innovation.
Small countries or regions like Scotland face ma¬
jor challenges in developing their own approaches to
successful technological innovation, international
competitiveness and economic growth (Walsh,
1988) and may struggle to make a significant contri¬
bution to new developments in world science and
technology. They have less money to spend on R&D
and fewer trained personnel but are faced with the
same breadth of possible research areas as large
economies. Small countries therefore face hard
choices — they must either spread their resources
more thinly or specialise; this issue must lie at the
heart of their Foresight strategies.
Scottish science strategy
The opportunities for a specifically Scottish system
of innovation are being influenced to some extent by
the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in
1999. Key areas of responsibility devolved to the
Scottish Parliament include: health; education; eco¬
nomic development; agriculture; and environment.
Many aspects of technology and innovation policy
are covered by Scottish economic development pol¬
icy; and some aspects of science policy, related to
education, public understanding of science, universi¬
ties and other higher-education institutes may be
covered by education policy. Science itself is a 'con¬
current power', meaning that responsibility is shared
between the Scottish and UK Parliaments.
The split between devolved and reserved powers
illustrates the highly complex situation of STI pol¬
icy, with many of the key policy-makers remaining
at the UK level. Policy links between the UK and
EU levels are well defined and have been smoothed
by long familiarity and regular use. Links between
the UK and Scottish levels are still in their formative
stages. The role of government is particularly import¬
ant in the Scottish system of innovation, given this
multi-level nature of governance, with policy ema¬
nating from local, national and supra-national levels
where many of the key drivers for science and inno¬
vation are external to the Scottish system.
Devolution may thus be unintentionally reinfor¬
cing traditional tendencies to develop policy in
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separate compartments, rather than the more inte¬
grated approaches described above as desirable. This
multi-level dimension of the Scottish system of
innovation presents a considerable co-ordination and
communication challenge.
There are limits to what a 'region-state' such as
Scotland can achieve when it seeks to use STI policy
to foster regional economic growth. Maskell and
Tornquist (1999, page 50) describe regional devel¬
opment policy as mainly a process of "making do"
with the historical legacy of institutions and rou¬
tines, maintaining that economic processes are so
strongly path dependent that we can never build any¬
thing entirely new.
Politics can both enhance and constrain innovation
and governance at the regional level. Although re¬
gional states are limited in their legislative and policy
aspirations (Latouche, 1998), major political devel¬
opments such as the re-establishment of the Scottish
Parliament can create expectations and motivate
individuals in ways that can circumvent long-standing
constraints and create unexpected outcomes.
As one example of such an outcome, Scotland
was one of the first regions in the EU to develop a
formal science strategy (Scottish Executive, 2001).
It takes as its starting point a vision of Scotland as a
modern dynamic country and aims to meet the chal¬
lenges of global competition, making the nation
more prosperous and its economy more competitive.
With clear connections to Foresight, it focuses on
five key objectives:
• maintaining a strong science base;
• increasing the effective exploitation of scientific
research;
• ensuring that enough people study science to meet
the future needs of Scotland;
• promoting the awareness, appreciation and under¬
standing of science across society;
• ensuring the effective use of scientific evidence in
policy formulation and resource allocation by
government.
Although promoted by the Scottish Executive as an
"integrated" strategy (Scottish Executive News Re¬
lease, 2001), the thrust of the strategy document is
on supporting the science base in Scottish universi¬
ties and encouraging them to commercialise their
inventions in order to foster a vibrant high-tech
small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) commu¬
nity in Scotland. Despite the claim that "science has
been interpreted to encompass the development, un¬
derstanding and application of the physical, life and
social sciences", the imagery and language through¬
out the strategy document imply that science is what
takes place in laboratories in universities and
PSREs. A major role for the strategy is to hasten the
transformation of this knowledge into new products,
processes and services. Without wishing to down¬
play the value of what is included in the strategy
document, this apparent adherence to the linear
model of innovation and the lack of recognition of a
role for social and economic concerns is disappoint¬
ing but not unexpected.
Scottish Foresight
Pre-devolution, at the inception of the UK Foresight
initiative, there was a strong uptake of Foresight in
universities and research institutes in Scotland. Many
PSREs, for example, began to restructure their re¬
search programmes to coincide with the research ar¬
eas identified by Foresight as important. The Scottish
Fligher Education Funding Council (SHEFC) pub¬
lished and implemented a Foresight Action Plan in
1995 (SHEFC, 1995) and requires the higher-
education institutions it supports to provide annual
reports outlining their Foresight-related activity. The
Royal Society ofEdinburgh also had a prominent role
in the promotion of Foresight and organised a series
of Foresight seminars reflecting the issues identified
as important by the national Foresight programme.
In Scotland, Foresight is co-ordinated by the Scot¬
tish Foresight Forum established in 1996 to develop
Foresight awareness and understanding in Scotland
and to ensure complementarity with related policies
and programmes; it is chaired by the Scottish Execu¬
tive. A Scottish Foresight Co-ordinator was appointed
in January 2000, based at the regional development
agency, Scottish Enterprise, to work with the En¬
terprise Network and other business intermediaries
to encourage companies to be more proactive in
anticipating future economic, technological and so¬
cial change and in taking action to increase their
long-term competitiveness (Scottish Executive,
2000).
According to the DTI (2000), Foresight activity in
Scotland has led to innovative new measures that
encourage companies and universities to be more
forward-looking and is "... firmly rooted in collabo¬
ration between public and private sector partners, so
that the Executive and its main Non-Departmental
Public Bodies are happy to lead by example".
In Scotland, Foresight activities for business are
being channelled through a wide range of business
intermediaries including: industry and sectoral rep¬
resentative bodies; National Training Organisations;
professional institutes and associations; and other
business support bodies such as Local Enterprise
Committees; and Chambers of Commerce. The
stated objective (Mearns, 2001) was to influence
business intermediaries by encouraging them "to
adopt as part of their mainstream activities a
stronger focus on future issues and challenges".
More recent activities of the Scottish Foresight
Coordinator (Mearns, 2002) have been focused on
continuing to connect Foresight panel outputs with
relevant initiatives and interest groups in the context
of the current transition of Foresight from a broad-
based future change programme to one focused on a
smaller number of science- and technology-related
priorities.
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Consideration is also being given to developing a
stronger connection between Foresight and the strat¬
egic policy community in Scotland so that Foresight
thinking can provide the longer-term perspective
often missing in a political climate with a strong focus
on short-term delivery (Mearns, 2002). Given the lat¬
est review of UK Foresight, which has resulted in a
restructured, more narrowly focused approach with
four main themes, as opposed to the 13 original pan¬
els, discussion is underway within the Scottish Execu¬
tive and with the Scottish Foresight Forum to consider
how best to take Foresight forward as Scotland begins
to identify its own 'futures' priorities through the
Scottish Science Advisory Committee and develop¬
ment of the Scottish Science Strategy.
Scottish Enterprise works in close partnership
with those who are developing Foresight in Scot¬
land, and indeed hosts the Foresight Co-ordinator in
Scotland. The activities on which it has taken a lead,
including the Proof of Concept Fund and the Clus¬
ters initiative, are described by Scottish Enterprise as
being part of "regional development" rather than
specifically Foresight-related. However, it is clear
that they could equally be considered as part of a
Foresight programme in other contexts.
Regional Foresight andmulti-level governance
Cooke et al (2000, pages 98-119) have analysed the
multi-level governance (MLG) of regional innova¬
tion systems with examples from several different
types of European region. Although not discussed by
them, Scotland would come into the category of a
"region with a high capacity for developing regional
innovation systems". They conclude, among other
things, that:
• in an MLG system, the ability to interact at all
appropriate levels, upwards and downwards, is a
distinct advantage;
• support from EU policies for regional innovation
systems is needed, in preference to existing piece¬
meal policies;
• regional innovation requires a package of meas¬
ures covering finance, management, training,
marketing and competitiveness advice, as well as
more conventional technology transfer;
• different regions have different innovation and
MLG models and this may take time to change (if
indeed change towards a European norm is seen
as desirable);3
• each regional innovation system must have at its
core a strong university-industry innovation and
networking system.
Our analysis has looked at issues of MLG mainly
from the perspective of policy integration. Horizontal
integration of issues, polices and initiatives has in
some cases been lacking altogether. Where it has been
attempted, it is being modified because of difficulties
in its implementation. For example, at EU, UK and
Scottish levels, there is so far a general lack of
integration between the modem approaches to
governance being developed in the social policy arena
and policies for science, technology and innovation,
which still seem to be driven by an old-fashioned, lin¬
ear conception of innovation systems (Tait and Wil¬
liams, 1999). Even within the area covered by STI
policies, as demonstrated by Scotland's Science
Strategy, these linear assumptions seem likely to dis¬
courage the flexible approach needed to encourage
effective development of new knowledge.
However, our analysis of the approaches being
adopted in Scotland could imply that the relative lack
of integration between the strategy for science and
research and similar initiatives being developed by
the Scottish Executive and the regional innovation
policies developed by Scottish Enterprise, has in fact
allowed Scottish Enterprise to achieve greater suc¬
cess, for example, with their Clusters Initiative, than
might otherwise have been the case. An analysis of
Foresight in the USA claims that, of the range of
Foresight-related initiatives adopted there, the most
successful approaches have been those driven by
business or trade associations with the strong unifying
motivation of economic survival, which academic or
government-run exercises lack (OST, 1998a).
Further research would be needed to elaborate
such relationships but, if this interpretation is justi¬
fied, care would be needed in attempting to integrate
the top-down science-driven approach underlying
much of Foresight and science policy with the bot¬
tom-up business- and industry-driven approach of
organisations such as Scottish Enterprise. In the
MLG agenda, this interface requires particularly
careful and sensitive treatment.
Much has also been made of the difficulties facing
regions in developing competitive innovation sys¬
tems in a global economy. However, perhaps such
difficulties have been exaggerated and seem more
daunting if viewed from the perspective of the pol¬
icy-maker who is focused on the superstructure of
national and European policies and constraints that
overlay regional structures. From the perspective of
an innovative company, large or small, and also of
regional development agencies such as Scottish En¬
terprise, both innovation systems and markets oper¬
ate globally, and the route to these global networks
is a direct one — it does not operate hierarchically
through the national and EU levels.
Policy integration and communication
Our analysis has covered two radically different types
of policy integration — vertical and horizontal.
Vertical integration
Policy integration across levels of governance, for
example, from EU to UK to Scotland, depends mainly
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on the ability to communicate effectively across sys¬
tem boundaries. The institutional structures deter¬
mined by government policy-making at the highest
levels have a major influence on the effectiveness of
such communications. For example, we noted above
that integration and communication across the EU/
UK boundary are relatively effective, while the situa¬
tion is much less satisfactory across the UK/
Scotland boundary. The comments from Charles and
Benneworth (2001) also emphasise this point.
Vertical integration is thus mainly a function of
the institutional structures determined by policy¬
making at senior government levels and its most
important constituents are effectiveness of commu¬
nications across levels of government. Ideally, verti¬
cal communication across these boundaries should
be a two-way process, leading to accommodation by
higher levels to the needs of the lower levels as well
as the reverse process.
However, human nature being what it is, effective
vertical integration often implies top-down control
with some form of sanction imposed where higher-
level policies are ignored or flouted. In the context
of Foresight initiatives, this raises questions about
how effectively stakeholders at the regional level
can engage in the Foresight process; the danger is
that Foresight just becomes an activity of the public
sector and does not include private business and
other interested parties.
Horizontal integration
Horizontal integration takes place across departmental
boundaries, for example, the ideal, but so far patchy,
integration between science and technology policy
and social and environmental policies in the UK in the
development of new approaches to governance. Inte¬
gration in this case poses similar challenges to that of
interdisciplinary research in academic organisations
(Tait et al, 2002; Bruce et al, 2004, in press).
Institutional structures are important here but they
do not determine the effectiveness of integration. In
the UK, there have been numerous examples of
amalgamation of Government departments, with
integration as one of the main aims, where the staff
involved have continued to operate within their pre¬
existing boundaries, with little interaction across
these old boundaries.
Communication is also important but the focus of
the communication is different and it imposes differ¬
ent challenges. As with interdisciplinary research in
academia, each policy area has its own specialist lan¬
guage and this leads to difficulties in effective com¬
munication across boundaries (Tait and Lyall, 2001).
Likewise, career structures for public servants reward
those who specialise and it is difficult to make a career
by 'trespassing' across traditional boundaries.
Most important, the impact of effective hori¬
zontal integration is a loosening of control and
the introduction of greater complexity into policy
implementation processes.
Horizontal policy integration, despite the import¬
ance we would attach to it, is therefore much more
difficult to achieve than vertical integration. It cuts
across the career structures of public servants, raises
communication difficulties and lessens the ability of
individual departments to exercise control in their
own spheres. However, that said, the case of Fore¬
sight in Scotland appears to demonstrate that the
Foresight Forum has achieved a certain degree of
integration across Scottish agencies but has been less
successful at vertical integration with industry and
other Foresight stakeholders.
Conclusions
The challenges exercised by horizontal policy
integration in Foresight and by interdisciplinary re¬
search in academia are similar in many respects, and
interdisciplinary research itself has an important
role to play in Foresight processes at the level of
STI policy. As recognised by FP5, integration of
socio-economic research, where appropriate, into
science- and technology-based research, technology
and development (RTD) programmes makes an
important contribution to the delivery of Foresight-
related policy objectives where the pitfalls in im¬
plementation lie as much in the social sphere as in
science and technology themselves.
To date, experience of interdisciplinary integra¬
tion in FP5 has been mixed, but it is important that
the EC learns from experience and adapts future
programmes accordingly, rather than abandoning the
experiment. Discussions with scientists who have
worked in both Europe and the USA have led to the
conclusion that America manages academic interdis¬
ciplinary integration much more effectively than we
do in Europe, and this could be a significant compo¬
nent of their relative competitive advantage in many
areas (Tait et al, 2002; Bruce et al, 2004, in press).
These difficulties are related to the linearity of the
assumed model of innovation. Current assumptions
see 'society' entering the picture as a market for the
products of innovation at the end of the development
pipeline, but not as a partner in their development.
Innovative companies may engage in sophisticated
market forecasting techniques, but they often have a
very restricted understanding of what constitutes
their market. Likewise, many of them fail to con¬
sider the policy environment into which their prod¬
ucts will be launched. The current UK debate on the
introduction of GM crops illustrates this point per¬
fectly (Tait, 1993; Tait et al, 2001a).
Finally, in attempting to facilitate regional
innovation, we should resist the tendency to place
artificial boundaries around science and innovation.
Such boundaries reinforce the 'linear model' and
ignore the fact that innovation does not simply result
from research undertaken in universities. The model
of technology transfer adopted by the Scottish Sci¬
ence Strategy seems unduly focused on this 'treasure
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trove' model. While the pharmaceutical and life sci¬
ence sectors most closely resemble this model, it is
far from typical of innovation as a whole. Industrial
R&D is a key knowledge source for new technical
advances and the knowledge contributions of public-
sector research are more often indirect (SUPRA,
2000; Bechhofer et al, 2001). What is needed is an
integrated strategy for research and innovation not
one that primarily focuses on the science base.
Notes
1. EC Fifth Framework STRATA Programme, Accompanying
Measure "Integrating Technological and Social Aspects of
Foresight in Europe" ITSAFE, see <http://www.innogen.
ac.uk>.
2. The term 'Third Way' seems to have been dropped from
the political lexicon in the UK recently, although the new
governance approaches it described are continuing to be
developed.
3. Our experience would reinforce this question whether such
change is desirable. A diversity of regional approaches is
likely to lead to the greater flexibility and resilience needed to
cope with rapid technological advance in a global trading
environment.
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